Loading..
Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 14 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order 7 Rule 11(D) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of Section 35 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
  • Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
  • Order VII Rule 11 (a).
  • section 43 of the tenancy act
  • Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act
  • Order VII Rule 11
  • Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948,
  • Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, 1948,
  • section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act,
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
  • Section 53A Page 9 of 17 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • Section-43 of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act.
  • Section - 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 7 Rule 11
  • Court Act, 1906.]" 33.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 14 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order 7 Rule 11(D) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of Section 35 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
  • Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
  • Order VII Rule 11 (a).
  • section 43 of the tenancy act
  • Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act
  • Order VII Rule 11
  • Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948,
  • Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, 1948,
  • section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act,
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
  • Section 53A Page 9 of 17 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • Section-43 of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act.
  • Section - 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 7 Rule 11
  • Court Act, 1906.]" 33.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant instituted a suit seeking specific performance of a contract based on an agreement to sell dated 30.09.2003 concerning a subject land initially classified as new tenure land under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The agreement stipulated that the defendants (original owners) were responsible for converting the land from new tenure to old tenure within one year. No action was taken by the parties until 2019, when the land was converted to old tenure on 29.05.2019. The very next day, the defendants executed a registered sale deed in favor of defendant no.7.

The appellant filed a suit for specific performance based on the 2003 agreement. Defendant no.7 filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC to reject the plaint, contending that the agreement was invalid under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act and that the suit was time-barred. The trial court allowed this application and rejected the plaint. Dissatisfied, the appellant filed the present First Appeal under Section 96 CPC against the trial court's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit for specific performance based on an agreement to sell hit by Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, is maintainable in law.
  2. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of invalidity of the agreement and limitation.
  3. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity and enforceability of the agreement of sale in the context of tenancy laws and conversion of land tenure.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The defendants were responsible for converting the land from new tenure to old tenure but delayed the process until 2019.
  • The suit was filed after the land conversion and the sale deed in favor of defendant no.7, hence the suit was not barred by limitation.
  • The trial court erred in rejecting the plaint solely on the basis that the agreement was hit by Section 43 of the Act.
  • The suit was not only for specific performance but also for damages and for setting aside the registered sale deed executed by defendants no.1 to 6 in favor of defendant no.7.
  • The appellant relied on conditions in the agreement to sell, particularly the obligation of defendants to convert the land tenure within one year.
  • Pending appeal against an earlier order (Exhibit-5) indicated that the application under Order 7 Rule 11 should not have been decided at that stage.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The agreement to sell concerning new tenure land hit by Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act is not enforceable in law.
  • The issue is settled by precedent and is no longer res integra.
  • The suit is barred by the law of limitation as the agreement was executed in 2003 and the suit was filed in 2019.
  • The plaint warranted rejection under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on grounds of invalidity and limitation.
  • Relied on authoritative decisions including Ganpatlal Manjibhai Khatri vs. Manguben Babaji Thakor and Hasvantbhai Chhanubhai Dalal vs. Adesinh Mansinh Raval.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganpatlal Manjibhai Khatri vs. Manguben Babaji Thakor, 2019 JX (Guj.) 1122 Suit for specific performance based on illegal or invalid agreement for sale is not maintainable. The Court applied this precedent to uphold that the agreement hit by Section 43 of the Tenancy Act is invalid and unenforceable, justifying rejection of the plaint.
Hasvantbhai Chhanubhai Dalal vs. Adesinh Mansinh Raval, 2019 (2) GLH 357 Agreement to sell new tenure land hit by Section 43 of the Tenancy Act is invalid and cannot be specifically enforced. The Court relied on this to hold that the suit based on such an agreement is not maintainable.
Narayanamma vs. Govindappa, Supreme Court decision dated 26/9/2019 Application of maxims ex turpi causa non oritur actio and ex dolo malo non oritur actio where parties are confederates in fraud; court should avoid assisting illegal agreements. The Court used the principles to emphasize that enforcement of an illegal agreement would be against public interest.
Immani Appa Rao and Ors. vs. Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi, (1962) 3 SCR 739 Courts should not enforce agreements contrary to law and public policy. Reinforced the principle that invalid agreements under statutory bars cannot be enforced.
V. Narasimharaju, AIR 1963 SC 107 Agreements with unlawful consideration are invalid as against public policy. The Court noted that absence of mandatory sanction renders the agreement invalid.
Himatrao Ukha Mali vs. Popat Devram Patil, AIR 1999 Bombay 10 Section 43 imposes a total prohibition on alienation of new tenure land without prior sanction; agreements without sanction are invalid. Supported the conclusion that the agreement was invalid due to lack of prior permission.
Raghwendra Sharan Singh vs. Ram Prasanna Singh, Civil Appeal No.2960/2019 Plaints can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) if suit is barred by limitation. Applied to hold that the suit was also barred by limitation.
K. Akbar Ali vs. K. Umar Khan, LL 2021 SC 114 Meaningful reading of plaint required to reject frivolous or vexatious suits under Order 7 Rule 11. Used to justify rejection of plaint where no clear right to sue is shown.
Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, Civil Appeal No.9519 of 2019 Strict adherence to conditions under Order 7 Rule 11 for rejecting plaint; court must determine if plaint discloses cause of action. Supported the procedural correctness of plaint rejection.
Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I & Anr., (2004) 9 SCC 512 Test for rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 is whether averments and documents taken together would result in decree. Applied to assess plaint's sufficiency and enforceability of contract.
Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614 Allegations in plaint must prima facie show cause of action; court cannot try factual disputes at this stage. Used to emphasize that plaint must disclose a valid cause of action.
I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 170 Courts do not permit clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action. Supported rejection of plaint where no clear right to sue is shown.
Satish Kumar vs. Karan Singh & Anr., Civil Application No.7385 of 2013 Specific performance requires valid and enforceable contract; court will not make a contract for parties. Applied to hold that invalid agreement cannot be basis for specific performance.
Mayawanti vs. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1 Jurisdiction to order specific performance depends on existence of valid and enforceable contract. Reiterated that invalid contracts cannot be specifically enforced.
Neminath Appayya Hanamannanavar vs. Jamboorao Satappa Kocheri, 1966 AIR (Kar.) 154 Civil Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity of agreement of sale before transfer/acquisition; Mamlatdar's jurisdiction is post-transfer. Applied to hold that Civil Court alone can adjudicate enforceability of agreement in tenancy context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the pleadings and documents on record, focusing on the applicability of Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, which prohibits transfer of new tenure land without prior sanction from the Collector. The agreement to sell dated 30.09.2003 was executed without such prior sanction, rendering it invalid and unenforceable in law.

