DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for severance of the counts of the indictment. The motion was untimely, and the defendant did not demonstrate "good cause" for the untimeliness (see CPL 255.20; People v. Garcia, 259 A.D.2d 630, 631). In any event, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever the indictment. "Separate offenses are joinable in a single indictment and may be tried together when the offenses * * * are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law" (People v. Richardson, 235 A.D.2d 502, 503; see People v. Allah, 283 A.D.2d 436; People v. Jenkins, 50 N.Y.2d 981).
Moreover, the defendant failed to show that he would be unduly and genuinely prejudiced by the joint trial of those charges, and failed to demonstrate in concrete terms that he had a strong need to refrain from testifying concerning the charges arising from some incidents, and important testimony to present concerning the other incidents (see People v. Telford, 134 A.D.2d 632; People v. Cabrera, 188 A.D.2d 1062, 1063). Further, there is nothing in the record to support the defendant's claim that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the denial of his severance motion (see People v. Richardson, supra at 503). The proof of each crime was presented separately, enabling the jury to segregate the evidence (see People v. Richardson, supra).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., SCHMIDT, ADAMS and COZIER, JJ., concur.