ARKANSAS D.H.S. v. CIRCUIT COURT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY

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Docket Number

No. 05-498.

Attorney(S)

Gray Turner, for petitioner. Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Eric Walker, Ass't Att'y Gen., for respondent. Jo Carson, for dependent-neglected juveniles.

Judges

TOM GLAZE, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

After opening a protective-services case involving Carla Dix’s three children, the Sebastian County Circuit Court ordered a home study and imposed conditions on Dix’s residence. When the children were found living outside Arkansas, the court approved a 72-hour hold. [1]

DHS obtained emergency custody after alleging that the children were dependent-neglected. Following probable-cause and adjudication hearings, the court found probable cause and later adjudicated the children dependent-neglected. It ordered that legal custody remain with DHS while physical custody remained with the children’s maternal grandmother, Toni Anderson. [2][3][4]

DHS petitioned the Supreme Court of Arkansas for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering split legal and physical custody. [5][6]

Legal Issues Presented

Whether certiorari was available to challenge the circuit court’s split-custody placement order. [6][7][8]
Whether the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the juvenile-placement statutes allegedly did not authorize the custody arrangement ordered. [9][10]
Whether DHS’s challenge concerned the court’s jurisdiction or instead the correctness of its interpretation of placement statutes and related cases. [11][12]

Arguments of the Parties

DHS’s Arguments

DHS argued that the circuit court acted beyond its jurisdiction by splitting legal custody between DHS and physical custody between the grandmother, Anderson. [9]
DHS contended that the juvenile code contained no disposition authorizing the custody arrangement and that the order contradicted the placement statutes. [9]
DHS acknowledged that certiorari ordinarily would not lie when an appeal was available but maintained that the court lacked power to issue this particular remedy. [9]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lackey v. Bramblett	Certiorari is extraordinary relief available for a plain, manifest, and gross abuse of discretion when no other remedy exists; it may address lack or excess of jurisdiction apparent on the record.	The court applied this restrictive certiorari standard and concluded that appeal, rather than certiorari, was available. [7][10]
Ivy v. Keith	Certiorari is appropriate only under the extraordinary circumstances identified by the court.	The case was cited as authority for the governing certiorari standard. [7]
Johnson v. Johnson	Certiorari requires the absence of another adequate remedy and a plain, manifest, and gross abuse of discretion.	The case was cited in defining the limited availability of the writ. [7]
Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Collier	Certiorari reaches a lack or excess of jurisdiction apparent on the record; a circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over dependent-neglected juvenile proceedings involving transfer of custody to DHS.	The court relied on the case to recognize the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the juvenile custody proceeding. [7][10]
Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Benton County Cir. Ct.	Authority cited for the rule limiting certiorari to jurisdictional or facial-record errors.	The case was cited through Collier in stating the certiorari standard. [7]
Juvenile H. v. Crabtree	Certiorari is not an appropriate remedy for reversing a trial court’s discretionary authority.	The court used this principle to reject DHS’s attempt to challenge the placement decision through certiorari. [8]
Kraemer v. Patterson	Certiorari is appropriate when a lower court allegedly lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim.	The court contrasted a true jurisdictional challenge with DHS’s challenge to the correctness of the placement ruling. [8][11]
King v. Davis	Certiorari does not replace an appeal unless the right to appeal was lost through no fault of the aggrieved party.	The court found that DHS had an available appeal. [8][12]
May Construction Company, Inc. v. Thompson	Certiorari is inappropriate when another remedy, such as appeal, exists.	The court relied on this rule in directing DHS to pursue an appeal. [13]
In re: Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil, Rule 2	The appellate rules were amended to permit and expedite appeals from specified juvenile orders.	The court cited the amendment to confirm that the adjudication order was appealable. [14]
Pederson v. Stracener	Jurisdiction is the court’s power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy.	The court used this definition to distinguish jurisdiction from an erroneous statutory interpretation. [11]
State v. Circuit Court of Lincoln County	Illustrates a court’s complete lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over a matter assigned to another court.	The case supported the court’s explanation of genuine jurisdictional absence. [11]
Douthitt v. Douthitt	Illustrates lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where a court lacked authority to hear the type of claim presented.	The case supported the distinction between jurisdiction and an error committed within jurisdiction. [11]
Young v. Smith	Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power to act on the general cause of action; an error within that jurisdiction is corrected by appeal or direct action, and the order remains binding until reversed or set aside.	The court applied this distinction to conclude that any error in the placement decision was appealable rather than jurisdictional. [15][16]
Banning v. State	Authority cited for the distinction between jurisdiction and an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.	The principle was incorporated into the rule quoted from Young. [16]
Lamb Rhodes v. Howton	Additional authority supporting the distinction between jurisdiction and an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.	The case was cited alongside Young and Banning. [16]
Lenser v. McGowan	Certiorari may lie when a court lacks jurisdiction to issue a particular type of remedy.	The court explained that DHS improperly relied on this language because the circuit court had jurisdiction to make a juvenile placement and custody order. [10]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first emphasized that certiorari is extraordinary relief, available only when the record shows no other remedy and a plain, manifest, and gross abuse of discretion, lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, or facially erroneous proceedings. [7]

