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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • ARTICLE 20 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 106 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 3 EVIDENCE ACT
  • ARTICLE 141 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 27 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 114 A EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • SECTION 43 EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • SECTION 6 A GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
  • SECTION 6 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • SECTION 61 EVIDENCE ACT
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 161 (2) of Cr.P.C.
  • section 109 of IPC. 9.1 A3
  • Sections 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act,
  • Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988
  • section 13(1)(e) {old section 5(1)(e)}
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act
  • Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 40 A1 and A2
  • Section 5(3). 78/117
  • CCS Conduct 35/117 Rules
  • Prevention of Corruption Act Cases (Principal Sessions Judge),
  • P.C. Act 1988 because Section 5(1)(e) of the old P.C. Act
  • Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973
  • Section 207 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. Section 30(2)
  • Sections 109 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against A1, A2 and A3. 4
  • Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act.
  • s. 106 of the Evidence Act.
  • provisions of Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act
  • 71/117 Section 13 of the 1988 Act
  • Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872.
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act
  • Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act
  • Section 3(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act r/w Section 109 IPC
  • Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act
  • Clause (b) of sub-section (3)
  • Section 313 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 5(1)(e). No doubt, Section 4(1)
  • Section 13(1)(e) of PC Act, 1988,
  • Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act
  • Section 162 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 311 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 13(1)(2) of PC Act r/w Section 109 IPC
  • Corruption Act, 1988: 34.Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act
  • Section 107 punishable under Section 109 IPC.
  • Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 8.6
  • Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act and Section 13(1)(e)of the 1988 Act
  • Sections 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act and Section 109 IPC r/w Section 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act. 5
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (in short "PC Act") Act,
  • Section 5 of the 1947 Act.
  • Section 63 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( in short "the Evidence Act")
  • Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act r/w 109 of IPC
  • tentacles of Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act
  • 691 ..Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 corresponds to clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 68/117
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • ARTICLE 20 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 106 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 3 EVIDENCE ACT
  • ARTICLE 141 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 27 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 114 A EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • SECTION 43 EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • SECTION 6 A GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
  • SECTION 6 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • SECTION 61 EVIDENCE ACT
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 161 (2) of Cr.P.C.
  • section 109 of IPC. 9.1 A3
  • Sections 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act,
  • Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988
  • section 13(1)(e) {old section 5(1)(e)}
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act
  • Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 40 A1 and A2
  • Section 5(3). 78/117
  • CCS Conduct 35/117 Rules
  • Prevention of Corruption Act Cases (Principal Sessions Judge),
  • P.C. Act 1988 because Section 5(1)(e) of the old P.C. Act
  • Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973
  • Section 207 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. Section 30(2)
  • Sections 109 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against A1, A2 and A3. 4
  • Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act.
  • s. 106 of the Evidence Act.
  • provisions of Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act
  • 71/117 Section 13 of the 1988 Act
  • Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872.
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act
  • Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act
  • Section 3(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act r/w Section 109 IPC
  • Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act
  • Clause (b) of sub-section (3)
  • Section 313 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 5(1)(e). No doubt, Section 4(1)
  • Section 13(1)(e) of PC Act, 1988,
  • Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act
  • Section 162 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 311 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 13(1)(2) of PC Act r/w Section 109 IPC
  • Corruption Act, 1988: 34.Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act
  • Section 107 punishable under Section 109 IPC.
  • Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 8.6
  • Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act and Section 13(1)(e)of the 1988 Act
  • Sections 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act and Section 109 IPC r/w Section 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act. 5
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (in short "PC Act") Act,
  • Section 5 of the 1947 Act.
  • Section 63 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( in short "the Evidence Act")
  • Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act r/w 109 of IPC
  • tentacles of Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act
  • 691 ..Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 corresponds to clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 68/117
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from a judgment of conviction dated 30.10.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Puducherry, in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008. The appellants, referred to as A1 and A2, were convicted under Sections 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) and Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for possessing assets disproportionate to their known sources of income during the period from 01.01.1997 to 07.01.2006. A1 was a public servant working as General Manager of Puducherry Agro Service and Industries Corporation Limited and as Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of Puducherry. A2 is his son. A3, the deceased wife of A1, was also arrayed as an accused but the charges against her abated upon her death.

The prosecution alleged that A1 acquired disproportionate assets worth Rs.3,75,30,221.11, held in the names of himself, A2, and A3, who abetted A1 in the offence. After investigation involving examination of 85 witnesses and marking of 377 documents, charges were framed and trial conducted. The learned Special Judge convicted A1 and A2 and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for one year with fines, and ordered confiscation of disproportionate assets. Both appellants filed separate criminal appeals challenging the conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants have satisfactorily accounted for the disproportionate assets found by the prosecution.
  2. Whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and Section 109 IPC.
  3. Whether the registration of the FIR and investigation complied with the procedural requirements, including the necessity of preliminary enquiry and sanction under the PC Act.
  4. The applicability and interpretation of "known sources of income" under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.
  5. The evidentiary value of Income Tax Returns filed by the accused and their family members.
  6. The correctness of valuation and inclusion of various assets and expenditures in the computation of disproportionate assets.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Preliminary enquiry was mandatory before registration of FIR, especially in PC Act cases, which was not conducted, rendering the FIR and investigation flawed.
  • The FIR was registered improperly without approval from the competent authority as per CBI Manual, violating procedural safeguards.
  • Investigation was flawed and motivated, lacking proper sanction before filing charge sheet and denying meaningful opportunity to account for assets.
  • The sanctioning authority merely performed a formality without independent application of mind, rendering sanction invalid and proceedings void ab initio.
  • Notices issued by Investigating Officer did not disclose the full check period, denying effective opportunity to respond.
  • The right to silence under Article 20(3) of the Constitution protects accused from being compelled to furnish explanations; failure to answer notices cannot be held against them.
  • The prosecution failed to prove disproportionate assets beyond reasonable doubt; the burden lies on prosecution to establish possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income.
  • Income Tax Returns filed by A2 and A3 are legal and assessed documents and were not disproved by independent audit or investigation.
  • Several items included as assets were either not acquired during the check period or belonged to a registered trust managed by A2, and thus should not be included.
  • Documents relied upon by prosecution such as uncertified copies of sale deeds lack evidentiary value.
  • The trial court erred in holding A2 liable for abetment under Section 109 IPC, as essential elements were not proved.
  • The defence witness (a Chartered Accountant) and documentary evidence were improperly disregarded by the trial court.
  • The valuation of school and hostel buildings was exaggerated by the prosecution; correct valuation is lower as per documents submitted by appellants.
  • The appellants demonstrated a surplus in income over expenditures and assets acquired, negating the charge of disproportionate assets.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The prosecution established that A1 acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income during the check period, amounting to Rs.3,75,30,221.11.
  • FIR was registered by P.W.75 after receipt of source information and proper authorization from Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Chennai.
  • Investigating Officer called for explanations from the accused, but they failed to avail the opportunity.
  • Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 mandates public servants to declare movable and immovable properties held by themselves or family members; A1 failed to disclose assets of his wife and son.
  • The prosecution relied on evidence including statements, documents, and valuation reports to establish disproportionate assets.
  • The trial court correctly rejected defence contentions regarding valuation, ownership, and timing of acquisition of assets.
  • The sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the PC Act was properly granted with independent application of mind.
  • Evidence of abetment by A2 was established through transactions and failure to prove that properties were purchased out of A2's own funds.
  • The trial court correctly applied the law on burden of proof and satisfactorily accounted assets.
  • The prosecution disproved the defence claims and established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7 Definition of "known sources of income" as sources known to prosecution; burden on accused to satisfactorily account for disproportionate assets. Used to clarify prosecution's burden to establish known sources and accused's burden to explain assets.
State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramachandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199 Interpretation of "known sources of income" and burden of proof under Section 5(1)(e) of PC Act. Reinforced that prosecution must establish known sources and accused must satisfactorily account for disproportionate assets.
State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 Explanation of "known sources of income" under amended PC Act and burden of proof on accused. Confirmed that income must be lawful and declared; accused must satisfy court that explanation is worthy of acceptance.
State of Tamil Nadu v. R.Soundirarasu, 2023 (6) SCC 768 Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) defining "known sources of income" and procedural aspects. Clarified that prosecution need not conduct extensive enquiry into all sources, relying on lawful declared income.
K. Veerasamy v. Union of India, 1991 (3) SCC 655 Meaning of "satisfactorily account" and evidential burden on accused. Emphasized accused must offer plausible and acceptable explanation for assets.
P. Nallammal v. State, 1999 6 SCC 559 Interpretation of Section 13(1)(e) and relation to other misconduct clauses. Explained that lawful declared income is critical to discharge burden under PC Act.
State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy, 2004 (7) SCC 763 Sanction under Section 19 of PC Act and appellate court's power to interfere. Held that absence or irregularity in sanction does not vitiate proceedings unless failure of justice is caused.
Vijay Rajmohan v. CBI, 2023 (1) SCC 329 Scope of protection and immunity of public servants; sanction as limited immunity. Confirmed immunity is not absolute; prosecution valid if sanction granted and no failure of justice.
State of Maharashtra v. Pollonji Darabshaw Daruwalla, 1987 Supp SCC 379 Prosecution's prerogative in fixing check period for disproportionate assets. Upheld prosecution's discretion in selecting check period for scrutiny.
State of Karnataka v. J. Jayalalitha, 2017 (6) SCC 263 Admissibility and probative value of Income Tax Returns in PC Act trials. Held IT returns alone do not conclusively prove lawful income; independent evidence required.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 Adverse inference on suppression of evidence favorable to accused. Applied to note prosecution's failure to produce crucial documents weakens its case.
Ranganayaki v. State by Inspector of Police, AIR 2005 SC 418 Elements of abetment under Section 109 IPC requiring overt act. Used to assess whether abetment by A2 was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 Scope of evidence and duty of courts to consider all evidence adduced. Referenced to emphasize trial court's duty to consider defence evidence.
Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 Power of court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to summon and examine witnesses. Discussed in context of trial court's evaluation of defence evidence.
Nani Bai v. Geeta Bai, AIR 1958 SC 706 Admissibility and evidentiary value of secondary evidence under Indian Evidence Act. Applied to reject uncertified copies of sale deeds relied upon by prosecution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook an independent re-appreciation of the entire evidence, including oral testimony and documentary exhibits, and considered the submissions of both parties. It analyzed the legal principles governing disproportionate assets cases under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, emphasizing the dual burden: prosecution to prove possession of disproportionate assets beyond known sources of income, and accused to satisfactorily account for such assets.

The Court noted that "known sources of income" refers to lawful income sources known to the prosecution after thorough investigation, not to sources known only to the accused. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) relieves prosecution from conducting wide-ranging enquiries into undeclared sources and allows reliance on declared lawful income.

The Court found that the appellants were given sufficient opportunity by the Investigating Officer to offer explanations and to account for assets, but failed to do so in a timely and satisfactory manner. The accused did not raise procedural objections at the earliest stage and only did so at the end of trial, which was held to be improper.

Regarding the valuation and inclusion of assets, the Court examined the evidence relating to properties, jewels, and investments, and found that the trial Court correctly rejected defence contentions that certain assets belonged to a trust or were acquired outside the check period. The Court also held that uncertified copies of documents produced by prosecution lacked evidentiary value, but the prosecution had otherwise discharged its burden with admissible evidence.

The Court rejected the defence attempt to rely on Income Tax Returns filed after FIR registration as conclusive proof of lawful income, citing Supreme Court precedents that IT returns alone do not establish lawful source of income and must be corroborated by independent evidence.

On the issue of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, the Court found that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind and accorded sanction, and no failure of justice resulted from any alleged irregularity.

The Court also addressed the charge of abetment against A2, holding that the prosecution established requisite elements including instigation and financial transactions, and that the defence failed to prove A2’s independent sources of income.

The Court found the defence evidence, including that of the Chartered Accountant, to be contrived and insufficient to rebut the prosecution’s case.

Overall, the Court concluded that the prosecution proved possession of disproportionate assets beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused failed to satisfactorily account for the same, justifying conviction and sentence.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed both appeals, upholding the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court against A1 and A2 under Sections 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the PC Act and Section 109 IPC.

The trial Court’s order of confiscation of disproportionate assets and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year with fines was affirmed. The Court directed the trial Court to secure custody of the accused to serve the remaining period of imprisonment, if any.

No new precedent was set by this judgment; it reaffirmed established legal principles regarding burden of proof, definition of "known sources of income," procedural requirements for sanction and investigation, and evidentiary standards in disproportionate assets cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

    C.ANANDANE v. STATE REP. BY

    Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

    JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 16.12.2024

    JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON

    : 09.01.2025

    CORAM:

    THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.VELMURUGAN

    Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018 ---

    C.Anandane ...Appellant in Crl.A.No.710/18 Ashok Anand ...Appellant in Crl.A.No.724/18 Vs.

    State rep. by

    The Inspector of Police,

    SPE:CBI ACB, Chennai,

    Through Public Pr osecutor,

    for CBI, Chennai. ...Respondent in both the Appeals

    (RC MAI 2006 A 0001)

    Prayer in both the Appeals: These Criminal Appeals are filed under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973 to set aside the judgment of conviction passed against the appellants in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008 dated 30.10.20218 by the learned Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases (Principal Sessions Judge), Puducherry.

    For Appellants : Mr.V.Raghavachari, Senior Advocate for

    1/117

    Mr.A.Kripakaran in Crl.A.No.710/18 Mr.R.Rajarathinam for

    Mr.M.S.Govindarajan in Crl.A.No.724/2018 For Respondents : Mr.N.Baskaran, Spl. Public Prosecutor for CBI Cases in both the Appeals

    *****

    COMMON JUDGMENT

    Both the Criminal Appeals are arising out of the same judgment of conviction passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge for cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008, dated

    30.10.2018.

    2 In this case, A1 is the appellant in Crl.A.No.710 of 2018 and A2 is the appellant in Crl.A.No.724 of 2018. For better understanding the appellants are hereinafter referred to as A1 and A2.

    3 The sum and substance of the case of the prosecution in nutshell is A1, as a public servant was working as a General manager, Puducherry Agro Service and Industries Corporation Limited, Pondicherry and Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of

    2/117

    Puducherry. During the period from 01.01.1997 to 07.01.2006 A1 acquired assets, which were disproportionate to his known source of income and was in possession of assets in his name and his family members i.e. A2 his son and his deceased wife, who was arrayed as A3, to the extent of Rs.3,75,30,221.11 and A2 and A3 abetted A1 in the commission of offence. On the culminations of the investigation, prosecution laid charge sheet before the learned Special Judge for cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (in short "PC Act") Act, Puducherry, for the offence under Sections 109 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against A1, A2 and A3.

    4 The learned Special Judge has taken the charge sheet on file in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008 and after hearing both sides and perusing entire materials and having prima faice satisfied, framed charges for the offence under Sections 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act and Section 109 IPC r/w Section 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act.

    5 In order to prove the charges, on the side of the prosecution, 85

    3/117

    witnesses were examined as P.Ws.1 to 85 and 377 documents were marked as Exs.P1 to P377. On the side of the defence, the Chartered Accountant was examined as D.W.1 and 37 documents were marked as Exs.D1 to D37.

