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Attorney(S)
  • Sri L. Govindaraj, Advocate for Appellant
  • Sri B. Prabhu Devaru, Advocate for R-1
  • Sri B. Prabhu Devaru, Advocate for Appellant
  • Sri L. Govindaraju, Advocate for R1
Judges
  • G.C Bharuka
  • A.V Srinivasa Reddy, JJ.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
  • Sri L. Govindaraj, Advocate for Appellant
  • Sri B. Prabhu Devaru, Advocate for R-1
  • Sri B. Prabhu Devaru, Advocate for Appellant
  • Sri L. Govindaraju, Advocate for R1
Judges
  • G.C Bharuka
  • A.V Srinivasa Reddy, JJ.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The workman was employed as "Helper-B" by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation ("the Corporation"). On 10.8.1987 the Corporation served a memorandum stating that the service records showed his date of birth as 12.1.1930 and that he would retire on 31.1.1988 on attaining 58 years. The workman disputed this, claiming his date of birth was 12.1.1937. The Corporation examined records and rejected the objection by an order dated 16.1.1988.

The workman challenged the Corporation's action by filing Writ Petition No. 5791/88 before this Court; that petition was dismissed by this Court on 1.6.1988, with the court observing that a disputed question of fact as to date of birth must be decided by a Civil Court and could not be gone into under Article 226.

Instead of approaching a Civil Court, the workman filed an application before the Labour Court on 16.11.1988, purporting to be under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (inserted by the Karnataka Amendment Act, 1987). The Labour Court entertained the application (although it was filed beyond the six-month period prescribed by that sub-section) and by an award dated 17.8.1988 directed the Corporation to pay full back wages from 31.1.1988 to 31.1.1995.

The Corporation challenged the Labour Court award by filing a writ petition in this Court; the Single Judge modified the award to direct payment of 50% back wages for the said period. Both the Corporation (employer) and the workman preferred intra-Court appeals against the Single Judge's order and the Labour Court award. The present opinion is delivered by the Division Bench hearing those appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the workman's application in view of this Court's earlier writ dismissal that indicated the disputed question of date of birth must be decided by a Civil Court.
  2. Whether a dispute about a workman's date of birth (leading to termination by reason of superannuation) falls within the scope of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus is amenable to adjudication under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10.
  3. Whether an application under Section 10(4-A) filed beyond the six-month period prescribed by that provision is barred and therefore not maintainable, and whether the time limit is mandatory or directory.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation) — Principal Contentions

  • The Labour Court lacked jurisdiction because this Court in W.P. 5791/88 had ruled that the question of correct date of birth could be decided only by a Civil Court.
  • A dispute relating to date of birth cannot be adjudicated under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 since it does not fall within Section 2-A of the Act.
  • Even if the Labour Court could entertain such a dispute, the application was filed beyond the six-month period prescribed by Section 10(4-A) and was therefore not maintainable.