The Court considered authoritative Supreme Court and High Court decisions establishing that courts cannot grant specific performance for agreements barred by statutory prohibitions or public policy. It emphasized the principle that courts should not actively assist in enforcing illegal agreements (ex turpi causa non oritur actio).

Further, the Court noted that although the suit was filed after conversion of the land to old tenure and subsequent registered sale deed execution, the fundamental defect in the original agreement's validity could not be overlooked. The suit was thus not maintainable.

The Court also addressed procedural aspects under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, highlighting that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action or a clear right to sue due to the invalidity of the agreement and limitation bar.

Jurisdictional issues were discussed, with reliance on precedent that Civil Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of agreements prior to transfer, and that other authorities like the Mamlatdar cannot adjudicate on such matters prematurely.

In sum, the Court upheld the trial court's order rejecting the plaint as legally sound and consistent with settled law.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the First Appeal, thereby affirming the trial court's order rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

The decision directly affects the parties by upholding that a suit for specific performance based on an agreement to sell agricultural land that is invalid under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, is not maintainable. The plaint is liable to be rejected on grounds of invalidity of the agreement and limitation.

No new precedent was established; the ruling follows established legal principles and prior authoritative decisions.

    VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUSHILABEN DAYALBHAI

    C/FA/1556/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 21/06/2021

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

    R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1556 of 2021 With

    CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2021 In

    R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1556 of 2021

    FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

    HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

    and

    HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI

    ==========================================================

    1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
    2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
    3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
    4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ?

