FOSTER v. HERBERT SLEPOY CORP

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Docket Number

No. 2008-11100.

Attorney(S)

Fumuso, Kelly, DeVerna, Snyder, Swart Farrell, LLP, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Scott G. Christesen of counsel), for appellants.

Judges

William F. Mastro
Leonard B. Austin

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendants, Herbert Slepoy Corp. and North and South Lewis Place Owners Corp., appealed an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, which denied their motion to compel the defendant Kerry Clancy to produce documents requested in a notice of discovery and inspection and to appear for another deposition. The motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3124 and 3126.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to compel further discovery from Kerry Clancy.
Whether the additional discovery sought was material and necessary under CPLR 3101(a) to the prosecution or defense of any claim in the action.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Friel v Papa, 56 AD3d 607, 608	Material and necessary discovery requires liberal interpretation to include any facts bearing on the controversy that assist trial preparation by sharpening issues and reducing delay.	Supported the principle that discovery must be useful and reasonable, guiding the court's evaluation of the defendants' motion.
Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406	Definition of "material and necessary" in discovery as facts that assist trial preparation.	Quoted to emphasize the liberal standard for discovery but balanced against limits on unfettered disclosure.
Gilman Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531	Parties do not have the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure.	Supported the limitation on discovery to prevent excessive or irrelevant demands.
Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 76 AD2d 873	Limitation on discovery rights to prevent abuse.	Referenced to underscore restrictions on discovery scope.
Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417, 418	Party seeking discovery must show the method will lead to relevant evidence or information bearing on claims.	Applied to require the appellants to demonstrate that their discovery requests were reasonably calculated to uncover relevant evidence.
Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 AD2d 420, 421	Standard for discovery requests requiring a reasonable calculation to lead to relevant information.	Quoted to affirm the burden on the party seeking discovery.
Casabona v Huntington Union Free School Dist., 29 AD3d 723, 723	Supreme Court has broad discretion in supervising discovery; its determinations should not be disturbed unless improvidently made.	Supported affirmance of the lower court's discretionary decision denying the discovery motion.
Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 746	Standard of appellate review of discovery rulings emphasizing deference to the trial court's discretion.	Reinforced the appellate court's deference to the Supreme Court's discretion.
Milbrandt Co., Inc. v Griffin, 19 AD3d 663	Supports broad discretion of Supreme Court in discovery matters.	Used to affirm the court's exercise of discretion in discovery rulings.
Provident Life Cas. Ins. Co. v Brittenham, 284 AD2d 518	Further supports the Supreme Court's discretion in discovery supervision.	Referenced to uphold the denial of the motion to compel discovery.
Palermo Mason Constr. v Aark Holding Corp., 300 AD2d 460	Supports the principle that discovery must be material and necessary under CPLR 3101(a).	Applied to conclude the additional discovery sought was neither material nor necessary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the liberal standard for discovery under CPLR 3101(a), which requires disclosure of all matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action. It emphasized that "material and necessary" should be interpreted broadly to include any facts that assist trial preparation by sharpening the issues and reducing delay. However, the court also recognized that discovery is not an unlimited right and must be controlled to prevent unfettered disclosure.

The court noted the burden on the party seeking discovery to demonstrate that the requested method will lead to relevant evidence or information bearing on the claims. It stressed the Supreme Court's broad discretion in supervising discovery and that such determinations should only be disturbed if improvidently made.

Applying these principles, the court found that the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in denying the defendants' motion because the additional discovery sought was neither material nor necessary to any claim. Thus, the denial was appropriate and within the court’s supervisory powers over discovery.

Holding and Implications

The court's final decision was to affirm the order denying the defendants' motion to compel discovery, without costs or disbursements.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the trial court’s discretion in limiting discovery to material and necessary matters, thereby preventing potentially burdensome or irrelevant discovery demands. The opinion does not establish any new precedent but reiterates existing standards governing discovery scope and appellate review of discovery rulings.

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PAULA FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. HERBERT SLEPOY CORP. et al., Appellants, and KERRY CLANCY, Respondent.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

CPLR 3101 (a) requires "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." "The phrase `material and necessary' should be `interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason'" ( Friel v Papa, 56 AD3d 607, 608, quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406). A party, however, does not have the right to "uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure" ( Gilman Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531; see Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 76 AD2d 873). "`It is incumbent on the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the method of discovery sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims'" ( Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417, 418, quoting Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 AD2d 420, 421).

"The Supreme Court has broad discretion in the supervision of discovery, and its determinations should not be disturbed on appeal unless improvidently made" ( Casabona v Huntington Union Free School Dist., 29 AD3d 723, 723; see Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 746; Milbrandt Co., Inc. v Griffin, 19 AD3d 663; Provident Life Cas. Ins. Co. v Brittenham, 284 AD2d 518). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in concluding, inter alia, that the additional discovery sought by the appellants was neither material nor necessary to the prosecution or defense of any claim ( see CPLR 3101 [a]; Casabona v Huntington Union Free School Dist., 29 AD3d 723; Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417; Palermo Mason Constr. v Aark Holding Corp., 300 AD2d 460).