    6 On completion of trial and hearing of arguments advanced on either side, the learned Special Judge, come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case and hence by judgment dated 30.10.2018 convicted the first accused for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and imposed fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only), in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. The second accused was convicted for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act r/w 109 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and imposed fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only), in default, to undergo rigourous imprisonment for a period of three months. Further the learned Special Judge, ordered confiscation of the disproportionate assets.

    4/117

    7 Aggrieved over the said judgment of conviction and sentence, the first and second accused are before this Court with the separate criminal appeals.

    8 Even though the learned Senior Counsel for A2 and the learned counsel for A1 argued separately and extensively, their submissions are on the same line and hence the arguments are summed up as follows.

    8.1 There are deficiencies in the very registration of FIR itself. It is well settled legal principle that a preliminary enquiry must be conducted prior to the registration of an FIR, in order to gather sufficient information that establishes a prima facie case for the commission of an offence, especially in the cases under the PC Act. The learned Senior Counsel placing reliance on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an enquiry at pre-FIR is desirable more particularly in case where the allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice acquiring the assets/properties disproportionate to his known sources of income.

    5/117

    1. (2021) 5 SCC 469 (Charan Singh vs. State of Maharashtra)

    2. AIR 1971 SC 520 (P.Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras)

    3. (2014) 2 SCC 1 (Lalitha Kumari vs. State of UP)

    4. (2011) 4 SCC 402 (Ashok Tshiring Bhuta vs. State of Sikkim)

    8.2 The FIR itself was registered improperly in violation of the CBI Manual, which also says a preliminary enquiry should be conducted after obtaining approval of the competent authority. Further in the case of Nirmal Singh Kahlon vs. State of Punjab reported in (2009) 1 SCC 441, the Supreme Court noted that the CBI, when lodging an FIR, must follow its manual, which provides for the conduct of preliminary enquiry and the Court affirmed that a prima facie case can only be established after completing the preliminary enquiry, which serves to determine whether the complaint warrants formal investigation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the same in many of its judgments. Further the testimony of P.W.75 reveal that he registered the FIR as per the directions (Ex.P346) issued by the Superintendent of Police, CBI, whereas, as per the CBI manual, the Director of CBI has to authorise, in respect of Group A

    6/117

    Government Servants.

    8.3 The investigation in the present case appears to be flawed and motivated against the appellants, since proper sanction was not obtained prior to filing of charge sheet against A1 and no meaningful opportunity was provided to account their alleged disproportionate assets. The lack of any explanation in the impugned judgment concerning the change of check period only alludes to the fact that the investigation in the present case was not free and fair, which is fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which was also reiterated in the decisions reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225 and (2013) 10 SCC 192.

    8.4 The sanctioning authority (P.W.5) performed an empty formality by granting the sanction order without performing its duties as required under law and hence the failure of the sanctioning authority to evaluate the materials before granting sanction for prosecution violates the mandatory requirements under Section 19 of the PC Act, which was also emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Singh Brahmajeet Singh Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 5

    7/117

    SCC 294 that a sanction order is invalid if there is no evidence of independent application of mind. The above fact has also been clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CBI vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal reported in AIR 2014 SC 827 and State of Punjab vs. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti reported in (2009) 17 SCC 92. In the present case no proper sanction was procured and hence the proceedings is rendered void ab initio.

    8.5 A bare perusal of the notice issued by the Investigating Officer dated 17.05.2007 (Ex. P. 374) does not disclose the check period and the notice merely stated that the check period starts from 01.01.1997 but not the end of check period. Therefore the appellants could not make their effective response to the said notice. P.W.85 has stated that he had issued notices to A1 and A2 to provide an explanation regarding the value and cost of the assets, but, the prosecution has not marked any such notice and hence an adverse inference ought to have been placed against the prosecution in terms of Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

    8.6 Further, the observations of learned Special Judge that the

    8/117

    appellants have been given an opportunity to raise objections through the investigating officer, but they failed to avail that opportunity, is erroneous. Right to Silence emanates from Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. It is the prerogative of the accused to remain silent till prosecution proved the necessary ingredients of charges. It is trite law that the prosecution has the duty to prove a person's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Ex.P372 and Ex.P373 show that the appellants were required to attend the C.B.I office to answer certain questions and explain their position and to bring relevant documents, if, any, and produce them in support of their answers/ explanation. Pertinently, Ex.P374 is a long questionnaire given to the appellants to furnish the information as stated therein. Ex.P374 is almost similar to long sting of questions as observed in the judgment reported in AIR 1978 SC 1025 and hence there was no requirement to answer to Ex.P374 and Ex.P272 to 274 cannot be looked into nor referred to in the impugned judgment. Therefore investigation had not been in consonance and confirmity with law and such illegalities cannot later be sanctified in subsequent proceedings as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Sing Bhullar reported in (2011) 14

    9/117

    SCC 770.

    8.7 The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof in establishing that the appellants are guilty for the offence under Section 13(l)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. To substantiate a charge under Section 13 (1) (e) of PC Act, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused is a public servant; (b) the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property which where found in his possession; (c) it must be proved as to what were his known source of income and (d) it must prove, quite objectively, that resources or property found in the possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known source of income. A criminal trial against an accused begins only upon framing of charges and in the present case the trial never began qua A3 and hence there is no question of abetting against A3, but the learned Special Judge has made an observation that A3 is also liable under Section 109 IPC. Therefore finding of the learned Special Judge relating the appellants along with A3 suffers from infirmities.

    8.8 The learned Special Judge held A2 guilty for offence of

    10/117

    abetment under Section 109 of IPC, but, a bare perusal of the observations made in regard to the same, none of the observations indicate any of the elements required under Section 107 punishable under Section 109 IPC. The prosecution did not examine the persons who were witnesses the registration of sale deed for the lands alleged to have purchased by the appellants to show whether A1, A2 and A3 were present during the time of registration. It is an admitted fact that A2 purchased properties out of his own funds and there is no case contrary to this which has been made out by the prosecution. The only situation which is being sought to be used against A2 is that the seller of the lands had his land surrounded by land of A1. Without prejudice, the said submission even if taken on face value does not establish that A2 is an abettor. In fact, PW57 who is a power of attorney holder of the seller of the lands has not said a single word incriminating against A2. Further merely the fact that father is surety/guarantor for availing loan by the son i.e., A2 does not establish that A2 has abetted A1 to acquire property disproportionate to his known source of income or has resulted in creation of property by A1. The findings of learned Special Judge that the prosecution has established that accused persons including A2 had transactions during

    11/117

    check period and purchased properties is incorrect and further cannot be the basis for inferring that A2 is guilty of abetment under section 107 of IPC. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranganayaki Vs. State by Inspector of police reported in AIR 2005 SC 418 observed that "The offence of abetment created under second clause of Section 107 IPC requires that there must be something more than mere conspiracy. There must some act or illegal omission in pursuance of that conspiracy."

    8.9 The learned Special Judge while passing the impugned judgment erred in not appreciating the testimony of defence witness, Rajendiran, DW1, which makes it clear that the above finding of the learned Judge is without any reasons. Further, Ex.D36 and D37 were the documents submitted by A1 as required under the law, being a government servant, the Trial Court ought to have given due consideration to the said documents. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1963 SC 151, held that the purpose of adducing evidence is to prove fact. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines evidence which means and includes all statements which the court permits or is required to be made

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    and such evidence, if adduced, must be taken into consideration. The scope of Courts to examine witnesses at any stage of trial/proceedings have been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Natasha Singh v. Central Bureau Of Investigation (State) ., (2013) 5 SCC 741 while emphasizing on the power of the court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The learned counsel further relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Anil Sharma vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2004) 5 SCC 679 and Krishna Swami vs. Union of India reported in

    (1992) 4 SCC 605.

    8.10 Exhibits D1 to D5 and D10 to 28 were already brought on record by the prosecution but were being read selectively. The learned Special Judge has relied upon certain parts of the afore-mentioned documents, though the law requires that he read the entire document to reach a logical conclusion. Some documents were produced by the appellant as he received the same under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The exhibits D6 to D9 were marked using the IT documents filed by A2 for the period from 01.04.2004 to 31.03.2006 through prosecution witness R. Govindan, PW-23. The learned Special Judge completely ignored the income of A2 for these two

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    years since they were not produced by the prosecution despite the fact that they are public documents.

    8.11 The findings of the learned Special Judge in the impugned judgment that it is unsafe to rely on income mentioned in such IT returns which did not reflect in the previous IT returns, are ex-facie devoid of any merit, unfounded and erroneous in law. Admittedly the check period was enlarged in both directions, the same remained unknown to the appellant as it was extended after the registration of the FIR. Therefore, merely the fact that FIR has been registered cannot be read as an instance to reject the ITR's on the ground that according to the FIR the said ITRs would fall outside the check period. The Income Tax Returns filed by A2 and A3 are legal documents assessed and accepted by the Income Tax Department. The prosecution has neither challenged these returns under the Income Tax Act nor presented any conclusive evidence to demonstrate exaggeration. As per the decisions in the case of Krishnanand Agnihotri vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1977 1 SCC 816, ITRs duly filed and assessed should be given due weight, and any claim of exaggeration must be supported by

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    concrete evidence. In this case, no independent audit or investigation disproving the legitimacy of the ITRs has been conducted by the prosecution.

    8.12 Items 39, 40 of Statement B which relate to pledging of jewels, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that they were acquired during check period. Merely because they were pledged with the concerned Banks during 2003, 2004, and 2005, it cannot be inferred or presumed that those jewels were acquired during check period. Further P.W.85, Investigating Officer deposed that he did not collect any documents concerning the purchase or procurement of the said jewels and there is no evidence to establish that the same were acquired or purchased during the check period. Therefore the jewels owned by A2 as described at Sl.No.39 of Statement B, having a total value of R.6,39,115/- have been wrongly included as assets owned during the illegally enlarged check period. The evidence of P.W.31 and P.W.37 and Exhibits Ex.P.197 to 206 and Ex.P239 and Ex.P240 does not disclose that the jewelry pledged were purchased during the check period. Even P.W.85 admitted that the jewels were not identified during

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    investigation and no materials were gathered to establish the age or the price of the jewels, as required by law, either through an expert or jewel appraiser.

    8.13 The learned Special Judge while passing the impugned judgment has erroneously included the properties mentioned at Sr.No.16, 17, 25, 26, 27, 31 and 33 having a total value of Rs.11,09,000/- in Statement B. In this regard, reliance could not have been placed upon Ex.P308 and Ex.P310 as the same were not certified copies of original registered documents. The Sale Deeds of the same have neither been procured nor produced by Investigating Officer in the Court. The Investigating Officer has only examined the SRO of the respective village and relied upon a letter Exs.P291, P308 and P310 issued by the SRO to him. P.W.49 and P.W46 speak about Ex.P291, Ex.P308, and Ex.P310 which merely contain particulars of the documents including document numbers, date of registration, Survey No., village and extent, name and address of seller, name and address of purchaser, sale consideration, Registration charges, and stamp duty. These documents, cannot be equated with certified copies though they are given by concerned Sub-Registrars, since the documents

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    cannot fall under Section 63 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( in short "the Evidence Act") as those documents are not made from the original documents nor can be compared with the original. Section 61 of the Evidence Act provides that the contents of document may be proved either by primary evidence or by secondary evidence. The evidence of P.W.46 and P.W.49 and Exhibits P.291, 308 and 309 as relied upon by the learned Special Judge is to be eschewed from consideration. They have no evidentiary value and are at best, weak pieces of evidence. In this regard, reliance is placed on the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nani Bai v. Geeta Bai, reported in AIR 1958 SC 706.

    8.14 Therefore, it is for the prosecution to establish or prove as to why it has not obtained certified copies from the Sub-Registrars. It is not the case of P.W85 that he sent letters to concerned Sub-Registrars to furnish certified copies of sale deeds relating to the sale transactions in favour of the accused. No document is filed to show that he addressed letters to the Sub- Registrars to furnish certified copies. Hence, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof. It is only after the discharge of the said burden, the onus of proof shifts to the accused to account satisfactorily the

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    pecuniary resources, which has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mussauddin Ahmed v. State Of Assam ., reported in (2009) 14 SCC

    541. The failure on the part of the prosecution to submit crucial documents, including seized invoices and records, warrants an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, highlighted that suppression of evidence favorable to the accused weakens the prosecution's case. Further prosecution has to stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases has held as above:

    1. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC

    116

    2. R. Venkatkrishnan v. Central Bureau Of Investigation ., (2009) 11 SCC 737

    3. Anand Ramachandra Chougulev.Sidarai Laxman Chougala, (2019) 8

    SCC 50

    8.15 A2 is the sole proprietor of Ashok Steels. Ex P152 dated 30.08.2005, shows the business name as Ashok Steels. Further, P.W.29 stated that the cash credit account of Ashok Steels from 13.06.2002 to

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    08.02.2007 is the ledger marked as Ex.P167. P.W23, Income Tax Officer stated that Income Tax Returns of A2 for financial year 2005-2006 is Ex.D6 which is accepted by the Income Tax Department. As seen from Ex.D.6 ITR for assessment year 2005-2006 (financial year 2004-2005) filed by A2 is on 31.10.2005 i.e., prior to registration of the present case. Further, gross profit under Ex.D6 is Rs.8,66,559/-. It also clearly goes to show that Ashok Steels invested Rs.41,65,018/- for school building. The source for the purchase of stocks may be through capital, credit, or, sales and it cannot be split to match the corresponding investments. Ex.D6 relates to Ashok Steels and Part-B shows that the nature of business was steel and cement dealer and net profit was Rs.11,10,166/-. Admittedly, EX.D.6 is not disputed or denied by the prosecution. While the learned Special Judge relied upon Ex.P79 to Ex.P81 regarding Sl.No.49 of Statement-C to show that A2 had shown his income as Rs.5,83,007/- which is admittedly from 01.04.2001 to 31.03.2005, the learned Judge ignored the income of A2 from 01.04.2005 to 07.01.2006. Ex.P79 makes it clear that the income tax return of A2 for the financial year 2000-2021 shows that exact value received from steel and cement sales is Rs.30,80,668/-. Further, by the end of 31.03.2021, Ashok steels had a credit

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    of Rs.13,77,731/-. It also shows that he was doing liquor business and he paid Rs.1,42,872/- towards excise duty. For financial year 2002-2003, Ashok paid Rs.2,20,396/- towards excise duty. Similarly, Ex.P80 Income tax returns for the financial year 2003-2004 also shows that A2 is a cement and steel dealer. Moreover, from the evidence of prosecution, it is also clear that A2 was also doing agriculture by raising sugarcane. Ex.D29 is prepared from records produced by A2 to D.W.1 for verification. Admittedly, the same is not shown to be incorrect and hence, admitted being true and reliable. As per trial Court, the income of A2 is Rs.10,06,127/-, but, whereas, as per audited cash flow including depreciation found in Ex.D29 the income of A2 as Rs.64,92,436.22/- the difference is Rs.54,86,309, which must be added in Statement C. Further S.No.57 of Statement D pertains to money received from Shri Ram Chit Funds to the tune of Rs.32,740/-. The said money has to be added as income in Statement C and must be removed from expenditure in Statement D. The bonus received by A1 to the tune of Rs. 47,650/- is based on the 5thpay commission and admittedly the same is not reflected in Ex.P.31. Therefore, Rs.47,650/- must be added to Statement C. The loan procured by A1 to purchase a personal computer for a sum of

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    Rs.72,000/- as deposed by P.W.14 and Ex.P52 has not been considered. Therefore, a sum of Rs.72,000/- must be included in Statement C. In 1998, a departmental enquiry was initiated by Chief Vigilance Office against A1 based on a memorandum dated 21.10.1998, Ex.D.37. During the enquiry, A1 disclosed that A2 and A3 have independent source of income by running a super market, Handy Super Store and are not dependent uponA1,Ex.P.84 to 87 and Ex.P.121. The capital for the business was through loans from Punjab National Bank, a term loan of Rs.5,00,000/- and working capital loan of Rs.5,50,000/-, the same was recorded during the enquiry, Ex.D.37. Further, the agricultural income of Rs.1,92,500/- from lands inherited from the respective ancestors in the year 2000 and 1975 respectively were also disclosed and marked as Ex. D. 34. The Chief Vigilance Office has accepted the explanation of A1 after detailed enquiry, and found that A2 and A3 are not the dependents of A1. The records of the departmental proceedings are marked as Ex. D. 37.

