DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court properly determined that there was clear and convincing proof that the appellant abandoned his son during the six-month period prior to the filing of the petition on April 24, 1998 (see, Social Services Law § 387-b[5][b]; Matter of I.R., 153 A.D.2d 559, 560; Matter of Rose Marie M., 94 A.D.2d 734). The appellant's one contact with his son during the time the appellant was incarcerated was insufficient to avoid the termination of his parental rights (see, Matter of Ravon Paul H., 161 A.D.2d 257; Matter of Crawford, 153 A.D.2d 108; Matter of Michael David K., 78 A.D.2d 901). In addition, the appellant failed to establish good cause for his failure to contact or communicate with his son (see, Matter of Charmaine T., 173 A.D.2d 625, 626). Neither the order of protection which directed the appellant to stay away from his son, nor the appellant's incarceration, prevented him from otherwise contacting his son or the foster care agency by telephone or by letter (see, Matter of Anthony M., 195 A.D.2d 315; Matter of Dawntal Danielle C., 170 A.D.2d 375; Matter of Thomas G., 165 A.D.2d 729; Matter of I.R., supra.; Matter of Ulysses T., 87 A.D.2d 998).