    ==========================================================

    VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL

    Versus

    SUSHILABEN DAYALBHAI

    ========================================================== Appearance:

    MR AB MUNSHI(1238) for the Appellant(s) No. 1 for the Defendant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6,6.1,6.2,6.3 MR RUTUL P DESAI(6498) for the Defendant(s) No. 7 ==========================================================

    CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

    and

    HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI

    Date : 21/06/2021

    Page 1 of 17

    ORAL JUDGMENT

    (PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI)

    1. This First Appeal under Section - 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of the original plaintiffs and is directed against the judgment and decree below Exh.31 dated 24.03.2021 passed by the 2ndAdditional Senior Civil Judge, Surat in the Special Civil Suit No.274 of 2019, by which, the Court rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    2. The appellant instituted the suit seeking for specific performance of the contract based on an agreement to sell dated 30.09.2003. At the time of the execution of the agreement to sell, the subject land was a new tenure land. In other words, the subject land was hit by Section-43 of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. In such circumstances, an understanding was arrived at as stipulated in the agreement to sell that the sellers i.e. the original defendants nos.1 to 6 shall take all necessary steps to get the land converted from new tenure to old tenure and such steps shall be taken by the seller within a period of one year from the date of execution of the agreement to sell. After the said agreement came to be executed in 2003, no action was taken by the parties till 2019.

    3. It appears that thereafter, the land came to be converted to old tenure vide order dated 29.05.2019. On the very next day, i.e. on 30.05.2019, the original owners i.e. the defendants nos.1 to 6 executed a registered sale-deed of the subject land in favour of the defendant no.7.

    4. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant herein instituted a suit for specific performance of contract based on the agreement to sell dated 30.09.2003. The respondent no.7 herein [purchaser of the property] preferred an application under Order 7 Rule 11(D) of the Code of Civil Procedure and prayed for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit itself was not maintainable as a decree of specific performance cannot be granted on the basis

    Page 2 of 17

    of a invalid or void agreement to sell hit by Section-43 of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act. The rejection of plaint was also prayed for on the ground that the suit is time barred.

    5. The Trial Court allowed the application below Exh-31 filed by the respondent no.7 herein and rejected the plaint.

    6. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the Court below rejecting the plaint, the original plaintiff is here before this Court with the present appeal.

    7. The original plaintiff instituted Special Civil Suit No.274 of 2019 praying for the following reliefs :-

    "(A) Your Honour may be pleased to pass the order in favour of I-the Plaintiff directing the Defendants or their heirs, guardian, agent to specifically perform the agreement to sell executed in favour of I-the Plaintiff on 30/09/2002 and to receive the outstanding amount of consideration from I-the Plaintiff and to hand over the peaceful and direct possession of the suit land after executing the sale deed in the name of I-the Plaintiff or in the name of any other person as per my wish by appearing in Surat Sub-Registrar Office in respect of the land registered vide R.S.No.49/1, block No.62 admeasuring to 2630 sq.mt. in moje Parvat village, Ta-Udhana, Dist: Surat. If the Defendant refuses to execute the sale deed, your honour may be pleased to pass the order appointing the competent court commissioner and to direct the court commissioner to be present in the Sub-Registrar Office and execute the Registered sale deed in favour of I-the Plaintiff or in the name of any other person as per my wish and to get the peaceful and direct possession of the suit land from the Defendants and hand over the same to I-the Plaintiff.

    At the Alternative

    Page 3 of 17

    If Hon'ble court does not deem it fit to grant the above prayer, Your Honour may be pleased to pass an order in favour of I-the Plaintiff and against the Defendants directing them to pay Rs.1,66,172/- of the earnest money deed and Rs.1,50,00,000/- towards compensation for damages to me after selling or mortgaging all the immovable properties of the Defendants.

