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  • Article 89 of the Limitation Act of 1908
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  • Article 89 of the Limitation Act of 1908
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was filed by the first respondent (plaintiff) on 4-11-1955 for partition and separate possession of a 1/8th share in Sri Ramakrishna Oil Mills, Eluru (the "suit mill") and for rendition of accounts of income from the suit mill from 6-1-1946. The parties were co-owners with shares alleged as: plaintiff 1/8, first defendant 1/2, second defendant 1/4 and third defendant 1/8. The co-owners agreed to lease the mill by auction on 6-1-1946; the first defendant was the highest bidder at Rs. 20,001 per year and was alleged to have become the lessee and the managing co-owner, and therefore liable to render accounts of rents and profits.

At trial the first defendant denied being the lessee personally (asserting he had bid on behalf of the 6th defendant – a firm of which he and the 4th and 5th defendants were partners) and denied being the managing co-owner; he also pleaded limitation. The trial Court held that the first defendant was the lessee and the managing co-owner, found the suit not barred by limitation, passed a preliminary decree for partition and possession of the plaintiff's 1/8th share and directed the first defendant to render accounts from 6-1-1946 until 25-5-1957 (date possession was taken by the Court-appointed Commissioner).

The first defendant appealed to the High Court (A.S. 4/61). He did not dispute the plaintiff's right to a decree for the 1/8th share and recovery of possession but challenged his liability to render accounts, repeated the contentions that he was not a co-owner and that the 6th defendant was the lessee, and raised limitation. He also sought to rely, for the first time in that appeal, on prior decisions in two earlier suits (O.S. 66/51 and O.S. 93/52) to assert res judicata. Krishna Rao, J. agreed with the trial court on the primary factual findings, modified certain directions on accounts and interest (holding interest at 6% per annum only from the date of the suit), and refused permission to permit the appellant to raise res judicata since it had not been raised earlier. That judgment dismissed the appeal with costs. The present Letters Patent Appeal challenges Krishna Rao, J.'s judgment and decree. During pendency of this appeal the appellant died and his legal representatives were brought on record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the first defendant was the lessee and the managing co-owner of the suit mill (i.e., liable to account as such).
  2. Whether the plea of res judicata based on findings in prior suits (O.S. 66/51 and 93/52) could be permitted to be raised for the first time in the appeal.
  3. Whether the suit for accounts was barred by limitation, specifically under Article 89 of the Limitation Act, 1908.
  4. Whether the directions given by the lower courts regarding the rendition of accounts and the rate/date of interest (6% per annum from suit date) were correct.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (First Defendant's) Arguments