Respondent (Workman) — Principal Contentions

  • Once it is found that the workman was kept out of service illegally, he is entitled to full back wages.
  • The workman relied on earlier judicial decisions (including certain Single Judge decisions) that, as argued by his counsel, supported entertainability or a more flexible approach to the time limit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan (1994 6 SCC 302) That courts/tribunals should not entertain claims about correctness of date of birth entered in service records at the fag end of career. Used as part of a group of Supreme Court decisions to support the conclusion that the Labour Court erred in entertaining a late challenge to recorded date of birth.
Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Khadri (1995 2 SCC 82) Same principle: reluctance to permit late challenges to recorded date of birth. Grouped with similar authorities to demonstrate established Supreme Court view against entertaining such fag-end claims.
Union of India v. Kantilal Hematram Pandya (1995 3 SCC 17) Same principle regarding challenge to date of birth at the fag end. Relied upon to reinforce the rule that such disputes should not be entertained by courts/tribunals at the fag end of service.
Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandu Majumdar (1995 4 SCC 172) Same principle as above. Used along with other decisions to show consistent Supreme Court approach.
Union of India v. Ram Suia Sharma (1996 7 SCC 421) Same principle as above. Placed among authorities that disapprove of late disputes about recorded dates of birth.
Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy (1997 4 SCC 647) Same principle as above (cited by the bench). Included in the list of Supreme Court judgments to support the proposition that the Labour Court erred.
Commissioner of Police v. Bhagwan N. Lahane (1997 1 SCC 247) Same principle as above. Relied upon with others to show settled Supreme Court view.
Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. S.M. Jadhav (2001 4 SCC 52) Same principle as above. Also cited to support the rule against entertaining late challenges to dates of birth in service records.
Indian Express (Madurai) Pvt. Ltd. v. G. Krishna Murthy (W.A. 2158/90, dt. 10.9.1991) Example where the Division Bench held that a dispute raised many years later was time-barred under Section 10(4-A); words to the effect that if reckoned, a dispute raised six years later is barred by time. Relied upon as a Division Bench authority supporting the proposition that the time limit in Section 10(4-A) is mandatory and a claim filed after that period is barred.
The K.S.R.T.C. v. Govinda Setty (ILR 1997 KAR 983) Single Judge decision holding that the time prescribed under Section 10(4-A) was directory and applications could be entertained even many years later. The Division Bench held this Single Judge decision was incorrect and per incuriam and overruled it.
North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Santmallaya (ILR 1999 KAR SN No. 98) Single Judge decision that followed Govinda Setty's approach on the time limit. Declined as correctly stating the law; held to be per incuriam and not followed by the Division Bench in this opinion.
W.A. No. 3414-15/95 (DD 15.7.1997) On facts the Court held the application was filed within six months and described Section 10(4-A) as a beneficial provision intended to help workmen when filed within the specified period. Referred to as an example where the time limit was properly met; used to distinguish cases where time limit was complied with.
Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways (2001 1 SCC 133) Principle that a dispute may be referred under Section 10(1) provided the dispute has not become stale by inaction of the workman. Invoked to show an alternative route (reference under s.10(1)) remains available unless the dispute is rendered stale; cited when discussing consequences of missing the s.10(4-A) window.
Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Prahlad Singh (2001 1 SCC 424) Similar principle concerning staleness of disputes and availability of remedy under s.10(1). Used together with Balbir Singh to indicate that s.10(1) reference remains open unless the dispute is barred by laches.
Telecom District Manager v. A.A. Angali (ILR 2000 KAR 2963) Similar authority on staleness and procedure. Also relied upon for the proposition that reference under s.10(1) may be possible if the dispute is not rendered stale.
Sail v. National Union Water Front Workers (2001 5 Scale 626) Principle of statutory interpretation: where statutory language is clear, the court must give effect to it; literal interpretation applies unless provisions are vague/obscure. Quoted and applied to hold that the six-month period in Section 10(4-A) is clear and must be given effect; the court refused to dilute the statutory time-frame.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench proceeded in a stepwise manner, addressing each principal ground raised by the Corporation and analyzing the factual record and statutory framework as follows.

1. Suppression and False Statements before Labour Court: The Court examined the award and found that the workman had made false and misleading statements before the Labour Court about the status of his writ petition. The opinion records an extract of the statements made to the Labour Court which were contradicted by the record (the writ petition had already been rejected on 1.6.1988). On this basis the Court concluded that the workman was guilty of "suppressio veri and suggestio falsi" in approaching the Labour Court.

2. Jurisdictional Obstacle from Earlier Writ Decision: Because this Court in W.P. 5791/88 had observed that the disputed question of date of birth could be resolved only by a Civil Court, the Division Bench held that the workman could not properly file an application before the Labour Court for that purpose. The Court concluded that, in view of the earlier order, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application seeking resolution of the date-of-birth dispute.

