R.A Mehta, J.:— The petitioners, original accused have filed this Criminal Revision Application against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Junagadh condoning delay of six days in filing of complaint by the public Prosecutor (Respondent No. 2 wherein) for offence under Section 500, I.P.C read with the provisions of Section 199, Cri. P.C 1973. The offending report was published in ‘Indian Express’ dated 25th December, 1979. The Collector, Junagadh (a public servant), feeling aggrieved by that offending report, requested the Government for the requisite sanction under Section 199(4)(b), Cri. P.C The State Government granted the sanction dated 21st June, 1980 and despatched the same to the Collector on 23rd June, 1980, which was received by the Collector on 28th June, 1980 and a complaint was filed by the Public Prosecutor on 1st July, 1980. Thus from the date of offence, namely, 25th December 1979 the complaint was not filed within a period of six months but it was filed six days late on 1st, July 1980 and, therefore, it appeared to be barred by Section 199(5), Cri. P.C, which reads as under:
“(5) No court of Session shall take cognizance of an offence under sub-section (2) unless the complaint is made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.”
2. Sub-section (2) is a provision for a complaint by the Public Prosecutor in case of defamation of a public servant. It is clear and admitted position that the complaint is filed beyond the period of six months from the date of the alleged offence. The question is whether the delay for which sufficient cause is shown, can be condoned or there is no power to condone delay at all and whether the period required for obtaining the requisite sanction can be excluded for computing the period of limitation?
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that there is no such power and Section 199(5), Cri. P.C is in very simple and clear language and makes an absolute provision for enabling the Sessions Court to take cognizance only if the complaint is made within six months from the date of the offence and once the period of six months has expired, there is no power to take cognizance and no power to condone the delay or exclude the period so as to enable it to take cognizance, which is expressly barred by the provision in Section 199(5), Cri. P.C
4. The learned Sessions Judge has relied on the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of Cri. P.C for exercising the power of condonation. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that for the purpose of Chapter XXXVI there is a special definition of “period of limitation” which means “the period specified in Section 468”. Section 467 reads as under:
“For the purposes of this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘period of limitation’ means the period specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence”.
5. It is, therefore, argued that in the present case the period of limitation not having been provided in Section 468 [but in Section 199(5)] the other provisions of that Chapter including Sections 470 and 473 also would not apply because there also the reference is made to “period of limitation” and that period of limitation is defined in Section 467 as the period of limitation prescribed by Section 468. Thus, the entire Chapter XXXVI is inapplicable to the period of limitation provided by Section 199(5), so argued the petitioner. Section 468, Cri. P.C provides for period of limitation generally for all offences punishable with fine only, with imprionment for a term not exceeding one year and with imprissonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. Ordinarily this offence under Section 500, I.P.C would be governed by sub-section (2) of Section 468, Cri. P.C But sub-section (1) itself refers to other periods of limitation provided in the Code itself. If any other period of limitation is provided in the Code itself, it is that period of limitation, otherwise the period of limitation which is provided in sub-section (2) of Section 468. Thus Section 468 itself refers to the period of limitation provided elsewhere in the Code and subject to that sub-section (2) provides for a period of limitation generally. Thus, the period of limitation provided elsewhere has been incorporated in Section 468 also by reference (except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code).
6. Moreover, the definition of ‘period of limitation’ in Section 467 also shows that the period of limitation defined to mean that period specified in Section 468 would be applicable only if the context does not require otherwise. Now in the context of Section 470 there are special weighty and valid reasons to hold that the context naturally and necessarily requires otherwise so as to include the periods of limitation specified elsewhere than in Section 468. Section 470(1) provides that in computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution against the offender shall be excluded. Here this would necessarily apply to all periods of limitation prescribed anywhere; because, the person who has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution against the offender cannot be differently placed because, the period of limitation is provided in Section 199(5). Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 470 also indicates that the context of the use of the words “period of limitation” there also requires to include the period of limitation provided elsewhere. Sub-section (2) provides for exclusion of the period during which institution or prosecution in respect of the offence had been stayed. There is no reason why such provision cannot apply to the period of limitation provided elsewhere in the Code. If a person is legally and effectively prevented for a certain time by a stay or injunction from instituting a prosecution, there is no reason why such period should not be excluded merely because the period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Code than Section 468.
7. More effective demonstration of the context requiring otherwise is provided by sub-section (3) of Section 470. It provides for exclusion of the period required for obtaining the requisite sanction. The sanctioning authority is different from the aggrieved party. The aggrieved party has no control over the sanctioning authority and the sanctioning authority is under no obligation to decide the question whether to grant or not to grant the requisite sanction, within any particular time. Therefore, the Legislature has advisedly provided for exclusion of the period of limitation while computing the period of limitation. Section 199 itself provides for both the necessity of the sanction as well as for the period of limitation. Here is the provision where the context very clearly requires that the period of limitation includes the period of limitation prescribed elsewhere in the Code.
8. Section 473 also enables a court to take cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation if the delay is properly explained or it is necessary in the interest of justice ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter’. This Section clearly shows that this power of the court is not restricted to or is controlled by any provisions of Chapter XXXVI including the definition of Section 467. This provision enables the court to take cognizance even after the period of limitation prescribed anywhere, if the delay is explained or the interest of justice requires.
9. It is thus abundantly clear that the period of limitation prescribed in Section 199(5) is also subject to the provisions of Chapter XXXVI more particularly of Section 473 and Section 470(3). Therefore the period required for obtaining requisite sanction is required to be excluded. In that case the complaint is within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 199(5). Therefore, there is no question or necessity of condoning the delay. Even if the period is treated as delay, the delay is properly explained and, therefore, the court has the power and jurisdiction to take cognizance. In the result, there is no substance in any of the contentions and the Revision Application deserves to be dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim relief stands vacated.
10. Rule discharged.