COLLIER v. THE KROGER CO

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. A09A1535.

Attorney(S)

Jerry L. Collier, pro se. Douglas A. Wilde, for appellee.

Judges

MIKELL, Judge.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Jerry Larry Collier, proceeding pro se, sought to file a complaint in DeKalb State Court against The Kroger Company and "Norred Associates, Inc." The trial court, pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-2(d), denied the filing on the ground that the pleading showed on its face a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact. Collier appealed that denial to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

The complaint alleged that on January 26, 2009, at about 6:15 p.m., an unnamed security officer employed by Norred Associates at Belvedere Plaza asked Collier to leave without giving a reason. Collier alleged Norred provided security under contract with a Kroger store at the plaza; that an assistant manager at Kroger spoke with the security officer and told Collier, in substance, that he could not return to Belvedere Plaza; and that Kroger and Norred thereby violated his civil rights, slandered and harassed him, plotted against him, and caused mental stress. Collier cited OCGA §§ 9-11-14(a) and 16-7-21 and, in his appellate brief, stated he had good cause to be at the plaza because he maintained automobile insurance there.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Collier's pro se complaint presented a justiciable issue of law or fact under OCGA § 9-15-2(d) such that the trial court erred in denying its filing.
Whether the complaint sufficiently pleaded (a) a violation of civil rights, (b) slander, and (c) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Grant v. Byrd, 265 Ga. 684-685 (1) (461 SE2d 871) (1995).	Statutory standard under OCGA § 9-15-2(d) permitting denial of filing when pleading shows complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact.	Used to state the standard governing denial of a pro se filing under OCGA § 9-15-2(d).
Moore v. First Family Financial Svcs., 246 Ga. App. 89 (539 SE2d 598) (2000).	Principle that pro se complaints are not held to the stringent standards of formal pleadings.	Applied to justify construing Collier's pro se complaint in the light most favorable to him while assessing sufficiency.
Cargill v. Zant, 207 Ga. App. 393, 394 (427 SE2d 809) (1993).	Support for the proposition that conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim.	Relied upon in concluding Collier's civil rights allegation was conclusory and presented no justiciable issue.
Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 876-877 (2) (e) (668 SE2d 330) (2008).	Standards regarding pleading elements of defamation/slander claims.	Applied to determine Collier failed to plead the requisite elements of slander.
Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 225 Ga. App. 636, 638-639 (1) (484 SE2d 659) (1997).	Defines the four elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.	Used to assess Collier's IIED claim and conclude the allegations were insufficient.
Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 434 (3) (571 SE2d 466) (2002).	Example of an IIED complaint held sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.	Referenced by way of comparison to show Collier's allegations were insufficient in contrast.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied OCGA § 9-15-2(d) and construed Collier's pro se complaint liberally. It summarized Collier's factual allegations regarding the January 26, 2009 incident and the subsequent communications with Kroger.

The court determined Collier's asserted civil-rights claim was a conclusory allegation with no supporting facts and therefore presented no justiciable issue. With respect to slander, the court stated the elements of the tort and found Collier did not plead those elements. For intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court identified the four required elements and concluded Collier's allegations were wholly insufficient to support that claim. Because each asserted cause of action failed to state a justiciable issue of law or fact, the court concluded the trial court properly denied the pro se filing under OCGA § 9-15-2(d).

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Collier's pro se complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-2(d). The direct effect is that Collier's proposed claims (civil rights violation, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) were held insufficient to present justiciable issues; the opinion does not announce any new legal precedent beyond applying established standards.

Show full summary ...

COLLIER v. THE KROGER COMPANY.

MIKELL, Judge.

Jerry Larry Collier appeals from the trial court's order determining, pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-2 (d), that the complaint he sought to file against The Kroger Company and "Norred Associates, Inc.," failed to present a justiciable issue of law or fact for which he could obtain relief. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.

1. OCGA § 9-15-2 (d) permits a trial court to deny the filing of a pro se complaint in a civil action if "the pleading shows on its face such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it cannot be reasonably believed that the court could grant any relief against any party named in the pleading." On appeal, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the losing party, and "pro se complaints are not held to the stringent standards of formal pleadings."

(Punctuation omitted.) Grant v. Byrd, 265 Ga. 684-685 (1) ( 461 SE2d 871) (1995).

Id. at 685 (1).

(Footnote omitted.) Moore v. First Family Financial Svcs., 246 Ga. App. 89 ( 539 SE2d 598) (2000).

So viewed, it appears that Collier's complaint alleges that on January 26, 2009, at 6:15 p.m., an unnamed security officer employed by "Norred Associates, Inc.," at Belvedere Plaza asked him to leave the Plaza without giving Collier a reason. The complaint alleges that Norred provided security pursuant to a contract with a Kroger store at the Plaza. According to the complaint, Collier called Kroger and reported the incident to an assistant manager, who spoke with the security officer and then informed Collier as follows: "the Norred security get sick on you talk cause itself tell you [sic] that you cannot come back in Belvedere Plaza." Kroger's assistant manager told Collier to disregard what Norred told him. Collier alleges "Kroger Company or defendant Kroger Citi Center and defendant Norred security violation plaintiff civil right ABabent [sic] from Belvedere Plaza without any reason or probable cause." The complaint alleges that these defendants slandered him, harassed him, plotted against him, and caused him mental stress. Collier cites OCGA §§ 9-11-14 (a), which addresses when a defendant may file a third-party claim, and 16-7-21, which defines the offense of criminal trespass. In his appellate brief, Collier repeats his allegations and states that he had good cause to be in Belvedere Plaza because he maintains automobile insurance there.

Collier's complaint and appellate brief are handwritten and exceedingly difficult to decipher.

2. Collier's complaint asserts what we construe to be three causes of action: (a) violation of civil rights, (b) slander, and (c) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(a) Violation of civil rights. Collier's claim that his civil rights were violated is nothing more than a conclusory allegation, as he sets forth no facts to support it. Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that it presented no justiciable issue of law or fact.

(b) The tort of slander consists of

(1) Imputing to another a crime punishable by law; (2) Charging a person with having some contagious disorder or with being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from society; (3) Making charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein; or (4) Uttering any disparaging words productive of special damage which flows naturally therefrom.

See Cargill v. Zant, 207 Ga. App. 393, 394 ( 427 SE2d 809) (1993).

Collier's complaint did not plead these elements and cannot be construed to have pled them. Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that this purported claim presented no justiciable issue of law or fact.

See Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 876-877 (2) (e) ( 668 SE2d 330) (2008).

(c) "A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has four elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct (2) that is extreme and outrageous and (3) causes emotional distress (4) that is severe."

(Citation omitted.) Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 225 Ga. App. 636, 638-639 (1) ( 484 SE2d 659) (1997).

The allegations of Collier's complaint are wholly insufficient to support this claim.

Compare Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 434 (3) ( 571 SE2d 466) (2002) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in complaint held sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss).

In sum, Collier's complaint fails to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact. It follows that the trial court properly denied the pro se filing of his complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-2 (d).

Judgment affirmed. Johnson, P.J., and Ellington, J., concur.