    8.16 The learned Special Judge has incorrectly included the properties of the Trust as properties of the appellants in Sr.No.36-38 & 50 of

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    Statement-B and Sr.No.47-50 & 82-91 of Statement D, Ex.P270-278, concluding that the trust was created only to escape from the clutches of law. There were no circumstances in the evidence of prosecution to infer that it is created to escape from the clutches of law. Even the investigating officers or any other witnesses did not speak on this aspect. Further, the trust was registered on 05.09.2001 and certified copy of trust is marked as Ex.P293 which is registered in the office of the District Registrar as Document No.1061 of 2001. It is a public charitable trust and is a creature of statute and the same was submitted by P.W.46 to Investigating Officer. After obtaining permission to run the Schools for the academic year 2005- 2006, A2 had to submit the accounts to the income tax authorities only after closure of financial year and not to the Registrar of Companies as the trust is registered with the Office of the District Registrar, Pondicherry. As per Ex.270, Ex.274, Ex.275, the trust address is 5, New Saram, Pondicherry, whereas the address of A1 as per Ex.P372, Ex.P 375 is 3, V.Subbaiah Street, Ellapillaichavadi, Pondicherry. The finding of learned Special Judge that Ex.P.270 to Ex. P278 reveal the office address of the trust was given the address of A1, is incorrect. Further, A2 is managing the trust properties and

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    therefore, as a Managing Trustee, he can sign the application dated 29.11.2004 as in Ex.P270 for proposal to open a new school by name Aditya Vidyashram Montessori School from LKG to 1st Standard. Moreover, the said educational agency is Shri Vidya Educational Trust and necessary fee for opening of school was paid under Ex.P271. Ex.P.272 and 273 are the fixed deposit receipts in the name of trust. The Director of School Education, Pondicherry, granted provisional permission as per Ex.P274. Similarly, A2 as managing trustee gave an application dated 29.11.2004 for permission to open school "Aditya Vidyashram Residential School "from LKG to VIII standard in the academic year 2005-2006. Under Ex.P276, the necessary fee was paid to the Education Department by the Trust. Ex.P277 and 278 fixed deposits were shown in the name of trust. Under Ex.P 279, the provisional permission was granted on 17.08.2005.

    8.17 Even P.W.42, who is Secretary to Government of Pondicherry, Health and Education Department had clearly stated that both the applications for schools are signed by A2 as Managing Trustee. Therefore, there is no scope or possibility for the trust to file income tax returns or to maintain accounts for the financial year 2005-2006 as the school and hostel

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    buildings were under construction and further prosecution registered the case against accused on 04.01.2006. Further, the evidence of P.W48 and Ex.P307 make it clear that a copy of Balance Sheet along with a statement of receipt and expenditure audited by chartered accountant was not filed by the society. Further, reliance placed by the learned Special Judge on the case of State of Tamilnadu Vs. Suresh Rajan, 2014 AIR SCW 942 is erroneous as there is no ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of Constitution of India that the trust properties cannot be included in the individual account. The prosecution has wrongly identified loss in sale of land and has been recorded the same in S.No.44A of Statement D. Therefore, Rs.1,32,200/- must be deducted from Statement D. Presumption of expenditures in relation to domestic expenditure is impermissible in law. Therefore, S.No.19 of Statement D for a sum of Rs.6,41,845/- must be deducted. Presumption of marriage expenses of daughters is impermissible in law. Therefore, Rs.8,25,000/- in S.No.21 of Statement D must be deducted. No requirement under Law for the Public Servant to disclose the assets and liability of family members,whose income is above Rs.1,500/- per month because they are not wholly dependent on the

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    Public Servant, but the trial Court, relying on Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 observed that A1 did not disclose the details of assets held by his family members, which is erroneous.

    8.18 The properties owned by the Trust cannot be indicated or included as properties of the accused, merely because the trust has not maintained proper books of accounts and operates from the premises owned by A1. The books of Accounts were maintained in ordinary course of business. The same ought to be excluded from Statement B and Statement D. Further, as per the evidence of P.W.48, Aditya Residential School, Poraiyur, is registered under Companies Act as mentioned in the Ex.P307, which is incorrect. Ex.P307 shows that the society has to file a copy of balance sheet along with statement of receipt and expenditure audited by chartered accountant. The subject in this document is mentioned as Aditya Vidhyasharam Residential School. P.W.85 stated that on 16.03.2007 he examined E.S.Ganesh of the office of the Registrar of Companies as P.W.48 with reference to the society in the name of Aditya Vidyashram School. Both the schools are under control and management of Sri Vidya Narayana

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    Trust. This is evidenced from Exs.P.270 to 279. Therefore, the observation of the learned Special Judge that according to the evidence of P.W.48, no balance sheet and statement of income and expenditure was filed by the trust, is totally incorrect as there was no oral or documentary evidence adduced by prosecution to show that the statement of receipt and expenditure of Sri Vidya Narayana Educational Trust was called by P.W.85. Therefore, values of items 36, 37 and 38 regarding purchase of vehicles stand in the name of Trust, Item 50, the FDR stands in the name of Trust cannot be included in Statement-B. Similarly, Sl.No.44 of Statement-C of Rs.66,636.75 has to be deleted. The value of properties namely Item Nos.36, 37, 38 and 50 have to be deleted from Statement -B.

    8.19 The Bank charges and interest received by A2 and A3 (deceased) have already been excluded from their respective net income mentioned in their respective ITRs for the said years 2000-05 and 2005-06 Ex.P79 to P81. Therefore, inclusion of the same in Statement D would amount to double accounting. At Sl.No.81, a sum of Rs.3,82,000/- has been indicated as a loss from purchase and sale of JCB Excavator. Admittedly, the income earned through JCB rental, was wrongly not included by the

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    learned Special Judge, stating that the same was exaggerated. However, even accepting the figures as proposed by the learned Special Judge, the JCB has not resulted in any losses, and in fact has only resulted in profits from sale of the same. Accordingly, the same must be excluded from Statement D.

    8.20 Reports recorded by police during the course of investigation in the presence of witnesses including search and seizure, making inventory of articles, contain both admissible and inadmissible portions. Only objectives findings like inventory of articles as mentioned in the reports Ex.P339 and Ex.P344 are only admissible. If the report is based on some information given by any person including the accused person, it is not admissible on the rule of hearsay as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameswar Dayal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1558. P.W.73, who conducted search and inventory under Ex.P339 specifically stated that he prepared the report by collecting the information about the value of the said goods, the date of purchase and method of purchase from the second accused and his mother. Any statement made by person accused of an offence is inadmissible under Section 162 of Cr.P.C except for a

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    limited purpose, if a portion of such statement falls under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, collecting information as stated by P.W.73 from the accused is contrary to Section 161 (2) of Cr.P.C. Investigating Officer P.W.75 and the so-called independent witnesses P.W.72 and Govindan did not speak anything as to how they came to the conclusion that the inventory articles were acquired by accused during check period and the value of articles. They are not proper and competent persons to assess the value of inventory articles and approximate year of acquisition. Therefore, the two reports Ex.P.339 and Ex.P.344 insofar as they refer to the year of acquisition and value of articles as allegedly stated by the accused are not admissible in law. Therefore, total value of inventory articles of Ex.P339 and Ex.P344 is Rs.4,58,295/- and the same has to be deducted from Statement-B. The estimate of the entire project comprising the School, Hostel, Staff Quarters, and Stadium is Rs.2,24,23,183/-and the same was approved by P.W.50, Town Planning Authority, Puducherry. A2 has mobilized funds by borrowing Rs.50,00,000/- as a term loan from Indian Overseas Bank in 2003. The Branch Manager of IOB (P.W.27), has spoken about at same (Pg.79, Vol.I), and marked as Ex.P.136 (Pg.978,Vol.II). The stocks worth

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    Rs.41,65,018.90/-were infused from Ashok Steel for the construction of the building in 2004, the said investments are sourced from the loans availed by M/s Ashok Steels and the same is also evidenced from the loans mentioned in the liability column. The above investments are disclosed in the respective ITR marked as Ex.D.6, which has been accepted by the Special Court. At the end of the check period i.e., on 07.01.2006, the hostel building was complete but the school building was incomplete. The Staff Quarters and Stadium were yet to be constructed. After the end of check period, further loan of Rs.1,75,00,000/- were borrowed from Indian Overseas Bank in October 2006 by pledging the land and building. Since it is after the check period, the same was not collected by the investigation agency and submitted before the Court. The construction of the buildings were completed in FY 2006-07 at a cost of Rs.2,02,07,435.77 (Hostel Building Value is Rs.77,82,674.75 plus School Building value of Rs,1,24,24,761.02) as per ITR returns.

    8.21 Regarding the land surrounding the above purchased land, the grand-father of A2 transferred the land to A1, and A1 transferred the said land to A2 on the same date, on 03.04.2002, in R.S.No.1/4, 11/1, 99/5, 99/4,

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    99/1, 74/4, vide Document Nos.682/2002, registered at SRO, Villianur, marked as item No.32 of Statement B and the value of the said land has been given by the prosecution as zero '0', because it is an ancestral property. The learned Special Judge merely relied upon the value mentioned in sale deed which is not produced and proved and learned Judge deducted Rs.5,13,000/-. The certified copy of original sale deed which will show about the sale consideration is the best piece of evidence. However, the same is not produced by prosecution nor given any explanation for not producing the same. Hence only an amount of Rs.90,000/- is to be added to item 28 of statement 'B', instead of Rs.9,50,000/-. As a result, a sum of Rs.8,60,000/- has to be deducted from Statement 'B'.

    8.22 The valuation of the School Building ought to have been taken as provided in Ex.D25 as deposed by P.W.64, i.e., a sum of Rs.1,34,08,000/- instead of Rs. 2,06,90,769/- as taken by the learned Special Judge. P.W.85 admitted in cross examination that he has noted in Ex.368 at Sl.No.34 of statement B that the cost of construction of the school building was given by IOB panel valuer of IT Department and valuation officer. Therefore, it is

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    clear that assessment of the value of buildings were based on the request made by the bank and by A2 as observed by the learned Special Judge. The evidence of P.W.64 and the recitals in Ex.D25, established beyond doubt that the cost of construction of school and hostel building is Rs.1,34,08,000/-

    . Admittedly, P.W.64 was not declared as hostile by the prosecution. P.W.23 who was the income tax officer, Pondicherry, till 2007 had also categorically admitted that Ex.D6 is the copy of the income tax returns of A2 for financial year 2005 and 2006. Moreover, Ex.D6 is not denied or disputed by the prosecution. In this document, the balance sheet of A2 clearly shows that he invested Rs.41,65,018.90/- It is pertinent to note this document has not been referred to in the impugned judgment by the learned Special Judge despite being specifically raised by A2 in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Being a dealer in cements and steel items, A2 was entitled to discounted rates in procuring the same. Therefore, the correct valuation to be accepted is the sum of Rs.1,34,08,000/-.

    8.23 The calculations presented by the appellants demonstrate a clear and logical methodology. The opening and closing asset values, as

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    reflected in Statements A and B, are drawn from verified documentary evidence, including financial records and property valuation reports. Income earned during the check period, shown in Statement C, has been calculated based on authentic records such as Income Tax Returns and business-related documents. Expenditures incurred during the check period, detailed in Statement D, are supported by valid documentation, including household expenditure details and verified invoices. These figures collectively establish a surplus of Rs.27,51,126.50/- in Statement F, conclusively proving that the appellants had sufficient legitimate income to account for the assets acquired during the check period. The calculations further show that assets acquired during the check period, as detailed in Statement E, amount to Rs.1,42,74,463.70/-, which is well within the likely savings of Rs.1,45,30,529.25/- computed in Statement F. This surplus demonstrates that there is no disproportionate acquisition of assets, and all financial details have been satisfactorily explained through legitimate sources of income and expenditures. Section 13(1)(e) of PC Act, 1988, requires the prosecution to establish that the accused is in possession of assets disproportionate to their known sources of income. This provision necessitates the prosecution to

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    prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the assets were not acquired through legitimate means or independently earned by family members. In this case, the surplus of Rs.27,51,126.50/- shown in Statement F negates the allegation of disproportionate assets. Section 20 of PC Act provides for a presumption against the accused only when the prosecution successfully establishes the existence of disproportionate assets. The burden of proving disproportionate assets lies squarely on the prosecution. It must establish, with credible evidence, that the assets are beyond the means of the accused and cannot be accounted for. In this case the prosecution has failed to discharge this burden. The evidence presented by the appellants, including verified income and expenditure records, negates the presumption under Section 20 of PC Act and demonstrates that all assets have been acquired through legitimate means.

    8.24 The adjustments made by the Trial Court in reducing the disproportionate assets percentage from 256% to 110.60% highlight the flaws in the prosecution's original computation. Despite this reduction, the inclusion of independent income sources and properties unrelated to A1

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    further skews the findings. In light of the above arguments, the prosecution failed to establish a case of disproportionate assets or abetment under Section 109 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.Chenga Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 193, emphasized that errors in valuation and computation undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Vasant Rao Guhe v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 14 SCC 442 held that metamorphosis of figures without alteration of charge is impermissible in law. The defense has effectively countered each claim with credible evidence and legal precedents, warranting a dismissal of the allegations against A1, A2, and A3. In light of the above, the calculations presented by the appellants are accurate, transparent, and supported by credible evidence. The prosecution's failure to establish disproportionate assets beyond reasonable doubt undermines their case, and the surplus shown in Statement F conclusively disproves the allegations against the appellants. Therefore the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant prays to set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008.