    Amended as per the Order of Exhibit-15, Date: 18/11/19 (A/A) Kindly declare that the so called sale deed executed in favour of the respondent no.7 by the respondent no.1 to 6 and registered with the Sub-Registrar Office, Surat on 30/05/2019 under Sr. No.6237 (Index dated 31/07/2019) for the land admeasuring 1840 Sq. Mts. of Final Plot No.43 of T.P. Scheme No.19 (Parvat-Magob) allotted in lieu of land admeasuring 2630 Sq. Mts. of Block No.62, Revenue Survey No.49/1 of Moje Village: Parvat of Taluka: Udhana, District: Surat, is bogus, fake, ultra-vires, fabricated, without consideration, nullity and void and it is not binding to the plaintiff and pass an order to cancel it. (A/A/A) Kindly declare that the respondent no.1 to 6 are not entitled to do any unlawful act, which frustrates the rights of agreement for sale of the plaintiff for the land admeasuring 1840 Sq. Mts. of Final Plot No.43 of T.P. Scheme No.19 (Parvat-Magob) allotted in lieu of land admeasuring 2630 Sq. Mts. of Block No.62, Revenue Survey No.49/1 of Moje Village: Parvat of Taluka: Udhana, District: Surat, and that the respondent no.7 does not get any ownership or possession rights by virtue of Sale Deed registered with the Sub-Registrar Office, Surat on 30/05/2019 under Sr. No.6237 (Index dated 31/07/2019).

    (B) Kindly declare that the respondents* Respondent nos .1 to 7, by taking disadvantage of their names reflecting in the village form no.7 x 12 of the land admeasuring 2630 Sq. Mts. of Block No.62, Revenue Survey No.49/1 of Moje Village: Parvat of Taluka: Udhana, District: Surat, themselves or through their legal heirs, agents, servants,

    Page 4 of 17

    are not entitled to execute documents relating to any kind of transfer or possession in favour of any third party or institute to create any kind of encumbrance of government / semi government or to do any kind of act containing transfer of nature of the land in the suit. * Amended as per the Order of Exhibit-15, Date:18/11/19

    (C) It is prayed that a permanent injunction order be passed against the respondents in the interest of the plaintiff that, taking the undue benefit of the names of Respondents No - 1 to 7 existing in the Village Form No - 7x12 of land with Revenue Survey No - 49/1, moje village Parvat, Taluka - Udhna, District - Surat whose Block No - 62 and the total area is 2630 square meter, they shall not enter into any transaction of transfer by sale, rent, gift etc. or execute any document in this regard with a third party or person by themselves or through their heirs, servants or agent and they shall not create or cause to create encumbrance in government or semi-government office and they shall not transfer or cause to transfer the possession of the land in suit and they shall not make or cause to make any construction on it which may change its identity.

    (D) It is prayed that all the possible relief with respect to the suit be granted.

    (E) It is prayed that all the cost of the suit be granted to the plaintiff from the respondents."

    8. Heard Mr. A. B. Munshi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Amit Thakkar learned counsel appearing for Mr. Rutul P. Desai, the learned counsel for the respondent No.7.

    9. Mr. A. B. Munshi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that since the responsibility of converting the suit land from new tenure to old tenure was on the defendants No.1 to 6, the defendants No.1 to 6

    Page 5 of 17

    did not undertake the exercise of converting the suit land to old tenure land. The appellant contended that the trial Court ought to have appreciated that even as per the say of the defendant No.7 the order of conversion from new tenure to old tenure passed by the Collector was dated 29.5.2019 and the registered sale deed in favour of the defendant No.7 was 30.5.2019 i.e. on the very next day of the conversion. The suit was preferred by the appellant-plaintiff on 5.9.2019 and at that point of time the suit land was already converted to new tenure to old tenure and there was registered sale deed in favour of the defendant No.7. The trial Court has erred in not considering this aspect while deciding the application filed by the defendant No.7 below Ex.31. The plaintiff's suit could not have been rejected solely on the ground that the agreement to sale being hit by Section 43 of the Act is not enforceable in law.

    9.1 It is submitted that the suit property was agreed to be sold after converting it from new tenure to old tenure land and it was the responsibility of the original owners to convert the tenure of the land. He relied on the conditions No.3 and 4 of the agreement to sell. He further raised the issue that limitation period of agreement was upto the execution of the registered sale deed and the defendants did not act to take permission of conversion of land to old tenure till the year 2019 and as and when the land was converted the plaintiff instituted the present suit. It was submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant that on the day of filing of the suit there was no restriction under Section 43 of the Tenancy Act. It is also submitted that as the Appeal From Order filed in this Court against the order passed below Ex.5 is pending, the application under Order 7 Rule 11 should not have been decided.

