J.B. Pardiwala, J.:— This Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is at the instance of the State of Gujarat and is directed against the judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 15 July, 2013 in the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003 preferred by the original petitioners.
2. The facts, giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under;
3. The respondent No. 1 herein (original petitioner) instituted the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003 praying for the following reliefs;
“(A) Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 25th February, 2003, Annexure-D to the petition passed by the respondent No. 2;
(B) Your Lordships may be pleased to declare that on coming into force of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act on 30th March, 1999, all proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act have abated and the petitioner remains to be the owner of the lands in question and 3780 sq. mtrs. of land which is declared as excess land cannot be declared as excess land;
(C) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the Respondent to issue No Objection Certificate and not to interfere with the developments of the said lands bearing Survey No. 90/1/1, 90/1/2 and 494 and House No. 384 by the petitioner;
(D) Pending admission, final hearing and disposal of the present petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent No. 2 to issue No Objection Certificate regarding the lands bearing Survey Nos. 90/1/1, 90/1/2 and 494 and House No. 384 and allow the petitioner the said lands;
(E) Such other and further order in the interest of justice which may be deemed fit to this Hon'ble Court.”
4. One Dhaniben D/o Haribhai Lalbhai and W/o Dalpatbhai Durlabhbhai was holding agricultural lands bearing Survey Nos. 90/1/1, 90/1/2 and 494 respectively including a house bearing No. 384, situated at Village Katargam, Taluka : Choryasi, District; Surat.
5. The said Dhaniben filed Form No. 1 under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short “the ULC Act”) declaring the aforesaid properties.
6. Dhaniben passed away on 17 October, 1983 during the pendency of the proceedings under the ULC Act before the Competent Authority.
7. The husband of Dhaniben, namely, Dalpatbhai continued to attend the proceedings before the Competent Authority.
8. By an order dated 5 November, 1990, the Competent Authority held that there was no excess vacant land and filed the Form No. 1 accordingly.
9. The order passed by the Competent Authority dated 5 November, 1990, referred to above, was challenged by the State Government by filing the revision application before the Revisional Authority under Section 34 of the ULC Act.
10. The Revisional Authority, by an order dated 23 May, 1994, held that the declarant was holding 3780 square meters of excess vacant land.
11. After the demise of Dhaniben, her husband Dalpatbhai got married with the respondent No. 1, namely, Kamuben. Later, Dalpatbhai also passed away. In such circumstances, Kamuben remained the sole surviving heir of deceased Dalpatbhai.
12. Kamuben instituted the Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 before this Court, challenging the order passed by the State Government in exercise of the revisional powers under Section 34 of the Act holding 3780 square meters of land as excess vacant land.
13. The Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 came to be rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide judgment and order dated 9 March, 1995.
14. Kamuben, being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, rejecting the Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995, preferred the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 and thereby questioned the legality and validity of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge.
15. The Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 came to be dismissed by an order dated 26 August, 2009. The order reads thus;
“Heard learned counsel for the parties.
We find no infirmity in the orders dated 23.05.1994 and 13.12.1994 of the revenue authorities, which has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge.
Learned counsel for the State submitted that possession is already taken over on 16.10.1996. Learned counsel further submitted that later on the appellant has also filed an application for no objection certificate, but the same also was rejected, against which the appellant filed Special Civil Application and the same is pending.
Considering the fact that possession is already taken over on 16.10.1996, we find no reason to examine the correctness of the impugned orders, therefore, we uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
Consequently, Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.”
16. It appears that after the dismissal of the appeal, referred to above, Kamuben preferred an application to the Competent Authority and the Addl. Secretary (ULC), Surat requesting for a “No Objection Certificate”. Such application was preferred, seeking No Objection Certificate, on the premise that pursuant to the order passed by the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, the possession of the subject land, at no point of time, was taken over from her or her predecessor and that she was actually in physical possession of the land declared as excess vacant land.
17. By an order dated 25 February, 2003, the application, referred to above, seeking No Objection Certificate, came to be rejected.
18. Kamuben, being dissatisfied with the order, referred to above, preferred the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003.
19. The Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003 came to be adjudicated by the learned Single Judge, and vide judgment and order dated 15 July, 2013, allowed the same holding as under;
“4. Mr. S.H. Sanjanwala, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that pursuant to the order passed by the State Government declaring 3780 square metres of land to be excess vacant, the possession of the subject land has not been taken over by following lawful procedure and as such, upon coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Repeal Act), the proceedings under the ULC Act have abated and the petitioner is entitled to develop the said lands. It was submitted that till date, no notice as envisaged under the ULC Act has been served upon the petitioner or her predecessor for taking over the possession of the land declared excess vacant and as such, no procedure for taking over possession has been followed. The petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed by granting the reliefs prayed for.
5. Opposing the petition, Mr. Viral Dave, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that the possession of the land declared excess vacant by the State Government had been taken over after following due procedure as provided under the ULC Act much prior to the coming into force of the Repeal Act and as such, the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of a No Objection Certificate. Reliance was placed upon the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Competent Authority wherein it has been stated that after the order under section 34 of the ULC Act came to be made by the State Government, appropriate order came to be passed under section 9 of the said Act and the land owner was acquainted with regard to the final statement. It is further averred that notification under section 10(1) of the ULC Act was published on 23rd February, 1995 and notification under section 10(3) was published in the Government Gazette on 11th April, 1996 and entry to this effect was made in the revenue record vide Mutation Entry No. 8333 on 7th August, 1995. That thereafter, notice under section 10(5) of the ULC Act was served upon the landlord on 24th July, 1996 pursuant to which the excess vacant land came to be handed over to the Government. It was submitted that the possession of the land declared excess vacant was handed over on 16th October, 1996 in the presence of the panchas and the Mamlatdar, ULC, Surat. Such possession had been taken over after the writ petition filed by the petitioner had been dismissed. It was argued that the possession of the land declared excess vacant having been taken over prior to the coming into force of the Repeal Act and there was no proceeding pending before any authority and as such in view of the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Repeal Act, read with the proviso to section 4 thereof, the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect the vesting of the vacant land under subsection (3) of section 10, as the possession has been taken over on behalf of the State Government. The petition being devoid of merit, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
6. In rejoinder, Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that if it is the case of the respondents that they have taken possession of the land declared excess vacant, they are required to show that such possession has been taken over by following due procedure in accordance with law. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case, no notice has been issued either to the petitioner or her predecessor either under section 10(5) of the ULC Act or section 10(6) of the ULC Act. Under the circumstances, paper possession, if any, taken over by the respondents cannot be said to be lawful possession as contemplated under the ULC Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector & Competent Authority, wherein the State Government had not been able to establish that possession of vacant land had been taken over and the Supreme Court held that mere vesting of vacant land with the State Government by operation of law without actual possession is not sufficient for operation of section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Reliance was also placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792 and in the case of Ritesh Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 677, wherein the court has held thus:
15. We find full force in the submissions so made by Shri Jayant Bhushan to a certain extent, and hold that all proceedings pending before any court/authority under the 1976 Act, stood abated automatically on coming of the 1999 Act into force, provided the possession of the land involved in a particular case had not been taken by the State. Such a view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in Pt. Madan Swaroo Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P.; Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority; Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of U.P. and Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport.