  • The first defendant contended he was not the lessee personally; he bid at the 6-1-1946 auction on behalf of the 6th defendant (a firm) and therefore liability for rent/lease rested with that firm.
  • He contended he was not the managing co-owner and thus not liable to render accounts as such.
  • He argued the suit was barred by limitation under Article 89, Limitation Act 1908, on the basis that agency had terminated (or that the plaintiff had treated him as a lessee in prior proceedings), so the three-year period had begun earlier.
  • He sought to rely on findings in prior suits (O.S. 66/51 and 93/52) which, he argued, found the 6th defendant to be the lessee; those findings, he said, operated as res judicata and precluded the trial court from finding he was the lessee.
  • He challenged certain directions given by the lower court regarding rendition of accounts and argued that interest ought to have been awarded at 6%.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents maintained the trial court and Krishna Rao, J.'s findings that the first defendant was the lessee and managing co-owner, reached after consideration of documentary and oral evidence, should stand.
  • They argued that in the prior suits the plaintiff and the present third defendant had been only proforma defendants or co-defendants with the first defendant, and that the requirements for a decision between co-defendants to operate as res judicata were not satisfied.
  • They submitted that the earlier suits were for recovery of rent (up to 1952) and were not suits for accounts; therefore the prior pleadings did not amount to termination of agency nor to a refusal to render accounts.
  • They noted that the account as co-owner was first demanded by notice Ex. A-5 dated 27-10-1953 and that the suit (filed 4-11-1955) was within three years of that demand, so the suit was within limitation.
  • They opposed permitting the res judicata plea to be raised for the first time in the High Court because it had not been pleaded or raised at trial or in preliminary issues, and no satisfactory explanation was given for the delay despite ample time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pandurang v. Maruti, AIR 1966 SC 153 Relied on by appellant to support the contention that the plea of res judicata concerns jurisdiction. The court noted the reliance but did not adopt that approach as decisive; it considered the point but found it unnecessary to decide whether res judicata affects jurisdiction because the plea was not properly raised in the trial pleadings/issues and the Court refused permission to raise it.
Venkatasubbarao v. Janakiramayya, 1959 Andh LT 156 Contains an observation (quoting Jagadish Chandra Deo) that the plea of res judicata does not affect jurisdiction and is a plea in bar which may be waived. The court examined this authority and observed that the portion suggesting res judicata is waivable may be open to question in light of other authorities; it weighed the authority but ultimately did not rely on waiver as the sole reason for refusing permission.
Jagadish Chandra Deo v. Gour Hari Mahato, AIR 1936 PC 258 Privy Council decision upholding a High Court which declined to go into res judicata because it had not been properly raised by the pleadings or issues. The court relied on this decision for the proposition that if res judicata has not been properly raised in pleadings or issues, a higher court is justified in declining to allow the appellant to go into that question; this supported refusal of permission here.
Raja of Venkatagiri v. Madras Province, AIR 1947 Mad 5 States that the doctrine of res judicata is founded on public policy to put an end to litigation and cannot be waived even by consent of parties. The court cited this decision to show an alternative view that res judicata may not be a waivable right and to demonstrate conflicting authorities; it contributed to the court's view that waiver may not be a proper reason to refuse the plea, although other procedural defects remained decisive.
Shivraj Gopalji v. Ayyissa Bi, AIR 1949 PC 302 Privy Council held that the High Court was right in allowing a plea of res judicata to be raised before it even though it had not been pressed in the trial court. The court used this authority to indicate that in some circumstances a plea not pressed at trial may be allowed on appeal; nevertheless, the court concluded that in the present case it was not appropriate to entertain the plea because it had not been properly raised in the pleadings or issues.
Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh, 1892 AC 473 Authority (Lord Watson) that a question of law arising on facts admitted or proved beyond controversy may be raised for the first time in a court of last resort in the interests of justice. The court acknowledged this principle and related authorities showing that pure questions of law can sometimes be entertained first in appeal; however, the court concluded that, on the facts and procedural history of this case, it was not a fit case to exercise that discretion to admit the res judicata point.