    9.2 The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the Special Civil Suit instituted by the appellant (original plaintiff) was not just for specific performance but also for claiming damages to the tune of Rs.1,50,00,000/- and also for setting aside the registered sale deed executed by the defendants No.1 to 6 in favour of defendant No.7 dated 30.5.2019. He placed reliance on the condition No.(3) of the agreement at page 28 of the paper-book :-

    Page 6 of 17

    "(3) As the said land is of New Tenure, entire procedure to transfer the same in Old Tenure shall be carried out by us - the second Party. We - the second Party will bare the entire expenses regarding such procedure and amount of Premium. We - the second Party will have to complete the said procedure within one year from the date of this Agreement to Sale."

    10. The defendants No.1 to 6 though served have not appeared.

    11. Mr. Amit Thakkar, the learned counsel assisted by Mr. Ritul Desai, the learned advocate appearing for the defendant No.7 submitted that short point for the consideration of the Court below while adjudicating the application filed by the defendant No.7 for rejection of plaint was whether an agreement to sell which is hit by Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act can be enforced in a Court of law for the purpose of seeking specific performance of contract. Mr. Thakkar would submit that law in this regard is well settled. According to Mr. Thakkar the issue is no longer res integra in view of the following two decisions;

    (1) Ganpatlal Manjibhai Khatri vs. Manguben Babaji Thakor, reported in 2019 JX (Guj.) 1122 and

    (2) Hasvantbhai Chhanubhai Dalal vs. Adesinh Mansinh Raval, reported in 2019(2) GLH 357.

    He would submit that an agreement to sell with respect to a new tenure land hit by the restriction of Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act is not enforceable in law and therefore, a suit for specific performance based on such an invalid agreement is not maintainable in law.

    11.1. He has further submitted that the alleged agreement was of the year 2003 and the suit came to be instituted in the year 2019, hence the suit is barred by the law of limitation and plaint is required to be rejected on that ground as well.

    Page 7 of 17

    12. The trial Court while rejecting the plaint has arrived at following findings at paragraphs 6 to 13 which are reproduced hereinbelow :-

    "6. On perusal of the fact of the plain with the documents filed, the averments of plain if performance of an agreement which was executed for the new tenure land. At the time of execution of the agreement, no previous sanction was received from the collected.

    7. On perusal of the fact of the case it is cleared that suit property was restricted from the transfer without the permission of the Collector. Recently in the decision of Narayanamma vs. Govindappa decided on Dtd.26/9/2019, same question was considered by Hon'ble Apex Court. The findings are necessary to note here.

    The question considered by the Apex Court in Narayanamma vs. Govindappa was in whose favour the balance of justice would tilt In a situation both the parties are common

    participator in the illegality ?

    Referring to Immani Appa Rao and Ors. vs. Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi (1962) 3 SCR 739 , the bench comprising Justice Arun Mishra, Justice MR Shah and Justice BR Gavai observed:

    As held in Immani Appa Rao (supra), if the decree is granted in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of an illegal

    agreement which is hit by a statute, it will be rendering an active assistance of the court in enforcing an agreement which is contrary to law. As against this, if the balance is tilted towards the defendants, no doubt that they would stand benefited even in spite of their predecessor-in-title committing an illegality. However, what the court would be doing is only rendering an assistance which is purely of a passive character. As held by Gajendragadkar, J. in Immani Appa Rao (supra), the first course would be clearly and patently inconsistent with the public interest whereas, the latter course is lesser injurious to public interest than the former. The bench referred to Apex Court judgments dealing with the question of application of the maxims ex turpi causa non oritur actio and ex dolo malo non oritur action. It noted these points:

    This Court held that, which principle is to be applied in the facts of the case would depend upon the question, as to which principle is more consistent with public interest. The Court finds that, when both the parties before the Court are confederates in the fraud, the Court will have to find out which

    Page 8 of 17

    approach would be less injurious to public interest. The Court observed that, whichever approach is adopted, one party would succeed and the other would fail and, therefore, it is necessary to enquire as to which party's success would be less injurious to public interest. The Court in the facts of the said case finds that if the decree was to be passed in favour of respondent No. 1 (who was the plaintiff), it would be actively assisting respondent No. 1 to give effect to the fraud to which he was a party and it has been held that in that sense the Court would be allowed to be used as an instrument of fraud and that is clearly and patently inconsistent with public interest.

