ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA)
1. This first appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short "the CPC") is at the instance of the original plaintiff and is directed against the order and decree passed by the 2ndAddl. Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) dated 19thJuly, 2018 below Exh.11 in the Special Civil Suit No.558 of 2014 by which the court below rejected the plaint under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC on the ground that the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of contract based on an agreement to sell is time barred.
2. For the sake of convenience, the appellant herein shall be referred to as the plaintiff and the respondents herein shall be referred to as the original defendants. The application, Exh.11 under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC was preferred by the defendant No.9. It is at the instance of the defendant No.9 that the plaint came to be rejected on the ground that the suit is time barred. It appears that the defendant No.9 is the subsequent purchaser of the property in question, for which, the suit came to be preferred for specific performance of contract.
3. The plaintiff preferred the Special Civil Suit No.558 of 2014 and prayed for the following reliefs:
"(a) Be pleased with regard to the property situated in the District Ahmedabad Sub-District Dakroi at mauje Ropda village sim Survey / Block No. 104A hector-aare- sq.mts. 0-60-70 having assessment Rs.4.06 paise and Survey / Block No. 104 B hector-aare-sq.mts. 0-73-86
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having assessment Rs. 5.05 paise the suit property is sold by the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 outside the knowledge of the plaintiff on 27/11/2010 by way of registered sale deed No. 12534 in favour of the defendant No. 9, the same is ab initio null and void that is illegal be pleased to declare accordingly.
(b) Be pleased with regard to the property situated in the District Ahmedabad Sub-District Dakroi at mauje Ropda village sim Survey / Block No. 104A hector-aare- sq.mts. 0-60-70 having assessment Rs.4.06 paise and Survey / Block No. 104 B hector-aare-sq.mts. 0-73-86 having assessment Rs. 5.05 paise the suit land was agreed to be sold by the defendant No.8 power of attorney holder for the defendant Nos. 1 to 9, whereas outside the knowledge of the plaintiff and without his consent on 19/11/2010 the registered banakhat agreement to sell No. 607/10 was cancelled and the document in this regard was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar at Sr. No. 12232, the said document is ab initio null and void and unlawful, be pleased to declare accordingly and further be pleased to hold that the defendant No. 8 did not have any right and authority to make any such document.
(c ) Be pleased with regard to the property situated in the District Ahmedabad Sub-District Dakroi at mauje Ropda village sim Survey / Block No. 104A hector-aare- sq.mts. 0-60-70 having assessment Rs.4.06 paise and Survey / Block No. 104 B hector-aare-sq.mts. 0-73-86 having assessment Rs. 5.05 paise be pleased to hold that the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 have executed the registered banakhat agreement to sell No. 607/2010 on 27/1/2010, and direct the defendants to execute registered sale deed of the above property in favour of the plaintiff, Alternatively
(c ) Be pleased with regard to the property situated in the District Ahmedabad Sub-District Dakroi at mauje Ropda village sim Survey / Block No. 104A hector-aare- sq.mts. 0-60-70 having assessment Rs.4.06 paise and Survey / Block No. 104 B hector-aare-sq.mts. 0-73-86 having assessment Rs. 5.05 paise the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 have executed registered banakhat agreement to sell No.607/2010 on 27/1/2010 in favour of the plaintiff to
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act as per the said banakhat and if the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is not executed then the honourable court be pleased to appoint Court Commissioner and order to execute the sale deed of the said property in favour of the plaintiff.
(d) Be pleased with regard to the property situated in the District Ahmedabad Sub-District Dakroi at mauje Ropda village sim Survey / Block No. 104A hector-aare- sq.mts. 0-60-70 having assessment Rs.4.06 paise and Survey / Block No. 104 B hector-aare-sq.mts. 0-73-86 having assessment Rs. 5.05 paise be pleased to restrain the defendant No. 9 from in any manner transferring or selling or alienating the suit property on the basis of the sale deed and the mutation entry made in the revenue records in favour of any third party.
(e) Be pleased with regard to the property situated in the District Ahmedabad Sub-District Dakroi at mauje Ropda village sim Survey / Block No. 104A hector-aare- sq.mts. 0-60-70 having assessment Rs.4.06 paise and Survey/Block No. 104 B hector-aare-sq.mts. 0-73-86 having assessment Rs. 5.05 paise be pleased to restrain the defendants and their servants, agents, persons from in any manner causing any hindrance, obstruction and interference in the occupation and use of the suit land by the plaintiff, and not to restrain the plaintiff from harvesting crops, be pleased to grant such injunction.
(f) Be pleased to grant any other and further relief as may deem just and proper by this honourable court.
(g) Be pleased to award the costs of this suit from the defendants. "
4. The cause of action pleaded in the plaint reads as under:
"The cause for filing this suit is that the defendant No 8 had in capacity as the power holder for the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 executed a registered banakhat agreement to sell on 24/1/2010 having registration no.607/2010 and since then and within the validity of the banakhat the titles of the land would be cleared then the written intimation was to be given to the plaintiff, since then and
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thereafter outside the knowledge of the plaintiff the defendant No.8 had on 19/11/2010 cancelled the registered banakhat deed No. 607/2010 dated 24/1/2010 without the consent or signature of the plaintiff ex-parte registered at Sr. No. 12232, since then, and thereafter the said property was sold to the defendant No.9 by way of registered sale deed No. 12534 on 27/11/2010 since then and the plaintiff came to know about the entire illegal proceedings on 14/7/2014 since then, and the defendants have in collusion with each other and in association received the full sale consideration and did not perform as per the conditions of the banakhat and therefore the cause has arisen within the local jurisdiction of this honourable court."
5. Few other relevant averments made in the plaint read as under:
"12. The plaintiff perused the copy of this document and found that the defendant Nos. 1 to 9 have in collusion with each other cancelled the banakhat and power of attorney and made false representation before the plaintiff and wrongly kept in confidence and ex-parte cancelled the registered banakhat Sr. No. 607/10 made in favour of the plaintiff on 27/1/10, the said document is registered in the office of the Sub- Registrar at Sr. No. 12232 on 19/11/2010, and thereafter imemediately the defendant in this mater have with the intentions of frustrating the rights of the defendants jointly and in collusion executed the sale deed on 27/11/2010 in favour of the defendant No.
