ROSENBLUM, J.
Plaintiffs appeal a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of defendant. They argue that the trial court erred by denying their motions to amend and to postpone trial, by giving two jury instructions, and by failing to give eight jury instructions. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motions and that the two given instructions to which plaintiffs assign error are not erroneous as a matter of law. We further conclude that the record before us does not permit us to meaningfully review whether the trial court erred by declining to give eight instructions requested by plaintiffs. Accordingly, we affirm.
Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit alleging that William Nelson, a medical doctor who treated their minor daughter Dea, negligently prescribed a medication and failed to make proper referrals and diagnoses. A few months before trial and nearly a year after the complaint was filed, plaintiffs deposed Nelson and learned that he did not authorize the third in a series of prescriptions of Lotrisone, despite the fact that his name appeared as the authorizing physician in his employer PeaceHealth's computer system.
Plaintiffs also named a pharmacy and a pharmacist as defendants. Those defendants settled prior to trial, and plaintiffs' claims against them have no bearing on this appeal.
After Nelson's deposition, plaintiffs moved to postpone trial and to amend their complaint to add PeaceHealth and Lori Ellis, a pharmacy technician at PeaceHealth, as defendants. The trial court denied the motions, noting that Uniform Trial Court Rule 7.020(5) provides that "[t]he trial date must be no later than one year from date of filing for civil cases * * * unless good cause is shown," and that it had already been more than a year since the complaint was filed.
At trial, plaintiffs requested several instructions pertaining to the issues surrounding defendant's failure to produce documentation showing that someone other than Nelson authorized the third prescription. Specifically, plaintiffs requested Uniform Civil Jury Instruction (UCJI) 12.01 (less satisfactory evidence) and a special instruction regarding the presumptions that arise upon proof that a party has wilfully suppressed evidence (Special Instruction Number 2). The trial court declined to give either instruction.
UCJI 12.01 provides:
Plaintiffs requested the following instruction:
Plaintiffs similarly requested that the jury be given UCJI 30.01 (fault/negligence of employee/agent imputed to employer/principal), UCJI 30.04 (respondeat superior), and three special instructions (Special Instructions Numbers 6, 7, and 8) with the goal of permitting the jury to find Nelson liable for authorizing the third prescription. Plaintiffs contended that Nelson either ratified the act of his apparent agents in prescribing the medicine by looking at Dea's records several months after the third prescription was issued or, alternatively, was liable as a principal/employer for the acts of his agent/employees. The trial court concluded that the evidence did not support the requested instructions.
UCJI 30.01 provides:
UCJI 30.04 provides:
Plaintiffs requested the following special instructions relating to apparent agency and ratification:
Plaintiffs also requested a special instruction drafted to permit the jury to find Nelson liable for failing to diagnose Dea's genetic disorder (Special Instruction Number 3). They contended that the instruction was appropriate because of the complaint's allegation that Nelson failed to timely refer Dea to a specialist, and because Nelson argued that Dea's problems were caused by her genetic disorder rather than by negligently prescribed medication. The trial court declined to give that special instruction.
Plaintiffs requested the following special instruction regarding Dea's genetic disorder:
In addition to requesting instructions that were not given, plaintiffs excepted to two instructions that the court did give. Specifically, plaintiffs excepted to the addition of a sentence to UCJI 44.03 (professional perfection not required) and to UCJI 44.01 (duty of medical professional) in its entirety. Plaintiffs argued that both instructions were out-dated, did not comply with Oregon law, and were not supported by the evidence. The trial court disagreed and gave the instructions.
UCJI 44.03 provides:
UCJI 44.01 provides:
The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. Although the notice of appeal designated "the entire trial court file, all exhibits, the record and transcript of oral proceedings, and the transcript of trial in this matter" as the record on appeal, see ORAP 2.05(6), plaintiffs later filed a corrected amended designation narrowing their designation of the transcript of oral proceedings to the following: (1) the transcript of the hearing on plaintiffs' motions to amend and to postpone trial; (2) portions of the testimony of defendant's medical office assistant, Erin Trebolo; (3) portions of defense expert Dr. William Miser's testimony about the standard of care regarding the third prescription; (4) portions of defendant'stestimony regarding his opportunity for knowledge of the third prescription after it was issued; and (5) the entirety of counsel's discussion with the court about jury instructions on two dates.