    It has further been held, that if both the parties are equally guilty and the fraud intended by them had been carried out, the position would be that, the party raising the defence is not asking the Court's assistance in any active manner. It has been held, that all the defence suggested is that a confederate in fraud shall not be permitted to obtain a decree from the Court because the documents of title, on which the claim is based really conveys no title at all. In the facts of the said case, it was held, that though the result thereof would be assisting the defence therein to retain their possession, for such an assistance would be purely of passive character and all that the Court would do in effect is that on the facts proved, it proposes to allow possession to rest where it lies. It has been held that, latter course appears to be less injurious to public interest than the former one. It could thus be seen that, although illegality is not pleaded by the defendant nor is relied upon by him by way of defence, yet the court itself, upon the illegality appearing upon the evidence, will take notice of it, and will dismiss the action ex turpi causa non oritur actio. It has been held, that no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountain of justice. It has further been held, that where parties are concerned in illegal agreements or other transactions, courts of equity following the rule of law as to participators in common crime will not interpose to grant any relief, acting upon the maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendetis et possidentis.

    8. In the case of V. Narasimharaju (AIR 1963 SC 107) [supra], the Apex Court held with regard to unlawful consideration that the agreement would be treated as invalid for the reason that such consideration is opposed to public policy and in case on hand particularly when previous sanction of the Collector was a mandatory and, admittedly, such previous sanction was not obtained by the parties and the agreement to sell an agricultural land is invalid and even Section 53A

    Page 9 of 17

    of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would also not safeguard such agreement.

    9. The above aspect is also dealt with by the Bombay High Court in the case of Himatrao Ukha Mali vs. Popat Devram Patil, AIR 1999 Bombay 10, [supra], wherein it is held that Section 43 imposes a total prohibition or legal bar on alienation of the lands vested in favour of the tenants under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. If an agreement of sale or any instrument in respect of the subject land is executed without taking previous sanction of the Collector under section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act, the said agreement shall be invalid as per Section 43(2) of the said Act. Suffice it to say that Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act bars even entering into agreement or alienating the land and usage of term 'shall' twice in the section including in the penultimate part of the section reveals mandatory character of the language contained therein and to be interpreted as such and, particularly when the agreement/ transaction was barred by subsection (1) of Section 43 of the Tenancy Act and subsection (2) of Section 43 of the said Act clearly refers such agreement or transfer shall be invalid.

    10. In the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in case of Raghwendra Sharan Singh vs. Ram Prasanna Singh in Civil Appeal No.2960/2019 decided on 13/3/2019, in which observation made that a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, if by considering the averments, it is found that the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation.

    11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in CASE: K. AKBAR ALI vs. K. UMAR KHAN [SLP 31844 OF 2018] CORAM: Justices Indira Banerjee and Hemant Gupta COUNSEL: Sr. Adv R. Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv R. Basant, Adv Raghenth Basant CITATION: LL 2021 SC 114 decided on 25/2/2021 held that "In any case, an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint requires a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole. As held by this Court in ITC v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal reported in AIR 1998 SC 634, clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint. Similarly the Court must see that the bar in law of the suit is not camouflaged by devious and clever drafting of the plaint. Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court. 8. In this case, a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole makes it abundantly clear that the relief claimed in the suit is barred in view of the restricted scope of the Power of Attorney given by the first Defendant to Mr. Zahir Ali."

    Page 10 of 17

    12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Case name: DAHIBEN vs. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI (GAJRA)(D) THR LRS Case no.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9519 OF 2019 Coram: Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Indu Malhotra decided on 9-7-202 The Court made the following observations:

    1. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.

    2. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.

    3. The documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.

    4. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

    5. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration.

    6. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I & Anr., (2004) 9 SCC 512.

    7. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. (2007) 5 SCC 614.

    8. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

    9. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the

    Page 11 of 17

    trial. Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra 7 (2003) 1 SCC 557. 10."Cause of action" means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.

    11. While considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory.

    12. Law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC

    170.