16. The aforesaid conclusion leads us further to the question as to whether the appellants have any justifiable cause to approach the court. Firstly, no proceedings had ever been initiated against the appellants by the authorities under the 1976 Act. Secondly, the State authorities, the respondent herein, failed miserably to perform their statutory duties and it appears that they could not muster the courage to take the actual physical possession of the land in dispute in spite of issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act in the year 1993. More so, the so-called authorities could issue notices under Section 10 of the 1976 Act after a lapse of twelve years as the assessment of surplus land became final in 1981 itself. Such an indifferent attitude on the part of the authorities is not commendable rather it is condemnable, but that does not mean that the court should decide only the effect of the repealing 1999 Act in these proceedings at the behest of the appellants in the absence of the original tenure-holders and subsequent transferees inasmuch as in the fact situation of this case where the appellants, for the reasons best known to them, did not consider it proper to place either of the sale deeds on record. Strong reliance was placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, (2013) 3 Scale 348 wherein the court has held that requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 10 of the ULC Act is mandatory. It was submitted that thus, the mandatory provisions of section 10(5) and section 10(6) of the Act have not been satisfied in the present case and as such, the possession, if any, taken over by the respondents is not lawful possession in the eye of law and as such, the petitioner is entitled to the grant of reliefs prayed for in the petition.
7. The controversy involved in the present case lies in a very narrow compass. The sole question that arises for consideration is as to whether the respondents can be stated to have taken over the possession of the land declared excess vacant by order passed under section 34 of the ULC Act. Since in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the competent authority, it has been averred that the due procedure in accordance with law had been followed by issuing notice under section 10(5) as well as 10(6) of the ULC Act and possession was taken over in the presence of panchas, the court had called for the original record from the office of the competent authority. A perusal of the record reveals that notifications under section 10(1) and 10(3) of the ULC Act were issued in the name of Dhaniben who had died during the pendency of the proceedings before the Competent Authority. Not only that, even the notice for handing over possession under section 10(5) was issued to Dhaniben. Besides, in the entire record, there is no material to show that notice under section 10(5) has, in fact, been served upon anyone. It may be noted that the original declarant-Dhaniben had expired during the pendency of proceedings before the Competent Authority and despite the fact that the factum of Dhaniben having expired finds a mention in the order passed by the Competent Authority, the authorities under the ULC Act have continued the proceedings against Dhaniben instead of bringing her heirs on record. Thus, the notification under sections 10(1) and 10(3) ULC have been issued in respect of a person who had already expired. Moreover, the notice under section 10(5) of the ULC Act had also been issued to Dhaniben despite the ULC authorities being aware that she had passed away. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that there is nothing on record to show that such notice though issued to Dhaniben was, in fact, served upon her heirs and legal representatives.
8. At this juncture reference may be made to the decision of this court in the case of Indrajitsing P. Geel v. Competent Authority & Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad, (2007) 1 GLR 677, wherein the court, in the context of sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act, has held thus:—
20. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 10 of the Act which are relevant for the purpose of the present petition read as under:
10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit:—
(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-sec. (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty day of the service of notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-sec. (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
21. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the statute contemplates giving an opportunity to the land-holder or any person in possession of excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government and for this purpose provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person to surrender or deliver possession of such lands. It is only when pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-sec. (5) within a period of thirty days of the service of notice, that the competent authority is required to take over possession of the vacant land and for that purpose may use force, if necessary. Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (6) are to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-compliance of an order under sub-section (5) of section 10 of the Act within the prescribed period.
22. As can be seen from the facts noted above, though it is the case of the respondents that the petitioner has been duly served with notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, no supporting document has been produced to show that service of notice has been duly effected. For the purpose of verifying the correctness of the aforesaid averments made by the competent authority, the learned Assistant Government Pleader had been directed to call for the record of the case from the competent authority. Upon perusal of the record, it is apparent that though at every stage of the proceedings notices issued to the petitioner have been served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due and the acknowledgment receipts thereof are also found on record. But, insofar as notice under section 10(5) of the Act is concerned no such receipt is found on record. Hence, in absence of proof of service of notice, it cannot be said that the requirements of section 10(5) of the Act have been complied with.
23. In The State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336, the Apex Court has in the context of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 held that the said Act being an expropriatory legislation is required to be construed strictly.
24. The Apex Court has in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [(2003) 2 GLR 1154 (SC)], in the context of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 held thus : The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must be strictly construed. It is well settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof.
25. Thus, applying the principle of strict construction with the dictum of the aforesaid decision, the authorities are required to act strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions. Thus, when sub-section (5) of section 10 mandates giving notice of an order under the said sub-section to the person in possession, the same is required to be complied with in true letter and spirit. Considering the nature of rights involved, mere issuance of notice without service thereof, cannot be said to be due compliance with the provisions of the statute. Besides, the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 10 can be resorted to only if the person fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) thereof, within a period of thirty days of service of notice. Hence, possession cannot be taken over under section 10(6) of the Act, unless a period of thirty days from the date of service of notice has elapsed. In absence of service of notice under sub-section (5) of section 10, there will be no starting point for calculating the period of thirty days. In other words, time will not start running, hence the question of taking over possession under sub-section (6) of section 10 of the Act, will not arise at all. In this view of the matter, it was not open to the respondent authorities to resort to the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 10 of the Act without first complying with the provisions of sub-section (5) thereof. Hence, such action being in contravention of the statutory provisions cannot be sustained and deserves to be struck down.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram (supra) has held thus:—
33. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10 again speaks of possession which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force as may be necessary can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice that is peaceful dispossession and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), than forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
34. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word may has been used therein, the word may in both the sub-sections has to be understood as shall because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under subsection (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word may has to be read as shall.
10. Examining the facts of the present case in the backdrop of the principles laid down in the above decisions, from the record of the case, there is nothing to establish that notice under section 10(5) of the ULC Act had been served upon the petitioner or her predecessor in title. Alongwith the affidavit filed by the Competent Authority, no supporting documents have been produced to show that service of notice had been duly effected. Even the original record does not contain any acknowledgment receipt indicating service of notice under section 10(5) of the ULC Act. Sub-section (6) of section 10 provides that if any person fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. Thus, for the purpose of resorting to sub-section (6) of section 10 of the ULC Act, a condition precedent is that there has to be service of notice under section 10(5) and it is only if after service of such notice the person refuses to comply therewith, that possession of the vacant land can be taken over. In the present case, when there is no service of notice under sub-section (5) of section 10, the question of taking over possession under sub-section (6) of section 10 of the ULC Act would not arise. Therefore, it cannot be said that the purported possession of the land declared excess vacant has been taken over in accordance with law.
11. In the meanwhile, in the year 1999, the Repeal Act has come into force. Under the circumstances, if possession of the subject land has not been taken over in accordance with law prior to the coming into force of the Repeal Act, having regard to the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Repeal Act, the vesting of the land declared excess vacant under section 10(3) of the ULC Act is not saved, as possession of such lands had not been taken over on behalf of the State Government and consequently, the proviso to section 4 would not be attracted and the proceedings would abate under section 4 of the Repeal Act. Accordingly, since it cannot be said that lawful possession of the land declared excess vacant has been taken over by the respondent authorities, the proceedings under the ULC Act stand abated by virtue of the operation of section 4 of the Repeal Act. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to a No Objection Certificate as prayed for in the petition.
12. In the light of the above discussion, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 25th February, 2003 (Annexure ‘D’ to the petition) is hereby quashed and set aside. It is held that upon coming into force of the Repeal Act on 30th March, 1999, all proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act have abated in respect of the subject land. The respondents are accordingly directed to issue a No Objection Certificate to the petitioner in respect of the land in question. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.”
20. The State Government, being dissatisfied with the aforesaid impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is here before this Court with the present appeal.
