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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Section 17 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 17(1)(b) of the Limitation Act
  • Order 7 Rule 6 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 58
  • Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 90 of the Evidence Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 17 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 17(1)(b) of the Limitation Act
  • Order 7 Rule 6 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 58
  • Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 90 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit on 27-03-2012 seeking, inter alia, a declaration that a registered sale deed dated 23-08-1969—executed by G (brother of the plaintiff) as attorney of their mother K—purporting to transfer the suit property to one T was void. The sale consideration recorded was Rs 90,000, part of which had admittedly been paid before the Sub-Registrar and the balance made payable in instalments. For more than four decades no challenge was raised to T’s title; indeed, after T’s death in 2008 family correspondence concerned only inheritance of T’s estate.

The defendants moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”) for rejection of the plaint as time-barred. Instead of deciding that application, the Single Judge framed a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2 on the same point and, relying on written statements and documents outside the plaint, rejected the plaint. A Division Bench upheld that order, additionally invoking Order 12 Rule 6 (judgment on admissions). The matter reached the Supreme Court where two separate opinions were delivered—Khanna J. (majority) and Trivedi J. (dissent).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plea of limitation—particularly the applicability of Article 58 vis-à-vis Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963—could be decided as a pure question of law on the basis of admitted facts, justifying rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.
  2. Whether the lower courts erred in simultaneously invoking Order 7 Rule 11, Order 14 Rule 2 and Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, despite each provision having distinct and mutually exclusive scopes.
  3. Whether the plaintiff’s pleadings satisfied the mandatory requirements of Order 6 Rule 4 and Order 7 Rule 6 CPC for claiming exemption from limitation on the ground of fraud and concealed documents.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff/Appellant

  • Contended that the 1969 sale deed was procured by fraud perpetrated by T in collusion with K and G; thus Section 17(1)(b) of the Limitation Act postponed the commencement of limitation.
  • Asserted that legal notices issued in 2008 used the word “given”, not “sale/transfer”, and therefore could not be treated as admissions recognising T’s ownership.
  • Alleged that the lower courts improperly relied on written statements and extraneous documents while deciding the preliminary issue.

Defendants/Respondents

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the defendants’ legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638Preliminary issue can be tried only when based on admitted facts.Majority invoked to justify deciding limitation as a preliminary issue on admitted facts.
Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557Admitted facts may warrant dismissal on limitation at the threshold.Relied on by both opinions to discuss the scope of Order 14 Rule 2.
Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549Interpretation of Section 17 Limitation Act—fraud and concealed documents.Majority used to explain when limitation is postponed and when it is not.
P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445Same as above—scope of Section 17.Cited by majority in analysing plaintiff’s reliance on fraud.
Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117Pleading standards under Order 6 Rule 4 CPC.Majority used to hold that specific dates and facts of discovery of fraud must be pleaded.
Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, (1973) 1 SCC 572Presumption of authenticity of 30-year-old registered documents (Section 90 Evidence Act).Majority applied presumption in favour of the 1969 sale deed.
Tej Kaur v. Chander Kalal, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1784Similar presumption regarding old registered documents.Reinforced the above principle.
Kamala v. K.T. Eshwara Sa, (2008) 12 SCC 661Scope of Order 7 Rule 11.Dissent cited to emphasise that only plaint averments may be seen.
Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557Same as above.Dissent relied upon.
Soumitra Kumar Sen v. Shyamal Kumar Sen, (2018) 5 SCC 644Order 7 Rule 11 parameters.Dissent relied upon.
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260Order 7 Rule 11 parameters.Dissent relied upon.
Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat, (2021) 9 SCC 99Order 7 Rule 11 parameters.Dissent relied upon.
Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala, (2015) 5 SCC 674Preliminary issues under Order 14 Rule 2.Dissent cited to show limitation usually mixed question.
S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497Same principle on preliminary issues.Dissent referred.
Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120Requirements for judgment on admissions (Order 12 Rule 6).Dissent used to criticise Division Bench reliance on admissions.
T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467Rejection of frivolous plaints.Dissent distinguished, stating Order 7 Rule 11 could not be used in present facts.
Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993Limits of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC.Dissent relied upon.
Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126Same principle on inherent powers.Dissent cited.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Opinion of Sanjiv Khanna, J. (Majority)