Defendant cross-designated other portions of Miser's testimony.
On appeal, plaintiffs raise 12 assignments of error. In their first and second assignments, plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to amend and by denying their motion to postpone trial. We find no abuse of discretion and reject those assignments without further discussion.
In their eleventh and twelfth assignments of error, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury by giving UCJI 40.01 with supplemental language and UCJI 40.03. Reversal on the basis of an improper jury instruction requires a showing that the instruction created an erroneous impression of the law in the jurors' minds that affected the outcome of the case. Howard v. Waremart, Inc., 147 Or App 135, 142-43, 935 P2d 432, rev den, 325 Or 491 (1997). Here, we are unable to determine whether the instructions affected the outcome of the case because we do not know the entirety of the evidence that was produced at trial. See State v. Ness, 54 Or App 530, 536-37, 635 P2d 1025 (1981), aff'd, 294 Or 8, 653 P2d 548 (1982) ("[T]he extent to which an improper jury instruction affects the substantial rights of a party depends heavily upon what evidence was produced at trial. Where * * * the evidence at trial is not in the appellate record, jury instructions will not be reviewed unless they are improper per se."). Because neither instruction was improper per se, we reject the eleventh and twelfth assignments of error without further discussion.
Accordingly, we write only to address plaintiffs' third through tenth assignments of error, in each of which they contend that the court abused its discretion by declining to give a proposed jury instruction. Defendant responds that those assignments of error are not subject to meaningful review because plaintiffs failed to designate the jury charge as part of the record on appeal, and because the portions of the trial testimony that plaintiff did designate do not permit us to determine whether plaintiffs' rights were substantially affected by any of the challenged rulings.
We agree with defendant that the record before us precludes meaningful appellate review of the failure to give the requested jury instructions. An appellant bears the burden of providing a record sufficient to demonstrate that error occurred. King City Realty, Inc. v. Sunpace Corp., 291 Or 573, 582, 633 P2d 784 (1981) ("It is well established that it is the duty of the appellant to designate and bring to the appellate court such portions of the record of the proceedings before the trial court as are necessary to support and establish his contention that the trial court committed the error of which the appellant complains on appeal."). Our subsequent cases have conformed to that principle. See, e.g., Richardson v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 211 Or App 421, 426, 155 P3d 881 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that an appellant has the responsibility of providing a sufficient record for review of the claims of error."); Russell v. Nikon, Inc., 207 Or App 266, 270, 140 P3d 1179, adh'd to on recons, 208 Or App 606, 145 P3d 312 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 299 (2007) ("As the appellant, plaintiff has the responsibility to furnish this court with a record of the * * * hearing [to which he assigns error]."); Collins and Collins, 178 Or App 158, 161, 35 P3d 339 (2001) ("The party asserting a claim of error has the affirmative obligation to provide the appellate court with a record adequate to demonstrate reversible error."); York v. Bailey, 159 Or App 341, 347-48, 976 P2d 1181, rev den, 329 Or 287 (1999) ("[T]he party seeking a modification or reversal on the basis of the asserted error will have a burden to ensure that the appellate record permits the court to make the determination necessary to award the relief the party seeks."); Ness, 54 Or App at 536-37 ("Any shortcomings in the record resulting in obstacles to [an appellant's] arguments on appeal must be held strictly against [appellant]."); H.N.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Hamilton, 49 Or App 613, 621 P2d 57 (1980) ("We cannot review this claim of error because the transcript is incomplete.").
