Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent granting the preliminary injunction, and (3) a balancing of the equities in the movant's favor ( see CPLR 6301; Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso, 75 NY2d 860, 862; Coinmach Corp. v Alley Pond Owners Corp., 25 AD3d 642, 643). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo and prevent the dissipation of property that could render a judgment ineffectual ( see Ruiz v Meloney, 26 AD3d 485, 486; Ying Fung Moy v Hohi Umeki, 10 AD3d 604). The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the Supreme Court ( see Ruiz v Meloney, 26 AD3d at 486).
Here, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he would suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction were not granted ( see Automated Waste Disposal, Inc. v Mid-Hudson Waste, Inc., 50 AD3d 1072, 1073; Khan v State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn, 271 AD2d 656, 657; Neos v Lacey, 291 AD2d 434, 435; Kurzban Son v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 129 AD2d 756, 757). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied his cross motion for a preliminary injunction.
In light of our determination, the plaintiffs remaining contentions are academic.