21. On behalf of the State Government, the learned Government Pleader has filed written submissions. The written submissions are as under;
“1. That one Dhaniben was the owner of the land in question. It is not established as to how Kamuben, the petitioner herein, who has tiled the writ petition through irrevocable Power of Attorney holder, has acquired title, interest or ownership or entitlement of the land in question.
2. As per the record of the competent authority Kamuben is neither a sister nor in any manner related by blood relation with the deceased Dhaniben.
3. That the present writ petition is filed challenging the order dated 25.02.2003 (Annexure-D, Pg.52 of the writ petition). The application filed by Dhaniben through her Power of Attorney for the purpose of seeking “No Objection Certificate” which was rejected by order dated 25.2.2003. It is against the order dated 25.02.2003 rejecting the application for “No Objection Certificate” that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Thus, the subject matter of the writ petition was whether the order of the Additional Collector and Competent Authority dated 25.02.2003 in not granting of “No Objection Certificate” was correct or not. Thus, the cause of filing the writ petition and scope and ambit of the writ petition was only the order dated 25.02.2003. (Annexure-D, Page.52).
4. The petitioner had in the writ petition has not challenged the proceedings which are culminated against the Dhaniben who had filed the Form No. 1 on 12.08.1976. The petitioner has also not challenged the consequential orders by the authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 dated 11.04.1996, notice under Section 25 dated 04.06.1996, Order of the Competent Authority dated 01.10.1996 and Order of Mamlatdar, Surat dated 06.10.1996 taking over the possession of the land in the presence of the Panchas. None of these orders are subject matter of the challenge in the writ petition. It is submitted that in absence of the challenge to these orders which have attained finality as far back as on 04.06.1996, writ petition cannot be held maintainable which challenges the all the proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act. Petitioner could not have raised the contentions regarding the illegality and correctness of the proceedings initiated against heirs under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. According to the Competent Authority, Kamuben, through her irrevocable Power of Attorney Holder, is a stranger to the subject matter of proceedings and could not have filed writ petition under the guise of challenging the order of Additional Collector dated 25.02.2003 and thereafter obtain the wider relief including the invalidation of entire proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
5. The petitioner is guilty of not stating and placing true and correct facts before this Hon'ble Court in writ petition. This facts and proceedings are to the knowledge of the petitioner and therefore it was solemn obligation and duty of the petitioner to state true and correct facts, which had direct bearing on the subject. It is respectfully submitted that the petitioner had filed Special Civil Application No. No. 1511 of 1995 challenging the order dated 23.05.1994 passed by the State Government by which it was declared that 3780 Sq. Mtrs. is declare access land of Dhaniben under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The petitioner claiming inheritance right of Dhaniben filed Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 before this Hon'ble Court. This Hon'ble Court by order dated 09.03.1995 had dismissed the writ petition. (Pg.175 of the paper book). In the prayer clause, the present petitioner herein has specifically prayed to quash and set aside the order dated 23.05.1994, order dated 13.12.1994 and restore the order dated 05.11.1990. The petitioner had also sought declaration to the effect that the provision of Urban Land Ceiling Act, are not applicable to the holding of deceased Dhaniben.
The petitioner Kamuben had also sought declaration that the predecessor of petitioner did not hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. This prayer was specifically made by the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 (prayers are on Pg.141 of the paper book).
6. The aforesaid writ petition came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Calla) by the judgment and order dated 09.03.1995 (Pg.40 to 51 of the paper book). The petitioner has annexed the order of the learned Single Judge without annexing the memo of the writ petition and prayer contained in the writ petition.
7. Therefore, feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner had filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 ‘of 1995 before this Hon'ble Court (appeal memo at Pg. 182 to 188)
8. The Hon'ble Division Bench (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Radhakrishanan and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Akil Kureshi) by judgment and order dated 26.08.2009 (Pg.190 of the paper book) were pleased to dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995. While dismissing the Appeal, the Hon'ble Division Bench was pleased to record as under:
“Heard learned counsel for the parties.
We find no infirmity in the orders dated 23.05.1994 and 13.12.1994 of the revenue authorities, which has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge.
Learned counsel for the State submitted that possession is already taken over on 16.10.1996. Learned counsel further submitted that later on the appellant has also filed an application for no objection certificate, but the same also was rejected, against which the appellant filed Special Civil Application and the same is pending.
Considering the fact that possession is already taken over on 16.10.1996, we find no reason to examine the correctness of the impugned orders, therefore, we uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
Consequently, Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.”
9. It is submitted that in spite of the fact that petitioner who herself filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 before this Hon'ble Division Bench and whose Appeal came to be dismissed with a specific finding that possession is already taken over on 16.10.1997, she purposefully choose not to disclose these vital facts into the body of writ petition nor attention of the Hon'ble Court was drawn by the petitioner in appeal.
10. The petitioner therefore suffer from suppression of facts of a material character and on this ground alone Letters Patent Appeal No. 775 of 2014 deserves to be allowed as Kamuben did not disclosed such vita] facts which goes to the route of present matter.
11. That it is further submitted that the judgment and order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Akil Kureshi) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 decided on 26.08.2009 have became final and conclusive.
12. It is submitted that in view of the provision contain under Section 21(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling Regulation) Act, 1976 read with Rule-11A, unless the declaration is not made under Section 15(1) by the holder of vacant land then such person shall not entitle the benefit of acquiring land by inheritance. It is submitted that the same principle would apply in the facts of the present case.
13. That’ the petitioner had cause of action in the year 1995 and thereby filed the writ petition in the year 2003 raising issue which has became conclusive and for which a normal course the petition would not be maintainable on the ground of delay and latches. Thus since the original owner holder of the land could not do it, the petitioner acting as the legal heirs through Power of Attorney Holder have sought to revive the issue which have attained finality in the year 1995. Therefore, the writ petition after lapse of such long period of time is not maintainable.
14. That it is submitted that the death of owner does not result into the lapse of the proceedings.
15. That it is submitted that the captioned writ petition was filed by Shri Shantibhai Veljibhai Patel holding irrevocable Power of Attorney on behalf of Kamuben Dalpatbhai Patel. The writ petition filed at the instance of power of Attorney is not maintainable.”
22. The learned Government Pleader has placed reliance on the following decisions;
Sr. No.
CITATIONS
PARAGRAPHS
1
(1993) 1 GLH 320 Puriben Manilal Solanki since Deceased Thr. Her heirs v. Competent Authority & Addl. Collector (ULC) Section 15(1) r/w Rule 11
8
2
(1999) 3 SCC 5 Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra Under section 10(1) order passed by the authority cannot be challenge after 10 year
3
3
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1050 Madhusudan Bhanuprasad Pandya v. State of Gujarat
14
4
Writ Petition No. 2866 of 2014 (HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT) Shivshankar Shivram Singh v. State of Maharashtra Under Section 10(5) order passed by the authority cannot be challenged after lapse of time.
16
5
(2016) 12 SCC 497 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Surendra Pratap
6
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 139 OF 2007 (HON'BLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT) Madhubindu Jayshanker Vyas v. State of Gujarat Order passed by the authority cannot be challenged after lapse of time.
3, 9, 23 and 9.25
7
(1982) 1 SCC 680 Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed Death of owner does not lapse proceeding of person.
15 and 19
8
(1993) 2 GLR 1808 Maganji Govindji v. Competent Authority & Addl. Collector, Urban Land Ceiling Death of owner does not lapse proceeding of person.
26
9
(1998) 2 GLH 70 Her Highness Maharani Shantadevi v. Savjibhai H. Patel
15, 16 & 17
10
Letters Patent Appeal No. 2167 of 2009 Muliben Bachhubhai Bharwad v. State of Gujarat
11
(2010) 2 SCC 114 Dalip Singh v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P. The appeal is liable to be dismissed only on the ground that the tenure holder did not state correct facts.