3. Scope of Section 10(4-A) and Section 2-A: The Court construed sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 and Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It explained that s.2-A deems a dispute arising from discharge/dismissal/retrenchment/termination of an individual workman to be an industrial dispute. The Court determined that the present case involved termination by reason of attaining superannuation as recorded in service records, and that no "industrial dispute" existed within the meaning of Section 2-A in the circumstances presented. The relationship terminated automatically on attainment of superannuation; accordingly the Labour Court should not have entertained the application under s.10(4-A).

4. Time-Limit Prescribed by Section 10(4-A): The Court analyzed the statutory six-month period within which an application under s.10(4-A) had to be filed (either within six months from the date of communication of the order of termination or six months from the commencement of the Karnataka Amendment Act, whichever is later). Applying the facts, the Court found that the endorsement communicating the date of retirement was communicated before 22.3.1988, making the six-month period expire on 21.9.1988; the Amendment Act took effect on 7.4.1988, making the six-month period from that date expire on 6.10.1988. The workman filed the application on 16.11.1988, which was beyond both relevant six-month periods and therefore outside the statutory window.

5. Precedents on Fag-end Challenges and Timeliness: The Court relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate a consistent principle that courts and tribunals should not entertain late challenges to dates of birth recorded in service records at the fag end of service. It held that, for this reason as well, the Labour Court erred in entertaining the workman's application.

6. Nature of the Remedy and Mandatory Character of the Statutory Time Limit: The Court interpreted s.10(4-A) as a statutory, legislatively-created remedy that is expressly limited by the six-month time frame. The Division Bench characterized the remedy as an alternative and expeditive path for individual workmen, but one that is "coupled with a condition" (the six-month limit). Applying the rule of literal interpretation (citing the Constitution Bench decision in Sail v. National Union Water Front Workers), the Court concluded that the time limit is not to be diluted by courts and that filing outside that period removes the Labour Court's jurisdiction to entertain the application.

7. Treatment of Conflicting Single Judge Authorities: The Court considered contrary views taken by Single Judges in Govinda Setty and Santmallayya which treated the time limit as directory and permitted very belated applications. Finding those views contrary to the Division Bench's reading and inconsistent with the Division Bench's view of Indian Express (Madurai) Private Limited (a Division Bench decision) and Supreme Court authorities, the Division Bench held that the Single Judge decisions were per incuriam and overruled them.

8. Consequence for Labour Court Award: Because the application before the Labour Court was both beyond the statutory period and concerned a dispute (date of birth) which should have been resolved only by a Civil Court according to the earlier writ ruling, the Division Bench concluded that the Labour Court had erred in entertaining the dispute and in passing the award directing back wages. The Court held that such an application filed beyond the six-month period must be rejected as not maintainable at the first instance (analogous to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The award of the Labour Court and the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge are set aside. The appeal in W.A. 625/98 is allowed and the appeal in W.A. No. 1353/98 is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The Labour Court award directing back wages for the period 31.1.1988 to 31.1.1995 is quashed.
  • The Single Judge's modification awarding 50% back wages is also set aside insofar as it rests on the Labour Court award's maintainability.
  • The appeals are disposed of as above, leaving no entitlement to back wages under the impugned orders.

Broader legal implications stated by the Court:

  • The Division Bench affirmed that the six-month period in Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act (as inserted by the Karnataka Amendment) is a mandatory statutory condition precedent to the exercise of the special remedy under that provision; an application filed after that period is not maintainable and the Labour Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.
  • The Court overruled Single Judge decisions (Govinda Setty and Santmallayya) that had treated the time limit as directory, holding them to be per incuriam and incorrect to the extent they conflict with binding authority and the correct interpretation of the statute.
  • The opinion reiterates that challenges to dates of birth recorded in service documents at the fag end of a career are generally not to be entertained by courts/tribunals, as reflected by multiple Supreme Court precedents cited in the judgment.

Note on precedent-setting: The Court expressly overruled two Single Judge decisions on the specific point of the mandatory character of Section 10(4-A)'s time-limit; it applied existing Supreme Court authorities and principles of statutory interpretation to do so. The decision clarifies the law in respect of the mandatory nature of the six-month window for s.10(4-A) applications and the unacceptability of belated challenges to recorded dates of birth.