Raghubans Narain v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 465 Illustrates that appellate courts have discretion to entertain new points of law in the interests of justice under appropriate circumstances. The court noted this authority as part of the body of law on appellate discretion but held that the interests of justice did not require entertaining the res judicata plea for the first time on appeal in this particular case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. On the principal factual questions whether the first defendant was the managing co-owner and whether he was the lessee, the court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial court and Krishna Rao, J. The trial court had considered documentary and oral evidence; in particular there was an admission by the first defendant in prior proceedings that he had been directed to manage the mill by all co-owners. No fresh material was produced to persuade the court to differ from those findings, and therefore the court affirmed them.
  2. On the res judicata contention, the court set out the prior proceedings (O.S. 66/51 and O.S. 93/52). In those suits the Subordinate Judge had dismissed the claims on 7-3-1953, holding inter alia that (a) the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 formed an unregistered firm rendering the suit not maintainable at the instance of one only, and (b) that the lessee of the mill was the 6th defendant (the firm), not the first defendant. Appeals to the High Court were filed but later withdrawn and dismissed on 5-9-1958 following a compromise of 14-7-1958 in which the first defendant agreed to pay Rs. 16,000 on behalf of the 6th defendant to the second defendant.
  3. The court examined whether the first defendant could raise res judicata for the first time in the appeal. It noted the plea had not been raised in the written statement filed on 6-3-1956. Although the appellant argued he could not have raised it earlier because the High Court appeals were pending, the court observed that those appeals were withdrawn/dismissed in 1958 and the trial judgment in the present suit was not given until 31-10-1960 — leaving more than two years during which the written statement could have been amended or an additional written statement filed to raise res judicata. The court further observed that preliminary issues (including limitation, mis-joinder and maintainability) were decided on 16-2-1959, and a revision petition against that order was dismissed on 8-1-1960; at none of these stages was res judicata sought to be raised.
  4. The court considered legal authorities on whether res judicata is waivable and whether an appellate court may entertain such a plea for the first time. It acknowledged conflicting decisions: some suggesting res judicata is waivable or a plea in bar (and may be waived), others (and some Privy Council decisions) indicating the plea can be entertained on appeal even if not pressed at trial, and still others emphasizing the doctrine's public-policy basis that it cannot be waived. The court concluded that although waiver may not be a proper reason to refuse the plea in every instance, the High Court was justified in refusing to allow the appellant to raise res judicata because it had not been properly raised by the pleadings or issues. Thus the procedural defect (failure to raise it in pleadings/issues) was decisive.
  5. Because the court refused permission to entertain the res judicata plea for the first time, it found it unnecessary to decide whether the prior findings in the earlier proceedings in fact operate as res judicata between the plaintiff and the first defendant.
  6. On the limitation plea under Article 89 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the court accepted the respondents' contention that the prior suits were for recovery of rent (to 1952) and not suits for accounts. The court did not construe the plaintiff's written statement in those suits as amounting to termination of the first defendant's agency or affecting his character as co-owner. The court noted that the account as co-owner was first demanded by notice Ex. A-5 dated 27-10-1953 and the suit was filed on 4-11-1955 (within three years), hence the suit was within time and the limitation plea failed.
  7. The court also addressed the appellant's challenge to certain directions regarding accounts and interest: Krishna Rao, J. had modified trial directions and held interest should be at 6% per annum only from the date of suit. The present court did not disturb Krishna Rao, J.'s modifications and refused to interfere with concurrent findings on the core factual issues.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The concurrent findings of the trial court and Krishna Rao, J. that the first defendant was the managing co-owner and the lessee are affirmed.
  • The plaintiff's suit for partition and possession of his 1/8th share and for rendition of accounts remains successful as ordered below; the trial court had directed accounts from 6-1-1946 until 25-5-1957 and Krishna Rao, J. directed that interest be awarded at 6% per annum only from the date of suit — the appeal did not displace those directions.
  • The court refused to permit the appellant to raise the plea of res judicata for the first time on appeal because it had not been properly raised in the pleadings or issues; as a result the court did not resolve whether the earlier decisions operate as res judicata between the parties.
  • The plea of limitation under Article 89 failed; the suit for accounts was held to be within time (account demand dated 27-10-1953; suit filed 4-11-1955).
  • Costs: the appeal was dismissed with costs in favour of respondent 1.
  • No broader binding precedent was established by this decision: the court applied existing authorities and exercised discretionary case management on whether to permit a new plea on appeal, but the judgment does not purport to lay down a novel rule of general application. (The court expressly noted it was unnecessary to decide the res judicata question on the merits.)