19
12
(1995) 1 GLH 1011 Navsarjan Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd. v. State of Gujarat
13
(2015) 2 GLR 1034 Purshottamdas Somabhai Patel Since Decd. Thro. Heirs & L.R. v. State of Gujarat
14
(2015) 5 SCC 321 State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma
15
(1991) 3 SCC 261 G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Government of Karnataka
23. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. S.H. Sanjanwala, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 (original petitioner). On the point of suppression and res judicata, as urged on behalf of the State Government, the written submissions filed by the learned senior counsel, are as under;
“It is submitted that the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court while disposing of Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 did not adjudicate the points raised in the appeal on merits. The said order was passed during the pendency of the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003. Therefore, there was no question of mentioning the factum of the above order in the said Special Civil Application which was already filed and, therefore, the point regarding suppression is thoroughly irrelevant and cannot be substantiated by any standard. In the said order, it is mentioned that since the possession has already been taken, the LPA is not decided on merits. It is under these circumstances that the reliance placed upon the said order to contend that there is a suppression cannot be sustained. That it is a settled law that the suppression has to be of a material fact and that the material relevant fact and that there must be a duty on the petitioner to disclose the same both are lacking in the present case. But it is clear that even the point taken regarding suppression is not based on correct facts and factually speaking, the said point is already taken in the writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003. (Kindly see paragraph 4.3 of the writ petition at page 13) The factum of handing over the possession was clearly mentioned, but it was further argued that mere taking paper possession is not sufficient after coming into the force of the Repeal Act in the year 1999 and that the possession is not taken after following due legal procedure and, therefore, the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act has to be given to the petitioner. It was further mentioned that no notice regarding taking over possession was ever served on the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner, namely, Dhaniben. In fact, now there is a finding of the learned Single Judge that no legal procedure has been followed and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. (See also Ground C at page 17). The Panchnama regarding taking over possession is also challenged. The said Panchnama is also not held to be legal by the learned Single Judge. That for the first time, in the Letters Patent Appeal, along with the affidavit of Mr. N.R. Dhandhal, Deputy Collector, the said order has been produced and only point taken is that in the petition, it is not mentioned that the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed. It is surprising how the said point can be taken because the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed on 26.8.2009 while the petition was filed in the year 2003. The relevant portion producing the said document is reproduced below
“A copy of the order dated 26.8.2009 is annexed hereto and marked Annexure-FA-4 to the affidavit. It is stated and submitted that the vital fact regardign dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal was not stated by the petitioner before the Learned Single Judge.” (Kindly see page 120) A copy of the further affidavit in reply on behalf of appellant No. 2 is annexed hereto and marked Annexure III.
Therefore, even the point of suppression was not taken in the said affidavit and only in the written submissions filed by the Government, the point is for the first time taken regarding suppression and res judicata, which cannot be permitted.
It is submitted that the petitioner has filed written submissions on behalf of the respondent No. 1 Kamuben. A copy of the written submissions is annexed hereto and marked Annexure IV. In paragraph 9 of the written submissions, the points raised by the Government in their written submissions are also dealt with. It is further submitted that regarding suppression and res judicata also, separate written submissions were filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, copy whereof is annexed hereto and marked Annexure V, in which all the above mentioned points are taken. Even the detailed affidavit has been filed regarding the said submission (kindly see at page 191). A copy of the said affidavit is annexed hereto and marked Annexure VI.
It is submitted in the written submissions and clear point has been taken that the principles of res judicata, estoppels, acquiescence or waiver would not apply. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment reported in (1972) 4 SCC 685 in which it is clearly held that no new point can be taken in the Letters Patent Appeal.
Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (D) by Lrs. v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 Scale 620. Therefore, throwing the point at the Court only in the written submission is hardly sufficient even to canvass this point before the Court.
On the point of res judicata, reliance was placed on (1962) 1 SCR 574 that the plea of res judicata has to be specifically and expressly raised and that the res judicata is a defence and, therefore, to take such a defence, there must be appropriate pleadings and the documents on the strength on which such a plea has to be taken as also to be produced on record.
In view of this, it is respectfully submitted that such a point taken belatedly in the written submissions may not be entertained by this Hon'ble Court.”
24. On the other aspects of the matter, the written submissions filed by the learned senior counsel are as under;
“1. That the argument made by the other side that the present Division Bench cannot even go into the qestion whether Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 was rightly decided or there was any estoppels or res judicata is to say the least not tenable in law. There was. nothing which was decide by the earlier Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 on merits after looking to the record of the case. Such an order, with utmost respect, will not bind the subsequent Division Bench.
2. It is submitted that the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Calla) was confined only to order under Section 34 and the review order. Therefore, in Letters Patent Appeal against the said orders, any observation which is made because of the statements beyond Section 34 will not come. Therefore, the only question which was for consideration before the learned Single Judge was under Section 34 and in the Letters Patent Appeal that was the only question which was involved. Even in the order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal, it was observed that we are not examining the correctness of the impugned orders, and hence, it is made very clear that no contrary view is possible as argued by the other side.
3. That all the matter regarding the order passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 has been dealt with in the affidavit of the respondents at Page 191.
4. That reference made to the order of the Hon'ble Division Bench (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari and Hon'ble Companion Judge) does not carry matter any further for the simple reason that in that case, it was an admitted position that notice under Section 10(5) was already served to the land holders.
5. It is submitted that the argument made by the other side as if the order dated 26.8.2009 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 is a final adjudication and, therefore, it is binding on the respondents and, therefore, she cannot even argue against the said order. It is submitted that when the Hon'ble Division Bench has passed an order on 26.8.2009, the question of legality of the possession under the ULC Act was pending consideration before the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the Court has said that we are not examining the impugned orders in a petition under Section 34. Further, it is of interest to note that when the said order records that the Possession is already taken, it is even too much to suggest that the question of Repeal Act was before the Court. It is submitted that the Court clearly says that since the application for no objection certificate was rejected and against which the appellant filed Special Civil Application and the same is pending, it is very clear whether the possession was taken or not legally or pending before the learned Single Judge. In light of this, the Hon'ble Division Bench has said that we do not examine the correctness of the impugned orders dated 23.5.1994 and 13.12.1994 which orders would be order under Section 34 dated 23.5.1994 and the review order dated 13.12.1994. There is no other interpretation possible.
6. Even the bear look at the orders dated 23.5.1994 and 13.12.1994 are considered, these were the only orders which were challenged before the Hon'ble Division Bench in the Special Civil Application and these orders were confirmed. Therefore, the legality of the said order has not been examined by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 while upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The following details of the orders would leave no manner of doubt whatsoever that the question for consideration before the Hon'ble Division Bench was quite different and it has been disposed of only on the statement of the learned Assistant Government Pleader -
23.5.1994 : Order under Section 34 is passed by the Designated Authority under the ULC Act.
13.12.1994 The said order was taken in review and confirmed.
23.2.1995 Notification under Section 10(1) was issued.
9.3.1995 Writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 was decided by the learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Calla):
29.7.1995 : Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed in Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 was filed.
11.4.1996 : Notification under Section 10(3) was issued. (Page 104-I)
24.7.1996 : Notice under Section 10(5) is issued. (Page 94/A)
26.8.2009 : Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 was dismissed recording that the possession is alleged to have been taken on 16.10.1996.
7. All these sequence of dates and events would show that the question under Section 10(3) and 10(1) was not there before the learned Single Judge as well as before the Hon'ble Division Bench. Therefore the principle of res judicata, estoppel acquirescence waiver would not apply.