9. The defendant No. 9 was knowing very well that the said property is agreed to be sold to the plaintiff and although the plaintiff had paid the sale consideration then also with the intentions to frustrate the rights of the plaintiff and with the intentions not to perform as per the banakhat and for making higher financial gains and the defendants have in collusion and association with each other cancelled the banakhat No. 607/2010 made in favour of the plaintiff by violating law, and in which without the signature and consent of the plaintiff such unlawful act is committed, and the defendant No. 9 is not the power holder of the said property then also banakhat Sr. 607/2010 ex-parte cancellation document
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is registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar on 19/11/2010 at Sr. No. 12232, and thereafter immediately the sale deed qua the said property is made on 27/11/2010 in favour of the defendant No. 9, the said sale deed is registered at Sr. No. 12534, thus all these proceedings are followed with the intentions to frustrate the banakhat rights and purchase rights of the plaintiff by the defendants, thus the defendant No. 8 had remained present before the Sub Registrar on 19/11/2010 and made cancellation deed cancelling the banakhat No. 607/2010 of the plaintiff, for declaring the said document ab initio null and void and that the defendant No. 8 did not have any rights to do so for declaring the same and thereafter the defendant Nos. 1 to 8 have in collusion with each other and in association with the defendant No. 9 executed the registered sale deed in favour of the defendant No. 9 on 27/11/2010 and the defendant No. 9 has transferred the said property in his own name, and the said document is registered at Sr. No. 12534, and for declaring the said document nullity and for the specific performance of the banakhat Sr. 607/2010 made by the defendant Nos. 1 to 8 in favour of the plaintiff on 27/1/2010 and to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for obtaining the decree accordingly against the defendants this suit is filed within the local jurisdiction of this honourable court.
13. The occupation of the suit property at site is with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is himself cultivating, and with regard to the occupation and use of the suit land till date no person or the defendants have made any representation or claim before the plaintiff, nor they have come to the site, in such circumstances the plaintiff has remained unaware about the titles of his property, and these persons have executed false documents and have remained silent, because if they come on the land then the plaintiff would come to know and then there would be claims made and immediate legal action would be taken, but with a view that such proceedings should not be initiated against the defendants therefore till date the plaintiff is kept in dark, and in such circumstances the plaintiff did not come to know about the document executed qua our property. The defendants in this matter have on 27/11/2010 executed the sale deed and thereafter
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till date did not come to site and did not let the plaintiff come to know about the document. But the defendant Nos. 1 to 8 have made a clear condition in the banakhat that after the titles of the said land are cleared and the written intimation in this regard is given to the plaintiff in writing thereafter the banakhat would be valid for six months, and the defendants in this matter have till date not given any intimation regarding the title clear of the said land, therefore our banakhat is alive even as on today, therefore there is no bar of limitation to this banakhat."
6. The defendant No.9 preferred the application, Exh.11, praying for rejection of the plaint, inter alia, stating as under:
"1. The plaintiff in this matter has filed the suit before the honourable court and in its paragraph No. 1 prayed for declaration, specific performance and for holding the registered sale deed executed in favour of the defendant qua the suit land as null and void that is nullity, and for obtaining permanent injunction for the so called reasons stated in the suit against the present defendant and the other defendants.
2. If the entire suit by the plaintiff is perused in entirety then prima facie there appear to be more than one legal bars, in such circumstances it is imperative to dismiss the suit by the plaintiff in the interest of justice.
3. The plaintiff has in the present suit prayed for specific performance of the so called registered banakhat agreed to sell Sr. No 607/2010 dated 27/01/2010, but in fact 607 banakhat is not registered on 27/01/2010. Thus, the plaintiff has demanded specific performance relief as per the Sr. No. 607/2010, but there is no such banakhat agreement to sell produced in the present suit. In the circumstances the present suit by the plaintiff is not tenable only for the said reason.
4. The suit by the plaintiff is clearly barred by Limitation Act, because as stated by the plaintiff in the suit the relief is prayed on the basis of the banakhat
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registered on 24/01/2007 at Sr. No 607. Also the said suit is also barred by cause of action. The banakhat on which the plaintiff is relying the said banakhat is registered on 24/01/2007 at Sr. No. 607. Whereas the plaintiff has filed the present suit on 14/08/2014. Thus the plaintiff has after a long time of about 7 years filed the suit on the basis of the banakhat. Not only that but the document cancelling the said banakhat was registered on 19/11/2010. In the circumstances registered document is considered a public document, and as per the rulings by the honourable High Court and honourable Supreme Court it is considered that there is deemed knowledge from the date on which the document is made. Taking into consideration the limitation from the date of registration of both these documents of year 2007 and 2010, then respectively the suit is filed after 7 and 3 years. In the circumstances the suit by the plaintiff is clearly barred by limitation, and only on this ground alone the suit by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed in the interest of justice.
5. The plaintiff ahs in the present suit demanded specific performance of the so called banakhat of the year 2007, but as per the article 54 of Limitation Act the suit should be filed within 3 years. Similarly the banakhat agreement to sell of the year 2010 ought to also be filed within 3 years as per the article 59 of Limitation Act. Thus, Taking into consideration the said provisions of the Limitation Act t hen also the plaintiff has not filed the said suit within 3 years. In the circumstances also it is imperative to dismiss the said suit in the interest of justice.
6. The plaintiff has in the present suit also prayed for relief for the cancellation of the registered sale deed o. 12534 made in favour of the present defendant by the defendant Nos. 1 to 6 on accepting due consideration on 27/11/2010. Also, on the basis of the registered sale deed made in favour of the defendant mutation entry No. 894 was made on 29/12/2010, relief is also prayed for cancellation of the same. The said registered sale deed and the mutation entry No. 894 made in the village records are public documents, and the date on which the said public document is registered is considered to be
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the deemed date of knowledge. In the circumstances also 3 years time has got over, and the present suit by the plaintiff is clearly barred by Limitation, therefore on the grounds of limitation alone the said suit deserves to be dismissed in the interest of justice.