    13. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal.

    14. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.

    13. The ratio of law clearly applicable to the case on hand. As per the provisions of law, when the transfer was restricted by and could not be made without the prior permission of the collector, hence, no suit can be entertained for the specific performance of any agreement executed without prior permission. It is the argument of learned advocate of plaintiff that date of filling of the suit is important not the date of agreement. But, in case on hand the date of agreement is important as on the execution of agreement, the consideration of the agreement was invalid and court has no power to order specific performance of agreement having invalid consideration. It is the prime question at the time of allowing specific performance that whether the agreement for which specific performance is sought was valid or invalid? If the answer is received as invalid then the position of law is binding on the court."

    13. In the case of Hasvantbhai Chhanubhai Dalal vs. Adesinh Mansihn Raval and ors. reported in 2019 (2) GLH 357, wherein the court was concerned with the question whether the agreement for sale of a new tenure land hit under section 43 of the tenancy act can be specifically enforced and performed. In paragraph 111, the Court held as under :-

    "[1] The suit for specific performance of contract based on an invalid agreement of sale hit by Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, 1948, is not

    Page 12 of 17

    maintainable in law. If the agreement is rendered invalid under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, such agreement is incapable of being specifically enforced. If the agreement of sale itself is invalid, no decree for specific performance can be passed by the Trial Court. Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act provides inter alia that a contract, which is in its nature determinable, cannot be specifically enforced. In such circumstances, the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale has rightly not been decreed.

    [2] Even otherwise, independent of the issue of Section 43 of the Act, 1948, the plaintiff has not been able to make out any case for grant of decree of specific performance of contract based on an invalid agreement of sale."

    14. The present case also stands covered by the ratio laid down in the case of Ganpatlal Manjibhai Khatri vs. Manguben Babaji Thakor, reported in 2019 JX (Guj.) 1122 , wherein in para 33 to 35 following observations are made :-

    "29. It is well settled that the jurisdiction to order specific performance of contract is based on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. Where a valid and enforceable contract has not been made, the Court will not make a contract for them. Specific performance will not be ordered if the contract itself suffers from some defect which makes the contract invalid or unenforceable. The discretion of the Court will not be there even though the contract is otherwise valid and enforceable. (See Satish Kumar vs. Karan Singh & Anr., Civil Application No.7385 of 2013, decided on 21st January, 2016).

    30. The Supreme Court in Mayawanti vs. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1 held thus:

    "8. In a case of specific performance it is settled law, and indeed it cannot be doubted, that the jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract is based on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. The Law of Contract is based on the ideal of freedom of contract and it provides the limiting principles within which the parties are free to make their own contracts. Where a

    Page 13 of 17

    valid and enforceable contract has not been made, the court will not make a contract for them. Specific performance will not be ordered if the contract itself suffers from some defect which makes the contract invalid or unenforceable. The discretion of the court will be there even though the contract is otherwise valid and enforceable and it can pass a decree of specific performance even before there has been any breach of the contract. It is, therefore, necessary first to see whether there has been a valid and enforceable contract and then to see the nature and obligation arising out of it. The contract being the foundation of the obligation the order of specific performance is to enforce that obligation."

    31. We shall now deal with the second contention of Mr. Joshi as regards Sections 85 and 85A of the Act. Section 85 of the Act reads as follows:-

    "Section 85 Bar of jurisdiction

    (1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question [(including a question whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant and whether any such tenant is or should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him) which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decide or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or Tribunal, a Manager, Collector or the [Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal] in appeal or revision or the [State] Government in exercise of their powers of control.

    (2) No order of the Mamlatdar, the Tribunal, the Collector or the [Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal] or the [State] Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. Explanation:- For the purposes of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906."

    32. Section 85A of the Act reads as follows:

    "Section 85A Suits involving issues required to be decided under this Act

    (1) If any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the "competent authority") the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination.

    (2) On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the competent

    Page 14 of 17

    authority shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall communicate its decision to the Civil Court and such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto.

    Explanation:- For the purpose of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906.]"

