DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is denied, and so much of the order dated July 20, 1998, as struck the answer of the defendant 21st Avenue Transportation Co., Inc., is reinstated.
As a result of the failure of the defendant 21st Avenue Transportation Co., Inc. (hereinafter 21st Avenue), to produce a witness for a deposition within 30 days of the entry of a conditional order striking its answer, the conditional order became absolute ( see, Clissuras v. Concord Vil. Owners, Inc., 233 A.D.2d 475; Stojowski v. Fair Oaks Dev. Corp., 151 A.D.2d 661). In order to avoid the adverse impact of the order, therefore, 21st Avenue was required to demonstrate an excusable default and the existence of a meritorious claim ( see, Felicciardi v. Town of Brookhaven, 205 A.D.2d 495). While a court may, in its discretion, accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse ( see, CPLR 2005; Putney v. Pearlman, 203 A.D.2d 333), a pattern of willful default and neglect should not be excused ( see, Roussodimou v. Zafiriadis, 238 A.D.2d 568, 569; see also, Wynne v. Wagner, ___; 262 A.D.2d 556 [2d Dept., June 21, 1999]; Rock v. Schwartz, 244 A.D.2d 542).
Here, after 21st Avenue had failed several times to produce a witness for deposition, the court issued a conditional order striking its answer unless the witness was produced within 30 days of the entry of the order. 21st Avenue failed to produce the witness within the allotted 30 days and then attempted to produce the witness after the order became absolute. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion when it granted the motion to vacate.
O'BRIEN, J.P., SULLIVAN, GOLDSTEIN, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.