7. In the present suit the plaintiff has relied upon the so called banakhat made on 24/01/2007 and demanded specific performance. But when the so called banakhat was made at that time the suit land was of new tenure, that is the restrictions of section 43 of the Tenancy Act were in force. As per the section 43 of the Tenancy Act the sale deed of new tenure land or banakhat cannot be made without the prior permission from the Collector. In the circumstances under the said banakhat agreement to sell the relief of specific performance cannot be granted legally. Because the said banakhat is contrary to the provisions of Tenancy Act and is an invalid agreement, thus on the basis of such agreement the plaintiff cannot get any legal rights and authority. In the circumstances the present suit by the plaintiff is without any cause of action and deserves to be dismissed.
8. The suit by the plaintiff is also clearly barred by misjoinder of cause of action, because the plaintiff has filed the present suit with regard to the different documents made between different persons at different times, and only one suit is filed. Because with regard to the said documents different cause of action has arisen for the plaintiff at different times and in different ways. Therefore also the suit by the plaintiff is not legally tenable, and deserves to be dismissed in the interest of justice.
9. The plaintiff does not have any legal rights and authority for filing the present suit. Also, the plaintiff has suppressed several important facts in the present suit and filed the suit. In the circumstances the suit by the plaintiff cannot survive on the grounds of suppression of material facts. The defendant No. 9 is in peaceful possession, occupation and use of the said land since 27/11/2010 on the basis of registered sale deed, and the land revenue for the suit land is also paid by the defendant. Moreover the defendant
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has with regard to the title report also published one public notice, and in this regard also obtained title clearance report. At that time also the plaintiff has not raised any objections nor opposed. Thus, in view of all these facts there is suppression of facts in the suit by the plaintiff and therefore also it is imperative to dismiss the suit by the plaintiff in the interest of justice.
10. In support of the said application the affidavit by the defendant is enclosed.
11. Thus, the defendant prays that,
(a) Be pleased to allow the present application by the defendant and in view of the provisions under CPC Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) be pleased to dismiss the suit by the plaintiff.
(b) Be pleased to grant any other and further relief in the facts of this application."
7. The application, Exh.11 was heard by the court below and, ultimately, by an order dated 19thJuly, 2018, the same came to be allowed and the plaint was ordered to be rejected on the ground that the suit was time barred. The order reads thus:
"The defendant No. 9 in this matter has filed this application under CPC Order 7 Rule 11 and claimed that the suit by the plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore it is requested to be dismissed.
(2) Facts of the plaintiff case ::
2.1 The brief facts of the plaintiff case are that, in the Ahmedabad District Sub District Daskroi at mauje Ropda village in the sim land having Survey / Block No. 10/4/A admeasuring hector 0-60-70 and Survey Block o. 10/4/b admeasuring hector 0-73-86 land is the 'suit ;and'
2.2 The said suit land is of restricted nature of
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tenure, and the tenure of land had to be changed and thereafter the premium had to be paid, thus on 1/9/2006 the defendant No. 8 was appointed as power of attorney holder. The defendant No. 8 had as the power of attorney holder executed a registered banakhat in the office of Sub-Registrar, Narol on 24/1/2007. The total consideration decided was Rs. 1,15,000/-
2.3 Thus in this matter thereafter on 19/11/2010 the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 had cancelled the power of attorney made in favour of defendant No. 8. Thus the defendant No. 8 does not have any powers so it was cancelled and the registration of document was done.
2.4 Moreover, thereafter on 27/11/2010 the defendant No. 1 to 8 in this matter had made registered sale deed in favour of the defendant No. 9 in this regard mutation entry No. 12534 was made.
2.5 Thereafter the plaintiff in this matter had field suit for specific performance against the defendants for cancellation of the said document.
(3) Submissions on behalf of the applicant / defendant No. 9 :
The learned advocate Mr. N.M. Rajput for the applicant [original defendant No. 9] is that, as per the suit by the plaintiff on 24/1/2007 the banakhat having registration No. 607 was registered. Thus, the plaintiff has remembered after 7 years. Also, the said document cancelling the banakht was registered on 19/11/2010. The plaintiff was in knowledge of the registered document, and also the registered document is a public document, and it is considered to be deemed knowledge. Moreover the plaintiff has demanded specific performance of the banakhat agreement to sell, wherein also the plaintiff has not filed the suit within 3 years from the date of banakhat, therefore it is barred by limitation. Also, the defendant Nos. 1 to 6 have executed registered sale deed No. 12534 in favour of the defendant No. 9 on 27/11/2010. Which is also a public document. Thus they have deemed knowledge. The suit is filed after three years after the banakhat therefore it is barred by limitation. Moreover the
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performance of the banakaht executed on 24/1/2007 is demanded. There are restrictions of section 43 of the Tenancy Act, therefore it deserves to be dismissed. Thus, the suit by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed.
(4) Submissions on behalf of the opponent [original plaintiff] :;
The learned advocate Mr. M.M. Bukhari for the opponent [original plaintiff] has submitted that, there is no clear mention in the application by the defendant, and also the present application is not tenable. Only with the intentions of delaying the present application is filed, it is requested to dismiss the same with costs, and also the plaintiff has denied the facts of the application by the defendant.
Undisputed / admitted facts ::
(1) The disputed documents are registered.
(2) The suit by the plaintiff is dated 14/08/2014.
(3) The documents of which the plaintiff has demanded specific performance are registered documents respectively (1) dated 27/12010 92) 19/11/2010 (3) 27/11/2010.
(5) Merits of the application ::
Perused the application and the reply. Heard the arguments advanced by the parties. Perused the records.
5.1 At this stage on perusal of the application by the applicant, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) below which the application is filed are reproduced here below,
11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases :-
Where it does not disclose a cause of action; ***
***
Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint
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to be barred by any law; ***
***
5.2 The plaintiff in this matter has filed the suit for specific performance, and mainly demanded the following relief,
18(a)the suit property is sold by the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 outside the knowledge of the plaintiff on 27/11/2010 by way of registered sale deed No. 12534 in favour of the defendant No. 9, the same is ab initio null and void that is illegal, be pleased to order to declare accordingly.
18(b) the suit land was agreed to be sold by the defendant No. 8 power of attorney holder for the defendant Nos. 1 to 9, whereas outside the knowledge of the plaintiff and without his consent on 19/11/2010 the registered banakhat agreement to sell No. 607/10 was cancelled and the document in this regard was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar at Sr. No. 12232, the said document is ab initio null and void and unlawful, be pleased to declare accordingly and further be pleased to hold that the defendant No. 8 did not have any right and authority to make any such document.