8. In this connection, it is clearly observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in the case of Shanbhagakannu Bhattar v. Muthu Bhattar, (1972) 4 SCC 685 (Judgment paper-book page 23) which decision clearly clinches the issue where the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 5 has observed as under:
“5. We are wholly unable to appreciate how on any principle or authority the Division Bench had, in an appeal under the Letters Patent, allowed a point which involved not only law but also facts to be agitated when that point had never been taken even in the plaint or before the trial Court, the first appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal. It had not been raised even in the memorandum of appeal at any stage. Indeed it was admitted before the first appellate Court that the alienation evidenced by ext.B 9 by Parvathiammal was one by way of a gift and was without consideration. It was never pleaded, asserted or claimed by the plaintiff that any consideration had passed for the properties which were the subject matter of the gift by Parvathiammal in favour of Duraiswami. In such a situation it was not open to the Division Bench of the High Court to allow the question of consideration to be raised for the first time and that also without any amendment of the pleadings being allowed and without the defendants having proper opportunity to meet the case.”
9. The same view is taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in the case of Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (Dead) by Legal Representatives v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 4 SCC 531, wherein in paragraph 27, it has been observed as under:
“27. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State that the writ petition is barred by res judicata is also not sustainable in law. In our considered view, question as to whether the appellant landholders were dispossessed from the land in question and the effect of the Repeal Act on this was not the issue in the earlier writ petition and, therefore, it cannot be held that the instant writ petition is barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata.”
10. Even in the binding judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of ATAM Sugnomal Pohani v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1986) 2 GLR 1161, it has been clearly held that the Court would not ordinarily permit a new contention to be raised by the appellant, if the contention raised in question of fact and cannot be determined without fresh investigation of facts.
11. So also, in the case of Smt. Sukanya Devi v. Smt. Karmi Devi &Ors. S, 2014 Law Suit (HP) 956, the Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High Court has observed in paragraph 5 that “We are wholly unable to appreciate how on any principle or authority the Division Bench had, in an appeal under the Letters Patent, allowed a point which involved not only law but also facts to be agitated when that point had never been taken even in the plaint or before the trial Court, the first appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal. The High Court could not have allowed the same without any amendment in the pleadings and giving an opportunity to defendants to have a proper opportunity.
12. That there is a binding decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the question of res judicata in the case of I.T.C. Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi, (2004) 7 SCC 591 : AIR 2005 SC 1370, wherein in paragraph 18, it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:
“18. Doubtless the principle of res judicata is a fundamental doctrine of law that there must be an end to litigation. [See Darvao v. The State of U.P., (1962) 1 SCR 574 but the plea of res judicata has to be specifically and expressly raised. (See : Medapati Surayya v. Tondapu Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi, AIR 1948 PC 3, 7. This view has been recently reiterated in V. Rajeshwan v. T.C. Saravanabava, (2004) 1 SCC 551 : (2003) 10 Scale 768, where it is said that the foundation of the plea of res judicata must be laid in the pleadings. If this was not done, no party would be permitted to raise it for the first time at the stage of the appeal. The only exception to this requirement is when the issue of res judicata is in fact argued before the lower Court. In this case not only had the plea not been taken by the Revenue at any stage before any of the authorities, but arguments exactly to the contrary had been put forward by the respondent. We will not permit the plea to be raised new. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the other arguments urged on the appellant to counter the respondent's submission on the applicability of the principles of res judicata.
Coming now to the question of interpretation of the Notification : the several decisions cited by both parties indicate the approach to a question of interpretation of a notification issued under a fiscal statute.”
25. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, we must look into few orders passed by the different benches in the present litigation. While issuing notice in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 775 of 2014, this Court passed the following order dated 23 July. 2014;
“Issue notice returnable on 13.8.2014. Learned advocate Shri Rajesh Savjani waived service of notice on behalf of respondent no. 1. Learned advocate Shri Sanjeev Dave waived service of notice on behalf of respondent no. 2.
It will be open for both the sides to produce the documents on record which formed either part of writ petition or official documents of ULC proceedings pertaining to land in question. We insist that all Gujarati documents be translated in English before production. Learned AGP shall also keep ready for Courts perusal the original files of ULC.“
26. While admitting the appeal, the following order came to be passed on 28 January, 2015;
“We have heard learned senior advocates appearing for the respective parties.
Appeal is admitted. Appeal is peremptorily fixed for final hearing on 23.03.2015.”
27. The State Government also preferred the Civil Application No. 7054 of 2014, seeking appropriate interim relief in the matter. The said civil application came to be disposed of by this Court vide order dated 28 January, 2015. The order reads thus;
“1. RULE. Mr. Savjani, learned advocate waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Dave, learned advocate waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondent No. 2.
2. By way of this application, the applicants have prayed for the following reliefs:—
(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit the Letters Patent Appeal.
(B) Your Lordships may be pleased to allow the present Civil Application by way of quashing and setting aside the order dated 15.07.2013, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Honble Court (Coram : Honble Ms. Justice Harsha Devani) in Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003.
(C) Pending, admission and final disposal of this petition Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the order dated 15.07.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Honble Court (Coram : Honble Ms. Justice Harsha Devani) in Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003.
(D) Your Lordships may be pleased to pass such other and further order or relief as may be deemed just, proper in the interest of justice.
3. Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General appearing with Mr. Rakesh Patel, learned AGP for the applicants has contended that the learned Single Judge has committed error in allowing the petition and in quashing order dated 25th February, 2003 (Annexure-D to the petition). He drew our attention to the fact that the power of attorney holder of Kamuben-respondent No. 1 herein, is the original petitioner and submitted that pending this appeal if the order of the learned Single Judge is not stayed, the order dated 25th February, 2003 will not come into operation and No Objection Certificate is required to be granted in favour of the original petitioner-respondent No. 2 herein. Therefore, he urged that this Court may allow this application and stay the order of the learned Single Judge.
4. Mr. S.I. Nanavati, learned senior advocate appearing with Mr. Sanjiv Dave, learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 has contended the alleged possession of the land in question was taken on 16th October, 1996, which is required to be viewed very seriously since the same is contrary to the decisions of the Apex Court. He invited our attention to paragraph No. 6 of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, which reads as under:—
6. In rejoinder, Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that if it is the case of the respondents that they have taken possession of the land declared excess vacant, they are required to show that such possession has been taken over by following due procedure in accordance with law. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case, no notice has been issued either to the petitioner or her predecessor either under section 10(5) of the ULC Act or section 10(6) of the ULC Act. Under the circumstances, paper possession, if any, taken over by the respondents cannot be said to be lawful possession as contemplated under the ULC Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector & Competent Authority, wherein the State Government had not been able to establish that possession of vacant land had been taken over and the Supreme Court held that mere vesting of vacant land with the State Government by operation of law without actual possession is not sufficient for operation of section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Reliance was also placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792 and in the case of Ritesh Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 677, wherein the court has held thus:
15. We find full force in the submissions so made by Shri Jayant Bhushan to a certain extent, and hold that all proceedings pending before any court/authority under the 1976 Act, stood abated automatically on coming of the 1999 Act into force, provided the possession of the land involved in a particular case had not been taken by the State. Such a view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in Pt. Madan Swaroo Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P.; Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority; Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of U.P. and Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport.