    Katta Subbarao (Died) And Others v. Pokuri Sri Ramalu And Others

    Kuppuswami, J.:— The first defendant in O.S 54/55 on the file of the District Judge. Eluru preferred the above appeal against the judgment and decree of Krishna Rao, J., in A.S 4/1961. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant died and his legal representatives have been brought on record. The suit was filed by the first respondent on 4-11-1955 for partition and separate possession of ⅛th share in Sri Ramakrishna Oil Mills, Eluru (hereinafter referred as the suit mill) and for rendition of account by the first respondent of the income from the suit mill from 6-1-1946 on the following allegations:.

    2. The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 are co-owners and the plaintiff being entitled to ⅛th share, first defendant to ½ share and the second defendant to ¼th share and the 3rd defendant to ⅛th share respectively. Due to differences between them they agreed to lease out the suit mill by auction among themselves on 6-1-1946 and the first defendant was the highest bidder at Rs. 20,001/- per year. The first defendant accordingly became the lessee of the suit mill. He was also the Managing Co-owner and as such was liable to render to the co-owners the account of the rents and profits. The defence of the first defendant material to the appeal was that he was not the lessee. He bid at the auction not for himself but on behalf of the 6th defendant-Firm of which he, 4th and 5th defendants were the partners and therefore, the 6th defendant alone was liable for rent. He further contended that he was not the managing co-owner and was not therefore, liable to account. He raised also the plea that the suit was barred by limitation.

    3. The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence held that the first defendant was the lessee and was also the managing co-owner and that the suit was not barred by limitation. He therefore, passed a preliminary decree for partition and delivery of possession of plaintiff's ⅛th share in the suit mill and directed the first defendant to render account of the suit mill business from 6-1-1946 until 25-5-1957 the date on which the possession of the suit mill was taken over by the Commissioner appointed by the Court.

    4. The first defendant, thereupon preferred A.S 4/61 to this court. He did not dispute the right of the plaintiff to a decree for ⅛th share and for recovery of possession, but questioned his liability to render account in addition to the pleas raised in the court below that he was not a co-owner, that the 6th defendant and not he was the lessee and that the suit was barred by limitation, he attempted to raise a further contention, namely that the finding in two prior suits, O.S 66/51 and 93/52 on the file of the Court, Eluru that the 6th defendant was the lessee and not the first defendant operated as res judicata and it was, therefore not open to the lower court to find that the first defendant was the lessee. He also urged that certain directions given by the lower court with reference to the rendition of accounts were erroneous and the interest ought to have been awarded at 6%.

    5. Our learned brother, Krishna Rao, J., after a consideration of the evidence agreed with the findings of the lower court that the first defendant was the co-owner and was also the lessee and that the suit was not barred by limitation. He gave certain directions regarding account and also held that the interest should have been awarded at 6% per annum, only from the date of suit. He however, refused to permit the appellant to raise the plea of res judicata which had not been raised in the lower court in the result subject to the modifications relating to the directions regarding accounting and interest he dismissed the appeal with costs. The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the said judgment and decree.

    6. We are not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of our learned brother and the trial court on the questions whether the first defendant was the managing co-owner and whether lie was lessee. The findings were arrived at by the trial court after elaborate consideration of the evidence. In fact, on the question whether the first defendant was the managing co-owner, there is the admission of the first defendant in the prior proceedings, in which he stated that he was directed to manage the mill by all of them (co-owners) including the plaintiff. On the question, whether the first defendant or the 6th defendant was the lessee, also the court considered the entire documentary and oral evidence and our learned brother, Krishna Rao. J., agreed with that finding. No other fresh material has been placed before us to differ from the conclusions of the trial court and our learned brother on these points and we, there, fore, affirm those findings.

    7. Sri Bapiraju however, urged that there is a finding in certain prior proceedings between the same parties that the lessee was not the first defendant but the 6th defendant-firm and that operates as res judicata in these proceedings, and that Krishna Rao, J. erred in refusing to permit the appellant to raise that question in the appeal before him. In order to appreciate the contention based on res judicata, it is necessary to set out briefly the previous proceedings.

    8. The second defendant filed two suits, O.S 66/51 and O.S 93/52 in the Sub-court Eluru, for recovery of his ¼th share of rent due from the first defendant for the period from 6-1-46 to 6-4-1949 and from 6-4-1949 to 6-1-1952 respectively. The present plaintiff was the third defendant in that suit and the present 3rd defendant was the second defendant therein. They supported the second defendant's case and asked for a decree in their favour for their share and offered to pay the necessary court-fee, if the suit was decreed for their share and the rent as well. The suits were tried together and dismissed on 7-3-1953. The Additional Subordinate Judge, found that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 constitute an unregistered firm and therefore, the suit was not maintainable at the instance of one of them only. He also held that the lessee of the mill was not the first defendant but the 6th defendant herein. It may be observed that the 6th defendant was not a party to those proceedings. Against the dismissal of the suit, the second defendant appealed to the High Court in A.S Nos. 874 and 875/53.