18(c) be pleased to hold that the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 have executed the registered banakhat agreement to sell No. 607/2010 on 27/1/2010, and direct the defendants to execute registered sale deed of the above property in favour of the plaintiff, Alternatively
18(c)the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 have executed registered banakhat agreement to sell No. 607/2010 on 27/1/2010 in favour of the plaintiff to act as per the said banakhat and if the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is not executed then the honourable court be pleased to appoint Court Commissioner and order to execute the sale deed of the said property in favour of the plaintiff. 18(d)be pleased to restrain the defendant No. 9 from in any manner transferring or selling or alienating the suit
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property on the basis of the sale deed and the mutation entry made in the revenue records in favour of any third party.
18(e) be pleased to restrain the defendants and their servants, agents, persons from in any manner causing any hindrance, obstruction and interference in the occupation and use of the suit land by the plaintiff, and not to restrain the plaintiff from harvesting crops, be pleased to grant such injunction.
5.3 Thus, on perusal of the above reliefs sought by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has demanded the specific performance of the registered banakhat dated 27/1/2010, and cancellation of the deed of cancellation of the banakhat dated 19/11/2010, and the cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 27/11/2010 made in favour of the defendant No. 9 by the defendant Nos. 1 to 7.
5.4 At this stage on perusal of the merits in the matter then, first of all taking into consideration the principle established by the honourable Apex Court in its various rulings which is as here below,
(1)In case of Poonambhai Shanabhai Valand Decd Versus Hasmukhbhai Bachubhai Parsana held that, [GLR - 2017 -3-2511] held that, 'The honourable Apex Court in a judgment reported in (2005) 7 SCC 510 in the case of Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Association, while considering the scope of O7 R.11 has also referred to its earlier judgment reported in (2004) 3 SCC 137 in the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable Vs. Asst. charity Commisioner and has observed, 'Keeping in view the aforesaid principles the reliefs sought for in the suit as quoted supra have to be considered. The real object of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of Courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, Order 10 of the Code is a tool in the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and by a searching examination of the party, in case the Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the Court, in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised." [Para -12]
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(2)In the cse of hemendra Ishwarbhai Patel through Poa Piyush B. trivedi Versus Gokulbhai Shanabhai - Decd. Through Legal Heirs [LAWS (GLH)-2017-3-12) held that, (8) Before adverting to the rival contentions raised by the learned Advocates for the parties it would be beneficial to summarize the legal position on the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11, as propounded by the Supreme Court in various cases from time to time. The Supreme Court as back as in 1977 has stated in case of T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and Anotehr [Supra[ that if on a meaningful reading of the plaint it manifestly appears to be vexatious and meritless, not disclosing a clear right to sue, the trial. Court should exercise its powers under Order VII Rule 11. It is also stated that if the clever drafting has created an illusion of a cause of action, the court should nip it in the bud at the first hearing. In case of Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 518 and in case of Sopan Sukhdeo sable and Ors. Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Ors. Reported in (2004) 3 SC 137, it was observed inter alia that the real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits. The word 'shall' used in the said provision clearly casts a duty on the Court to perform its obligation in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without the intervention of the defendant.
[Para 9] Of course, in the latest decision in the case of P.V. Guru Raj Reddy Rep. By GPA Laxmi Narayan Reddy & Anr. Vs. P. Neeradha Reddy & Ors. Reported in AIR 2105 SC 2485 the Supreme Court has put the Courts on guard by observing inter alia that rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 being drastic power conferred in the Court, to terminate civil action at the very threshold, the conditions precedent to the exercise of such power must be strictly complied with. [Para 12] So far as the rejection of plaint on the ground of being barred by law of limitation, the Supreme Court has held in case of Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company [supra] in paragraph 25 as under :-
'25. The language of Order VII Rule 11 CPC is quite clear
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and unambiguous. The plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation only where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Mr. Nariman did not dispute that ;law; within the meaning of Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint if taken to be correct in their entirety a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. As observed earlier, the language of Clause (d) is quite clear but if any authority is required, one may usefully refer to the judgments of this Court in Liverpool and London S.P. and I. Association Ltd. Vs. M.V. Sea Success I and Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association."
(3)In the case of Becharbhai Zaverbhai Patel versus Jashbhai Shivabhai Patel [GLR-2013-1-398] held that, in para 6.2 as held by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Dilboo [Smt] Dead Bijlee whenever the document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge and in other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge.
(6) In this matter the suit relating to the above relief by the plaintiff was field on 14/08/2014. Also the relief prayed for in the suit is relating respectively to 27/1/2010, 19/11/2010 and 27/11/2010 registered documents after period of three years the suit is filed
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and relief is prayed for. Thus, at this stage as per the article 54 of the Limitation Act if there is any relief for specific performance then the suit has to be filed within three years. If the suit is filed after a period of three years then, there is bar of provisions of the Law of Limitation, thus the suit deserves to be dismissed [Rejection of Plaint]. Moreover the above documents are registered documents therefore the parties have deemed knowledge such inference has to be drawn in view of the principles established by the honourable Supreme Court in its ruling.
Thus, in the above facts of the case, circumstances, legal provisions and the guideline principles established by the honourable Apex Court the following orders are passed in the interest of justice.
ORDER
(1) The application Exh. 11 by the defendant is allowed.
(2) The suit by the plaintiff is dismissed under CPC Order 7 Rule 11.
(3) The parties are ordered to bear their own costs.
(4) Decree to be drawn as per the orders."
8. Being dissatisfied with the order and decree passed by the court below, rejecting the plaint, the original plaintiff has come up with this first appeal.
9. Mr. S.S. Joshi, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff vehemently submitted that the court below committed a serious error in rejecting the plaint holding that the suit for specific performance is time barred. According to Mr. Joshi, having regard to the averments made in the plaint, more particularly, the averment with regard to the cause of action for preferring the suit, it cannot be said that the suit is time
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barred. Mr. Joshi submitted that even otherwise, the issue whether the suit is hit by the law of limitation or not is a mixed question of law and fact and ordinarily the same can be decided only after the evidence is recorded. In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Joshi prays that there being merit in this first appeal, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed and set aside.
