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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 343
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999
  • Amending Act 46 of 1999
  • CPC (Civil Procedure Code)
  • Amending Act 22 of 2002
  • Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 343
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999
  • Amending Act 46 of 1999
  • CPC (Civil Procedure Code)
  • Amending Act 22 of 2002
  • Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code
Smart Summary

Supreme Court of India – Case Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant and the respondent, both members of the Adarsh Bhawan House Building Co-operative Society, Delhi, were jointly allotted Plot No. 13/20, Punjabi Bagh Extension, New Delhi (426 sq yds) under a perpetual lease deed dated 12-5-1981. By mutual consent, they partitioned the plot: the appellant obtained the front portion and the respondent the rear. Construction on the respective portions was completed in 1984 (appellant) and 1985 (respondent).

A 10-foot-wide common driveway served both portions. In 1986, the respondent filed Suit No. 261 of 1986 seeking a mandatory injunction directing the appellant to remove obstructions and refrain from locking the main gate that provided access to the driveway. The appellant filed her written statement the same year.

On 12-5-2004—eighteen years after the suit was instituted and after evidence had been concluded—the appellant moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC to amend her written statement, seeking to introduce an alleged written partition agreement dated 10-9-1982 that she claimed was discovered only then among papers of her deceased son.

The trial court allowed the amendment on 18-11-2004. The respondent challenged that order in CM (Main) No. 136 of 2005 before the Delhi High Court. On 22-11-2006, the High Court set aside the trial court’s order and rejected the amendment. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court by special-leave petition, resulting in the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a defendant can be permitted, under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, to amend her written statement after commencement of trial and conclusion of evidence by introducing an alleged partition agreement discovered belatedly.
  2. Whether the Delhi High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s order that had allowed the belated amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant)

  • Contended that the written partition agreement dated 10-9-1982 was found only in 2004 among papers of her deceased son who had earlier conducted the litigation.
  • Argued that the document is crucial to deciding the real controversy and should therefore be brought on record.
  • Maintained that the delay was unintentional and covered by the “due diligence” exception in the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17.

Respondent (Plaintiff)

  • Opposed the amendment as highly belated—filed 18 years after institution of suit, and after evidence and arguments had closed.
  • Alleged that the partition agreement was forged and inadmissible.
  • Asserted that the appellant lacked the due diligence required under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (2005) 12 SCC 1 Delay and laches are relevant factors in deciding whether to permit amendments to pleadings. Cited to emphasize that unexplained delay can justify refusal to allow amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed Order 6 Rule 17 and its 2002 proviso, which restricts amendments after commencement of trial unless the party shows that, despite “due diligence,” the new matters could not have been raised earlier. The Court noted:

  • The appellant’s written statement filed in 1986 did not mention any written partition agreement.
  • The appellant’s son—a Chartered Accountant managing the litigation—died in 1998, yet no steps were taken until 2004.
  • The appellant, as DW-1, had earlier deposed that the partition was oral, making the late discovery of a written agreement implausible.
  • The suit, pending since 1986, was at the verge of completion; introducing a new document would prejudice the respondent and cause further delay.
  • The explanation offered did not satisfy the requirement of “due diligence”; mere late discovery among papers of the deceased son was insufficient.

Accordingly, the Court concurred with the High Court that the amendment application was not bona fide and that allowing it would defeat the purpose of the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed; High Court order affirmed.

The amendment to the written statement is definitively rejected, and the trial court is directed to dispose of Suit No. 261 of 1986 on the existing pleadings within three months of receipt of the Supreme Court’s judgment. The ruling underscores that unexplained, prolonged delay will defeat attempts to amend pleadings after trial has commenced, reinforcing the restrictive nature of the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. No broader precedent is set beyond reaffirming this principle.

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    Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand .

    P. Sathasivam, J.— Leave granted.

    2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 22-11-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in CM (Main) No. 136 of 2005 whereby the High Court allowed the petition filed by the respondent herein.

    Brief facts

    3. The appellant and the respondent, being members of Adarsh Bhawan House Building Cooperative Society, Delhi were jointly allotted a plot bearing No. 13/20, Punjabi Bagh Extension, New Delhi admeasuring 426 sq yd vide perpetual lease deed dated 12-5-1981. After the allotment, the plot was partitioned with the mutual consent of the parties. The front portion was allotted to the appellant and the back portion was allotted to the respondent. The appellant raised construction in the year 1983 and completed the same in the year 1984. The respondent also started raising the construction on the back portion and completed the same in the year 1985. Both the parties were in use and occupation of their respective portions of the property after the respective construction.