Certiorari cannot be used to reverse discretionary authority or substitute for an appeal, except when the right to appeal was lost through no fault of the aggrieved party. [8]

The court noted that an order resulting from a juvenile adjudication or disposition hearing involving out-of-home placement is final and appealable under Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 2(c)(3)(A). The rule was amended to expedite appeals in such cases. [13][14]

The court rejected DHS’s characterization of the dispute as jurisdictional. Jurisdiction concerns a court’s power to hear and determine the subject matter; it does not depend on whether the court exercised that power correctly in a particular case. Errors in interpretation or irregular proceedings within the court’s assigned jurisdiction must be addressed by appeal or direct action. [11][16]

Because the circuit court had authority over dependent-neglected juvenile proceedings and plainly had jurisdiction to place the children and establish custody, the dispute concerned whether it correctly interpreted the placement statutes and related cases. [10]

That question was appropriate for an appeal, which DHS was entitled to pursue under Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 2(c)(3)(A). Certiorari therefore was unavailable. [12]

Holding and Implications

The petition for writ of certiorari was denied. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction to make the placement decision and that DHS should have appealed any alleged error in interpreting the placement statutes. [6][12]

The direct effect was that the circuit court’s custody order was not disturbed through certiorari, and DHS’s challenge was left to the ordinary appellate process. [16][12] No broader implications were discussed, and no new precedent was set.

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ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of HUMAN SERVICES v. CIRCUIT COURT of SEBASTIAN COUNTY.

1. CERTIORARI, WRIT OF — EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF — WHEN GRANTED. — A writ of certiorari is appropriate when on the face of the record it is apparent that no other remedy is available to correct a plain, manifest, and gross abuse of discretion by the trial judge; a writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief, and the supreme court will grant it only when there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record.

2. CERTIORARI, WRIT OF — REMEDY NOT APPROPRIATE TO REVERSE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY — WRIT CANNOT TAKE PLACE OF APPEAL. — Certiorari is not an appropriate remedy to use to reverse a trial court's discretionary authority; certiorari is appropriate where a party claims that a lower court did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim; however, certiorari will not take the place of an appeal unless the right of appeal has been lost by no fault of the aggrieved party.

3. APPEAL ERROR — ORDER RESULTING FROM JUVENILE ADJUDICATION OR DISPOSITION HEARING IS FINAL APPEALABLE CERTIORARI NOT APPROPRIATE. — Under Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 2(c)(3)(A), when: an order results from an adjudication or disposition hearing in a juvenile case where an out-of-home placement has been ordered, such an order is final and appealable; certiorari is not appropriate when some other remedy, such as appeal, exists.

4. COURTS — JURISDICTION — DEFINED. — "Jurisdiction" is a court's ability to act; it is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties.

5. JURISDICTION — DISTINCTION EXISTS BETWEEN WANT OF JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE MATTER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER JURISDICTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED — SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION DISCUSSED. — There is a distinction between want of jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter and a determination of whether the jurisdiction should be exercised; jurisdiction of the subject matter is a power lawfully conferred on a court to adjudge matters concerning the general question in controversy; it is power to act on the general cause of action alleged and to determine whether the particular facts call for the exercise of that power; subject-matter jurisdiction does not depend on a correct exercise of that power in any particular case; if the court errs in its decision or proceeds irregularly within its assigned jurisdiction, the remedy is by appeal or direct action in the erring court; if it was within the court's jurisdiction to act upon the subject matter, that action is binding until reversed or set aside.