End of summary. This summary is based exclusively on information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or interpretations not present in the text.

Show full summary ...

    Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Khaleel Ahmed And Another

    6. (1997) 4 SCC 647 : AIR 1997 SC 2055 Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy (do) 14 7. (1997) 1 SCC 247 Commnr. of Police v. Bhagwan N. Lahane (do) 14 8. (2001) 4 SCC 52 Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. S.M Jadhav (do) 14 9. W.A 2158/90 dt. 10.9.1991 Indian Express (Madhurai) Pvt. Ld. v. Sri G. Krishna Murthy (do) 19 10. ILR 1997 KAR 983 The K.S.R.T.C v. Govinda Setty (do) 19 11. ILR 1999 KAR SN. No. 98 North West Karnataka Road Transport Corpn. v. Santmallaya (do) 19 12. (2001) 1 SCC 133 Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways (do) 23 13. (2001) 1 SCC 424 Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Prahlad Singh (do) 23 14. ILR 2000 KAR 2963 Telecom Dist. Manager v. A.A Angali (do) 23 15. 2001 (5) Scale 626 Sail v. National Union Water Front Workers (do) 24

    Sri L. Govindaraj, Advocate for Appellant
    Sri B. Prabhu Devaru, Advocate for R-1
    Sri B. Prabhu Devaru, Advocate for Appellant
    Sri L. Govindaraju, Advocate for R1

    JUDGMENT

    Bharuka, J.:—

    Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge in writ jurisdiction both the employer, namely, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (“the Corporation” for short) as also the workman have preferred these intra Court appeals.

    2. The foundational facts lie in a narrow compass. At the material time the workman was employed on the post of “Helper-B” in the Corporation. He was served with a memo dated 10.8.87 intimating him that since as per the service records his date of birth was 12.1.1930, he on completion of 58 years will be retiring on 31.1.1988 The workman objected to the said memo by taking the stand that his date of birth is 12.1.1937 and not 12.1.1930 as has been intimated to him by the Corporation. But the concerned authorities after examination of the records rejected the said objection under their order dated 16.1.1988

    3. The workman questioned the legality of the above order by filing Writ Petition being W.P 5791/88 but the same was rejected by this Court by an order dated 1.6.1988 Paragraph 3 of the order so passed reads as under:

    “The petitioner claimed before the authorities that his actual date of birth was 12.1.1937 Though opportunity was given to him, he did not produce any evidence in support of his claim. In the circumstances, the authorities proceeded to retire the petitioner on the basis of the date of birth entered in the Service Register. The petitioner had no right to continue unless he had secured a declaration by a Civil Court that his date of birth was as claimed by him. Such a disputed question of fact cannot be gone into in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (see: Subba Rao v. LIC of India — AIR 1976 KAR 231.)”

    4. In view of the above order passed by this Court, the workman could have got the dispute with regard to his date of birth resolved only through the Civil Court. But curiously, instead of moving the Civil Court he filed an application before the Labour Court on 16.11.88 purported to be one under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the Act” for short) which reads thus:

    “(4-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 9-C and in this section, in the case of a dispute falling within the scope of Section 2-A, the individual workman concerned may, within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply, in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and the Labour Court shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1).”

    The above sub-section was inserted in the Act by the Karnataka Amendment Act 1987 vide Karnataka Act 5 of 1988 Section 2, which came into force from 7.4.1988

    5. Though as specifically provided in sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act an application under the said sub-section could have been filed only within six months from the date of coming into force of the Karnataka Amendment Act but still the Labour Court entertained the application filed by the workman which was ex facie filed beyond the statutory period prescribed by the Legislature. The Labour Court by accepting the stand taken by the workmen passed an award dated 17.8.88 (Annexure-C) directing the Corporation that it should pay to the workman all backwages from the date of his alleged premature retirement on 31.1.1988 till 31.1.1995 thereby giving a deemed extension of service of seven years to the workman.