  • Reaffirmed that a pure question of law founded on admitted facts can be decided as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC.
  • Held that the plaintiff’s principal relief hinged on invalidating the 1969 sale deed; without such declaration all other prayers would fail.
  • Applied Article 58 of the Limitation Act and found the suit, filed 42 years after the sale deed, to be clearly time-barred.
  • Examined Section 17 Limitation Act and clarified that limitation is postponed only when fraud falls within clauses (a)–(d) and when the plaintiff pleads specific dates of discovery with reasonable diligence—requirements the plaint did not meet.
  • Noted that the registered sale deed enjoys a statutory presumption of validity under Section 90 of the Evidence Act and had remained unchallenged for over three decades during the lifetimes of both K and T.
  • From the plaintiff’s own notices in 2008 and other incontrovertible documents, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was aware of T’s ownership well before filing the suit.
  • Consequently, on a demurrer, the plaint was liable to rejection under Order 7 Rule 11(d).

Opinion of Bela M. Trivedi, J. (Dissent)

  • Observed that the Single Judge conflated three distinct provisions—Order 7 Rule 11, Order 14 Rule 2 and Order 12 Rule 6—each having separate jurisdictions and pre-conditions.
  • Emphasised that, under Order 7 Rule 11, only averments in the plaint and its annexures may be considered; reliance on written statements and external documents was impermissible.
  • Stated that limitation is generally a mixed question of law and fact; unless entirely borne out from plaint averments, it cannot be decided as a preliminary issue.
  • Found no clear, unequivocal admissions by the plaintiff that could justify a judgment under Order 12 Rule 6.
  • Held that even allegations of clever drafting or misuse of process could not substitute for the statutory tests under Order 7 Rule 11.
  • Concluded that rejection of the plaint was legally unsustainable and that the suit ought to proceed to trial.

Holding and Implications

Majority Holding: On the admitted facts the suit is barred by limitation; the plaint stands rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.

Dissent: The rejection of the plaint was procedurally flawed and should be set aside.

Implications: The majority view underscores that where foundational facts are undisputed, courts may invoke Order 14 Rule 2 to dispose of suits on limitation at the threshold, thereby reinforcing judicial economy. The dissent cautions against conflating procedural provisions and stresses adherence to the statutory limits of each rule. No new substantive precedent is created on limitation, but the judgment clarifies the interaction of Orders 7, 12 and 14 of the CPC.

    Saranpal Kaur Anand v. Praduman Singh Chandhok And Others

    Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.