6. COURTS — CIRCUIT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER ORDER PLACING JUVENILES FOCUS OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IMPROPER. — Appellant improperly attempted to focus on the language in Arkansas cases stating that certiorari will lie when a court does not have jurisdiction "to issue a particular type of remedy"; appellant argued that, because the statutes governing placement of juveniles do not authorize the type of custody arrangement ordered by the trial court, the court lacked jurisdiction to issue that type of remedy; however, it was apparent that the circuit court in this case had jurisdiction to enter an order placing the juveniles and establishing custody in this case.

7. CERTIORARI, WRIT OF — PETITION FOR WRIT DENIED — TRIAL COURT CLEARLY HAD AUTHORITY TO MAKE PLACEMENT DECISION. — Where the actual subject of review here was whether the trial court correctly interpreted the placement statutes and related cases in making its decision, certiorari would not lie; the trial court clearly had the authority to make a placement decision; whether that decision was correct or not should have been the subject of an appeal, to which petitioner would have been entitled under Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 2(c)(3)(A); therefore the petition for writ of certiorari was denied.

TOM GLAZE, Justice.

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) has filed a petition for writ of certiorari, alleging that the Circuit Court of Sebastian County acted in excess of its jurisdiction in ordering a custody arrangement.

On December 29, 2004, Sebastian County Circuit Judge Mark Hewett opened a protective services case on the three children of Carla Dix. After a hearing, Judge Hewett ordered a home study on Dix's residence; the judge also ordered Dix not to move in with her boyfriend until she was divorced from her husband. On February 1, 2005, a Department of Children and Family Services caseworker went to Dix's house, where the caseworker found Dix and her boyfriend living together. Dix told the caseworker that she had given custody of the children to their father, who was living in Oklahoma. Later that same day, Judge Hewett approved a 72-hour hold on the children because they had been taken out of state.

On February 4, 2005, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody, alleging that the children were dependent/neglected. The petition further asked the court to place custody of the children with DHS pending a further hearing or court order. The court granted the petition for emergency custody on February 4, 2005, finding that there was probable cause to believe that the children were dependent/neglected. As such, the court placed the children in the custody of DHS, and set a probable cause hearing for Friday, February 11, 2005.

Following the February 11 hearing, the trial court entered a probable cause order, finding that probable cause existed to believe that the children were dependent/neglected. The children were placed in the physical custody of their maternal grandmother, Toni Anderson. The court set an adjudication hearing for March 11, 2005. After that hearing, the court entered an adjudication order in which it found that the children were dependent/neglected. The court then made the following ruling:

Legal custody of the juveniles shall remain with [DHS] pending further order of the court, and physical custody remains with Toni Anderson as previously ordered. The court notes [DHS's] objection to the split custody arrangement. The court makes this order based on the ruling in the case of Linda Batiste v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, Arkansas Supreme Court Case No. 04-486.

Upon concluding its adjudication order, the court continued jurisdiction over the matter and set a review hearing for June 23, 2005.

On May 9, 2005, DHS filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari, alleging that the circuit court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction by ordering that legal and physical custody of the children be split between DHS and Anderson. We decline to issue the writ and hold that DHS should have appealed.

[1] A writ of certiorari is appropriate when on the face of the record it is apparent that no other remedy is available to correct a plain, manifest, and gross abuse of discretion by the trial judge. See, e.g., Lackey v. Bramblett, 355 Ark. 414, 139 S.W.3d 467 (2003); Ivy v. Keith, 351 Ark. 269, 92 S.W.3d 671 (2002); Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000). This court has specifically stated that "a writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief, and we will grant it only when there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record." Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 516, 95 S.W.3d 772, 777 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Benton County Cir. Ct., 336 Ark. 136, 984 S.W.2d 429 (1999)).

[2] Moreover, this court has recognized that certiorari is not an appropriate remedy to use to reverse a trial court's discretionary authority. Collier, supra; see also Juvenile H. v. Crabtree, 310 Ark. 208, 833 S.W.2d 766 (1992). Certiorari is appropriate where a party claims that a lower court did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim. Kraemer v. Patterson, 342 Ark. 481, 29 S.W.3d 684 (2000). However, certiorari will not take the place of an appeal unless the right of appeal has been lost by no fault of the aggrieved party. King v. Davis, 324 Ark. 253, 920 S.W.2d 488 (1996).