    6. The above award was questioned by the Corporation by filing the Writ Petition before this Court which was disposed of by the learned Single Judge with the only modification that instead of full back wages the workman will be entitled to 50% back wages for the above said period of seven years. The Corporation has questioned the legality and the validity of the impugned award of the Labour Court as well as the order of the learned Single Judge on the grounds that:

    (i) In view of the order passed by this Court in W.P 5791/88, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the workman since the question regarding the correct date of birth could have been decided only through the forum of the Civil Court.

    (ii) A dispute relating to the date of birth of a workman cannot be subjected to adjudication by filing an application under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act.

    (iii) Even if the dispute of the nature involved herein was entertained by the labour Court, the same having been raised beyond the time limit prescribed in the Act, it was liable to be rejected on this count alone.

    7. On the other hand and the workman has questioned the order of the learned Single Judge on the ground that once it was found that he was kept out of service by the Corporation in an illegal manner, he has of right entitled to full back wages. At this stage it may be of importance to notice that pursuant to an interim order passed by this Court in the Writ petition, the Corporation has already paid Rs. 50,000/- to the workman.

    Re: Ground No. 1

    8. So far as first ground taken by the Corporation is concerned, we find from the award that the workman had deliberately misled the Labour Court by making a false statement regarding the above Writ proceedings and the orders passed therein by this Court. Paragraph 4 of the award gives the facts disclosed by the workman before the Labour Court. The relevant portion for the present purpose, reads thus:

    “….That aggrieved by the orders of retirement dated 16.1.1988 the petitioner preferred a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in W.P 5791/1988 on 22.3.1988 The High Court of Karnataka expressed its opinion that the petitioner should approach this Hon'ble Court for redressal of his grievances. However, the Writ Petition before the High Court of Karnakata is still pending. Nevertheless, the petitioner submits that he undertakes to withdraw the Writ Petition, as the Hon'ble Judge has expressed the opinion and directed the petitioner to withdraw the wit petition and prefer a dispute before this Hon'ble Court. As the writ petition is not listed subsequent to 25.5.1988, but in the meanwhile the petitioner has preferred this dispute before this Hon'ble Court.”

    9. On the very face of the record, the above statements made by the workman were palpably false and misleading because admittedly the workman had sought to rise the dispute before the Labour Court by filing application on 16.11.1988, whereas by that time his Writ Petition filed before this Court had already been rejected on 1.6.1988 Further, this Court had clearly observed that the dispute regarding date of birth can be resolved only through the Civil Court. This Court never said that the workman can approach Labour Court for resolving the dispute.

    10. In view of the above facts, we hold that the workman is guilty of ‘suppressio vari and suggestio falsi’ in approaching the Labour Court. We are also of the clear opinion that in view of the order passed by this Court in the Writ Petition filed by the workman restricting his forum for resolution of the dispute with regard to his date of birth only to Civil Court, he could not have filed any application before the Labour Court for the said purpose and that too by making false statements.

    Re: Ground No. 2

    11. So far as the second ground is concerned a plain reading of sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act makes it clear that this provision can be resorted to by a workman only in relation to a dispute which is covered by Section 2-A of the Act. Section 2-A of the Act reads thus:

    “2-A Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute — where any employer discharges, dismisses retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.”

    12. In the present case, the dispute sought to be raised by the workman was that his date of birth namely, 12.1.1930 as recorded in his service records was incorrect. According to the workman, the true date of birth was 12.1.1937 According to the date of birth in the service records, he was to retire on 31.1.1988 since the age of superannuation for the employee of the corporation was 58 years. Therefore, his right to continue in service beyond the period of superannuation as calculated on the basis of his service records depended on resolution of the said dispute. In this view of the matter it is a case where the corporation had sought to terminate services of the workman on attainment of the age of superannuation based on service records. It cannot be disputed that on attainment of the age of superannuation the relationship between the employer and the employee automatically comes to an end.

    13. In this view of the matter, since no ‘industrial dispute’ can be said to be in existence within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act, the application filed by the workman before the Labour Court could not have been entertained.