    When decision on issues of law depend upon decision on issues of fact, the issue of law should not be decided as a preliminary issue. However, when the issue of law can be adjudicated on “admitted facts”, the court can decide the issue of law as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC.
    (Para 7)
    Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 671, referred to
    Unless the plaintiff succeeds in grant of declaration whereby the validity of the sale deed dated 23-8-1969 executed and transferring the suit property in favour of late T has been challenged, all other reliefs would fail and cannot be granted.
    (Para 9)
    On applying Article 58 to the prayer for declaration, that the sale deed dated 23-8-1969 is invalid, the suit filed after 42 years on 27-3-2012 is clearly barred by limitation. However, though not adverted to in the impugned order of the Division Bench and the order of the Single Judge of the High Court, it is apparent that the plaint, for the purpose of decree of declaration that the sale deed dated 23-8-1969 is invalid, relies on Section 17 of the Limitation Act.
    (Para 10)
    The general principle, which also manifests itself in Section 17 of the Limitation Act, is that every person is presumed to know his own legal right and title in the property, and if he does not take care of his own right and title to the property, the time for filing of the suit based on such a right or title to the property is not prevented from running against him. The provisions of Section 17(1) embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz. that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings when the facts or the documents have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who had acted fraudulently should not be given the benefit of limitation running in its favour by virtue of such frauds. However it is important to remember that Section 17 does not defer the starting point of limitation merely because the defendant has committed a fraud. Section 17 does not encompass all kinds of frauds, but specific situations covered by clauses (a) to (d) to Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act. Sections 17(1)(b) and (d) encompass only those fraudulent documents or acts of concealment of documents which have the effect of suppressing knowledge entitling the party to pursue his legal remedy. Once a party becomes aware of antecedent facts necessary to pursue legal proceedings, the period of limitation commences.
    (Para 11)
    Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549; P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 773, referred to
    Therefore in the event the plaintiff makes out a case that falls within any or more of the four clauses to sub-section (1) to Section 17 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for filing of the suit shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud/mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it or if the document is concealed till the plaintiff has the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production a fortiori.
    (Para 12)
    The word “diligence” read with the word “reasonable” in the context of Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act is subjective and relative, and would depend upon circumstances of which the actor called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. Vague clues or hints may not matter. Whether the plaintiff/applicant had the means to know the fraud is a relevant consideration. It is manifest that Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act does not protect a party at fault for failure to exercise reasonable diligence when the circumstances demand such exercise and on exercise of which the plaintiff/applicant could have discovered the fraud. When the time starts ticking subsequent events will not stop the limitation. The time starts running from the date of knowledge of the fraud/mistake; or the plaintiff/applicant when required to exercise reasonable diligence could have first known or discovered the fraud or mistake. In case of a concealed document, the period of limitation will begin to run when the plaintiff/applicant had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production.
    (Para 14)
    Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117, referred to
    Thus when the plaintiff relies on Section 17(1)(b) of the Limitation Act asserting fraud or mistake, he has to state the date on which he has discovered the fraud or mistake, and also state that he could not have discovered the fraud or mistake with reasonable diligence on a date earlier than on which he has based his cause of action.
    (Para 15)
    Order 7 Rule 6 is liberal and flexible as while mandating that a suit instituted post expiry of the period of limitation must state the grounds upon which exemption is claimed, permits the plaintiff to rely on a “ground” not inconsistent with the ground set out in the plaint. The proviso does not nullify the requirement that in the first place the plaint must set out the ground seeking exemption from limitation.
    (Para 16)
    When and to the extent Order 7 Rule 6 and Order 6 Rule 4 apply, these provisions being specific will prevail over the general rule found in Order 6 Rule 2 CPC. Nevertheless, the requirement of the Rules is to plead specific facts with dates, but not the factual evidence on the basis of which the plaintiff would ultimately seek to establish and justify his claim for exemption of limitation. When the minimum threshold required in terms of Order 6 Rule 4 and Order 7 Rule 6 is satisfied and met, cannot be put in a straitjacket or rigid formula, as it would depend upon the facts and circumstances including antecedent facts, and in particular the relationship between the parties or their predecessors and the period bygone without challenge.