[3] Stated another way, certiorari is not appropriate when some other remedy, such as appeal, exists. See May Construction Company, Inc. v. Thompson, 341 Ark. 879, 20 S.W.3d 345 (2000) (certiorari inappropriate where petitioner fell short of showing that there had been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion without any other remedy, such as appeal). Under Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 2(c)(3)(A), when an order results from an adjudication or disposition hearing in a juvenile case where an out-of-home placement has been ordered, such an order is final and appealable.

In 1999, this court appointed the Arkansas Supreme Court Ad Hoc Committee on Foster Care and Adoption to assess court processes and implement plans to improve those processes in order to enable children who are abused and neglected to be placed in safe and permanent homes in a timely fashion. Following the Committee's recommendations, this court specifically amended the Rules of Appellate Procedures in 1999 to permit appeals from such orders. See In re: Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil, Rule 2, 336 Ark. Appx. 649 (1999). This amendment to Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 2 was intended to expedite appeals in such cases. Id.

DHS concedes that certiorari will not lie when an appeal is available, but nonetheless maintains that it is entitled to the writ in this case because the circuit court, in splitting legal and physical custody between DHS and the grandmother, Anderson, made a ruling that it did not have the power to make. Particularly, DHS argues that there is no disposition in the juvenile code that would have permitted the court to make the type of custody order that it did here, and the court's order was in "clear contradiction" of the juvenile placement statutes. In essence, DHS contends that the circuit court did not have the "jurisdiction" to make the kind of disposition it did in this case.

[4] DHS has confused a court's "jurisdiction," which is a court's ability to act, with a court's error in interpreting a statute. "Jurisdiction" is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties. Pederson v. Stracener, 354 Ark. 716, 128 S.W.3d 818 (2003); see also State v. Circuit Court of Lincoln County, 336 Ark. 122, 984 S.W.2d 412 (1999) (concluding that the Lincoln County Circuit Court was wholly without jurisdiction to decide a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, when the petitioner had been sentenced not in Lincoln County, but in Cleveland County Circuit Court); Douthitt v. Douthitt, 326 Ark. 372, 930 S.W.2d 371 (1996) (holding that chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a tort claim).

[5] This concept was explained succinctly in Young v. Smith, 331 Ark. 525, 964 S.W.2d 784 (1998), wherein this court wrote as follows:

The rule of almost universal application is that there is a distinction between want of jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter and a determination of whether the jurisdiction should be exercised. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is power lawfully conferred on a court to adjudge matters concerning the general question in controversy. It is power to act on the general cause of action alleged and to determine whether the particular facts call for the exercise of that power. Subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on a correct exercise of that power in any particular case. If the court errs in its decision or proceeds irregularly within its assigned jurisdiction, the remedy is by appeal or direct action in the erring court. If it was within the court's jurisdiction to act upon the subject matter, that action is binding until reversed or set aside.

Young, 331 Ark. at 529 (citing Banning v. State, 22 Ark. App. 144,149, 737 S.W.2d 167, 170 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Lamb Rhodes v. Howton, 131 Ark. 211, 213, 198 S.W.521, 522 (1917).

[6] DHS has improperly attempted to focus on the language in our cases stating that certiorari will lie when a court does not have jurisdiction "to issue a particular type of remedy." See, e.g., Lenser v. McGowan, 358 Ark. 423, 191 S.W.3d 506 (2004); Lackey v. Bramblett, 355 Ark. 414, 139 S.W.3d 467 (2003). It argues that, because the statutes governing the placement of juveniles do not authorize the type of custody arrangement ordered by the trial court, the court "lacked jurisdiction" to issue that type of remedy. However, it is plainly apparent that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter an order placing the juveniles and establishing custody in this case. See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-355 (Supp. 2005); see also Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003) (circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings in which a juvenile is alleged to be dependent/neglected and in which custody of a juvenile is transferred to DHS).

[7] What is actually the subject of review in this case is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the placement statutes and related cases in making its decision. Certiorari will not lie in this instance, because the trial court clearly had the authority to make a placement decision; whether that decision was correct or not should have been the subject of an appeal, to which DHS would have been entitled under Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 2(c)(3)(A). This court therefore denies DHS's petition for writ of certiorari.