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    9 The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent would submit that during the period from 01.01.1997 to 07.01.2006, A1 acquired assets which were disproportionate to his known source of income and was in possession of assets in his name and in the name of his family members i.e Ashok Anand (A2) and his deceased wife Vijayalakshmi (A3) to an extent of Rs.3,75,30,22.1.11/-, which were disproportionate to his known sources of income for which he could not satisfactorily account for and the percentage of the disproportionate assets is 256%. FIR was registered by PW 75 (Krishnamoorthy) based on the source information and subsequently, searches were conducted at the premises of A1 and A2. P.W.75 called for explanation from the accused for the properties acquired by them. A1 submitted Statements I to VI, which is EX.P.25 in which he had declared only the properties held and acquired by him. In the said statement A1 has not declared the properties of A3 wife and A2 son. As per the rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, it is mandatory for every Public Servant to declare the transactions of immovable and movable properties, including Jewellery, held by him either in his own name or in the name of his family members. This CCS Conduct

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    Rules is applicable to the Public Servants of Puducherry Government also. The Investigating Officer called for explanation from the accused for the properties acquired by them. However, the accused have not availed the opportunity given to them. Therefore, PW 75 (Krishnamoorthy) has taken the income as per the salary particulars and income of A2 and A3 from the Income Tax Returns particulars here to the date of registration of FIR. After registration of FIR A2 and A3 filed their Income Tax Returns with exaggerated figures and A2 & A3 have not produced any evidence to show their sources of huge income that was filed before the Income Tax Returns. A2 and A3 abetted A1, therefore they are liable to be prosecuted under section 109 of IPC.

    9.1 A3 died and the charges against A3 was also abated. In Statement A of the Charge Sheet, 8 items were shown and A1 and A2 admitted all the 8 items. A2 contended that an immovable property standing in the name of A2 was not considered. A2 claimed that the value of property was Rs.14,000/- but the prosecution has not given any value to the property. Therefore, the learned Judge has included an immovable property for the value of Rs.14,000/- and after including the sum of Rs.14,000/- in Statement

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    A, the total value of the assets in Statement A has been arrived at Rs.16,01,431/- instead of Rs.15,87,431/- as calculated by the prosecution. The other contention raised by the accused is that the jewels were purchased before the check period. Therefore, the value of Jewels are to be added in Statement A. To support his contention, the defence relied upon the evidence of P.W.85, Investigating Officer. In the cross-examination, Investigating Officer has admitted that he has not collected any documents to show that the documents were purchased during the check period. It is pertinent to note that A1 has submitted Statements I to VI and in the said Statements, he has not mentioned about the properties of his wife nor his son, particularly in Statement IV he has not declared the jewels held by his wife. The Investigating Officer would have taken it into consideration and added it in Statement A, if it had been declared in Statements I to VI by the accused. In the absence of any material produced by the accused, it cannot be added in Statement A. The learned Judge properly held that the jewels were purchased during the check period. It is also pertinent to note that the jewels were pledged during the check period and the accused failed to make any objection at the earliest point of time and such objection was raised only at

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    the time of arguments. Therefore, the contention of accused is only afterthought.

    9.2 Sl. No 5 in Statement B, the household articles worth about Rs.4,58,295/- was disputed by the accused persons. As per EX.P.339 and EX.P.334 the valuation was arrived at the time of search and A1 and A2 during the searches in their premises signed the Mahazar and they have not raised any objection at the time of valuation and they were not permitted to raise the objection during trial. However, the learned Judge has added a sum of Rs.1000/- in Sl.No.49 of Statement B. Therefore, the value of Rs.4,59,295/- is proper and rightly held by the learned Judge. As far as SI. No 12 in Statement B, a sum of Rs.50,000/- is received as rental advance is concerned, the accused contested that it should be shown in Statement D as expenditure. The rental advance paid by A1 to PW70. The defence has argued that it should be brought under expenditure column. The said amount is only an advance and the said amount is refundable at the time of vacation of the house and it is properly shown in Statement B and the learned Judge also accepted the contention of the prosecution and rejected the contention of the defence. As far as SI. No 16, 17, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31and 33 in Statement

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    B, the total value of Rs.11,09,000/- was shown in Statement D. It is argued on behalf of the accused that the prosecution has failed to produce the documents to show the value of properties. EX.P. 291, 308 and 310 were submitted by the concerned Sub-Registrar, who is a competent authority and he has given the said Exhibits in his Official capacity. Therefore, the Exhibits are proper to show the value of properties and the learned Judge accepted the arguments of prosecution and held that the sum of Rs.11,09,000/- properly shown in Statement B. 16.

    9.3 The accused has not denied the title of the properties and disputed only the value of the property. The Sub-Registrar has taken the value of the properties as per the documents, which cannot be disputed. Therefore, the contention of the accused is liable to be dismissed and the learned Judge has properly taken the value as per EX.P.291, 308 and 310. Investigating Officer has examined the witnesses and obtained documents regarding the value of the properties in their official capacity. Therefore, the contention of accused that the documents were hit by Section 162 of CrPC is incorrect and it was rightly held so by the learned Judge. The learned Judge

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    has not relied upon the evidence of P.W.53 and therefore has deducted a sum of Rs.4,37,000/- from Statement B in SI. No.28. In the same way the learned Judge has not relied upon the evidence of P.W.54 and therefore has deducted a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- from Statement B in SI. No.29.

    9.4 As far as Item 34 of Statement B is concerned about the construction of the school and hostel building, the prosecution has examined PW 34 who is a Valuation Officer from Income Tax Department and also spoken that he has lot of experience in valuation of building. His Valuation Report is marked as EX.P.219 and additional Report is EX.P. 220. P.W.34 has given reasoned valuation and he valued the school building as Rs.2,42,17,614/- and the hostel building as Rs.1,27,20,239/-. It was pointed out that P.W.34 is not competent person to value the building. However, the accused have not pointed out the mistake in valuation. The accused contented that P.W.64 in his evidence deposed that he valued the building at Rs.1,34,08,000/- and EX.D25 also reveals the same value. P.W.64 valued the properties of A2 and he filed the Valuation Report in EX.P145. As per his report the value of the building is Rs.2,06,90,769/- and the land value is Rs.87,39,000/-. It can be seen from the evidence of P.W.64 that EX.P.145

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    was given for the purpose of bank loan and the valuation report of EX.D25 was given for the purpose of Income Tax. The same valuer has given two reports which is inconsistent to each other. The accused has not disputed the value of the property except for disputing the designation of PW34. Therefore, the learned Judge has taken the value of the building as per EX.P.145 and deducted a sum of Rs.1,77,41,960/- from Statement B. As far as Item No 21 and 39 of Statement B are concerned, the value of the jewels is not declared and mentioned in Statements I to VI by A1. Therefore, it cannot be treated as property purchased before the check period and it can only be treated as property purchased during the check period.

    9.5 As far as Item No. 47 of Statement B is concerned, as per EX.P.311 to EX.P. 313, A2 has applied in his individual capacity and made payment of Rs.48,628/-. Therefore, it is rightly held by the learned Judge that Item No 47 is not belong to the Trust. As far as Item No.22 and 40 of Statement B are concerned, the jewels were pledged during the check period and the jewels were with the bank at the end of the check period. Therefore, the learned Judge rightly held that the value of Jewels as per EX.P.194, 201 and 202. Item No 51 is properly considered by the learned Judge. After

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    carrying out the said corrections in Statement B, the learned Judge has taken the value of assets in Statement B as Rs.2,84,21,181/- instead of Rs.4,69,03,141.29 as calculated by the prosecution. As far as Item No.1 in Statement C is concerned, the Bonus and pay commission arrears were received by A1 as per EX.P. 31. Therefore, the contention of A1 was rightly rejected by the learned Judge. There is an argument regarding Item No.2 and 8 in Statement C were admitted by the prosecution and an amount of Rs.540/- and Rs.1000/- was added in Item No 2 and 8. The same way there was an arithmetical error in calculating GPF amount which was given as Rs.2,60,000/- as GPF withdrawals between 2003 and February 2006. On 01.02.2006 a sum of Rs.58,000/- was received after the check period. Therefore, Rs.58,000/- has to be deducted from Item No. 11 and it is rightly held so by the learned Judge. In the same way, in Item No.12 a sum of Rs.4,000/- is wrongly added and that has to be deducted and the correct amount is Rs.50,000/- and this correction has also been rightly held by the learned Judge.

    9.6 As far as Item No.32 in Statement C is concerned, the Income

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    Tax Returns of A3 for the AY 2005-2006 shown as Rs.1,23,336/- by the prosecution. The Income Tax Returns of A3 for the AY 2004-2005 and AY 2005-2006 in EX.P. 78, EX.D 8 and EX.D 30, the evidence of PW 33 and DW 1 accrues to Rs.7, 24,870/-. After filing of FIR, A3 has increased her income without any basis and filed her Income Tax Returns. Therefore, the learned Judge has considered the income of A3 which is shown as Rs.1,23,336/- for the AY 2005-2006 as proper and correct. For the AY 2008-2009 it is shown in the Income Tax Returns that she earned income through agriculture and milk vending business. However, she has not filed any proof for the milk vending and agricultural income. Therefore, the learned Judge is correct in rejecting the contention of the accused. Therefore, the learned Judge has properly taken a sum of Rs.1,23,336/- for the AY 2006-2007 of A3. 32. As far as Item 44 in Statement C is concerned the income is Rs.66,336.75/- but the accused contested that it is the income of the Trust and it cannot be added in Statement C. The defence miserably failed to produce any document in support of their contention for existence of the Trust and further there is no book of accounts produced before the Court to support their contention and it was properly held by the learned

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    Judge that it should be brought in Statement C. The learned Judge categorically analysed about the Trust in Paragraph 128 of the Judgment.

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    9.7 As far as Item No 49 in Statement C is concerned, the prosecution has shown a sum of Rs.5,83,050/- as income of A2 as per the Income Tax Returns for the AY 2000-2001 to 2004-2005. The defence has produced the document in EX.D29 to show that the income of A2 during the check period was Rs.64,92,436/-. The Learned Judge has taken a sum of Rs.5,83,007/- as income of A2 and rejected the EX.D.29 as A2 has shown exaggerated income in the Income Tax Returns without any documentary support. The learned Judge rightly added the sum of Rs.25,000/- towards GPF withdrawals and Rs.1,73,000/- towards the sale value of the land in Statement C. The learned Judge has rightly rejected the claim of the accused for a sum of Rs.72,000/- towards computer advance and Rs.1,01,799/- towards jewel loans. The learned Judge has rightly rejected the contention of the accused with regard to jewel loan of Rs.49,612/- and the sale value of JCB for an amount of Rs.5,17,047/- as profit of sale. The learned Judge rightly added the rental income of JCB for years 2005 and 2006 as Rs.3,57,400/- based on the Income Tax Returns of A2 for the year 2005 and rejected the contention of A2 that the rental income of JCB for the year 2006 is Rs. 9,48,687/-. 36. Therefore, after carrying out the said corrections in

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    Statement C, the learned Judge has taken the value of income in Statement C as Rs.1,57,67,032/- instead of Rs. 1,46,67,636 as calculated by the prosecution. As far as Item No 19 in Statement D is concerned, the learned Judge has rightly accepted the contention of the prosecution and held that 1/3 of the income as domestic expenditure. As far as Item No 21 in Statement D is concerned, the learned Judge has held that while the prosecution has shown the marriage expenditure as Rs.8,25,000/- yet it could produce evidence for only Rs.45,000/- and therefore the learned Judge has taken a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as marriage expenditure instead of Rs.8,25,000/- which was shown by the prosecution in Statement D. As far as Item Nos.30 to 43 in Statement D are concerned, the learned Judge has rightly rejected the contention of the accused.

    9.8 As far as Item No. 44 of Statement D is concerned, the prosecution has shown a sum of Rs.1,73,000/- as loss suffered by A3 in selling the property. The learned Judge has deducted the said amount from Statement D. As far as Item Nos 45, 47 to 50, 51 to 56, 59 to 61, 64 to 67, 68 to 80 in Statement D are concerned, the learned Judge has rightly rejected

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    the contention of the accused. As far as Item No 81 of Statement D is concerned, the learned Judge has held that the loss of Rs.3,82,000/- on account of the sale of JCB is not to be included in Statement D expenditure for the reason that the learned Judge has already considered the rental income on account of JCB at Paragraph 140 of the Judgment. Therefore, after carrying out the said corrections in Statement D, the learned Judge has taken the value of Expenditure in Statement D as Rs.63,84,122/- instead of Rs. 68,82,147/- as calculated by the prosecution. After the corrections carried out in Statement A, B, C and D, the learned Judge has held that the disproportionate assets of the accused to the tune of Rs.1,74,36,839/- instead of Rs.3,75,32,656/- as calculated by the prosecution and the learned Judge has reduced the percentage of disproportionate Assets from 256% to 110.60%.

    9.9 In view of the above facts, the Appeals filed by the appellants are liable to be dismissed and the judgment passed by the learned Special Judge needs no interference of this Court.

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    10 Heard the rival submissions made by the respective counsel for the appellants and the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent and carefully perused the materials available on record.

    11 It is the specific case of the prosecution that A1, as a public servant was working as a General Manager, Puducherry Agro Service and Industries Corporation Limited, Pondicherry and Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of Puducherry. During the period from 01.01.1997 to 07.01.2006 A1 acquired assets, which were disproportionate to A1's known source of income and was in possession of assets in his name and his family members i.e.A2 his son and his deceased wife, who was arrayed as A3, to the extent of Rs.3,75,30,221.11 and A2 and A3 abetted A1 in the commission of offence.