    (Para 17)
    There is no bar against invoking the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 and Order 14 Rule 2 CPC together, or even applying Order 12 Rule 6 while proceeding with demurrer. Provisions of the Code are not watertight compartments, unless such statutory construction is express or manifestly prohibited.
    (Para 18)
    The sale deed dated 23-8-1969 in favour of T was executed by G as the attorney of K. G, the third defendant in the suit, is the brother of the plaintiff. Execution of the sale deed and signatures of G acting as the attorney of his mother K are undisputed. The sale deed is a registered document. The plaint accepts that the sale was for a consideration of Rs 90,000. The sale deed states that Rs 20,000 was received in advance and Rs 30,000 was paid before the Sub-Registrar. The balance amount of Rs 40,000 was to be paid to the vendor by the vendee in four equal monthly instalments. The plaint does not state if any suit or proceedings were initiated for the recovery of Rs 40,000. Any suit or proceedings for recovery of Rs 40,000 would be barred by limitation. The sale deed mentions that on the date of execution K was present in Tehran, Iran, and therefore, her son G, who is the brother of the plaintiff, as an attorney, was executing the sale deed as authorised vide Special Power of Attorney authenticated on 23-8-1969. These facts are again not challenged and contested in the plaint. Sale deed dated 23-8-1969 is more than thirty years old, and during the lifetime of K or T it was never challenged and questioned by K or any of their family members. In terms of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, the presumption is that the signature and every other part of the document, its execution and attestation is by persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.
    (Para 20)
    Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, (1973) 1 SCC 572; Tej Kaur v. Chander Kalal, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1784, referred to
    The language and the words used in the legal notices on behalf of the plaintiff and other family members are admissions of facts which uncover the illusion made by creative and crafty narration to obfuscate the patent delay of over four decades. To get over the admissions, the plaintiff has submitted that the word/expression used in the notices is “given” and not “transfer/sale”. That the word “given” used is factually correct, albeit when one reads the notices holistically it is lucid that the plaintiff, along with her family members and Defendant 3, have accepted that there was transfer of the suit property in favour of T. The notice was for partition of the estate left behind by T in the form of the suit property. The plaintiff in the notices did not challenge the legal title of T but had claimed the right of inheritance being a granddaughter of T. Further, the plaintiff was aware and had knowledge of the will dated 3-5-2007 executed by T. The bequest included the suit property is a fact admitted by the plaintiff in Para 14 of the plaint.
    (Para 23)
    The assertions made in the plaint by the plaintiff against her mother late K that she had acted in an active and joint concert, connivance and conspiracy with late T are self-serving and phantastic. As per need and factual background of the matter, assertions in the pleadings have to be examined and understood with other statements and documents relied on by the plaintiff without feeling helpless and paralysed by unclear, illusory or contradictory drafting. Meaningful reading of the entire plaint may be required when grossly implausible and dubious statements are made. The idea is to check and weed out manifestly vexatious and meritless cases at the threshold.
    (Para 25)
    R. Dalmia v. CIT, (1977) 2 SCC 467 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 308; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602, referred to
    For 42 years post the execution of the sale deed in 1969, there was no dispute and challenge to the ownership of T. In 2008, disputes had arisen but regarding inheritance of the estate of T however the plaintiff and Defendant 3 did not challenge the title and ownership of T.
    (Para 26)
    On application of the principle of demurrer, it has to be held, on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and the documents relied upon and admitted by the plaintiff, that even prior to 2008, the plaintiff was aware and had knowledge of the sale deed dated 23-8-1969 by which the ownership rights were transferred to T. The plaintiff did not, in 2008, question and challenge the transfer, though she was fully aware that T had acquired ownership rights.
    (Para 28)
    Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act saves rights of the party defrauded from lapse of time as long as the party is not at fault on his own account.
    (Para 29)
    Saranpal Kaur Anand v. Praduman Singh Chandhok, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8722; Saranpal Kaur Anand v. Praduman Singh Chandhok, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2434; Saranpal Kaur Anand v. Praduman Singh Chandhok, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 7728, referred to