    14. Another aspect, which is more startling, is that according to the service record as already noticed above, the workman was to retire on 31.1.1988 He filed a Writ Petition in W.P 5791/88 (on 22.3.1988) before this Court questioning the correctness of his date of birth after attaining the age of superannuation. The said Writ Petition came to be rejected on 1.6.1988 More than five months thereafter, he filed, application under Section 10(4A) of the Act on 16.11.1988 The Supreme Court has repeatedly said the Court or Tribunal cannot entertain claim for correctness of date of birth duly entered in the service record at the fag end of the career. For this reason as well, the Labour Court has erred in entertaining the application of the workman. See: State Of T.N v. T.V Venugopalan . 1994 6 SCC 302., Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Khadri. . 1995 2 SCC 82., Union of India v. Kantilal Hematram Pandya . 1995 3 SCC 17., Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandu Majumdar . 1995 4 SCC 172., Union Of India v. Ram Suia Sharma. . 1996 7 SCC 421., Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy . 1997 4 SCC 647, Commissioner of Police v. Bhagwan N. Lahane . 1997 1 SCC 247., Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. S.M Jadhav . 2001 4 SCC 52..

    Re: Ground No. 3

    15. So far as this ground is concerned, as already noticed above, respondent workman was retired on superannuation on 31.1.1988 Even if on the facts of the present case, retirement of the respondent workman can be deemed to be a termination for the purposes of sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act, he could have raised a dispute under the said sub-section only within 6 months from the date of communication to him of the alleged order of termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever was later.

    16. As already noticed above, the respondent workman was issued endorsement dated 16.1.1988 intimating him that according to the date of birth recorded in his service book, he on completion of 58 years will be retiring on 31.1.1988 On receiving the said endorsement, he assailed the same by filing Writ Petition before this Court on 22.3.1988 being W.P No. 5791/1988 which was ultimately dismissed by this Court by order dated 1.6.1988

    17. Therefore, from the above facts, it cannot be disputed that the endorsement dated 16.1.1988 was certainly communicated to the respondent workman before 22.3.1988 If this date be taken as the date of communication, then 6 months from this date had expired on 21.9.1988 Further, since the Amendment Act had come into force w.e.f 7.4.1988, six months from this date had expired on 6.10.1988 Therefore, out of the two relevant dates, the respondent workman would have filed an application under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act on or before 6.10.1988

    18. In the present case, the workman filed application under Section 10(4-A) of the Act before the Labour Court on 16.11.1988 Therefore, it was filed much beyond the statutorily fixed time limit. According to the counsel for the Corporation, any application filed after the expiry of the statutory time limit was not entertainable by the Labour Court.

    19. Sri L. Govindaraj, learned Counsel for the Corporation, in support of his submission has relied on an unreported judgment of this Court in the case of Indian Express (Madhurai) Private Limited v. Sri G. Krishna Murthy . W.A 2158/90 dt. 10.9.1991. Whereas Sri Prabhu Devaru, learned Counsel for the respondent-workman, has relied on two judgments both of the learned Single Judges in the cases of The K.S.R.T.C v. Govinda Setty . ILR 1997 KAR 983. and North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Santmallaya . ILR 1999 KAR SN. No. 98.. According to him, writ appeal preferred against the order of the learned Single Judge in Govinda Setty's case (supra), was also rejected by the Division Bench. According to him, the order of the learned Single Judge in Govinda Setty's case (supra) was considered by the Division Bench in W.A No. 3414-15/95 (DD 15.7.1997) and was impliedly approved.

    20. So far as judgment in Indian Express (Madurai) Private Limited (Supra) is concerned, it was found as of fact that the order of termination was served on the workman on 31.12.1983 and he had raised dispute under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act on 23.1.1990 Keeping these facts in view, the Division Bench held that.

    “So reckoned, six years later if the dispute is sought to be raised, it is clearly bared by time as stipulated under Section 10(4-A) extracted above.”