16. The aforesaid conclusion leads us further to the question as to whether the appellants have any justifiable cause to approach the court. Firstly, no proceedings had ever been initiated against the appellants by the authorities under the 1976 Act. Secondly, the State authorities, the respondent herein, failed miserably to perform their statutory duties and it appears that they could not muster the courage to take the actual physical possession of the land in dispute in spite of issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act in the year 1993. More so, the so-called authorities could issue notices under Section 10 of the 1976 Act after a lapse of twelve years as the assessment of surplus land became final in 1981 itself. Such an indifferent attitude on the part of the authorities is not commendable rather it is condemnable, but that does not mean that the court should decide only the effect of the repealing 1999 Act in these proceedings at the behest of the appellants in the absence of the original tenure-holders and subsequent transferees inasmuch as in the fact situation of this case where the appellants, for the reasons best known to them, did not consider it proper to place either of the sale deeds on record.
Strong reliance was placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, (2013) 3 Scale 348 wherein the court has held that requirement of giving notice under subsections (5) and (6) of section 10 of the ULC Act is mandatory. It was submitted that thus, the mandatory provisions of section 10(5) and section 10(6) of the Act have not been satisfied in the present case and as such, the possession, if any, taken over by the respondents is not lawful possession in the eye of law and as such, the petitioner is entitled to the grant of reliefs prayed for in the petition.
4.1. Mr. Nanavati, learned senior advocate thereafter drew our attention to paragraph Nos. 3 and 4 of the Additional Affidavit filed in the writ petition, wherein it has been averred that:—
3. The appellant further states that the notices were issued under Urban Land Celing Act, 1976. The Copy of the notice dated 24.07.1996 under Section 10(5) isa marked herewith and marked as Annexure-II
4. It is stated that the competent authority passed an order dater 01.10.1996 after following the procedure proscribed under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. The copy of the said order is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-III.
4.2. Mr. Nanavati, learned senior advocate also drew our attention to the Notice dated 24.07.1996 and the Further Affidavit filed by the applicants in the Appeal. By making such submissions, learned senior advocate Mr. Nanavati submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be stayed since the possession is taken contrary to the decisions of the Apex Court.
5. Mr. Oza, learned senior advocate appearing for original owner, respondent No. 1 herein has contended that this Court may not stay the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single. He drew our attention to the order dated 29.08.2013 passed in Civil Application No. 5654 of 2013 in First Appeal No. 1274 of 2013, preferred by one Madhubhai Virjibai Dhanani Patel against the present respondent No. 1-kamuben @ Kamlaben. It is necessary to reproduce the order passed in said Civil Application, which reads as under:—
1. We have heard Mr. Navin Pahwa for the applicants, Mr. Y.N. Oja with Ms. Thula for the opponent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, Mr. G.M. Joshi for the opponent No. 4, Mr. B.B. Naik with Mr. Mehta for the opponent Nos. 5 and 6 and Mr. S.P. Majmudar for the opponent No. 7.
2. It is an admitted position that pending the suit before the trial Court, no interim injunction was in operation. Subsequently, by the impugned order the suit has been dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, we find that the ad-interim injunction granted earlier does not deserve to be continued. We leave it at that, because Mr. Pahwa has not invited further reasons on the said aspect.
3. However, considering the facts and circumstances, since the appeal has been admitted, the principles of lis pendense should apply. Therefore, it is observed that the appellant original plaintiff can be at the liberty to get the lis pendense registered with the concerned Sub-Registrar showing the pendency of the present proceedings. Once the lis pendense is registered the order passed by this Court in the present proceedings shall be binding to the person concerned. So as to enable the applicant/appellant to get the lis pendense registered, the ad-interim relief granted earlier can be continued for some time.
4. Hence, so as to enable the applicant to get the lis pendense registered, the ad-interim relief granted earlier shall remain in operation till 16.9.2013. It is also clarified that by non-continuance of the interim relief, neither party would get any additional right to disturb the possession of any party to the proceedings or any third party, who may be holding the possession of the property or part thereof under the transaction already entered into.
5. Subject to the aforesaid observation and direction present application is disposed of.
6. We have heard learned senior advocates appearing for the parties and perused the material on record. Keeping in mind the fact that if the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is not stayed, the very purpose of admission of the appeal would be frustrated. Further, we are of the opinion that if the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is stayed, the respondents herein will not be prejudiced in any manner whatsoever.
7. Incidentally, at this stage it needs to be mentioned that the respondent No. 1 herein was the petitioner before the learned Single Judge while initially the present applicants were impleaded as the respondents therein. At a later stage the respondent No. 2 herein preferred an application for joining party and she came to be impleaded as respondent No. 3 in the petition before the learned Single Judge. In the backdrop of this scenario, in our considered opinion it is the respondent No. 1 herein who can oppose the grant of interim relief and the respondent No. 2 herein has no locus to oppose the grant of interim relief.
8. Hence, we are staying the judgment and order dated 15.07.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2013. We direct the State Government-applicant herein to maintain the status quo as on today and not to deal with the land in question in any manner whatsoever till the pendency of this appeal.
9. It is made clear that the parties are at liberty to produce on record the documents which are produced before the learned Single Judge by way of filing appropriate application and to initiate any other proceedings, if they so desire, which is prescribed under the law. Paper book will be prepared on or before 2nd March, 2015.
10. With the above observations and directions, the present Application stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.”
The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge;
28. The learned Single Judge took notice of the following facts;
(i) The ULC Act came to be repealed with effect from 30 March, 1999.
(ii) The learned Single Judge called for the original record from the office of the Competent Authority in the wake of the stance of the State Government that due procedure in accordance with law had been followed by issuing notice under Section 10(5) as well as Section 10(6) of the ULC Act and possession was taken over of the excess vacant land in the presence of the Panch witnesses. The perusal of the record by the learned Single Judge revealed that the notifications under Section 10(1) and Section 10(3) respectively of the ULC Act were issued in the name of Dhaniben who had passed away during the pendency of the proceedings before the Competent Authority.
(iii) The learned Single Judge took notice of the fact that even the notice for handing over the possession under Section 10(5) was issued to Dhaniben.
(iv) The learned Single Judge further took notice of the fact that in the entire record, there was no material to indicate that the notice under Section 10(5) had, in fact, been served upon anyone.
(v) The learned Single Judge took notice of the fact that the original declarant, namely, Dhaniben had passed away during the pendency of the proceedings before the Competent Authority, and despite such fact, the Competent Authority continued the proceedings against a dead person instead of bringing her heirs on record.
(vi) The learned Single Judge took notice of the fact that the notification under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) respectively of the ULC Act had been issued in respect of a person who had already died.
(vii) The learned Single Judge also took notice of the fact that the notice under Section 10(5) of the Act had been issued to Dhaniben despite the fact that it was within the knowledge of the ULC Authorities that she had passed away.
(viii) The learned Single Judge placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indrajitsing P. Geel v. Competent Authority & Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad, (2007) 1 GLR 677.
(ix) Ultimately, the learned Single Judge, having regard to the materials on record, concluded that there was nothing on record to establish that the notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act had been served upon Kamuben or her predecessor-in-title. The learned Single Judge also took notice of the fact that there was no supporting documents to indicate or establish that the service of notice had been duly effected.
(x) Even the original record does not contain any acknowledgment receipt indicating service of notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act.
(xi) Having regard to the aforesaid findings of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge, a final finding of fact came to be recorded that on the date of the repeal of the Act, the physical possession of the excess vacant land remained with Kamuben and, therefore, the case put up by the State Government was not accepted by the learned Single Judge.
29. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error in passing the impugned order.
