DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the appellants' answer is reinstated.
The so-ordered stipulation in the instant case, signed by counsel for the respective parties during a court appearance, is binding (see CPLR 2104). In the stipulation, the plaintiff agreed that, in the event that the appellants failed to comply with the so-ordered stipulation, her remedy would be limited to the preclusion of their testimony at trial. While a court certainly has discretion to refuse to enforce a stipulation where there is evidence of fraud, overreaching, unconscionability, or illegality (see Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230), there is no such evidence in this case. The so-ordered stipulation functioned as a conditional order of preclusion, which became absolute upon the appellants' failure to comply (see Jenkinson v. Naccarato, 286 A.D.2d 420; Liotti v. Ruk, 282 A.D.2d 717; Kepple v. Hill Assocs., 275 A.D.2d 299, 300; Stewart v. City of New York, 266 A.D.2d 452; Tirone v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 264 A.D.2d 415; Michaud v. City of New York, 242 A.D.2d 369, 370; Clissuras v. Concord Vil. Owners, 233 A.D.2d 475). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in imposing a sanction other than the agreed-upon sanction when the appellants did not comply with the so-ordered stipulation (see Tirone v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., supra; Ferrantello v. St. Charles Hosp. Rehabilitation Ctr., 249 A.D.2d 263; Smith v. City of New York, 239 A.D.2d 337, 338).
FLORIO, J.P., S. MILLER, ADAMS and CRANE, JJ., concur.