    9. While the appeals were pending the second defendant and the first defendant entered into a compromise on 14-7-1958 by which the first defendant agreed to pay on behalf of the 6th defendant-firm a sum of Rs. 16,000/- to the second defendant in full settlement of his claims. In view of the compromise the appeals were withdrawn and were dismissed on 5-9-1958. It is contended that as the appeals were withdrawn and dismissed, the decision of the Subordinate Judge in those suits have become final and operates as res judicata in these proceedings.

    10. It is contended for the respondents that the plaintiff herein and the 3rd defendant were only proforma defendants in that suit and as they were co-defendants with the first defendant, any decision therein cannot operate as res judicata in these proceedings as the requirements necessary to make the decision between the co-defendants as res judicata are not present in this case.

    11. Before considering the question whether the findings operate as res judicata, it has to be decided first, whether the first defendant should have been allowed to raise this question of res judicata in the appeal before our learned brother and should be allowed to raise it again before us. This contention was admittedly not raised in the written statement. It is argued that it could not have been raised as the appeal in the High Court was still pending at the time when the written statement was filed on 6-3-1956, But the appeals were withdrawn and dismissed on 5-9-1958 and the judgment of the trial court in this suit was given on 31-10-1960. Thus the suit was pending for more than two years after the dismissal of the appeals in the High Court, no reason has been given as to why the written statement was not amended or an additional written statement was not filed raising the pleas of res judicata during this long period. We find from the judgment that issues 13 to 15 regarding the limitation, mis-joinder of parties, maintainability of suit were decided as preliminary issues on 16-2-59. Even at this stage the defendant could have asked for an issue regarding res judicata also to be raised. A revision petition was preferred against the order of the preliminary issues to the High Court and the petition was dismissed on 8-1-1960. During all these stages no attempt was made to raise the plea of res judicata. If the plea had been raised and an issue had been framed, this court would have had the benefit of the judgment of the trial court on that aspect. Further it is possible that the plaintiff might not have allowed the appeals in the High Court to be withdrawn and would have taken steps to transpose himself as the appellant and continue the appeal on the ground that the second defendant, (the plaintiff therein) had entered into compromise with the first defendant. The defendant by trying to raise this plea of res judicata is making an attempt to defeat the claims of the plaintiff for his share of the profits which are admittedly due to him.

    12. For all these reasons we do not consider in the interest of justice that it is a fit case for permitting the first defendant to raise the plea of res judicata and our learned brother was also equally right in refusing that permission.

    13. Mr. Bapiraju argued that one of the main reasons for Krishnarao, J., to refuse the permission to raise this plea was that he considered that the plea of res judicata was not one which affects the jurisdiction of the Court and is a plea in a bar which a party may waive. Mr. Bapi Raju contends that this is not a correct statement of law. He has relied on a decision in Pandurang v. Maruti, AIR 1966 SC 153 in support of his contention that the plea of res judicata concerns jurisdiction. Our learned brother, Krishnarao, J., relied on a decision of a Bench of this court in Venkatasubbarao v. Janakiramayya, 1959 Andh LT 156, at page 165 it was stated as follows:

    “In Jagadish Chandra Deo v. Gour Hari Mahato, AIR 1936 PC 258 the Privy Council upheld the decision of the Calcutta High Court which had declined to go into the question of res judicata on the ground that it had not been properly raised by the pleadings or in the issues, particularly in the issues. The plea of res judicata is not one which affects the jurisdiction of the court. It is a plea in a bar which a party may waive.”

    14. Perhaps, the later portion of this observation namely, that the plea of res judicata is not one which affects the jurisdiction of the Court and is a plea in a bar which a party may waive, is open to question. The decision of the Privy Council relied on in that Judgment, namely, AIR 1936 PC 258 does not support that proposition. On the other hand, a decision of a Bench of the Madras High Court in Raja of Venkatagiri v. Madras Province, AIR 1947 Mad 5 (2) consisting of Patanjali Sastri and Bell, JJ., is to the effect that—

    “though the doctrine of res judicata is often treated as a branch of the law of estoppel it is really founded on the public policy of putting an end to all litigation in regard to the same matter or in other words, of setting to rest fights of litigants, and cannot be waived even by the consent of the parties”.