    4. In the year 1986, the respondent herein filed a suit for mandatory injunction being Suit No. 261 of 1986 alleging that the driveway, which is 10′ wide from gate facing 30′ road up to the road facing 15′ wide service lane at the back, has been encroached upon by the appellant and the appellant is not permitting him to use the driveway. Written statement was filed and the witnesses were examined.

    5. On 12-5-2004, the appellant herein filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of written statement and sought the permission of the court to file a written agreement executed between the parties on 10-9-1982. The respondent herein filed a reply to the application denying the execution of the agreement and claimed that the same is forged and fabricated document.

    6. The trial court, after hearing the arguments, allowed the amendment application on 18-11-2004. Against that order, the respondent herein filed CM (Main) No. 136 of 2005 before the High Court of Delhi. By order dated 22-11-2006, the High Court allowed the petition and set aside the order passed by the trial court on 18-11-2004 in the amendment application. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred the present appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

    7. Heard Mr Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent.

    8. The respondent herein (the plaintiff) filed Suit No. 261 of 1986 on the file of the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi praying a decree for mandatory injunction against the defendant (the appellant herein) to remove all obstructions at Point ‘X’ and lock at Point ‘Y’ in the site plan of Property No. 13/20, Punjabi Bagh Extn., New Delhi and also not to put the lock at main gate of the property. In the same prayer, the plaintiff has prayed that the defendant may further be directed not to obstruct the plaintiff, his family members or relations from using the common driveway from Point ‘Y’ to ‘Z’ in the site plan. The said suit was filed on 23-5-1986; the defendant filed a written statement even in the year 1986 itself. While so, on 12-5-2004, the defendant filed an application for amendment of written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC. The main reason for seeking the amendment in the written statement is that the defendant is the housewife and was earlier assisted by his son, namely, Sunit Gupta, who was a Chartered Accountant. He died at a young age i.e in 1998. According to the defendant, he was following the litigation and the document/agreement pertaining to the parties was in his custody. Only her another son, namely, Navneet Agrawal searched the papers/documents of his brother Sunit Gupta and located an agreement dated 10-9-1982. Since the said agreement is a material one and has a bearing on the dispute between the parties and the execution of the same is admitted by the plaintiff, her application may be allowed by permitting the defendant to raise the plea of the agreement dated 10-9-1982 in her written statement and mark the same as a document of the defendant.

    9. The said application was resisted by the plaintiff by filing an objection. It was stated that the suit was filed by the plaintiff in the month of May 1986 and after more than 18 years, the present application has been moved with a view to frustrate the claim of the plaintiff. The trial has completed and after the final arguments when the defendant came to know that she is going to lose her case she is changing her stance by filing the present application for amendment in the written statement. It was further stated that the alleged agreement/partition dated 10-9-1982, which itself is not admissible in the eye of the law since it is a forged document and on the basis of the said document, the proposed amendment cannot be allowed.

    10. The Civil Judge, based on the claim of both the parties, particularly accepting the explanation offered by the defendant allowed the said application and permitted the defendant to incorporate the proposed amendments in the written statement on payment of costs of Rs 3000. Questioning the said order, the plaintiff has filed CM (Main) No. 136 of 2005 before the High Court of Delhi. On going through the entire materials and details, namely, filing of the suit in the year 1986, the application for amendment of written statement filed only in 1994 (sic 2004) and of the fact that nothing has been stated in the written statement as well as in her evidence, the High Court by the impugned order set aside the order of the trial court and rejected the application filed by the defendant seeking to amend the written statement. Aggrieved by the said order of the High Court, the defendant has filed the above appeal by way of special leave.

    11. In order to find out whether the application of the defendant under Order 6 Rule 17 for amendment of written statement is bona fide and sustainable at this stage or not, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions of CPC. Order 6 Rule 17 reads thus:

    “17. Amendment of pleadings.—The court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleading in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:
    Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”

    This Rule was omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999. However, before the enforcement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, the original rule was substituted and restored with an additional proviso. The proviso limits the power to allow amendment after the commencement of trial but grants discretion to the court to allow amendment if it feels that the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial in spite of due diligence. It is true that the power to allow amendment should be liberally exercised. The liberal principles which guide the exercise of discretion in allowing the amendment are that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided, that amendments which do not totally alter the character of an action should be granted, while care should be taken to see that injustice and prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted upon the opposite party under pretence of amendment.

    12. With a view to shorten the litigation and speed up the trial of cases Rule 17 was omitted by amending Act 46 of 1999. This Rule had been on the statute for ages and there was hardly a suit or proceeding where this provision had not been used. That was the reason it evoked much controversy leading to protest all over the country. Thereafter, the Rule was restored in its original form by amending Act 22 of 2002 with a rider in the shape of the proviso limiting the power of amendment to some extent. The new proviso lays down that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the commencement of trial, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. But whether a party has acted with due diligence or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. This would, to some extent, limit the scope of amendment to pleadings, but would still vest enough powers in courts to deal with the unforeseen situations whenever they arise.