    12 P.W.75, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, on receipt of source information, after obtaining authorisation from the Superintendent of Police, ACB, CBI, Chennai, had registered FIR and made search in the house and office of A1 and also house of A2. Thereafter prepared search list

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    Ex.P342 and shown value of the articles and the inventory list to A1 and after collecting particulars of salary of A1 for the period from 1995-2005 along with GPF advance particulars of Al, handed over the entire case file to P.W.84, Additional Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Chennai, who recorded statements and collected documents. Thereafter further investigating was taken up by P.W.85, Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Chennai, who examined remaining witness and after recording statements and collecting documents, he laid the Final Report before the trial Court. As per the version of prosecution, details of assets, liabilities and income and expenses are shown in Statements A to D which reads as follows:

    STATEMENT - 'A'

    Assets held at the beginning of the check period

    Sl. NoPeriodDescription of the Immovable and Movable PropertyAmount
    129.3.1985Plot No.4 measuring 2638.64 Sft in Plotted Development Scheme of Pondichery Housing Board Saram of A11,09,730.90
    21988-1989Construction of house No. 5 New Saram Pondichery of A19,29,200.00

    3 20.09.1990 Purchase of land R.S No. 102/03 in 7,000.00

    Reddiyarpalayam Village vide Document

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    Sl. NoPeriodDescription of the Immovable and Movable PropertyAmount
    No 2469/90 registered at SRO Oulgaret in the name of Ms Anuradha of A1
    430.01.1992Purchase of land R.S No. 1/3 &2/5 in Villianur Village vide Doc.133/92 registered at SRO Villianur of A121,500.00
    513.04.1993200 shares of Pondicherry Gazetted Officers Co-Operative Credit Society Ltd of Rs 100/- each of A12,000.00
    6Various house hold articles found in residential premises of A1 and A2.11,000.00
    720.10.1982Purchase of land R.S No. 86/4(Part) in Reddiyarpalayam, Document No 2477/82 registered at SRO , Puducherry of A312,000.00
    825.10.1996Purchase of land R.S No. 99/2/A/1, 100/1, 100/2 in Thirukanchi owned by Shoram, Emaile Salari Jone son of Remon Savari through PA holder Shri P Nataraja Chettiar vide doc No 5337/96 of A34,95,000.00
    Total15,87,430.90

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    STATEMENT -'B'

    Assets held at the end of the check period

    Sl. No.Details of Immovable & Movable PropertiesValue of Property (including stamp fee)
    129.03.85 Plot No.4 measuring 2,638.84 sq ft in Plotted Development Scheme of Pondichery Housing Board in Saram Revenue Village of A11,09,730.90
    21988-89 Construction of House at No.5, New Saram, Pondichery (on the above plot) as per Statement-I submitted by Shri Anandane.(A1)9,29,200.00
    320.09.90 Purchase of land in R.S. No. 102/3 in Reddiarpalayam village vide doc.No. 2469/90 registered at SRO Oulgaret in the name of Ms Anutha of A17,000.00
    430.01.92 Purchase of land in RS No. 1/3 & 2/5 Villianur Village document No. 133/92 registered at SRO Villianur of A121,500.00
    5Various house hold articles found in residential premises of A1 and A2.4,58,295.00
    6125 shares of Pondichery Gazetted Officers Co-Operative Credit Society Ltd of Rs 100/ each of A112,500.00
    7Balance in SB A/c. No.19562 at Indian Bank, Ariyankuppam176.00
    8Balance in SB A/c. No.12115 at PNB, Pondicherry163.00
    9Balance in SB A/c No.8319 at Union Bank of India, Pondichery Branch1,135.00

    10 Corporation Bank, Pondichery Branch SB 3,081.7

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    Sl. No.Details of Immovable & Movable PropertiesValue of Property (including stamp fee)
    A/C No.3487 balance amount
    11Purchase of Sumo Victa PY-01-AA 3999 From VST Motors on 14.03.2005 by A15,88,280.00
    12Advance given to House owner Smt. Vijaya by A150,000.00
    1320.10.82 Purchase of land in RS No. 86/4 Reddiyarpalayam document No. 2477/82 registered at SRO Pondichery. In favour of A312,000.00
    14Acquisition of land in R.S. No.86/4A by A300.00
    15Purchase of land in R.S.No.75/2 in Thirukanchi by A300.00
    1607.04.2003 Purchase of Land in RS No. 16/3 & 16/3 Villianur Village document No. 783/03 registered at SRO Villianur by A31,70,000.00
    1720.10.04 Purchase of land in RS No. 2/2 & 2/4 Villianur Village document No. 3536/04 registered at SRO Villianur by A34,00,000.00
    1812/1999 Purchase of Falt “C” in IIIrd Floor Comfort Apartment, 5th and 6th Cross Natesan Nagar, Pondichery along with undivided of share of land in RS No. 172/2 by A35,95,400.00
    1927/9/2004 Purchase of Tempo 3wheeler Minidor Pickup from Vinayaga Tempo, Puduchery by A31,83,613.00

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    Sl. No.Details of Immovable & Movable PropertiesValue of Property (including stamp fee)
    21Value of Jewels pledged to REPCO Bank Ltd, Pondichery of gross weight of 1147.700 and net weight 939 grams by A33,42,735.00
    22Jewels loan at Poraiyur Primary Agriculture Co-Operativve Credit Society, Pondichery of gross weight of 220.600 and net weight 182.4 grams by A31,01,779.00
    23ICICI bank A/C No 005605001788 in the name of Hanndy Super Store balance amount of A310,193.27
    24ICICI bank A/C No 005605002148 in the name of Vinayaga Agencies balance amount of A333,530.72
    2524.8.98 Purchase of land in RS No. 75/1 Osudu Village document No. 1816/98 registered at SRO Villianur by A258,000.00
    2624.8.98 Purchase of land in RS No. 75/12 Osudu Village document No. 1818/98 registered at SRO Villianur by A26,000.00
    2726.3.99 Purchase of land in RS No. 75/3 Osudu Village document No. 624/99 registered at SRO Villianur by A21,35,000.00
    2808.6.00 Purchase of land in RS No. 10/1 & 06/2 Villianur Village document No. 2439/00 & 2440/00 registered at Joint/ Addl SRO Puduchery by A29,50,000
    29Amount paid to Shri. Deivasigamani for purchase of land by A23,00,000.00

    20.8.2001 Purchase of land in RS No. 84/7 &

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    Sl. No.Details of Immovable & Movable PropertiesValue of Property (including stamp fee)
    84/10 in Osudu Village document No. 1740/01 registered at SRO Villianur by A2
    3020.8.2001 Purchase of land in RS No. 84/7 & 84/10 in Osudu Village document No. 1740/01 registered at SRO Villianur by A290,000.00
    3127.02.2002 Purchase of land in RS No. 2/3 Villianur Village document No. 425/02 registered at SRO Villianur by A21,00,000.00
    32Transfer of lands in Villianur village from G. Kannaiyan to A1& subsequent transfer from A1 to A200.00
    3317.4.2002 Purchase of land in RS No. 2/6 Villianur Village document No. 777/02 registered at SRO Villianur by A21,50,000.00
    34Construction of School and Hosterl Buildings asper the IOB valuation by A23,84,32,729.00
    3518.02.2005 Purchase of Chevrlet Tavera from Sundaram Motors by A28,93,368.00
    3601.06.2005 Purchase of Veh No.TN27C 5969 from Suguneswara Motors(p) Salem by A21,50,000.00
    37Purchase of Mahendra Maxi Car PY 01 D 4423 from P.K.Baskar by A21,30,000.00
    38Purchase of TN 49X 4041 from D. Kalavathi on 08.06.2005 by A21,25,000.00
    39Value of Jewels pledged to REPCO Bank Ltd, Pondichery of gross weight of 2043.800 and net weight 1751 grams by A26,39,115.00
    40Jewels loan at Poraiyur Primary Agriculture49,612.00

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    Sl. No.Details of Immovable & Movable PropertiesValue of Property (including stamp fee)
    Co-Operativve Credit Society, Pondichery of gross weight of 105 and net weight 94.5 grams by A2
    41SBT, Pondicherry Current A/C No 1257 balance amount by A24,323.45
    42UBI Current A/C No 101-11148 in the name of M/s Ashoka Steel balance amount by A213,609.00
    43Corporation Bank Current A/C No 01/000978 Ashoka Steel balance amount by A24,257.5
    44IOB, Reddiarpalayam Current A/C No 303 in the name of A2 balance amount3,692.25
    45TMB Current A/C No 318972 in the name of A2 balance amount2,767.5
    46F.D A/C 4768 in the name of A2 in REPCO Bank Ltd25,432.00
    47F.D A/C 5097 in the name of A2 in REPCO Bank Ltd25,106.00
    48F.D A/C 5703 in the name of A2 in REPCO Bank Ltd22,817.00
    49Daily Deposit A/C 4262 in the name of A2 in REPCO Bank Ltd1,000.00
    50FD in the name of the School of A21,75,000.00
    51Investment shares of UBI in the name of A3, Gopika Devi and Rathi32,000.00

    Total 4,69,03,141.29

    STATEMENT - 'C'

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    Income earned during check period - Details of Income

    Sl. No.Details of IncomePeriod of IncomeAmount
    1Salary received from PASICJanuary 1997 to Dec 1997 by A11,15,765
    2Salary received from PWDFrom 22.12.1997 to 13.08.1998 by A132,062
    3Salary received from PWDFrom 14.08.1998 to 03.11.1998 by A115,743
    4Salary received from PWDFrom 04.11.1998 to 14.11.2000 by A11,76,377
    5Salary received from PWDFrom 15.11.2000 to 28.11.2003 by A13,49,287
    6Salary received from PWDFrom Dec.2003 to 30.04.2005 by A12,16,191
    7Salary received from PWDFrom 01.05.2005 to 31.12.2005 by A11,25,538
    8GPF withdrawal from PWD14.08.1998 to 03.11.1998 by A128,759
    9GPF withdrawal from PWD04.11.1998 to 14.11.2000 by A11,68,000
    10GPF withdrawal from PWD15.11.2000 to 28.11.2003 by A11,33,000
    11GPF withdrawal from PWDDec. 2003 to 30.04.2005 by A11,54,000
    12GPF withdrawal from PWDFrom 01.05.2005 to 31.12.2005 by A154,000
    13Amount received from Doordarshan Kendra by A1July 2004600
    14Outstanding balance of loan2,20,810

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    Sl. No.Details of IncomePeriod of IncomeAmount
    given by Pondicherry Gazetted Officers Co-Operative Society to A1
    15Outstanding balance in salary loan A/c 554/80 at Indian Bank, AriyankuppamA14,858
    16Balance Car loan A/C No 379506520470317 of UBICar loan A/C No 379506520470317 of UBI3,92,811
    17Outstanding balance in Loan given by PPACCSA131,800
    18Interest Credit to ED SB A/c. Canara BankA149
    19Interest Credit at SB Account 19652 at Indian BankA1140
    20Interest Credit at SB Account 121156 at PNBA1249
    21Interest Credit at SB Account 8319 at UBIA1865
    22Interest Credit at SB Account 3487 at Corporation BankA1428
    23Debit balance in SB A/C No 000019479 at Canara BankA12,087
    24Housing Loan from CANFIN Home LtdA31,76,206
    25CC A/C No. 142 of Handy Super Store at Punjab National BankA35,12,158.83

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    Sl. No.Details of IncomePeriod of IncomeAmount
    26Term Loan A/C No. 12567 of Handy Cafeteria at PNBA34,84,000
    27Vehicle loan A/C No. MTL 131 at SBTA33,62,110
    28CC A/C No. 1004 at SBTA31,034,204
    29Agriculture Jewels loan at PPACSA328,600
    302 Loans at PPACSA369,200
    313 Jewels loan at REPCOA34,20,000
    32Income as per IT return 2005- 06A31,23,336
    33Car loan MTL 184 at SBTA25,14,550
    34TL Suvida A/C No. 67001927913 at SBTA23,00,000
    35CC A/C No 540547 of M/s Ashoka Steel at UBIA21,001,749.5
    36Term Loan of IOBA250,00,000
    37Loan from PPACCSA231,000
    38Jewels loan from PPACCSA235,700
    39Development loan A/C No 1143 M/s Ashoka Steel at REPCO BankA21,85,571
    40Outstanding of development loan A/c No.947 of M/s Ashok Steels at REPCO Bank released on 23.06.2004A200.00
    413 Jewels loan from REPCO BankA28,00,000

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    Sl. No.Details of IncomePeriod of IncomeAmount
    42Outstanding balance in loan under agreement00
    43Divident received from UBI in the name of A3 and Gopika DeviA24,560
    44Current A/C 347 of IOB balanceA266,636.75
    45Muthukuviyal Deposit interestRs 1.1 lakhs made on 09.07.200111,419
    46Interest received in Daily Deposit Account 3165 at Repco BankA1356
    47Interest received in Daily Deposit Account 3723 at Repco BankA1217
    48Interest received in Daily Deposit Account 2680 at Repco BankA1522
    49Income shown in IT return of A2AY 2000 to 20055,83,050
    50Income Tax refund- do-3,49,071
    51Sale of land at Vanoor village, Tindivanam by sale deed 795/99A13,50,000

    Total 1,46,67,636.08

    STATEMENT - 'D'

    EXPENDITURE INCURRED DURING CHECK PERIOD

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    Sl. No.Details of ExpenditurePeriod of ExpenditureAmount Rs.
    1Repayment of HBA principal amount by A107/09/199868,750.00
    2Payment of Interest on HBA by A111.02.199971,815.00
    3CAN Card Visa bearing No. 454363301070942 of A1Oct 97 to Sep 035,982.00
    4Telephone bill for No. 2243565 by A1Dec98 to1,29,084.00
    5Donation given by A1 for renovation of Senate Hall of University Madras15.10.04200.00
    6Payments made to Regn Fee, Hypothecation entry fee and one time tax reservation of fancy number and termination of HPA entry. by A18,900.00
    7Rent paid for premises at No 3 by A1Jan 2004 to Dec 20052,16,000.00
    8Registration and stamp duty paid for settlement deed No 681/02 by A18,990.00
    9Interest and Bank charges debited in ED SB A/c 000019479 at Canara Bank by A11,709.00
    10Interest and Bank Charges SB A/c. 1956265.00
    11Interest and Bank charges debited in ED SB A/c 12115 at Punjab National Bank by A1780.00
    12Interest and Bank charges debited in ED SB A/c 8319 at Union Bank of India1,350.00

    13 Interest and Bank charges debited in 77,680.00 Vehicle Loan A/c No. 470159 of A1 at UBI for Veh No. PY-01-V-4005

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    Sl. No.Details of ExpenditurePeriod of ExpenditureAmount Rs.
    14Interest and Bank charges debited in Vehicle Loan A/c No. 379506520470317 of A1 at UBI37,811.00
    15Interest and Bank charges debited in SB A/c 01/003487 at Corporation Bank100.00
    16Insurance and registration charges for SUMO Victa31,083.00
    17Intereset paid on loans taken from PPACCS9,992.00
    18Interest paid on loan taken from PGOCCS ltd1,62,987.00
    19Domestic expenditure6,41,845.00
    20Interest debited in salary A/c No. 554/80 in Indian Bank26,508.00
    21Expenditure for the marriage of his two daughters8,25,000.00
    22Loss suffered in purchase and sale of Qualies1,53,580.00
    23Registration and one time tax paid for vehicle No. PY-01AA 39997,800.00
    24NIC premium for policy No. 50150607.07.2003 to 07.07.200551,332.00
    25Interest paid in Salary Loan A/C No. DLS/01/99/0003 at Corporation Bank13,061.00
    26Tuition and examination fee paid to SRM Engg College66,515.00

    27 Repair and damage of Qualis Toyota 34,368.00

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    Sl. No.Details of ExpenditurePeriod of ExpenditureAmount Rs.
    28IT and surcharge paid by A3 asper IT returns for Ays 2005-069,718.00
    29Registration and Stamp Duty for Settlement Deed 549/97 by A37,947.00
    30Registration and stamp duty for settelment deed No 1453/97 by A334,392.00
    31Registration and stamp duty for settelment deed No 783/03 by A317,948.00
    32Registration and stamp duty for settelment deed No 3536/04 by A33,098.00
    33Interest and Bank charges debited in Current A/c No.1601 at PNB by A390.00
    34Interest and Bank charges debited in C C A/c No.142 at PNB by A32,42,671.00
    35Interest and Bank charges debited in C urrent A/c No.1602 at PNB by A33,225.00
    36Interest and Bank charges debited in MTL A/c No.131 at SBT by A365,110.00
    37Interest and Bank charges debited in C C A/c No.1004 at SBT by A31,63,024.00
    38Interest and Bank charges debited in C A A/c No.005605002148 at ICICI by A31,975.23
    39Interest and Bank charges debited in C A A/c No. 005605001788 at ICICI by A31,503.87
    40Interest debited in Housing Loan No 1404 of CANFIN Home Ltd by A32,24,206.00