    15. Further it is doubtful whether the mere fact that the plea was not raised in the written statement amounts to waiver. In the decision in Shivraj Gopalji v. Ayyissa Bi, AIR 1949 PC 302 their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the High Court was right in allowing the plea of res judicata to be raised before them even though it was not pressed in the trial court having been raised there.

    16. If a plea which has been raised and not pressed could be permitted again to be raised in the High Court, we do not see any reason why the plea which was not raised at all in the trial court should not be allowed in the High Court on the ground of waiver and therefore, we are Inclined to agree with the argument of Mr. Bapiraju, that in this case waiver may not be a proper reason for refusing the permission to raise this plea as an additional and new ground of appeal. But as pointed out by the Privy Council in AIR 1936 PC 258 (supra) if the plea of res judicata is not raised properly by the pleadings or in the issues, particularly in the issue, the High Court would be justified in declining to allow the appellant to go into the question of res judicata.

    17. Mr. Bapiraju relied on a number of decisions to the effect that a pure question of law can be raised for the first time in an appeal, if it is based either on facts which are admitted or which have been proved beyond controversy and in this case as there is no dispute about the prior proceedings which form the basis of the plea of res judicata, the said question should have been permitted to be raised. He relied upon the off-quoted decision in Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh, 1892 AC 473 where Lord Watson observed as follows:

    “When a question of law is raised for the first time in a court of last resort upon the construction of a document or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedient in the interests of justice to entertain the plea.”.

    18. These observations have been referred to and followed in a number of decisions of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court, for instance, see decision in Raghubans Narain v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 465 of the Supreme Court. But the question in each case is whether the circumstances of that case and the interests of justice require that the appellate court should exercise its discretion to entertain a new point, even though it is a pure question of law. For the reasons staged in the earlier part of our judgment we feel that this is not a fit case for entertaining this plea of res judicata for the first time.

    19. In this view it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the findings in the prior proceedings operate as res judicata between the plaintiff and the first defendant who were co-defendants in those proceedings.

    20. Sri Bapi Raju contends that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 89 of the Limitation Act of 1908 which deals with a suit by a principal against his agent for movable property received by the latter and not accounted for and period of three years is to commence when the account is during the continuance of the agency, demanded and refused or, where no such demand is made, when the agency terminates. He contended that in the prior suit which was filed by the second defendant it was stated that the first defendant had agreed to pay the lease amount individually to each of the other-co-owners and the present plaintiff in his written statement which he filed as a second defendant in that suit also took up the same position. He contends that the agency was terminated by reason of the stand taken up in that suit, and that he also ceased to be a co-owner because the plaintiff chose to treat him as a lessee by filing the written-statement as the second defendant to that effect.

    21. Mr. Eamachandra Rao contends that these two suits were for recovery of rent upto 1952 and not suits for accounts and there was no question, therefore, of asking for accounts on the footing of agency or the termination of agency. We agree with this contention. We do not construe the written statement of the plaintiff as second defendant in those suits as amounting to termination of the agency of the first defendant or affecting his character as co-owner. The character of those suits is entirely different from the character of the suit in the present case as the previous ones were for rent against the lessee whereas the present suit is one for accounts against co-owner. In the circumstances, it cannot be stated that there is any termination of agency or refusal by the first defendant to account as co-owner or as agent. The account as co-owner was asked for, for the first time by notice Ex. A-5 dated 27-10-1953 and the suit was filed on 4-11-1955 within three years thereafter. The suit was, therefore, within time. The plea of limitation also therefore, fails. In the circumstances the appeal is dismissed with costs of respondent 1.

    22. Appeal dismissed.

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    Katta Subbarao (Died) And Others v. Pokuri Sri Ramalu And Others
    (Mar 28, 1968)