    13. The entire object of the said amendment is to stall filing of applications for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and the parties had sufficient knowledge of the other's case. It also helps in checking the delays in filing the applications. Once, the trial commences on the known pleas, it will be very difficult for any side to reconcile. In spite of the same, an exception is made in the newly inserted proviso where it is shown that in spite of due diligence, he could not raise a plea, it is for the court to consider the same. Therefore, it is not a complete bar nor shuts out entertaining of any later application. As stated earlier, the reason for adding proviso is to curtail delay and expedite hearing of cases.

    14. Keeping the above broad principles in mind, let us ascertain whether the defendant has justiciable cause to file an application praying for amendment of a written statement for bringing an agreement dated 10-9-1982. We have already referred to the fact that the plaintiff had approached the court seeking a decree for mandatory injunction as early as in 1986. We also refer to the fact that within a short duration i.e in 1986 itself, the defendant has filed a written statement. Absolutely, there is no whisper about the prior partition agreement dated 10-9-1982. No doubt, in the application for amendment, it was stated that her son who was a Chartered Accountant all along was looking after this suit and he died in the year 1998. It is also available from the very same application that apart from her first son, namely, Sunit Gupta, the defendant has another son by name Navneet Agarwal. Admittedly, the son who was looking after the suit was none else than a Chartered Accountant. In such circumstances, if the alleged agreement dated 10-9-1982 between the plaintiff and the defendant was in existence nothing prevented her son, Chartered Accountant, to bring it to the notice of her counsel and refer it in the written statement filed in the year 1986. It is relevant to mention that in the reply, the plaintiff has specifically denied the same and asserted that the alleged agreement/partition deed dated 10-9-1982 is a forged document and based on the same, the proposed amendment cannot be allowed. It is also not in dispute and best known to both the parties that the suit which is of the year 1986 came to be taken up for trial only in 2004 and admittedly on the date of filing of the petition for amendment, the trial was on the verge of completion. It was brought to our notice that both sides have closed their evidence and completed their argument, but only at this stage the defendant filed the said application for amendment of her written statement.

    15. As discussed above, though first part of Rule 17 makes it clear that amendment of pleadings is permitted at any stage of the proceeding, the proviso imposes certain restrictions. It makes it clear that after the commencement of trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed. However, if it is established that in spite of “due diligence” the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial depending on the circumstances, the court is free to order such application.

    16. The words “due diligence” have not been defined in the Code. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edn. 2006), the word “diligence” means careful and persistent application or effort. “Diligent” means careful and steady in application to one's work and duties, showing care and effort. As per Black's Law Dictionary (18th Edn.), “diligence” means a continual effort to accomplish something, care; caution; the attention and care required from a person in a given situation. “Due diligence” means the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. According to Words and Phrases by Drain-Dyspnea (Permanent Edn. 13-A) “due diligence”, in law, means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. “Due diligence” means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs.

    17. It is clear that unless the party takes prompt steps, mere action cannot be accepted and file a petition after the commencement of trial. As mentioned earlier, in the case on hand, the application itself came to be filed only after 18 years and till the death of her first son Sunit Gupta, Chartered Accountant, had not taken any step about the so-called agreement. Even after his death in the year 1998, the petition was filed only in 2004. The explanation offered by the defendant cannot be accepted since she did not mention anything when she was examined as witness.

    18. As rightly referred to by the High Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (2005) 12 SCC 1 this Court cautioned that delay and laches on the part of the parties to the proceedings would also be a relevant factor for allowing or disallowing an application for amendment of the pleadings.

    19. As observed earlier, the suit filed in the year 1986 is for a right of passage between two portions of the same property dragged for a period of 21 years. In spite of long delay, if acceptable material/materials placed before the court show that the delay was beyond their control or diligence, it would be possible for the court to consider the same by compensating the other side by awarding costs. As pointed out earlier, when she gave evidence as DW 1, there was no whisper about the written document/partition between the parties. On the other hand, she asserted that partition was oral. Now by filing the said application, she wants to retract what she pleaded in the written statement, undoubtedly it would deprive the claim of the plaintiff. We are also satisfied that she failed to substantiate inordinate delay in filing the application that too after closing of evidence and arguments. All these aspects have been considered by the High Court. We do not find any ground for interference in the order of the High Court, on the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the same.

    20. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. It is made clear that we have not expressed anything on the stand taken by both the parties in the suit and it is for the trial court to dispose of the same uninfluenced by any of the observation made above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.

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    Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand .
    (Mar 11, 2008)