In King City Realty, the Supreme Court also held that "if the respondent * * * contends that any such error was not prejudicial and that additional portions of the record will support such a contention, he must designate and bring before the appellate court any such additional portions of the record." 291 Or at 583. When King City Realty was decided, evidentiary error was presumed prejudicial under Oregon law unless a respondent was able to demonstrate a lack of prejudice. See Elam v. Soares, 282 Or 93, 103, 577 P2d 1336 (1978). Elam was legislatively overruled by the enactment of OEC 103, which states that "[evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial." Because there is no longer a presumption that evidentiary error is prejudicial, the party seeking relief or modification of the judgment bears the burden of ensuring that the appellate record permits us to determine that error occurred and to award the relief that the party seeks. See York v. Bailey, 159 Or App 341, 347-48, 976 P2d 1181, rev den, 329 Or 287 (1999).
In this case, plaintiffs failed to designate the transcript of that part of the trial record in which the court actually gave the instructions to the jury; that is, the jury charge itself. Defendants contend that, as a result of that failure, we do not know how the court ultimately instructed the jury. The designated record does, however, include both sides' proposed jury instructions, the transcript of the preinstruction conference with counsel in which the trial court ruled on each of the proposed instructions (with the exception of withholding ruling on the Oral Admissions instruction), as well as the transcript of the post-instruction colloquy with counsel, during the course of which neither counsel raised any new exceptions to the giving of the jury instructions. From our review of those portions of the record, we can discern which instructions were given to the jury in this case and we are comfortable that the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with its rulings at the preinstruction conference.
Appellants who assign error to jury instructions without designating the jury charge as part of the record do so at their peril. See, e.g., Smith v. Terminal Transfer, 61 Or App 739, 740, 658 P2d 579 (1983). Although we have been able to cobble together sufficient information in this case to figure out to our satisfaction the content of the jury instructions that were actually given by the trial court, we are not masters at jigsaw puzzles and we may not always be able — or willing — to charge portion of the proceedings when assigning error to jury instructions.
Nevertheless, we have determined that the record is inadequate for review of plaintiffs' third through tenth assignments of error. Reversal is warranted only if the requested instruction both accurately states the law in question and is supported by the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. See State v. Marsh, 186 Or App 612, 614, 64 P3d 1141 (2003). Here, plaintiffs' de minimis designation of the trial testimony prevents us from applying that standard of review. The designated portions of the trial transcript are simply insufficient to allow us to properly assess whether the evidence supports the requested instructions. We briefly address each, in turn.
In their third assignment of error, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by failing to give UCJI 12.01 (less satisfactory evidence). Plaintiffs argue that they were entitled to that instruction because defendant denied authorizing the third prescription, and they argued to the jury during closing that defendant's failure to produce evidence showing that someone else authorized the prescription should be construed against him. Our review of the limited record before us reveals no basis for that instruction, so we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by declining to give it.
During oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel stated that she presented that contention during her closing argument. As plaintiffs did not designate closing arguments, we are unable to confirm that representation.
We turn to UCJI 30.01 (fourth assignment of error), UCJI 30.04 (fifth assignment of error), and plaintiffs' Special Instructions Numbers 6, 7, and 8 (eighth, ninth, and tenth assignments of error, respectively) (collectively, the agency instructions). Plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to the agency instructions because someone other than defendant authorized the third prescription. We find no evidence in the designated portion of the transcripts that would support such a finding. engage in this process. In short, future appellants should always designate the jury
That is not surprising, as plaintiffs refer only to defendant's deposition testimony when discussing defendant's claim that he did not authorize the third prescription. That deposition testimony is not part of the record on appeal.
Plaintiffs also point to the testimony of medical office assistant (MOA) Erin Trebolo in support of the agency instructions. Even if we were to conclude that Trebolo's testimony established that she acted as defendant's agent in certain instances, Trebolo was not working at the time the third prescription was authorized. Without knowing who entered the third prescription into the computer system, we cannot know whether that person was acting as defendant's agent or apparent agent. Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the third prescription was entered into the computer system by an MOA, we are not able to conclude that that person was either acting as an agent of defendant, or that plaintiffs believed that to be the case under the doctrine of apparent agency. Thus, again, the record is insufficient to support giving those instructions.