30. Having regard to the findings of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge after calling for the original record from the ULC Authorities, it would not have been difficult for us to dismiss the appeal. However, a new point has been raised by the State Government in this appeal. The point is with regard to the principle of res judicata. It appears, as is evident on plain reading of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, that there is no reference of the order passed by this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 decided on 26 August, 2009. It is the case of the State Government that the order passed by this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 dated 26 August, 2009 has been deliberately suppressed from the learned Single Judge. In the main matter, i.e, the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003, the following averments have been made as regards the previous litigation between the parties.
“The petitioner has not filed any appeal or application, either in this Hon'ble Court or in any other Court of Law including the Hon'ble Supreme Court India, except Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 in this Hon'ble Court in the subject matter of this petitioner, save and except what is stated herein above.”
31. Thus, it appears that there is no reference of the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 and its dismissal vide order dated 26 August, 2009 in the pleadings of the writ petitioner. At the same time, we take notice of the fact that in none of the replies filed on behalf of the respondents before the learned Single Judge, there is a reference of the order passed by this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995, decided on 25 August, 2009. For the first time, in the further affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the appellant No. 2 in the present appeal, the fact of the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 has come on record.
32. The principal argument canvassed on behalf of the State Government is that the main matter, i.e., the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003 ought to have been rejected by the learned Single Judge only on the ground of the petition being not maintainable on the principle of res judicata. In other words, it is the case of the State Government that while disposing of the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995, this Court observed that the possession of the land had already been taken over on 16 October, 1996. In view of such finding recorded by the Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995, the learned Single Judge could not have proceeded to adjudicate the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003 thereafter on merits.
33. It is true that the respondent No. 1. i.e, the original petitioner as well as the State Government failed to bring to the notice of the learned Single Judge the order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995. It is also not in dispute that the State Government had not raised the plea of res judicata before the learned Single Judge by placing reliance on the order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995. In such circumstances, no fault could be found with the learned Single Judge if the learned Single Judge has not touched the issue of the applicability of the principle of res judicata and the effect of the order or rather the legal implications of the order dated 26 August, 2009 passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995. We fail to understand that what had prevented the State Government from bringing it to the notice of the learned Single Judge the order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 509 of 1995 if the State Government was very much sure that the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003 deserved to be rejected only on the ground of principle of res judicata.
34. In such circumstances, referred to above, we had two options in mind. First to ask the State Government to prefer an appropriate review application before the learned Single Judge so that the learned Single Judge may examine the issue of res judicata and its legal effect if such a plea would have been raised at an appropriate time before the learned Single Judge. The second option with us was to look into the principal argument canvassed on behalf of the State Government as regards the principle of res judicata and decide whether the writ application ought to have been rejected on the plea of res judicata.
35. The doctrine of the res judicata is one of the oldest doctrine in the history of the world. Res judicata “is as old as the law itself” “Res judicata pro veritate accipitur” is the Latin maxim for the doctrine of the Res judicata.
36. The doctrine of res judicata is originated from 3 Roman maxims:
1. Nemo debet bis vexari prounaeadem causa - It means that no person should be vexed for the same cause;
2. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium - It means that it is in the interest of the state that there should be an end to a litigation; and
3. Re judicata pro veritate occipitur - a judicial decision of the court must be accepted as true.
37. Essentials of res judicata under Section 11 CPC:
1. There must be two suits one former (previously decided) suit and the other subsequent suit.
2. Parties of the former and subsequent suit or the parties under whom they or any of them claim should be the same.
3. The subject matter of the subsequent suit should be identical or related to the former suit either actually or constructively.
4. The case must be finally decided between the parties.
5. The former suit should be decided by the court of competent jurisdictions.
6. Parties in the former as well as in Subsequent suit must have litigated under the same title.
38. The leading case on the doctrine of res judicata is the Duchess of Kingstone case (1775-1802) All ER 623), wherein Sir William de Grey made the following remarkable observations:
“From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true; firstly, that judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another court; secondly, that the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly in the point, is in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a Court of concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction nor of any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment (ID, at p. 645 (SLC)
39. In Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol 34, p. 743) also, it has been stated : “res judicata is a rule of universal law pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is put upon two grounds, embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation; the other, the hardship to the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.” (Ibid, see also Halsbury's laws of England, 3 Edn., Vol.15, p.185)
40. It has been settled since long that though Section 11 of the Code does not, in terms, apply to the writ petitions, there is no good ground to preclude decisions in matters in controversy in the writ proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in the subsequent petitions or regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of finality of decision after full contest. [Sharma v. Krishna Sinha, AIR 1960 SC 1186]
41. In Sharma v. Krishna Sinha (supra), for the first time, the Supreme Court held that the general principle of res judicata would apply even to writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Thus, if once the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is dismissed by the court, subsequent petition is barred” [Amalgamated Coalfields v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013]. Similarly, if a writ petition filed by a party under Article 226 is considered on merit : as a contested matter and is dismissed, the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed in appeal or in other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment and again move the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs. [Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457].
42. It is well settled that in order to operate as res judicata, the finding must be one disposing of a matter directly, and substantially in issue in the former suit and the issue should have been heard and finally decided by the Court trying such suit. A matter which is collaterally or incidentally in issue for the purpose of deciding the mater which is directly and substantially in issue cannot be made the basis of a plea of res judicata.
43. It is well settled that res judicata has to be pleaded and proved. For that purpose, the plea must be raised at the proper stage of the proceedings. The party who is sought to be affected by the bar of res judicata should have notice of the point likely to be decided against him and he should have an opportunity of putting forward his defence against such plea. [Nazim Ali v. Anjuman Islamia, (1999) 3 SCC 91]. Moreover, the plea of res judicata is one which a party can waive. Hence, the court may decline to go into the question of res judicata on the ground that it has not been properly raised in the pleadings or in the issues [Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, (1970) 1 SCC 613]. Again, if a party does not raise the plea when he ought to have raised it, under Explanation IV to Section 11, it will be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue and finally decided against him constructively. Unless raised in defence, the court cannot decide the plea of res judicata suo motu. [Katta v. Pokuri, AIR 1970 AP 258].
44. But, it is equally well settled that the plea of res judicata like the plea of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the court which tries the proceedings. A finding of this plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the court [Pandurang Dhondi v. Maruti Hari, AIR 1966 SC 153]. Hence. a plea of res judicata can be allowed to be raised even by an appellate court if there is sufficient material on record [State of Punjab v. B.D. Kaushal, (1970) 3 SCC 656]. In B.D. Kaushal (supra), the plea of res judicata had not been specifically raised by the defendant in the written statement nor an issue was framed by the court. But all necessary facts were on the record and present in the minds of the parties and gone into by the court. In such circumstances, the defendants were allowed to raise the plea negativing the contention of the plaintiffs.
45. The Supreme Court observed:“Although no specific plea was taken in the written statement nor was any issue framed before the trial court but the necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the court… We are wholly unable to understand how in the above circumstances any question of waiver could arise when the point had throughout been under consideration and discussion and how the appellate could be precluded from pressing that point before the High Court” [Krishna Chand v. Challa Ramanna, AIR 1932 PC 50, 51]
46. The onus is on the party who contends that an earlier decision operates as res judicata between the parties. He has to establish that the matter in issue in the subsequent suit was also in issue in the former suit and it had been heard and finally decided between the same parties by a competent court [Tarini Charan v. Kedar Nath, AIR 1928 Cal 777].
47. In the leading case of Tarini Charan (supra), speaking for the Full Bench, Rankin, C.J., stated:
“In India, at all events, a party who takes plea of res judicata has to show that the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and also that it has been heard and finally decided.” [Province of Bombay v. Ahmedabad Municipality, AIR 1954 Bom 1].