10. Mr. Satyen Thakkar, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant No.9, at whose instance the plaint came to be rejected, has appeared on caveat. Mr. Thakkar submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the court below in rejecting the plaint. Mr. Thakkar invited the attention of this Court to the application, Exh.11, more particularly, para-7 therein. In para-7, it has been stated that the suit for specific performance is based on an agreement of sale dated 24thJanuary, 2017. it is further stated that on the date of the execution of the agreement of sale, the land in question was a new tenure land hit by Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. It is submitted that a suit for specific performance based on an illegal or invalid agreement of sale is not maintainable in law. Mr. Thakkar pointed out that although this contention was specifically raised before the court below, yet the same has not been considered and only on the ground of limitation, the plaint came to be rejected. According to Mr. Thakkar, even if the impugned order is to be quashed on the ground that the suit could not be said to be time barred, the plaint deserves to be rejected on the ground that the suit is not maintainable as the agreement of sale is invalid being hit by Section 43 of the Act, 1948.
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11. Mr. Thakkar, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on the following decisions;
"(1) Rameshbhai Chaturbhai Prarjapati & Ors. vs. Minaxiben Wd/o. Rasiklal Tilakram & Ors., reported in 2011 (2) GLH 760;
(2) Hardik Harshadbhai Patel vs. Amarsang Nathaji as himself and Karta and Manager, reported in 2016 JX (Guj.) 574; 2016 AIJEI HC 235181;
(3) Chandrakant Kantilal Jhaveri vs. Madhuriben Gautambhai, reported in 2011 (1) GLR 270; 2010 (3) GCD 2387;
(4) Becharbhai Zaverbhai Patel vs. Jashabhai Shivabhai Patel, reported in 2013 (1) GLR 398; AIR 2012 Company Court 3312;
(5) Dilboo (Smt.) (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. vs. Dhanraji (Smt.) (Dead) & Ors., reported in (2000) 7 SCC 702;
(6) Chinubhai Babidas Chauhan vs. Shardaben Somaji Thakor, First Appeal No.3407 of 2013;
(7) Hemendra Ishwarbhai Patel through Poa Piyush B. Trivedi vs. Gokulbhai Shanabhai deceased through Legal Heirs, reported in 2017 JX (Guj.) 201; 2017 AIJEL HC 237338;
(8) Mohanbhai Maganbhai Patel vs. Miral Vallabhbhai Surani, reported in 2016 JX (Guj.) 1290; 2016 AIJEL HC 236160;
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(9) Janardhanam Prasad vs. Ramdas, reported in (2007)
15 SCC 174;
12. Mr. Joshi, in rejoinder, submitted that the plaint is not liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit for specific performance is not maintainable as the same is based on an invalid or illegal agreement of sale. Mr. Joshi submitted that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into such issue as the jurisdiction would be exclusively that of the Mamlatdar under the Act, 1948. Mr. Joshi submitted that although strong reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Hasvantbhai Chhanubhai Dalal (supra) , yet the decision of this Court could be termed as per incurium as there is no reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nathulal vs. Phoolchand, reported in AIR 1970 SC
546. Mr. Joshi submitted that the issue whether the agreement to sell is hit by Section 43 of the Act, 1948 or not cannot be looked into by the Civil Court. If such an issue arises in the suit proceedings , the same would have to be referred by the Civil Court for determination to the Mamlatdar having regard to the provisions of Section 85 of the Act as also Section 85-A of the Act.
13. Mr. Joshi, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Balu Baburao Zarole vs. Shaikh Akbar Shaikh Bhikan, reported in 2001 AIR (Bom.) 364 wherein the Bombay High Court has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nathulal (supra). In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Joshi prays that there being no merit in any of the submissions canvassed on behalf of the defendant No.9, those be rejected and the impugned
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order be quashed.
ANALYSIS
14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the plaint is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit for specific performance of contract based on an illegal or invalid agreement to sell hit by Section 43 of the Act, 1948 is not maintainable?.
15. The law is well settled that for the purpose of rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, the relevant facts, which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments made in the plaint. The defence of the defendant is inconsequential. The averments made in the written statement are also inconsequential. The trial Court can exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. at any stage of the suit i.e. before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under Clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII Code of Civil Procedure, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant to decide the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. But curiously in T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal and Anr. (referred supra) the Apex Court has held as follows:
"5. ...The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - for formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not
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disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. and if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X, Code of Civil Procedure An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Cr.XI) and must be triggered against them...."
16. It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order VII Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer J., in the above referred decision, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order X of the Code.
17. To apply the principle laid down in T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal and Anr. (referred supra), the Court can reject the plaint only at the time of first hearing by examining the parties under Order X of C.P.C. but not based on any application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. Therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to find out whether the allegations made in the plaint would give rise to any cause of action or the plaint discloses any cause of action for the suit.
18. What is cause of action has been succinctly explained by the Supreme Court in the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Ane. vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem, reported in 1989 AIR 1239, wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:
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"Cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the Plaintiff a right to relief against the Defendant. It must include some act done by the Defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. "
19. In Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors., reported in 1994 SCC (6) 322 the word cause of action is defined as follows:
"Cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court."
20. Having regard to the averments made in the plaint, more particularly, the averments with regard to the cause of action, as pleaded in the plaint, we are of the view that the plaint could not have been rejected on the ground that the suit for specific performance is time barred. However, we are of the view that the court below should have taken into consideration the submission with regard to the maintainability of the suit for specific performance based on an illegal agreement to sell being hit by Section 43 of the Act, 1948. One of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) had the occasion to consider this issue in the case of Hasvantbhai Chhanubhai Dalal (supra). The final conclusions drawn by this Court in Hasvantbhai (supra) are as under:
"[1] The suit for specific performance of contract based on an invalid agreement of sale hit by Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, 1948, is not maintainable in law. If the agreement is rendered invalid under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, such agreement is incapable of being specifically enforced. If the agreement of sale itself is invalid, no decree for specific performance can be passed by the Trial Court. Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act provides inter
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alia that a contract, which is in its nature determinable, cannot be specifically enforced. In such circumstances, the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale has rightly not been decreed.
[2] Even otherwise, independent of the issue of Section 43 of the Act, 1948, the plaintiff has not been able to make out any case for grant of decree of specific performance of contract based on an invalid agreement of sale."
