Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the defendant third-party and second third-party plaintiff-respondent, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.
Generally, the issue of whether a dangerous or defective condition exists on property depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and presents a question of fact for the jury ( see Trincere v. County of Suffolk, 90 NY2d 976; Friedman v. Beth David Cemetery, 19 AD3d 365; Adsmond v. City of Poughkeepsie, 283 AD2d 598; Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, 271 AD2d 595). However, a property owner may not be held liable for trivial defects, not constituting a trap or a nuisance, over which a pedestrian might merely stumble, stub his or her toes, or trip ( see Hagood v. City of New York, 13 AD3d 413; Hargrove v. Baltic Estates, 278 AD2d 278). In determining whether a defect is trivial, a court must examine all of the facts presented, including the "width, depth, elevation, irregularity and appearance of the defect along with the `time, place and circumstance' of the injury" ( Trincere v. County of Suffolk, supra at 978, quoting Caldwell v. Village of Is. Park, 304 NY 268, 274; see Friedman v. Beth David Cemetery, supra; Mendez v. De Milo, 17 AD3d 328; Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, supra).
Here, considering the dimensions and appearance of the subject defect, and taking into account its location and the circumstances of the accident, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that it was so trivial in nature that it could not give rise to liability on the part of the defendant ( see Friedman v. Beth David Cemetery, supra; Smith v. A.B.K. Apts., 284 AD2d 323; Adsmond v. City of Poughkeepsie, supra; Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, supra). Furthermore, the fact that the defect may have been open and obvious did not negate the defendant's duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition, but rather, may raise an issue of fact as to the plaintiff's comparative negligence ( see Femenella v. Pellegrini Vineyards, Inc., 16 AD3d 546; Sportiello v. City of New York, 6 AD3d 421; Cupo v. Karfunkel, 1 AD3d 48). Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment should have been denied.