    41 Interest paid for 3 closed Jewel Loans at 10.12.2005 50,472.00 REPCO Bank

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    Sl. No.Details of ExpenditurePeriod of ExpenditureAmount Rs.
    42Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan taken from PACCS ltd by A314,350.00
    43Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan taken from PACCS ltd by A36,155.00
    44Loss suffered in purchase and sale of Land in RS 99/2/A/1 by A31,73,000.00
    44 ALoss suffered in purchase and sale of Land in RS 75/2 by A31,32,200.00
    45BSNL Mobile expenditure by A207/05 -96 to 01/06 -20069,756.00
    46IT and surcharge paid by A3AY 2000 to 054,65,010.00
    47Fee paid to Pondicherry Planning Authority by A248,628.00
    48Fee paid to Directorate of School Education for permission to open School by A229/11/2004 to 08/12/2005200.00
    49Stamp Duty and registration charges for Trust Deed 1061/01216.00
    50Registration Fee for School50.00
    51Paid For Daily Thanthi News Paper03.09.02 to 28.11.0214,500.00
    52Paid For Dinakaran News Paper25.12.02 to 05.01.0315,000.00
    53Paid For Tamil Murasu News Paper6,500.00
    54Payment made to Dinamalar for Advertisement31.10.025,000.00
    55Payment made on Air Media Net work15.12.0210,000.00

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    Sl. No.Details of ExpenditurePeriod of ExpenditureAmount Rs.
    56Payment made to Malaimalar for Advertisement11.09.028,400.00
    57Amount received from Sri RAM Chits32,740.00
    58Paid to LIC Prmium in Policy No. 73161248 and 7136703941,76,786.00
    59Registration and stamp duty for settelment deed No 1816/985,900.00
    60Registration and stamp duty for settelment deed No 1818/98658.00
    61Registration and stamp duty for settlement deed No 624/9913,596.00
    62Registration and stamp duty for settlement deed No 2439/20005,512.00
    63Registration and stamp duty for settlement deed No 2440/200046,022.00
    64Registration and stamp duty for settlement deed No 1740/200113,781.00
    65Registration and stamp duty for settlement deed No 425/200210,599.00
    66Registration and stamp duty for settlement deed No 682/028,994.00
    67Registration and stamp duty for settlement deed No 777/0215,872.00
    68Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 1257 in SBT15,047.00
    69Interest Bank charges MTL A/C No. 184 in SBT19,550.00
    70Interest Bank charges CC A/C No.9,28,703.00

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    Sl. No.Details of ExpenditurePeriod of ExpenditureAmount Rs.
    54047 in UBI
    71Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 10111148 in UBI3,283
    72Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 01000978 in Corporation Bank11,949.5
    73Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 303 in IOB7,940.75
    74Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 347 in IOB1,453.75
    75Interest Bank charges TL TCD A/C No. 207500031 in IOB2,86,754.00
    76Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 318972 in TMB7,062.5
    77Interest on development loan A/C 804in REPCO2,956.00
    78Interest on development loan A/C 947 in REPCO11,726.00
    79Interest on development loan A/C 1143 in REPCO5,473.00
    80Interest on Jewel loan A/C 10/14 in REPCO1,28,666.00
    81Loss and purchase sale of JCB3,82,000.00
    82Interest on loan from Kotak Bank2,17,006.00
    83Insurance JCB08.01.03 to 08.01.0547,240.00
    84Registration fee for JCB725.00
    85Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan taken from PACCS ltd17,309.00

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    Sl. No.Details of ExpenditurePeriod of ExpenditureAmount Rs.
    86Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan on Jewel taken from PACCS ltd2,654.00
    87Insurance premium for veh no. TN 27 C 596913,260.00
    88Temporary registration charges for Tavera36,671.00
    89Registration fee one time tax paid for veh. No PY-01-AA69997,800.00
    90Registration fee one time tax paid for veh No PY-01-AA6999/ PY01 AF 71792,600.00
    91Primary permit for veh. No TN 49 X 41042,000.00
    92Registration fee one time tax paid for veh No PY 01 S 0789 and PY 01 S 34351,520.00
    93Insurence for above vehicle1,390.00
    94Insurance premium for veh No PY 01 S 343515.3.02 to 13.03.05 for two yrs and 15.03.03 and 15.03.2004 one year1,225.00

    Total 68,82,146.8

    13 The trial Court, after hearing both the parties and based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, found the first accused (A1) guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment

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    for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only), in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and found A2 guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act r/w Section 109 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only), in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months.

    14 Now this Court has to answer the questions as to whether the appellants have satisfactorily accounted the disproportionate assets found by the prosecution and whether the prosecution has proved its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

    15 Before entering into the merits of the case, it is useful to refer the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein, the meaning for "KNOWN SOURCE OF INCOME" has been discussed in detail:

    (1) C .S.D.Swami -Vs- State r eported in A IR 1960 SC 7

    Now, the expression " known sources of income " must have reference to sources known to the prosecution on a thorough investigation of the case. It was not, and it

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    could not be, contended that " known sources of income

    " means sources known to the accused. The prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of an accused person. Those will be matters " specially within the knowledge" of the accused, within the meaning of s. 106 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution can only lead evidence, as it has done in the instant case, to show that the accused was known to earn his living by service under the Government during the material period.

    (2) State of Maharastra -Vs- Wasudeo Ramachandra Kaidalwar

    r eported in 1 981 (3) SCC 199

    "The provisions of section 5(3) have been subject of judicial interpretation. First the expression "known sources of income" in the context of s.5(3) meant

    "sources known to the prosecution"."

    (3) S tate of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta r eported in (2004) 1

    SCC 691

    ..Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 corresponds to clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

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    (referred to as 'Old Act'). But there has been drastical amendments. Under the new clause, the earlier concept of "known sources of income" has undergone a radical change. As per the explanation appended, the prosecution is relieved of the burden of investigating into "source of income" of an accused to a large extent, as it is stated in the explanation that "known sources of income" mean income received from any lawful source, the receipt of which has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. The expression

    "known sources of income" has reference to sources known to the prosecution after thorough investigation of the case. It is not, and cannot be contended that "known sources of income" means sources known to the accused. The prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of an accused person. Those will be matters "specially within the knowledge" of the accused, within the meaning of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). The phrase "known sources of income" in section 13(1)(e) {old section 5(1)(e)} has clearly the emphasis on the word "income". It would be primary to observe that qua the public servant, the income would be what is attached to his office or post,

    commonly known as remuneration or salary. The term "income" by itself, is elastic and has a wide connotation. Whatever comes in or is received, is income. But, however, wide the import and connotation of the term "income", it is incapable of being understood as meaning receipt having no

    nexus to one's labour, or expertise, or property, or

    investment, and having further a source which may or may not yield a regular revenue. These essential

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    characteristics are vital in understanding the term

    "income". Therefore, it can be said that, though

    "income" is receipt in the hand of its recipient, every receipt would not partake into the character of income. Qua the public servant, whatever return he gets of his service, will be the primary item of his income. Other incomes which can conceivably are income qua the public servant, will be in the regular receipt from (a) his property, or (b) his investment. A

    receipt from windfall, or gains of graft, crime, or immoral secretions by persons prima facie would not be receipt from the "known sources of income" of a public servant.

    (4) State of Tamil Nadu v. R.Soundirarasu - 2023 (6) SCC 768:

    "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:

    34.Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act including Explanation thereto reads as under:

    "13.Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct—

    (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and

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    such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant."

    35. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) defines the expression "known sources of income" and states that this expression means the income received from any lawful source and also requires that the receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. This Explanation was not there in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short "the 1947 Act"). Noticing this fact in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] , this Court has observed as under:

    "7. A bare reading of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act shows that any act done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the repealed Act, shall, insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of the Act. It does not substitute Section 13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. Section 30(2) is applicable 'without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897'. In our opinion, the application of

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    Section 13 of the 1988 Act to the fact situation of the present case would offend Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which, inter alia provides that repeal shall not (i) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or (ii) affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such rights, privilege, obligation, penalty, forfeiture or punishment. Section 13, both in the matter of punishment as also by the addition of the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) is materially different from Section 5 of the 1947 Act. The presumption permitted to be raised under the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) was not available to be raised under Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act. This difference can have a material bearing on the case."

    36. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act has the effect of defining the expression "known sources of income" used in Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act consists of two parts. The first part states that the known sources of income means the income received from any lawful source and the second part states that such receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.

    37. Referring to the first part of the expression "known

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    sources of income" in N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P. [N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 17 SCC 83 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 454] , this Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 86-87, para 17)

    "17. '… 6. The emphasis of the phrase "known sources of income" in Section 13(1)(e) [old Section 5(1)(e)] is clearly on the word "income". It would be primary to observe that qua the public servant, the income would be what is attached to his office or post, commonly known as remuneration or salary. The term

    "income" by itself, is elastic and has a wide connotation. Whatever comes in or is received is income. But, however, wide the import and connotation of the term "income", it is incapable of being understood as meaning receipt having no nexus to one's labour, or expertise, or property, or investment, and being further a source which may or may not yield a regular revenue. These essential characteristics are vital in understanding the term

    "Income". Therefore, it can be said that, though "income" in receipt in the hand of its recipient, every receipt would not partake the character of income. Qua the public servant, whatever return he gets from his service, will be the primary item of his income. Other income which can conceivably be income qua the public servant will be in the regular receipt from (a) his property, or (b) his investment. A receipt from windfall, or gains of graft crime or immoral secretions by persons prima facie would not be

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    receipt from the "known source of income" of a public servant.' [Ed. : As observed in State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 at p. 697, para 6] "

    38. The above brings us to the second part of the Explanation, defining the expression "such receipt should have been intimated by the public servant" i.e. intimation by the public servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules or orders applicable to a public servant.

    39. The language of the substantive provisions of Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act before its amendment, Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act and Section 13(1)(e)of the 1988 Act continues to be the same though Section 5(3) before it came to be amended was held to be a procedural section in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464] . Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act before it came to be amended w.e.f. 18-12-1964 was interpreted in C.S.D. Swami v. State [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] , and it was observed : (C.S.D Swami v. State ., AIR 1960 SC 7] , AIR pp. 10- 11, paras 5-6)

    "5. Reference was also made to cases in which courts had held that if plausible explanation had been offered by an accused person for being in possession of property which was the subject- matter of the charge, the court could exonerate the accused from

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    criminal responsibility for possessing incriminating property. In our opinion, those cases have no bearing upon the charge against the appellant in this case, because the section requires the accused person to "satisfactorily account" for the possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Ordinarily, an accused person is entitled to acquittal if he can account for honest possession of property which has been proved to have been recently stolen [see Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. The rule of law is that if there is a prima facie explanation of the accused that he came by the stolen goods in an honest way, the inference of guilty knowledge is displaced. This is based upon the well- established principle that if there is a doubt in the mind of the court as to a necessary ingredient of an offence, the benefit of that doubt must go to the accused. But the legislature has advisedly used the expression "satisfactorily account". The emphasis must be on the word "satisfactorily", and the legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance.

    6. Another argument bearing on the same aspect of the case, is that the prosecution has not led evidence to show as to what are the known sources of the appellant's income. In this

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    connection, our attention was invited to the evidence of the investigating officers, and with reference to that evidence, it was contended that those officers have not said, in terms, as to what were the known sources of income of the accused, or that the salary was the only source of his income. Now, the expression

    "known sources of income" must have reference to sources known to the prosecution on a thorough investigation of the case. It was not, and it could not be, contended that "known sources of income" means sources known to the accused. The prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of an accused person. Those will be matters "specially within the knowledge" of the accused, within the meaning of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution can only lead evidence, as it has done in the instant case, to show that the accused was known to earn his living by service under the Government during the material period. The prosecution would not be justified in concluding that travelling allowance was also a source of income when such allowance is ordinarily meant to compensate an officer concerned for his out-of-pocket expenses incidental to journeys performed by him for his official tours. That could not possibly be alleged to be a very substantial source of income. The source of income of a particular individual will depend upon his position in life with particular reference to his occupation or avocation in life. In the case of a government

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    servant, the prosecution would, naturally, infer that his known source of income would be the salary earned by him during his active service. His pension or his provident fund would come into calculation only after his retirement, unless he had a justification for borrowing from his provident fund. We are not, therefore, impressed by the argument that the prosecution has failed to lead proper evidence as to the appellant's known sources of income. It may be that the accused may have made statements to the investigating officers as to his alleged sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case, and if the prosecution has failed to disclose all the sources of income of an accused person, it is always open to him to prove those other sources of income which have not been taken into account or brought into evidence by the prosecution."

    40. Even after Section 5(3) was deleted and Section 5(1)(e) was enacted, this Court in Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar [State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] has observed that the expression "known sources of income" occurring in Section 5(1)(e) has a definite legal connotation which in the context must mean the sources known to the prosecution and not sources relied upon and known to the accused. Section 5(1)(e), it was observed by this Court, casts a burden on the accused for it uses the words "for which the public

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    servant cannot satisfactorily account". The onus is on the accused to account for and satisfactorily explain the assets. Accordingly, in Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar [State of

    Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] it was observed : (SCC pp. 204-205, paras 11-13)

    "11. The provisions of Section 5(3) have been subject of judicial interpretation. First the expression "known sources of income" in the context of Section 5(3) meant "sources known to the prosecution". The other principle is equally well-settled. The onus placed on the accused under Section 5(3) was, however, not to prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt, but only to establish a preponderance of probability. These are the well- settled principles : see C.S.D. Swami v. State [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] ; Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464] and V.D Jhingan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh . [V.D Jhingan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh ., AIR 1966 SC 1762] The legislature thought it fit to dispense with the rule of evidence under Section 5(3) and make the possession of disproportionate assets by a public servant as one of the species of the offence of criminal misconduct by inserting Section 5(1)(e) due to widespread corruption in public services.

    12. The terms and expressions appearing in Section 5(1)(e) of the Act are the same as those used in the old Section 5(3).

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    Although the two provisions operate in two different fields, the meaning to be assigned to them must be the same. The expression

    "known sources of incomes" means "sources known to the prosecution". So also, the same meaning must be given to the words "for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account" occurring in Section 5(1)(e). No doubt, Section 4(1) provides for presumption of guilt in cases falling under Sections 5(1)(a) and (b), but there was, in our opinion, no need to mention Section 5(1)(e) therein. For, the reason is obvious. The provision contained in Section 5(1)(e) of the Act is a self-contained provision. The first part of the section casts a burden on the prosecution and the second on the accused. When Section 5(1)(e) uses the words 'for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account', it is implied that the burden is on such public servant to account for the sources for the acquisition of disproportionate assets. The High Court, therefore, was in error in holding that a public servant charged for having disproportionate assets in his possession for which he cannot satisfactorily account, cannot be convicted of an offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Act unless the prosecution disproves all possible sources of income.