48. Thus, it lies upon the person who pleads res judicata to show that the matter was in issue in the former suit and the court had decided it in his favour in the earlier proceedings. This he may do by producing a copy of the judgment and decree or such documents as will bring the case under Section 11. Mere bald assertion is not sufficient. [Kumar Jagat Kishore v. Parmeshwar, AIR 1951 Pat 348]
49. According to the Supreme Court, the best method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits, and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgments which operates as res judicata.
50. It is a settled proposition that the principle of res judicata would not only apply between the two different proceedings but would also apply at the different stages of the same proceedings. In this regard, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, reported in AIR 1960 SC 941, where the Supreme Court held as under;
“7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter-whether on a question of fact or a question of law-has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.
8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again?” The judgments on the aforesaid point are umpteen and does not require relook. In case of Ajay Mohan (supra), the Apex Court reiterated the same principles.
The further point which springs out is whether the plea of res judicata is a pure question of law or not. Mr. Banerjee's contention that the question of law can be agitated even before the Court of last resort as held in case of Gurucharan Singh (supra) does not require revisit. The question of law, which strikes at the root of the case if no further facts or the evidence or the documents are required to be put in, can be agitated even before the Supreme Court for the first time. To attract the applicability of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, it should be held that the plea of res judicata is a pure question of law and not the question of fact as well.
The plea of res judicata emerges from a procedural law but in substance, is substantive law since the right of the litigant is denied by the Court by applying the aforesaid principle. There is a distinction between a res judicata and issue estoppel or the cause of action estoppel. The res judicata put fetters on the Court from exercising jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties and, therefore, is a different kind of estoppel i.e. estoppel by accord whereas the issue estoppel is invoked against the parties. [(See Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787)].
Lord Diplock, J; in Thoday v. Thoday reported in (1964) 1 All ER 341 defines in these words:
“The cause of action estoppel, is that which prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence of which has been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist i.e. judgment was given on it, it is said to be merged in the judgment…. if it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per cent judicatam.”
51. It is not in dispute that the plea of res judicata was not specifically pleaded by the appellant State before the learned Single Judge. This plea is sought to be raised, for the first time, in appeal before this Court. The plea of res judicata should not only be specifically pleaded but by conduct of the parties seems to have been taken in a proceeding, if the party does not raises a plea of res judicata, it would be deemed that he has waived such plea and, therefore, shall be precluded from raising the same before the higher forum. The point of res judicata is a mixed question of law and fact. (see Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 which is further reiterated in the case of Ram Harakh v. Hamid Ahmed Khan, (1998) 7 SCC 484)
52. The waiver is an intentional and/or conscious relinquishment of a known, right or advantage, benefit, claim or privileges which except for such waiver, the party would have enjoyed. The waiver acquiescence or res judicata springs from a procedural law and cannot have any application in a case where the order have been passed by the Court which has no authority in that behalf. The principle of waiver or res judicata does not give the Court the jurisdiction under the Act which it had none.
53. If the party does not plead res judicata nor raises such question before the Trial Court, he could be said to have waived his plea and cannot be allowed to raise before the higher forum.
54. We are of the view that the plea of res judicata, which has been raised for the first time on behalf of the State Government is not tenable in law. We are saying so because the issue before the learned Single Judge in the Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995, decided on 9 March, 1995 was not with regard to whether the possession had been taken over in accordance with law or not. When the learned Single Judge decided the Special Civil Application No. 1511 of 1995 on 9 March, 1995, the Act was very much in force. The Act came to be repealed in the year 1999. The issue before the learned Single Judge was limited to the extent of the legality and validity of the order passed by the State Government declaring some portion of the land as excess vacant land under the provisions of the ULC Act. When the matter was carried in appeal by Kamuben, the Appellate Court noted that there was no infirmity in the orders dated 23 May, 1994 and 13 December, 1994 respectively of the Revenue Authorities as affirmed by the learned Single Judge. The Appellate Court could have stopped at that stage and could have dismissed the appeal. However, the Appellate Court proceeded to record a statement made by the learned AGP for the State which, in fact, was not necessary for the purpose of the adjudication of the appeal. The statement made by the learned AGP for the State was that the possession had already been taken over on 16 October, 1996. At the same time, the Appellate Court also took notice of the fact that Kamuben had preferred an application for no objection certificate which came to be rejected and against which the special civil application, i.e, the Special Civil Application No. 3119 of 2003 was pending. Ultimately, while dismissing the appeal, the Appellate Court observed that as the possession had also been taken over in view of the statement made by the learned AGP, there was no good reason to examine the correctness of the impugned orders. Whether such a finding recorded by the Appellate Court while dismissing the appeal can come in the way of the original petitioner, more particularly, when it is the case of the original petitioner that the possession has remained with her all throughout.
55. We are of the view that there was no adjudication on merit on the factum of possession which could be said to have attained finality between the parties. If a statement is made by the learned AGP, and such statement is recorded in the order, whether the same, thereafter, could be used for the purpose of raising the plea of res judicata?. We are afraid, we are not in a position to appreciate such contention canvassed on behalf of the State Government.
56. The Supreme Court in the case of Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (dead) by Legal Representative v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2016) 4 SCC 531, in identical facts, observed in para-27, as under;
“27. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State that the writ petition is barred by res judicata is also not sustainable in law. In our considered view, question as to whether the appellants landholders were dispossessed from the land in question and the effect of the Repeal Act on this was not the issue in the earlier writ petition and, therefore, it cannot be held that the instant writ petition is barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata.”
57. The Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280, considered the question whether the deemed vesting of surplus land under Section 10(3) of the Act would amount to taking de facto possession depriving the land holders of the benefit of the saving clause under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. The Supreme Court observed as under;
“35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) of Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression “where any land is vested” under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualises a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession.
Forceful dispossession
36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) of Section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force—as may be necessary—can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under subsection (5) of Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations i.e. taking possession by giving notice, that is, “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), then “forceful dispossession” under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
37. The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word “may” has been used therein, the word “may” in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under subsection (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word “may” has to be read as “shall”.”
58. The Bench further considered the effect of Repeal Act and held that:—
“41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly repealed Act 33 of 1976. The objects and reasons of the Repeal Act have already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. The Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving clause. The question whether a right has been acquired or liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in each case depend on the construction of the statute and the facts of the particular case.
42. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18-3-1999. The State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the landowner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act.
43. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed so also the other appeals. No documents have been produced by the State to show that the respondents had been dispossessed before coming into force of the Repeal Act and hence, the respondents are entitled to get the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. However, there will be no order as to costs.”
59. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Ram (supra) has been referred to and relied upon later in the case of Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (supra).
60. Once we hold that the plea of principle of res judicata is not tenable in law, we find it difficult to disturb the findings of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge upon perusal of the original record. The learned Single Judge has observed, in so many words, that the original record was called for from the ULC Authorities, and upon perusal of the same, it was found that there was nothing to indicate that the possession had been taken over in accordance with law. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that we should not disturb the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
61. The contention like whether Kamuben could be said to be a stranger to the litigation etc. are sought to be raised for the first time in this appeal. No such contentions were canvassed before the learned Single Judge. The issue before the learned Single Judge was limited to the extent whether on the date of the repeal, Kamuben was in actual physical possession of the subject land or not. The finding of fact in this regard, as recorded by the learned Single Judge, is that Kamuben was in actual physical possession of the subject land on the date of repeal and, in such circumstances, the ULC proceedings could be said to have lapsed thereafter. If we have to close this judgment with one last observation, then we would say that the case on hand is one of paper possession and nothing beyond that.
62. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
63. In view of the order passed in the main matter, the civil application for stay also does not survive and is disposed of accordingly.