21. Mr. Joshi, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff vehemently submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of Hasvantbhai (supra) could be termed as per incurium as this Court has not taken into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nathulal (supra). Nathulal (supra) has been referred to and relied upon by the Bombay High Court in the case of Balu Babulal Zarole (supra). Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (as his Lordship then was) had the occasion to consider Section 43 of the Act, 1948 as applicable for the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra. His Lordship was called upon to decide whether a decree for specific performance, subject to the condition of sanction being obtained for the sale from the Collector, is a valid and legal decree or not. His Lordship observed as under:
"[2] The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the agreement to sell was duly proved and that the plaintiff who had paid the entire consideration had established his readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the contract subject to the sanction by the Collector under section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The trial Court held that in the event of the Collector not granting sanction, the plaintiff would be entitled to a refund of the amount of Rs. 20,000/- paid by him together with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the institution of the suit. The Appellate Court has affirmed the judgment of the
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trial Court. The Appellate Court has held that possession was given to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had paid the entire purchase price and had also deposited the land revenue in respect of the land. Nothing further remained to be done by him and the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff has been established on the evidence before the courts below. These findings of the Appellate Court do not suffer from any infirmity. They are based on the evidence on the record and do not call for any interference in a Second Appeal.
[3] Section 43 of the Act provides, in so far as is material that no land purchased by a tenant inter alia under section 32 "shall be transferred by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment without the previous sanction of the Collector". The requirement of taking the previous sanction of the Collector would apply to a transfer by sale or by any of the other modes specified therein. In so far as the requirement of taking the sanction of the Collector under the provisions of section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 is concerned, the trial Court and the Appellate Court correctly held that the decree for specific performance would be subject to the condition of the sanction being obtained to the sale from the Collector under section 43. In the event of the Collector not granting sanction, the plaintiff would be entitled to a refund of the purchase price together with interest only as, in the absence of sanction under section 43 the sale cannot be concluded. In taking this view, no error has been committed by the trial Court and by the Appellate Court. In (Nathulal v. Phoolchand), reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 546, a Bench of the Supreme Court, consisting of Mr. Justice J.C. Shah (as the Learned Chief Justice then was) and Mr. Justice K.S. Hegde held that where by a statute property is not transferable without the permission of an authority, an agreement to transfer the property must be deemed to be subject to the implied condition that the transferor will obtain the sanction of the authority concerned. While laying down the aforesaid proposition in paragraph 5 of its judgment, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of the Privy Council in (A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 187) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Chandnee Widya Vati Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial)3, A.I.R.
1964 S.C. 978.
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[4] Section 43 of the Act would be attracted at the stage of execution of the conveyance since upon the execution of the sale deed, the property is transferred by sale. An agreement to sell does not create any interest in property. In this regard, a reference may be made to a judgment of a Learned Single Judge of this Court, D.K. Deshmukh, J., delivered on 1st October, 1997, in Appeal from Order No. 713 of 1977. The earlier judgment delivered by M.F. Saldanha, J., reported in (Parshuram Kathod Gaikar v. Pandu Mahadu Hard)4, 1994(I) Bom.C.R. 715 which was subsequently referred to in the judgment of V.H. Bhairavia, J., reported in (Lotan Ramchandra Shimpi v. Shankar Ganpat Kayasth)5, 1994(4) Bom.C.R. 575 will have to be construed with reference to the observation of the Learned Judge in para 9 of the judgment where the learned Judge clarified that the observations which were made in the order were for the limited purpose of the petition before the Court, which arose against an interim order. Since the suit was pending before the trial Court, the learned Judge held that it would be open to the parties in the said case to urge all contentions before the trial Court "without being prejudiced even in the least by any of the observations made" in that judgment. In view of the subsequent judgment of a learned Single Judge, D.K. Deshmukh, J., it would be clear that the provisions of section 43 of the Act would be attracted at the stage of the execution of the conveyance. Before the conveyance is executed in pursuance of a decree for specific performance the previous sanction of the Collector under section 43 would have to be sought and the execution of the conveyance can only take place after and subject to the grant of sanction by the Collector. If the Collector grants sanction, the terms and conditions laid down therein have to be observed. If sanction is refused, no conveyance can be executed. Section 43 would unquestionably be attracted to the execution of the conveyance in respect of the land and it is, therefore, that both the courts in the present case came to the conclusion that the decree will have to be subject to the condition that permission of the Collector would have to be sought under the provisions of section 43. The judgments of both the Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity. There is, therefore, no merit in the Second Appeal."
22. In Nathulal (supra), the Supreme Court had observed as
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under:
"7. The High Court proceeded to decide the case largely upon the view that Nathulal committed breach of contract. But the question whether Nathulal had committed the breach is not of much significance. Nathulal was the owner of the land:he had executed no conveyance in favour of Phoolchand in the land or the factory. Nathulal had sued for possession relying upon his title, and Phoolchand could defeat that claim if he established his; defence of part-performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
8. The argument raised by counsel for Nathulal, that by virtue of Section 70(8) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, the plea of part performance is not available to a person put in possession of the property under a contract of sale, has, in our judgment, no force. Section 70(8) provides :
"No sale under this section shall be deemed to be valid until the sale deed effecting such a sale has been registered in accordance with the law of registration in force for the time being."
But this clause only requires that not only the conditions prescribed by Section 70, but registration of sale deed in accordance with the law of registration for the time being in force is a condition required to be complied with before a sale is deemed valid. There is no sale in the present case, and Phoolchand is not relying upon any sale. He is relying upon a contract of sale and equity which he may set up to defend his possession against the claim made by Nathulal. To the making of such a claim, relying upon the doctrine of part performance in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, there is nothing in Section 70(8) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act 66 of 1950 which may operate as a bar.
9. The conditions necessary for making out the defence of part performance to an action in ejectment by the owner are
(1) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with
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reasonable certainty;
(2) that the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract;
(3) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and
(4) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. If these conditions are fulfilled then notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the' transferee any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possesion, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract.
10. There is in this case a contract to transfer for consideration immovable property by writing signed by Nathulal from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. In part performance of the contract, Phoolchand has taken possession of the property and he had in pursuance thereof paid an amount of Rs. 22,011/-. The argument raised by counsel for Nathulal that the act done in pursuance of the contract must be independent of the terms of the contract cannot be accepted. The first three conditions for the defence of part performance to be effectively set up by Phoolchand exist. Mr. Shroff for Nathulal however contends that Phoolchand was not willing to perform his part of the contract.