    33. In our opinion, it would be within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court alone to determine whether the agreement on the basis of which the suit for specific performance is instituted is a valid agreement or not. To put it in other words, the jurisdiction exercisable for the determination of the enforceability of the agreement of sale clearly resided in the Civil Court which alone had the jurisdiction to make an adjudication on that question.

    34. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Neminath Appayya Hanamannanavar vs. Jamboorao Satappa Kocheri, reported in 1966 AIR (Kar.) 154, wherein the Court observed as under:

    "[89] Section 70(mb) authorises and empowers the Mamlatdar to decide the validity of a transfer or acquisition and to make that decision under Section 84B or section 84C. Section 848 among other matters authorises a Mamlatdar when he has reason to believe that a transfer or acquisition made on or after June 15, 1955, contravenes sections 63 or 64 of the Act as it stood before the commencement of the amending Act, 1955. to make an enquiry and decide whether the transfer or acquisition was or was not valid.

    [90] Section 84C empowers the Mamlatdar to hold an enquiry by the option of the procedure prescribed in section 84B whether a transfer or acquisition made after the commencement of the amending Act,1955. was valid.

    [91] Since the agreement of sale in the case before us was made after the commencement of the amending Act,1955, the relevant statutory provision under which the Mamlatdar can make the enquiry authorised by section 70(mb) is section 84C. But. what is authorised by section 84C is an enquiry into the validity of a transfer or acquisition made after the commencement of the amending Act 1955. So. the condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Mamlatdar is a transfer or acquisition made in that way and that Judge is unavailable until the transfer or acquisition actually comes into being.

    Page 15 of 17

    [92] In this case, no such transfer or acquisition had yet been made by any one. The acquisition which the plaintiff wanted to make was an acquisition which he could make only after he obtained a decree for specific performance and the invalidity of the acquisition if it was in contravention of section 35 would attack itself to the acquisition only after delivery of possession to the plaintiff of an area of land in excess of what is permitted by the law.

    [93] In that view of the matter, the jurisdiction exercisable for the determination of the enforceability of the agreement of sale clearly resided in the Civil Court which alone had the jurisdiction to make an adjudication on that question. Surely, the Mamlatdar could not have at a stage when the acquisition or transfer had not yet been made and all that the plaintiff wanted to do was to enforce an agreement of sale so that he could make the acquisition or obtain a transfer under the terms of the agreement exercised power under S.70(mb) or under section 84C and made one he would have this exercised his jurisdiction prematurely and that adjudication would have invited the criticism that it was one without competence.

    [94] In my opinion, when a question arises in a suit for specific performance whether the agreement on which that suit is based is void on the ground that any acquisition made pursuant thereto would contravene or transgress the provisions of Section 35 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the Civil Court Is the only forum in which an adjudication is possible and the Mamlatdar cannot make any such adjudication. The power to make any adjudication under section 84C arises and accrues to the Mamlatdar only after the acquisition or the transfer as the assessee may be is completed and not before."

    35. In the overall view of the matter, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the Civil Court, rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suit is time barred, may not be sustainable in law, but at the same time, no interference is warranted in the present first appeal, because in our opinion, the plaint is liable to be rejected mainly on the ground that the suit for specific performance based on an illegal or invalid agreement to sell is not maintainable as, such a contract is not enforceable."

    15. In view of the above settled legal position, the Court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the agreement to sell dated 30.9.2003 entered into between the defendants No.1 to 6 and the appellant itself being hit by the bar

    Page 16 of 17

    under Section 43 of the Tenancy Act could be said to be invalid and not enforceable in law.

    16. The Trial Court has rightly rejected the plaint by correctly following the ratio as laid down in the various decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court as discussed above.

    17. The decision of the trial court while rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 cannot be faulted with since the issue is no longer res integra and is squarely covered in the case of Ganpatlal Manjibhai Khatri vs. Manguben Babaji Thakor, reported in 2019 JX (Guj.) 1122. In this case also, the court rejected the plaint on the ground that the suit for specific performance based on illegal and invalid agreement for sale is not maintainable.

    18. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Consequently the civil application also stands disposed of.

    (J. B. PARDIWALA, J)

    (VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI,J)

    K.K. SAIYED

    Page 17 of 17

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUSHILABEN DAYALBHAI
    (Jun 21, 2021)