Trebolo's testimony contains evidence that a medical office assistant works under a doctor, including by taking direction about entering prescriptions into a computer system; that Trebolo worked with defendant at certain times while he was treating Dea, but not when the third prescription was authorized; that she checks what medications a patient is taking at the beginning of each office visit; that defendant reviews any questions she has about medications when they are working together; that the third prescription was not issued with a direction for frequency of use, which is unusual; that certain drugs require prior doctor approval before a pharmacy will dispense them; that Dea's prescriptions of Lortisone were entered by "[t]hree different staff persons on behalf of the doctors"; that Dr. Pearson authorized a prescription for another medication while he was on call for defendant; that the computer system can detect duplicate prescriptions and patient allergies; that sometimes there are delays in refilling prescriptions; and that defendant gave a late dictation of an office visit for Dea, even though the paper chart could not be found, in which he omitted certain facts about another medication that Trebolo would expect to see included. She also described the process for issuing a new prescription and refilling a prescription, including the practice of obtaining the treating physician's approval for refill requests.
To do so on this record would be pure speculation. Trebolo testified that both doctors and MOAs have access to the computer system and that Dea's grandmother, also an employee of PeaceHealth, refilled at least one of Dea's prescriptions. There is no evidence from which we can discern how the third prescription was entered.
In their sixth assignment of error, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury about the presumptions that arise when a party wilfully suppresses evidence (Special Instruction Number 2). The designated record, however, does not contain any evidence to support a finding that Nelson wilfully suppressed evidence about the third prescription. Similarly, plaintiffs' seventh assignment of error concerns the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that a finding of negligence could be based on defendant's failure to timely diagnose a certain genetic disorder (Special Instruction Number 3), but we are unable to locate anything in the designated record that would support such a finding. The record before us does not establish that Dea suffers from a particular genetic disorder and, if so, when it was diagnosed, or who diagnosed it, let alone evidence that Nelson breached the standard of care.
Miser testified only that "they" "were able to diagnose an extremely rare condition that occurs that none of us as family physicians in our lifetime would ever even see or hear about."
We conclude that the designated record does not permit us to adequately evaluate plaintiffs' third through tenth assignments of error, and we decline to review them on that basis. ORS 19.365(5) ("If the record on appeal is not sufficient to allow the appellate court to review an assignment of error, the court may decline to review the assignment of error * * *."). Plaintiffs argue that we may not exercise our discretion under ORS 19.365(5) in this case. To support that argument, plaintiffs rely on State v. Culbertson, in which we held that a defendant's failure to designate additional portions of the record "is, in effect, a stipulation that the portion of the record designated by appellant is sufficient." 29 Or App 363, 366-67, 563 P2d 1224 (1977) (explaining that the prior version of ORS 19.250 "gives to respondent the responsibility and authority to designate additional portions of the record as respondent deems necessary"); see also City of Eugene v. Monaco, 171 Or App 681, 17 P3d 544 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 240 (2001).
Plaintiffs' reliance on Culbertson is unavailing. That case was decided prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in King City Realty, that an appellant alone bears the burden of designating a record sufficient to demonstrate that error occurred. Thus, if Culbertson stands for the principle that a respondent who does not file a cross-designation of record may not be heard to complain that the designated record is insufficient, that principle did not survive King City Realty. Plaintiffs' reliance on Monaco is similarly misplaced, as that case involved an entirely distinct principle not at issue here, namely, who bears the burden of establishing that an error was (or was not) harmless. 171 Or App at 690. We need not consider the prejudicial effect of an error that we cannot determine occurred.
It was plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate that the trial court erred by declining to give the requested instructions. By failing to designate essential portions of the record, they failed to carry that burden.
Affirmed.