11. Nathulal had expressly undertaken to have the revenue records rectified by securing the deletion of Chittarmal's name, and it was an implied condition of the contract that Nathulal will secure the sanction of the Collector to the transfer under Section 70(4) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act 66 of 1950. The first condition was not fulfilled till October 6, 1952 and the second condition was never fulfilled. We are unable to agree with Mr. Shroff that the repeal of the Madhya Bharat Act 66 of 1950 by the Madhya Pradesh
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Land Revenue Code, 1959, has retrospective operation.
12. In considering whether a person is willing to perform his part of the contract the sequence in which the obligations under a contract are to be performed must be taken into account. The argument raised by Mr. Shroff that Nathulal was bound to perform the two conditions only after the amount of Rs. 21,000 was paid is plainly contrary to the terms of the agreement. By virtue of Section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act the chapters and sections of the Transfer of Property Act which relate to contracts are to be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. If, therefore, under the terms, of the contract the obligations of the parties have to be performed in a certain sequence, one of the parties to the contract cannot require compliance with the obligations by the other party without in the first instance performing his own part of the contract which in the sequence of obligations is performable by him earlier.
13. In view of the arrangement made by Phoolchand it was clear that he had at all relevant times made necessary arrangements for paying the amount due, but so long as Nathulal did not carry out his part of the contract, Phoolchand could not be called upon to pay the balance of the price. It must, therefore, be held, that Phoolchand was at all relevant times willing to carry out his part of the contract."
23. Section 43 of the Act, 1948, as applicable for the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra reads as under:
"Section 43 Restriction on transfer of land purchased or sold under land
(1) No land purchased by a tenant under section 32, SECTION 32F, [32I, 320,[33C or 43-ID]] or sold to any person under 32P or 64 shall be transferred by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment* * * *without the previous sanction of the Collector, [such sanction shall be given by the Collector in such circumstances, and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed by the State Government:
Provided that, no such sanction shall be necessary where the land is to be mortgaged in favour of the Government or a society registered or deemed to be registered under
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the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, for raising a loan for effecting any improvement of such land.
(2) Any transfer of land in contravention of sub-section
(1) shall be invalid."
24. On the other hand, Section 43 of the Act, 1948 applicable for the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat reads as under:
"43. Restriction on transfers of land purchased or sold under this Act. - [(1) No land or any interest therein purchased by a tenant under section 17B, 32, 32F, 321, 320, [32U, 431D or 88E] or sold to any person under section 32P or 64 shall be transferred or shall be agreed by an instrument in writing to be transferred, by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment, without the previous sanction of the Collector and except in consideration of payment of such amount as the State Government may by general or special order determine; and no such land or any interest, therein shall be partitioned without the previous sanction of the Collector.]
Provided that no previous sanction of the Collector shall be required, if the partition of the land is among the members of the family who have direct blood relation or among the legal heirs of the tenant:
Provided further that the partition of the land as aforesaid shall not be valid if it is made in contravention of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.
Provided also that such members of the family or the legal heirs shall hold the land, after the partition, on the same terms, conditions and restrictions as were applicable to such land or interest therein purchased by the tenant or the person.
[(1A) The sanction under sub-section (1) shall be given by the Collector in such circumstances and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed by the State Government.,]
[(1AA) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
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(1), it shall be lawful for such tenant or a person to mortgage or create a charge on his interests in the land in favour of the State Government in consideration of a loam advanced to him by the State Government under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1983 (XIX of 1983), the Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1984 (XII of 1983), or the Bombay Non-agriculturists' Loans Act, 1928 (Bombay Ill of 1928), as in force in the State of Gujarat, or in favour of a bank or cooperative society, and without prejudice to any other remedy open to the State Government, bank or co-operative society, as the case may be, in the event of his making default in payment of such loan in accordance with the terms, on which such loan was granted, it shall be lawful for the State Government, bank or co-operative society, as the case may be, to cause his interest in the land to be attached and sold and the proceeds to be applied in payment of such load.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section,"
bank" means-
(a) the State Bank of India constituted under the State Bank of India Act, 1955 (23 of 1955);
(b) any subsidiary bank s defined in clause (k) of section 2 of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959);
(c) any corresponding new bank as defined in clause (d) of section 2 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970);
(d) the Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation, established under the Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation Act, 1963 (10 of 1963).] (1B) Nothing in sub-section (1) [Or (1AA) shall apply to land purchased under section 32, 32F, 320 or 64 by a permanent tenant thereof, if prior to the purchase, the permanent tenant, by usage, custom, agreement or decree or order of a Court, held transferable right in the tenancy of the land.]
[(1C) The land to which sub-section (1) applies and for which no permission is required under sub-section (1) of section 65B of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bombay V of 1879) for use of such land for a bona fide industrial purpose may, notwithstanding anything
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contained in sub-section (1) of this section, be sold without the previous sanction of the Collector under sub- section (1) but subject to payment of such amount as may be determined by the State Government under sub- section (1).]
(2) [Any transfer or partition, or any agreement of transfer, or any land or any interest therein] in contravention of sub-section (1) [or sub-section (1C)] shall be invalid.] "
25. One pertinent feature of Section 43 of the Act, 1948 applicable for Bombay area of the State of Gujarat is the amendment by which even an agreement by an instrument in writing to be transferred came to be prohibited. Such restriction is not to be found in Section 43 applicable for the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra. Section 43(2) for the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat reads as under;
"Any transfer or partition, or any agreement of transfer, or any land or any interest therein in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be invalid."
26. The principle which the Supreme Court has laid down in Nathulal (supra) and which has been referred to and relied upon by the Bombay High Court in the case of Balu Baburao Zarole (supra) is that if a property is not transferred under a statute without the permission of an authority, an agreement to transfer the property must be deemed to be subject to the implied condition that the transferor will obtain the sanction of the authority concerned.