    13. That takes us to the difficult question as to the nature and extent of the burden of proof under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act. The expression "burden of proof" has two distinct meanings (1)

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    the legal burden i.e. the burden of establishing the guilt, and (2) the evidential burden i.e. the burden of leading evidence. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused lies upon the prosecution, and that burden never shifts. Notwithstanding the general rule that the burden of proof lies exclusively upon the prosecution, in the case of certain offences, the burden of proving a particular fact in issue may be laid by law upon the accused. The burden resting on the accused in such cases is, however, not so onerous as that which lies on the prosecution and is discharged by proof of a balance of probabilities. The ingredients of the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) are the possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the known sources of income for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account. To substantiate the charge, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 5(1)(e), namely, (1) it must establish that the accused is a public servant, (2) the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property which were found in his possession, (3) it must be proved as to what were his known sources of income i.e. known to the prosecution, and (4) it must prove, quite objectively, that such resources or property found in possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known sources of income. Once these four ingredients are

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    established, the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 5(1)(e) is complete, unless the accused is able to account for such resources or property. The burden then shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for his possession of disproportionate assets. The extent and nature of burden of proof resting upon the public servant to be found in possession of disproportionate assets under Section 5(1)(e) cannot be higher than the test laid by the Court inJhingan case [V.D Jhingan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh ., AIR 1966 SC 1762] i.e. to establish his case by a preponderance of probability. That test was laid down by the court following the dictum of Viscount Sankey, L.C., inWoolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 AC 462 (HL)] . The High Court has placed an impossible burden on the prosecution to disprove all possible sources of income which were within the special knowledge of the accused. As laid down inSwami case [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC

    7] , the prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of a public servant found in possession of resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income i.e. his salary. Those will be matters specially within the knowledge of the public servant within the meaning of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 106 reads:

    '106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. —When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person,

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    the burden of proving that fact is upon him.' In this connection, the phrase the "burden of proof" is clearly used in the secondary sense, namely, the duty of introducing evidence. The nature and extent of the burden cast on the accused is well-settled. The accused is not bound to prove his innocence beyond all the reasonable doubt. All that he need to do is to bring out a preponderance of probability." (emphasis supplied)

    41. While the expression "known sources of income" refers to the sources known to the prosecution, the expression "for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account" refers to the onus or burden on the accused to satisfactorily explain and account for the assets found to be possessed by the public servant. This burden is on the accused as the said facts are within his special knowledge. Section 106 of the Evidence Act applies. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) is a procedural section which seeks to define the expression "known sources of income" as sources known to the prosecution and not to the accused. The Explanation applies and relates to the mode and manner of investigation to be conducted by the prosecution, it does away with the requirement and necessity of the prosecution to have an open, wide and roving investigation and enquire into the alleged

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    sources of income which the accused may have. It curtails the need and necessity of the prosecution to go into the alleged sources of income which a public servant may or possibly have but are not legal or have not been declared. The undeclared alleged sources are by their very nature are expected to be known to the accused only and are within his special knowledge. (emphasis supplied) The effect of the Explanation is to clarify and reinforce the existing position and understanding of the expression "known sources of income" i.e. the expression refers to sources known to the prosecution and not sources known to the accused. The second part of the Explanation does away with the need and requirement for the prosecution to conduct an open ended or roving enquiry or investigation to find out all alleged/claimed known sources of income of an accused who is investigated under the PC Act, 1988. The prosecution can rely upon the information furnished by the accused to the authorities under law, rules and orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. No further investigation is required by the prosecution to find out the known sources of income of the accused public servant. As noticed above, the first part of the Explanation refers to income received from legal/lawful sources. This first part of the expression states the obvious as is clear from the judgment of this Court in N. Ramakrishnaiah [N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 17 SCC 83 : (2010) 4

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    SCC (Cri) 454] .

    42.Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid that the expression

    "known source of income" is not synonymous with the words "for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account." The two expressions connote and have different meaning, scope and requirements."

    16 The Investigating Officer issued notice to A1 and A2 on 14.5.2007, calling upon them to appear before him for offering their explanations. Again, on 17.5.2007, the Investigating Officer issued notice Ex.P374 and on 17.9.2007 issued another notice Ex.P375 calling upon him for satisfactory explanation. But the accused did not send any explanation, which reveal that the accused did not avail the opportunity extended by the Investigating Officer in the manner known to law. Further the accused did not raise any objection regarding the denial of opportunity during trial and also sending notice by Investigating Officer to the accused, but they have raised such objection only at the end of the trial.

    17 During trial, A3 died and charges against A3 got abated. A1 and A2 alone were facing trial and have been convicted, against which, A1 and A2 are before this Court.

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    18 This Court heard the rival submissions made on behalf of both the parties and perused the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution as well as the accused and also the decisions relied on by both the counsel.

    19 This Court, as an appellate Court and as a final Court of fact finding, it has to necessarily re-appreciate the evidence and give finding independently.

    20 Now the question that arisen for consideration in this case is as to whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts for the offence under Section 13(1)(2) of PC Act r/w Section 109 IPC against the accused.

    21 It is settled proposition that to prove the offence under Section 13(1)(2) of PC Act, the prosecution has to prove that the accused did not satisfactorily account the disproportionate asset. In this regard it is useful to

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    refer the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

    (1) CSD Sami vs. State. reported in AIR 1960 SC 7 The Legislature has advisedly used the expression

    "satisfactorily account". , The emphasis must be on the word " satisfactorily ", and the Legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance.

    (2) K.Veerasami vs. Union of India and Ors reported in

    1991 (3) SCC 655

    The Legislature has advisedly used the expression

    "satisfactorily account". The emphasis must be on the word

    "satisfactorily". That means the accused has to satisfy the court that his explanation is worthy of acceptance

    (3) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors. reported in 2004(1) SCC 691

    The legislature has advisedly used the expression

    "satisfactorily account". The emphasis must be on the word

    "satisfactorily" and the legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a

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    burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the Court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance.

    (4) K.Anbazhagan vs. Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals and Ors. reported in 2017 (6) SCC 263

    It was emphasised that the word "satisfactorily" did levy a burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth but also to satisfy the Court that the explanation was worthy of acceptance. The noticeable feature of this pronouncement thus it that the explanation offered by the accused to be acceptable has to be one not only plausible in nature and content but also worthy of acceptance.

    22 In the present case the accused were given sufficient opportunity to show satisfactorily account the disproportionate asset, but, they did not avail the same. A bare perusal of Exs.P372 to 375 and the evidence of the investigating officer provided regarding opportunity for satisfactorily account. A perusal of Ex.P376 reveal that A1 at a later stage,

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    after long deliberation, requested to send separate details of statement of assets and liabilities of A1 and A3. Further, if at all as per the accused, no sufficient opportunity was given to them to account the disproportionate asset, they should have raised objections at the initial stage of trial itself, but they have raised such objections only at the end of trial. The accused have not denied the assets stand in their name except A1 subsequently belatedly asked for a separate statement of asset. It is not the case of the first accused that he was not aware of this proceedings. On reading of evidence of P.W.85, who filed Charge sheet shows that prosecution summoned several witnesses and recorded their statements and collected documents Ex.P1 to

    377. The particulars of assets and liabilities statement have already been extracted above. Therefore it is clear that statutory provisions with regard to notice to the accused for satisfactory account has been duly complied with by the prosecution.

    23 As far as the contention of the learned Senior Counsel with regard to the burden of proof by the prosecution, it is useful to refer the

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    following decisions of the Hon'ble Constitution Bench of Supreme Court:

    K.Veerasamy Vs Union of India reported in 1991 (3) SCC 655

    But the legal burden of proof placed on the accused is not so onerous as that of the prosecution. However, it is just not throwing some doubt on the prosecution version. The Legislature has advisedly used the expression "satisfactorily account". The emphasis must be on the word

    "satisfactorily". That means the accused has to satisfy the court that his explanation is worthy of acceptance. The burden of proof placed on the accused is an evidential burden though not a persuasive burden.

    P. Nallammal -Vs- State reported in 1999 6 SCC 559

    Shri K.K. Venugopal endeavoured to establish that the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act is to be understood as an offshoot of the different facets of misconduct of a public servant enumerated in clauses

    (a) to(d) of the sub-section which a public servant might commit. According to him, unless the ill-gotten wealth has a nexus with the sources contemplated in the preceding clauses the public servant cannot be held

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    guilty under clause (e) of Section 13(1). Learned senior counsel elaborated his contention like this: If a public servant is able to account for the excess wealth by showing some clear sources, though not legally permissible, but not falling under any of the preceding clauses of the sub-section, he would be discharging the burden cast on him. He cited an example like this:

    If the public servant satisfies the court that the excess wealth possessed by him is attributable to the dowry amount which he received from the father-in-law of his son, the public servant is not liable to be convicted under the aforesaid clause.

    The above contention perhaps could have been advanced before the enactment of the P.C. Act 1988 because Section 5(1)(e) of the old P.C. Act did not contain an "Explanation" as Section 13(1)(e) now contains. As per the Explanation the "known sources of income" of the public servant, for the purpose of satisfying the court, should be "any lawful source". Besides being the lawful source the Explanation further enjoins that receipt of such income should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with the provisions of any law applicable to such public servant at the relevant time. So a public servant cannot now

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    escape from the tentacles of Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act by showing other legally forbidden sources, albeit such sources are outside the purview of clauses (a) to

    (d) of the sub-section.

    24 With the above guidelines and principles now, this Court as a final Court of fact finding has to re-appreciate the entire evidence of the prosecution witnesses and defence witnesses and has to analyse the legal aspects raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the accused.

    25 A1, who was a public servant, is accountable to give statements of assets stand in his name and his family members as per Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, which is extracted hereunder:

    "18. Movable, immovable and valuable property (1) (i) Every Government servant shall on his first appointment to any service or post submit a return of his assets and liabilities, in such form as may be prescribed by the Government, giving the full particulars regarding - (a) the immovable property inherited by him, or owned or acquired by him or held by him on lease or mortgage, either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family or in the name of any other person; (b) shares,

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    debentures and cash including bank deposits inherited by him or similarly owned, acquired, or held by him; (c) other movable property inherited by him or similarly owned, acquired or held by him; and (d) debts and other liabilities incurred by him directly or indirectly."

    25.1 The above Rule clearly mandates A1, who was admittedly a public servant, to produce details of assets held either in his name or his family members. A1 sent letter Ex.P376 after a long deliberation to give separate statement of asset. It is not the case of A1 that there is no talking terms between A1 and A3, who are husband and wife and living under the same roof. Even though A3 has right to have and maintain property on her own, as a public servant, A1 cannot simply say that he does not know anything about the properties standing in the name of his wife A3 and it is the bounden duty of A1 to give explanation, at least after receiving notice from the investigating officer that what are the properties belong to him and what are the properties belonging to his wife. Further the properties held by A1 or his family members is the personal knowledge of A1 and he only knows what are properties stand in his name, what is the source of income

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    and what are the liabilities and hence he should have offered his explanation for the properties stand in his name as well as in the name of his wife A3. There is no materials to show that A1 has shown or submitted the details of assets held in his name or his family members to the department, during or prior or subsequent to the check period. Therefore the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the wife is not dependent of A1 and she has independent source of income is not sustainable for the purpose of this Act.

    26 To support the case of the defence, the accused have examined the Auditor as D.W.1 and marked documents as Ex.D1 to D37.

    27 With regard to contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the accused regarding finding of the trial Court that the loss of Rs.3,82,000/- in the sale of JCB is concerned, as per prosecution, the JCB was purchased for Rs.15,95,000/- and it was sold for a sum of Rs.12,13,000/- thereby incurred a loss of Rs.3,82,000/-. The accused denied the said loss on the ground that already the JCB yield income. Burt, the trial Court has already added the said income in Statement C. Further from the evidence of P.W.32, 33 and P.W.85 and also Statements C and D, it is clear that the trial Court has

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    rightly shown Rs.3,82,000/- as loss in JCB. Further A2 did not come into witness box to disprove the case of the prosecution and it is only a defence created by D.W.1. It is to be noted that A2 shown the rental income of the JCB too high in ITR filed after FIR with the aid and assistance of D.W.1, comparing with the ITRs filed before FIR and there is no proof for the same. Therefore the contention of the learned Senior Counsel is not acceptable.

    28 Coming to purchase of land, evidence of P.W.51, 53, 54, 55, 56 and 57 is clear that A1 instigated and instructed to sell the lands, which were purchased not only in the name of A1 , but also in the name of A2. It is the evidence of P.Ws.51, 53 and 54 that A1 only paid the amount and A2 did not come to the Registration office during the time of registration. There is no material evidence to show that A2 only paid consideration for purchase of the said property out of his own source of income. Therefore, the evidence of the above witnesses have clearly proved the offence of abetment of A2.

    29 It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the accused that the value shown in Ex.D.25 is the actual cost of construction of

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    the School and Hostel Buildings, which is Rs.1,34,08,000/-, wheras the learned Judge has placed reliance on Ex.P.145 and concluded the value of the property at Rs.2,06,90,769/ given by P.W.64 stating that the same is only before registering the FIR and Ex.D25 is after registering the FIR. Ex.P145 is only for the purpose of availing loan from the Bank and Ex.D25 is the actual expenditure incurred. Therefore the learned trial Judge is wrong in relying on Ex.P145.

    30 With regard to the above contention, P.W.64, who is the Consulting Engineer and Valuer has given his report Ex.P145, which shows that the value of the buildings worth Rs.3,84,32,729/-. Even though, it is contended that A2 has materials for the construction, which was not revealed by A2 at the time of inspection by P.W.64, who also took photographs and attached the same to his report Ex.P145. Therefore the contention of the accused is only after thought in order to escape from the clutches of law.

    31 The evidence of P.W.5, it is clear that based on the request from CBI, he applied his mind and accorded sanction (Ex.P22) for Prosecution

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    under PC Act against A1 under Section 19(3) and (4). In this regard, it is pertinent to refer a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State v T.Venkatesh Murthy, reported in 2004 (7) SCC 763, wherein it was held as follows:

    "7. A combined reading of sub-sections (3) and

    (4) makes the position clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code no finding, sentence and order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

    8. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) is also relevant. It shows that no court shall stay the proceedings under the Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice.

    9. Sub-section (4) postulates that in determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the court shall have regard

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    to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.

    10. Explanation appended to the section is also of significance. It provides, that for the purpose of Section 19, error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction."

    32 The above decision of the Supreme Court makes it clear that no finding, sentence and order passed by the trial Court shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal. Further, from the evidence of P.W.5, it is clear that the sanctioning authority has applied its mind and accorded the sanction and hence this Court does not find any failure of justice.

    33 Further evidence of P.Ws.7, 9 and 10 reveal abetment of A2, wherein PASIC, in which A1 was employee, supplied cement to the Ashok Stee, which was run by A2, for which the cheque issued by A2 was returned and there was also complaint raised by PASIC, but subsequently on payment by A2, the matter was settled.

