DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The award of counsel and accountant's fees is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case ( see Domestic Relations Law § 237[a], [d]; DeCabrera v. DeCabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Kearns v. Kearns, 270 A.D.2d 392, 393). A court must consider the relative merits of the parties' claims and their respective financial positions ( see Merzon v. Merzon, 210 A.D.2d 462, 464; Borakove v. Borakove, 116 A.D.2d 683, 684).
In light of the disparity in income between the parties, and the defendant's tactics which unnecessarily prolonged the litigation, the Supreme Court properly directed the defendant to pay the plaintiff's counsel and accountant's fees, despite the substantial equitable distribution award to the plaintiff ( see Krutyansky v. Krutyansky, 289 A.D.2d 299, 300; Nee v. Nee, 240 A.D.2d 478, 479; Hackett v. Hackett, 147 A.D.2d 611, 613). The parties stipulated that a determination regarding such fees could be made on submission in lieu of a hearing. Therefore, the need for a hearing on the reasonableness of these fees was obviated ( see Krutyanski v. Krutyanski, supra; Pinto v. Pinto, 260 A.D.2d 622).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
RITTER, J.P., SMITH, H. MILLER and MASTRO, JJ., concur.