    21. In the case of Govinda Setty (supra), the learned Single Judge took a contrary view by holding that time prescribed for filing application under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act was directory and held that on the facts of the case though application was filed almost 17 years after the date of discharge, the application was maintainable. According to him, the prescription of time limit Under Section 10(4-A) of the Act was wholly insignificant and the application can be filed at any time. Whereas, in Santmallayya's case, the learned Single Judge had just followed the view taken in Govinda Setty's case (supra).

    22. So far as judgment in W.A 3414-15/95 (supra) is concerned, on facts, the Court held that in the case before them, the workman had filed the application within a period of six months. The finding recorded was to the following effect—

    “It is not disputed that the application under Section 10(4-A) of the Act was filed by the appellant on 6.10.1988, admittedly within the period of 6 months. It has to be kept in mind that Section 10(4-A) of the Act was intended to be a beneficial legislation for the workmen facilitating them to approach the Court directly within the time specified therein”.

    (emphasis supplied)

    23. It seems quite clear to us that the State Legislature has incorporated sub-section (4A) in Section 10 of the Act to provide a more expeditious remedy to the workman enabling him to redress his grievances without undergoing the ordeal of approaching any Labour Union and without approaching the State Government for referring his case to the Labour Court. Therefore, the remedy provided under sub-section (4-A) is a remedy alternative to what is provided under sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act. But the right created under the State Amendment is coupled with a condition that individual workman has to prefer application before the Labour Court within the time frame of six months fixed by the legislature. It is a statutory condition precedent for exercise of the right and availment of remedy under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act. Therefore, it has to be held that if an application is filed beyond the period of 6 months as prescribed under the above sub-section, then it will be incumbent on the part of the Labour Court not to entertain such an application since the condition does not only bars the special remedy but it also strikes at the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain such an application. Such an interpretation is in consonance with the general rule of interpretation of statute. Such construction will not also in any way prejudice the right of a workman to get his dispute resolved by a reference under sub-section 10(1) of the Act provided the dispute sought to be raised do not become state because of his inaction as held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways . 2001 1 SCC 133., Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Prahlad Singh. . 2001 1 SCC 424. and Telecom District Manager v. A.A Angali . ILR 2000 KAR 2963..

    24. So far as rule of interpretation of statute is concerned, once again Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has reiterated the provisions in the case of Sail v. National Union Water Front Workers . 2001 5 Scale 626. wherein it has been held that:—

    “It is a well settled proposition of law that the function of the Court is to interpret the Statute to ascertain the intent of the legislature — Parliament. Where the language of the Statute is clear and explicit the Court must give effect to it because in that case words of the Statute unequivocally speak the intention of the legislature. This rule of literal interpretation has to be adhered to and a provision in the Statute has to be understood in its ordinary natural sense unless the Court finds that the provision sought to be interpreted is vague or obscurely worded in which event the other principles of interpretation may be called in aid.”

    25. Adopting the above principle of interpretation, in our considered opinion, there is no ambiguity in the language used by the legislature under Section 10(4A) of the Act specifying time frame within which only an application can be filed by a workman for being entertained by the Labour Court. In this view of the matter, it is no permissible for the Court to dilute the provisions providing time frame on the basis of supposed legislative policy.

    26. For these reasons, we hold that the two judgments of this Court rendered by the learned Single Judges in Govinda Setty and Santmallayya cases (supra) do not lay down the correct law and are also per incuriam for having not followed the law laid down by this Court in Indian Express (Madurai) Private Limited's case (supra). Accordingly, the same was overruled.

    27. In view of the above discussions, we hold that if an aggrieved individual workman do not file application within the period prescribed under Section 10(4A) of the Act then, it will be impermissible for the Labour Court to entertain the same and the same has to be rejected as not maintainable at the very first instance after hearing the workman or his counsel like rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

    28. For the aforesaid reasons, the award of the Labour Court as well as impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. The appeal in W.A 625/98 is allowed and the appeal in W.A No. 1353/98 is dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.

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    Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Khaleel Ahmed And Another
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