Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
"In order to obtain a preliminary injunction ( see CPLR 6301), the moving party must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) an irreparable injury absent the granting of injunctive relief, and (3) a balancing of the equities in its favor" ( Wiener v Life Style Futon, Inc., 48 AD3d 458; see Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso, 75 NY2d 860, 862; Iron Mtn. Info. Mgt, Inc. v Pullman, 41 AD3d 656, 657). "`The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending determination of the action'" ( City of Long Beach v Sterling Am. Capital, LLC, 40 AD3d 902, 903, quoting Kelley v Garuda, 36 AD3d 593, 596). "The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the Supreme Court" ( Ruiz v Meloney, 26 AD3d 485, 486; see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750; Ying Fung Moy v Hohi Umeki, 10 AD3d 604). Here, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that they would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction were not granted ( see EdCia Corp. v McCormack, 44 AD3d 991, 994; Matos v City of New York, 21 AD3d 936, 937; 1659 Ralph Ave. Laundromat Corp. v Ben David Enters., 307 AD2d 288, 289; Marders the Landscape Store v Barylski, 303 AD2d 465; Neos v Lacey, 291 AD2d 434, 435). The plaintiffs' contention that the Supreme Court was required to hold a hearing on its motion is without merit ( see CPLR 6312 [c]; Marders the Landscape Store v Barylski, 303 AD2d at 466). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.