Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment on her counterclaim for a divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (1) and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment on her counterclaim for a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (1). The defendant made a prima facie showing that she was entitled to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, which was founded upon the plaintiff's physical assault of the defendant on January 1, 2001. On December 17, 2001, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the third degree in violation of Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00. In opposition to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant pendente lite child support ( see Macagnone v. Macagnone, 7 AD3d 680; Cooper v. Cooper, 7 AD3d 746). "The appropriate remedy for any perceived inequity in a pendente lite award is a prompt trial" ( McDermott v. McDermott, 4 AD3d 457).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.