27. This decision, in our opinion, has no application to the facts of the instant case because in our opinion, under Section 43 of the Act, 1948 applicable to the Bombay area of the State
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of Gujarat, there is a total prohibition of even entering into an agreement in writing for the purpose of sale. Section 43 of the Act applicable for Bombay area of the State of Gujarat makes it very clear that any transfer or partition or any agreement of transfer or any land or any interest therein in contravention of sub-section (1) or subsection (1)(c) shall be invalid. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nathulal (supra) has no application in the present case. If that be so, the decision in Hasvantbhai (supra) cannot be termed as per incurium.
28. It is not in dispute that the agreement to sell dated 27th January, 2010 could be termed as invalid or void as the same was entered into without the prior permission or sanction of the Collector. The suit for specific performance of contract based on an invalid agreement to sell hit by Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, 1948 applicable for the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat is not maintainable in law. If the agreement is rendered invalid under Section 43 of the Act, 1948, such agreement is incapable of being specifically enforced. If the agreement to sell itself is invalid, no decree for specific performance can be passed by the Trial Court.
29. It is well settled that the jurisdiction to order specific performance of contract is based on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. Where a valid and enforceable contract has not been made, the Court will not make a contract for them. Specific performance will not be ordered if the contract itself suffers from some defect which makes the contract invalid or unenforceable. The discretion of the Court will not be there even though the contract is otherwise valid
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and enforceable. (See Satish Kumar vs. Karan Singh & Anr., Civil Application No.7385 of 2013, decided on 21stJanuary,
2016).
30. The Supreme Court in Mayawanti vs. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1 held thus:
"8. In a case of specific performance it is settled law, and indeed it cannot be doubted, that the jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract is based on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. The Law of Contract is based on the ideal of freedom of contract and it provides the limiting principles within which the parties are free to make their own contracts. Where a valid and enforceable contract has not been made, the court will not make a contract for them. Specific performance will not be ordered if the contract itself suffers from some defect which makes the contract invalid or unenforceable. The discretion of the court will be there even though the contract is otherwise valid and enforceable and it can pass a decree of specific performance even before there has been any breach of the contract. It is, therefore, necessary first to see whether there has been a valid and enforceable contract and then to see the nature and obligation arising out of it. The contract being the foundation of the obligation the order of specific performance is to enforce that obligation."
31. We shall now deal with the second contention of Mr. Joshi as regards Sections 85 and 85A of the Act. Section 85 of the Act reads as follows:-
"Section 85 Bar of jurisdiction
(1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question [(including a question whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant and whether any such tenant is or should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him) which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decide or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or Tribunal, a Manager, the
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Collector or the [Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal] in appeal or revision or the [State] Government in exercise of their powers of control.
(2) No order of the Mamlatdar, the Tribunal, the Collector or the [Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal] or the [State] Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court.
Explanation:- For the purposes of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906."
32. Section 85A of the Act reads as follows:
"Section 85A Suits involving issues required to be decided under this Act
(1) If any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the "competent authority") the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination.
(2) On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall communicate its decision to the Civil Court and such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto.
Explanation:- For the purpose of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906.]"
33. In our opinion, it would be within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court alone to determine whether the agreement on the basis of which the suit for specific performance is instituted is a valid agreement or not. To put it in other words, the jurisdiction exercisable for the determination of the enforceability of the agreement of sale clearly resided in the Civil Court which alone had the jurisdiction to make an
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adjudication on that question.
34. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of
Neminath Appayya Hanamannanavar vs. Jamboorao Satappa Kocheri, reported in 1966 AIR (Kar.) 154, wherein the Court observed as under:
"89] Section 70(mb) authorises and empowers the Mamlatdar to decide the validity of a transfer or acquisition and to make that decision under Section 84B or section 84C. Section 848 among other matters authorises a Mamlatdar when he has reason to believe that a transfer or acquisition made on or after June 15, 1955, contravenes sections 63 or 64 of the Act as it stood before the commencement of the amending Act, 1955. to make an enquiry and decide whether the transfer or acquisition was or was not valid.
[90] Section 84C empowers the Mamlatdar to hold an enquiry by the option of the procedure prescribed in section 84B whether a transfer or acquisition made after the commencement of the amending Act,1955. was valid.
[91] Since the agreement of sale in the case before us was made after the commencement of the amending Act,1955, the relevant statutory provision under which the Mamlatdar can make the enquiry authorised by section 70(mb) is section 84C. But. what is authorised by section 84C is an enquiry into the validity of a transfer or acquisition made after the commencement of the amending Act 1955. So. the condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Mamlatdar is a transfer or acquisition made in that way and that Judge is unavailable until the transfer or acquisition actually comes into being.
[92] In this case, no such transfer or acquisition had yet been made by any one. The acquisition which the plaintiff wanted to make was an acquisition which he could make only after he obtained a decree for specific
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performance and the invalidity of the acquisition if it was in contravention of section 35 would attack itself to the acquisition only after delivery of possession to the plaintiff of an area of land in excess of what is permitted by the law.
[93] In that view of the matter, the jurisdiction exercisable for the determination of the enforceability of the agreement of sale clearly resided in the Civil Court which alone had the jurisdiction to make an adjudication on that question. Surely, the Mamlatdar could not have at a stage when the acquisition or transfer had not yet been made and all that the plaintiff wanted to do was to enforce an agreement of sale so that he could make the acquisition or obtain a transfer under the terms of the agreement exercised power under S.70(mb) or under section 84C and made one he would have this exercised his jurisdiction prematurely and that adjudication would have invited the criticism that it was one without competence.
94 In my opinion, when a question arises in a suit for specific performance whether the agreement on which that suit is based is void on the ground that any acquisition made pursuant thereto would contravene or transgress the provisions of Section 35 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the Civil Court Is the only forum in which an adjudication is possible and the Mamlatdar cannot make any such adjudication. The power to make any adjudication under section 84C arises and accrues to the Mamlatdar only after the acquisition or the transfer as the assessee may be is completed and not before."
35. In the overall view of the matter, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the Civil Court, rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suit is time barred, may not be sustainable in law, but at the same time, no interference is warranted in the present first appeal, because in our opinion, the plaint is liable to be rejected mainly on the ground that the suit for specific performance based on an illegal or invalid
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agreement to sell is not maintainable as, such a contract is not enforceable.
36. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
37. In view of the above, the civil application also stands disposed of.
(J. B. PARDIWALA, J)
(A. C. RAO, J)
Vahid
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