WILLIAM F. MASTRO
Hammill, O'Brien, Croutier, Dempsey, Pender & Koehler, P.C., Syosset, N.Y. (Anton Piotroski of counsel), for appellant. Zemsky & Salomon, P.C., Hempstead, N.Y. (Jason M. Zemsky of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated October 23, 2014, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the alleged dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it ( see Beceren v. Joan Realty, LLC, 124 A.D.3d 572, 2 N.Y.S.3d 155; Payen v. Western Beef Supermarket, 106 A.D.3d 710, 964 N.Y.S.2d 583). While a “defendant [is] not required to cover all of its floors with mats, nor to continuously mop up all moisture resulting from tracked-in rain” (Negron v. St. Patrick's Nursing Home, 248 A.D.2d 687, 687, 671 N.Y.S.2d 275; see Paduano v. 686 Forest Ave., LLC, 119 A.D.3d 845, 989 N.Y.S.2d 379; Sarandrea v. St. Charles Sch., 118 A.D.3d 690, 691, 986 N.Y.S.2d 351; Dubensky v. 2900 Westchester Co., LLC, 27 A.D.3d 514, 813 N.Y.S.2d 117), a defendant may be held liable for an injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition created by water, snow, or ice tracked into a building if it either created the hazardous condition, or had actual or constructive notice of the condition and a reasonable time to undertake remedial action ( see Mentasi v. Eckerd Drugs, 61 A.D.3d 650, 651, 877 N.Y.S.2d 149; Ruic v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 1000, 1001, 858 N.Y.S.2d 761; Williams v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 39 A.D.3d 852, 834 N.Y.S.2d 310).
Here, the defendant failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the surveillance video which captured the accident did not unequivocally show that there was no water in the area where the plaintiff fell ( see generally Deviva v. Bourbon St. Fine Foods & Spirit, 116 A.D.3d 654, 983 N.Y.S.2d 295). Additionally, the defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact with regard to its contention that it did not have constructive notice of the alleged wet floor since it failed to proffer any evidence demonstrating when the subject area was last cleaned or inspected prior to the plaintiff's accident ( see Rogers v. Bloomingdale's, Inc., 117 A.D.3d 933, 985 N.Y.S.2d 731; Babb v. Marshalls of MA, Inc., 78 A.D.3d 976, 911 N.Y.S.2d 640; Williams v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 39 A.D.3d 852, 834 N.Y.S.2d 310). Since the defendant failed to meet its initial burden as the movant, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers ( see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.