    Per Bela M. Trivedi, J. (disagreeing)

    Though Defendant 2 had filed an application seeking rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, the Single Bench instead of deciding the said application, framed a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2, as to “whether the suit as framed is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of limitation”. The Single Bench then decided the preliminary issue against the plaintiff holding that the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d), considering the written statement and other documents filed by the defendants concerned, which were not part of the plaint. The Division Bench in the regular appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff against the judgment and order passed by the Single Bench, committed further error by relying upon the provisions contained in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, which was not even the issue before the Single Bench, and confirmed the order passed by the Single Bench. It is needless to say that the scope, ambit and parameters for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) for the rejection of the plaint; for raising a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(2); and for passing the judgment on admission of fact in the pleading or otherwise under Order 12 Rule 6 being absolutely different and mutually exclusive, all the three provisions could not be interchangeably used for the purpose of rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. It is also well settled proposition of law that when a power is to be exercised by a civil court under an express provision, the inherent power under Section 151 CPC cannot be taken recourse to.
    (Para 41)
    The basic postulate underlined in clause (a) and clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 is that while rejecting the plaint under the said provisions, the court is required to see only the averments made in the plaint and the documents, if any, annexed to the plaint, and not to the written statement or other documents which are not part of the plaint.
    (Para 43)
    Kamala v. K.T. Eshwara Sa, (2008) 12 SCC 661; Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557; Soumitra Kumar Sen v. Shyamal Kumar Sen, (2018) 5 SCC 644 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 329; Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 286; Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat, (2021) 9 SCC 99 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 489, referred to
    Soumitra Kumar Sen v. Shyamal Kumar Sen, 2016 SCC OnLine Cal 12071; Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100, cited
    Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 Order 14 specifies that where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit and the court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if the issue relates to — (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force.
    (Para 48)
    The Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue.
    (Para 50)
    Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala, (2015) 5 SCC 674 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 243; Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638; S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon, (1964) 4 SCR 409 : AIR 1964 SC 497, referred to
    Satti Paradesi Samathi v. M. Sakunthala, CS No. 673 of 1997, order dated 24-7-2003 (Mad); Satti Paradesi Samadhi v. M. Sakuntala, 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 2046 : (2012) 2 LW 865, cited
    In a case question of limitation can be decided based on admitted facts, it can be decided as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(2)(b). Once facts are disputed about limitation, the determination of the question of limitation also cannot be made under Order 14 Rule 2(2) as a preliminary issue or any other such issue of law which requires examination of the disputed facts.
    (Para 52)
    Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 671, relied on
    A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from the facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation being mixed question of law and fact cannot be decided as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(2).
    (Para 53)
    Now, so far as pronouncing a judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 is concerned, again the law is well settled that for an admission to qualify as a valid admission, it necessarily has to be an unequivocal, unambiguous and unconditional.
    (Para 54)
    Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120; Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011) 15 SCC 273 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376; Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262; Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan, (2005) 11 SCC 279, referred to
    Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha, (2010) 6 SCC 601 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 745, cited
    Apart from the fact that no preliminary issue could have been framed under Order 14 Rule 2(2) with regard to the issue of limitation which was a mixed question of law and fact, the Single Bench erroneously considered the written statement and the documents filed by the defendant while rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The Division Bench also fallaciously referred to the contentions raised in the written statement and referred to the documents, namely, CM applications filed in some eviction proceedings, which were neither referred to in the plaint nor annexed to the plaint. The Division Bench further erroneously relied upon some statements made in the legal notices dated 10-10-2008 and 24-10-2008 construing them as an admission on the part of the plaintiff for passing judgment under Order 12 Rule 6 against the plaintiff, while confirming the order passed by the Single Bench rejecting the plaint of the plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.
    (Para 57)
    There was no clear, unambiguous and unconditional admission made by the plaintiff in any of the said legal notices which could be termed as an admission of the claim made by the defendant with regard to the knowledge of the plaintiff in respect of the execution of the alleged sale deeds. On the contrary, the plaintiff had pleaded fraud committed against her and other defendants who were the legal representatives of K. The Court at this juncture is not inclined to go into the merits of the issues involved in the suit.
    (Para 58)
    Even if, the Single Bench had found that the suit was filed misusing the process of law or that an illusion was created with regard to the cause of action by clever drafting, in that case also Order 7 Rule 11 could not have been resorted to.
    (Para 59)
    T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, referred to
    It is also a trite law that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised to nullify the provisions of the CPC. The inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code, and cannot be exercised in a manner which will be contrary or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.
    (Para 60)
    Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993; Saranpal Kaur Anand v. Praduman Singh Chandhok, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8722; Saranpal Kaur Anand v. Praduman Singh Chandhok, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2434, referred to
    Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 484; Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan, (2005) 11 SCC 279, cited
    VN-D/68661/CV

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