    34 All the documents produced by the accused have been invented

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    and created only for the purpose of defence and in order to escape from the clutches of law, which are not natural. For one example, D.W.1 has stated in his evidence that the father of the accused is Class-I Contractor in Puducherry and Tamil Nadu. 1st accused is 1st son of the said Cannaiyan who was working as Superintending Engineer in Puducherry and the 2nd son Jayakumar is the sitting MLA and the 3rd son Seetharaman was working as Assistant Engineer. One Vijayalakshmi of Valavanur is the wife of 1st accused. Vijayalakshmi's parents owns 100 acres of land, cinema theatre, rice mill, school and dairy farm. After the marriage of Vijayalakshmi with the 1st accused, she was doing the business of dairy farm. The 2nd accused, who is an Engineering Graduate is the son of Vijayalakshmi and 1st accused. Their daughters are Anudha and Aarthi and they are also graduates. Anudha and Aarthi were given to marriage and their marriage expenses were met out by their respective grooms family. The 2nd accused married one Gopikadevi, only daughter of one Govindasamy, who owns 150 acres of land, rice mill, and 8 buses. The marriage expenses of the 2nd accused was borne by the bride's parents besides they had also adorned the wife of 2nd accused with 200 sovereigns of gold jewels, and was given sufficient

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    sridhana articles of silver and brass items, refrigerator, etc.

    35 From the above statement of D.W.1, it is clear that the accused never spent single pie for the above said marriages, which itself shows that evidence of D.W.1 is unnatural and artificial and the same is not genuine one. Further D.W.1 is not the competent person to speak about the marriage expenses spent by the bride and groom of A1's family. D.W.1, being a Chartered Accountant, can only assist the person for filing of Income Tax Returns. None of the persons who had personal knowledge about the same has been examined.

    36 Once as discussed above and also in the decisions quoted above, the prosecution found disproportionate assets, the accused, being a public servant, has to satisfactorily account them with his known source of income, which is not known to the prosecution and the accused has to rebut the presumption.

    37 Therefore a reading of the evidence of prosecution witnesses

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    and statements and also defence taken by the accused and also reading of the judgment of the trial Court, which gone into detail and also discussed elaborately about various documents and statement rightly held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This Court, as an appellate Court, while re-appreciating the entire evidence independently, finds that as discussed above, the accused have not satisfactorily account the disproportionate assets and also have not given any satisfactorily explanation for the same. It is the personal knowledge of the accused and they have to come forward with the explanation and they have to satisfactorily account and convince the investigating agency, if it is done by the accused, prosecution could not have prosecuted them further.

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    38 It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that even after demise of A3, who has independent source, the trial Court would not have included the properties of A3 and there is no ingredient made out against A3 and further no explanation was called for from A3. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2021 (18) SCC 135 (CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi):

    "27. This conclusion is also supported by the judgment of another Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami [K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] . The judgment was in context of Section 5(1)(e) of the old Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is similar to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. It was argued that : (i) a public servant must be afforded an opportunity to explain the alleged disproportionate assets before an investigating officer; (ii) this must then be included and explained by the investigating officer while filing the charge-sheet; and (iii) the failure to do so would render the charge-sheet invalid. Rejecting this submission, the Constitution Bench held that doing so would elevate the investigating officer to the role of an enquiry officer or a Judge and that their role was limited only to collect material in order to ascertain whether the alleged offence has

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    been committed by the public servant.

    28. In his opinion for himself and Venkatachaliah, J., K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. held thus : (K. Veeraswami [K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655, para 75 :

    1991 SCC (Cri) 734] , SCC p. 715, para 75)

    "75. … since the legality of the charge-sheet has been impeached, we will deal with that contention also. The counsel laid great emphasis on the expression "for which he cannot satisfactorily account" used in clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. He argued that that term means that the public servant is entitled to an opportunity before the investigating officer to explain the alleged disproportionality between assets and the known sources of income. The investigating officer is required to consider his explanation and the charge-sheet filed by him must contain such averment. The failure to mention that requirement would vitiate the charge-sheet and renders it invalid. This submission, if we may say so, completely overlooks the powers of the investigating officer. The investigating officer is only required to collect material to find out whether the offence alleged appears to have been committed. In the course of the investigation, he may examine the accused. He may seek his clarification and if necessary he may cross check with him about his known sources of income and assets possessed by him. Indeed, fair investigation requires

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    as rightly stated by Mr A.D. Giri, learned Solicitor General, that the accused should not be kept in darkness. He should be taken into confidence if he is willing to cooperate. But to state that after collection of all material the investigating officer must give an opportunity to the accused and call upon him to account for the excess of the assets over the known sources of income and then decide whether the accounting is satisfactory or not, would be elevating the investigating officer to the position of an enquiry officer or a Judge. The investigating officer is not holding an enquiry against the conduct of the public servant or determining the disputed issues regarding the disproportionality between the assets and the income of the accused. He just collects material from all sides and prepares a report which he files in the court as charge-sheet." (emphasis supplied)

    29. Therefore, since an accused public servant does not have a right to be afforded a chance to explain the alleged disproportionate assets to the investigating officer before the filing of a charge-sheet, a similar right cannot be granted to the accused before the filing of an FIR by making a preliminary enquiry mandatory."

    39 In the case on hand, as discussed above, the accused were called for explanation and they were given sufficient opportunity to

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    satisfactorily account for the disproportionate asset. But, A1, being a Public Servant, failed to disclose the asset stand in the name of his wife A3, as emanated under Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,

    1964.

    40 A1 and A2 have not come to the witness box and they cleverly invented D.W.1, who is not competent to speak about personal knowledge of the accused and put him into box and marked documents, which were created for the purpose of defence and evidence of D.W.1 is also unnatural.

    41 Even though, it is settled law that the accused need not come into the witness box and he can remain silent, but, when the prosecution has produced sufficient materials by oral and documentary, it is for the accused to come forward with satisfactory explanation for the same, especially in the cases of disproportionate asset, since it is only personal knowledge of the accused. In this regard, it is relevant to notice a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v J.Jayalalitha, reported in 2017 (6)

    SCC 263:

    "191. Though considerable exchanges had been made

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    in course of the arguments, centring around Section 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, we are of the comprehension that those need not be expatiated in details. Suffice it to state that even assuming that the income tax returns, the proceedings in connection therewith and the decisions rendered therein are relevant and admissible in evidence as well, nothing as such, turns thereon definitively as those do not furnish any guarantee or authentication of the lawfulness of the source(s) of income, the pith of the charge levelled against the respondents. It is the plea of the defence that the income tax returns and orders, while proved by the accused persons had not been objected to by the prosecution and further it (prosecution) as well had called in evidence the income tax returns/orders and thus, it cannot object to the admissibility of the records produced by the defence. To reiterate, even if such returns and orders are admissible, the probative value would depend on the nature of the information furnished, the findings recorded in the orders and having a bearing on the charge levelled. In any view of the matter, however, such returns and orders would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove the charge and can at best be pieces of evidence which have to be evaluated along with the other materials on record. Noticeably, none of the respondents has been examined on oath in the case in hand. Further, the income tax

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    returns relied upon by the defence as well as the orders passed in the proceedings pertaining thereto have been filed/passed after the charge-sheet had been submitted. Significantly, there is a charge of conspiracy and abetment against the accused persons. In the overall perspective therefore neither the income tax returns nor the orders passed in the proceedings relatable thereto, either definitively attest the lawfulness of the sources of income of the accused persons or are of any avail to them to satisfactorily account the disproportionateness of their pecuniary resources and properties as mandated by Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.

    In the case on hand also, the accused were not examined to prove the source of income in the manner known to law.

    42 As far as contention of the accused regarding extension of check period, it is prerogative of prosecution to fix check period and the same is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Pollonji Darabshaw Daruwalla, reported in 1987 Supp SCC 379, which reads as follows:

    18. .. It is for the prosecution to choose what, according

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    to it, is the period which having regard to the acquisitive activities of the public servant in amassing wealth, characterise and isolate that period for special scrutiny. It is always open to the public servant to satisfactorily account for the apparently disproportionate nature of his possession... Further in this case, admittedly A1 is a public servant during the check period. Section 13 (1)(e) of the PC Act is clear, which reads as follows:

    "Section 13: Criminal misconduct by a public servant:--

    (1) ...

    (a) ....

    (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income." From the above said provisions and the decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that there is nothing wrong in fixing the check period.

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    43 It is the duty of the public servant, who are accountable for their income and assets and liabilities. They know even when they are entering into the service what is their assets and what would be their income. As a model citizen, in order to get trust of the public, public servant should be accountable for their assets. When any complaint raised against them, they have to satisfactorily account the known source of income by giving satisfactory explanation for the same.

    44 As far as Income Tax Returns is concerned, one of the grounds taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that the ITR filed by A2 and A3 are legal documents assessed and accepted by the Income Tax Department and the prosecution has also neither challenged these returns nor presented any conclusive evidence to demonstrate the exaggeration and also to support this contention, reliance was also placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnanad Agnihotri vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1977 (1) SCC 816. In this regard it is pertinent to note that subsequently the Hon'ble Supreme Court has rendered its judgment in the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. N.Suresh Rajan and Others

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    reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709 and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder

    "The property in the name of an income tax assessee itself cannot be aground to hold that it actually belongs to such an assessee. In case this proposition is accepted, in our opinion, it will lead to disastrous consequences. It will give opportunity to the corrupt public servants to amass property in the name of known persons, pay income tax on their behalf and then be out from the mischief of law."

    In the present case, merely the accused have filed ITR, subsequent to registration of the FIR, they cannot be allowed to escape from the clutches of law unless proved the same with sufficient materials in the manner known to law. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. J.Jayalalitha reported in (2017) 6 SCC 263 has held as follows:

    "190. The decision is to convey that though the IT returns and the orders passed in the IT proceedings in the instant case recorded the income of the accused concerned as disclosed in their returns, in view of the charge levelled against them, such returns and the orders in the IT proceedings would not by themselves establish that such

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    income had been from lawful source as contemplated in the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988 and that independent evidence would be required to account for the same.

    191. Though considerable exchanges had been made in course of the arguments, centring around Section 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, we are of the comprehension that those need not be expatiated in details. Suffice it to state that even assuming that the income tax returns, the proceedings in connection therewith and the decisions rendered therein are relevant and admissible in evidence as well, nothing as such, turns thereon definitively as those do not furnish any guarantee or authentication of the lawfulness of the source(s) of income, the pith of the charge levelled against the respondents. It is the plea of the defence that the income tax returns and orders, while proved by the accused persons had not been objected to by the prosecution and further it (prosecution) as well had called in evidence the income tax returns/orders and thus, it cannot object to the admissibility of the records produced by the defence. To reiterate, even if such returns and orders are admissible, the probative value would depend on the nature of the information furnished, the findings recorded in the orders and having a bearing on the charge levelled. In any view of the matter, however, such returns and orders would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove the charge and can at best be pieces of evidence which have to be evaluated along with the other materials on record. Noticeably, none of the

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    respondents has been examined on oath in the case in hand. Further, the income tax returns relied upon by the defence as well as the orders passed in the proceedings pertaining thereto have been filed/passed after the charge-sheet had been submitted. Significantly, there is a charge of conspiracy and abetment against the accused persons. In the overall perspective therefore neither the income tax returns nor the orders passed in the proceedings relatable thereto, either definitively attest the lawfulness of the sources of income of the accused persons or are of any avail to them to satisfactorily account the disproportionateness of their pecuniary resources and properties as mandated by Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.

    192. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] in this context had ruled that there is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding on the other as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.

    ......

    196. This Court ruled that the fact that the accused, other than the two Ministers, had been assessed to income tax and had paid income tax could not have been relied upon to discharge the accused persons in view of the allegation made by the prosecution that there was no separate income to amass such huge property. It was

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    underlined that the property in the name of the income tax assessee itself cannot be a ground to hold that it actually belongs to such an assessee and that if this proposition was accepted, it would lead to disastrous consequences. This Court reflected that in such an eventuality it will give opportunities to the corrupt public servant to amass property in the name of known person, pay income tax on their behalf and then be out from the mischief of law.

    45 The details of statements, showing disproportionate assets as projected by the prosecution is as follows.

    StatementDetailsAmount Rs.
    Statement AAssets held at the beginning of the check period15,87,430.90
    Statement BAssets held at the end of the check period4,69, 03,141.29
    Statement CIncome earned during check period1,46,67,636.08
    Statement DExpenditure incurred during Check Period68,82,146.80
    EStatement B – Statement A4,53,15,710.39
    FStatement E + Statement D5,21,97,857.19
    Quantum of Disproportionate Assets (F-C)3,75,30,221.11
    Percentage of Disproportionate Assets DP x 100/Total Income255.91%

    46 The learned trial Judge, based on the evidence and the available materials, found the disproportionate asset for the value of Rs.1,74,36,839/- and thereby has reduced the percentage from 255.91% to 110.59%. Mere

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    defect on the part of the investigating agency may not be a ground affecting the case of the prosecution and the accused are not entitled to get acquittal on that ground.

    47 It is true that Section 19 of PC Act is there as protection and immunity to the public servant and if any one wants to take vengeance under the guise of prosecution to prosecute the public servant, they cannot just like that do the same and prior sanction should be obtained from the competent authority. But at the same time, the public servant should not take advantage of the protection and immunity provided under the law and escape from the clutches of law. Therefore, when the first opportunity was offered to them, it is the duty of the public servant to come forward with the satisfactory explanation and when he failed to do the same, subsequently with the aid of legal brain, they cannot try to fill the gap and escape from the clutches of law and if this Court encourages such type of defence, no public service can be put into clutches of law and simply they will escape from the clutches of law taking advantage of the technicality and other defect in investigation with the help of legal brain. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer the

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    judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Rajmohan v. Central Bureau Of Investigation (anti-corruption Branch) ., reported in 2023 (1) SCC 329:

    "22. Statutory provisions requiring sanction before prosecution either under Section 197CrPC or under Section 97 of the PC Act also intend to serve the very same purpose of protecting a public servant. These protections are not available to other citizens because of the inherent vulnerabilities of a public servant and the need to protect them. However, the said protection is neither a shield against dereliction of duty nor an absolute immunity against corrupt practices. The limited immunity or bar is only subject to a sanction by the appointing authority."

    48 Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that the decisions relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants are not applicable to the facts of the present case on hand.

    49 From the aforesaid discussion, the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal and factual position, it is clear that, in this case, the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts and that A1 has disproportionate asset and A2 and A3 abetted for the same. This Court also independently finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all

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    reasonable doubts. There is no merit in both the appeals and same are liable to dismissed.

    50 Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. The trial Court is directed to secure the custody of the accused A1 and A2 to serve the remaining period of imprisonment, if any.

    09.01.2025

    Index : Yes/No Speaking Order/Non Speaking Order Neutral Citation case: Yes/no cgi/cs

    To

    1. The Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases (Principal Sessions Judge), Puducherry.

    2. The Inspector of Police, SPE:CBI ACB, Chennai, Through Public Prosecutor, for CBI, Chennai.

    3. The Public Prosecutor (Pondicherry), High Court of Madras.

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    P.VELMURUGAN, J

    cgi Pre-Delivery Judgment in

    Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018

    09.01.2025

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