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  • M.P Fundamental Rules and M.P Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1958 (for brevity 1958 Rules).
  • Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
  • ARTICLE 16 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 2(d)(ii) of 1958 Rules
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citation codes
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  • M.P Fundamental Rules and M.P Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1958 (for brevity 1958 Rules).
  • Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
  • ARTICLE 16 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 2(d)(ii) of 1958 Rules
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Sanjay Yadav, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This intra-Court appeal under section 2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyay Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, challenges the order dated 22-6-2015 in Writ Petition No. 8843/2015. The appellant sought appointment on compassionate grounds following the death of his mother, a Lab Attendant in the Higher Education Department, who died on 30-9-2010.

The appellant's initial claim was rejected by communication dated 20-5-2011 because his elder brother was employed as an Assistant Surgeon in the State Government. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 1637/2013, which was disposed on 8-2-2013 directing an opportunity for fresh representation raising the contention that the employed brother lived separately. On re-representation, the claim was rejected on 2-4-2013 for the reason that the elder son (the appellant's brother) was in Government service.

A subsequent Writ Petition No. 8520/2013 led to a direction to reconsider the claim (order dated 29-1-2015). After reconsideration, the claim remained rejected (order dated 4-4-2015) and the impugned writ court order dated 22-6-2015 relied on Clause 4.1 of the State's compassionate appointment Policy (dated 18-8-2008) to hold that if any one person of the family is already in Government service, the rest are not eligible for compassionate appointment. The present appeal challenges that conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Clause 4.1 of the Policy dated 18-8-2008 precludes entitlement to appointment on compassionate grounds for a member of the deceased Government servant's family where another member of that family is in Government service but is not residing with the family (i.e., lives separately).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that although his brother is employed as an Assistant Surgeon with the State Government, the brother is living separately and therefore cannot be construed as a "member of family" as contemplated in the Policy.
  • He relied on two earlier decisions—Ku. Priyanka Dixit v. State of M.P. and Prakash Parmar v. Government of M.P.—to support the proposition that a government-employed family member living separately should not be counted as a member of the family for the purposes of Clause 4.1.

Respondent State's Arguments

  • The State submitted that the Policy for compassionate appointment does not create a substantive right to appointment but confers a privilege to assist families of deceased government servants who are thrown into financial penury.
  • The State urged that a narrow construction of "member of family" that excludes employed members living separately would run contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution (equality of opportunity in public employment) because it would allow other family members to claim compassionate appointment merely on the basis that the employed member does not live with the deceased.
  • The State contended that the interpretation given in the two judgments relied upon by the appellant (Priyanka Dixit and Prakash Parmar) needs reconsideration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ku. Priyanka Dixit v. State of M.P., W.P. No. 3250/2006 (decided 17-7-2007) Held that a brother who was employed but living separately did not come within the meaning of "family" under the State's (earlier) compassionate appointment policy; compassionate appointment previously granted was upheld against a withdrawal. The present Court examined Priyanka Dixit and observed that the Writ Court was not directly called upon to interpret "member of family" in depth; the present Court found that Priyanka Dixit's affirmative observation that a brother living separately cannot be construed as family was an over-simplification and declined to follow that interpretation for Clause 4.1 of the 2008 Policy.
Prakash Parmar v. Government of M.P., 2012 (4) M.P.L.J. 539 Interpreted Clause 4.1 with reliance on definitions of "family" drawn from M.P. Fundamental Rules and M.P. Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1958; emphasized that members living separately may be excluded. The present Court noted that Prakash Parmar borrowed definitions from statutory rules but failed to consider clarifications (e.g., government circular) and thus its emphasis on exclusion for those living separately was not persuasive for interpreting Clause 4.1 of the 2008 Policy.
Kamal Singh Bamne v. State of M.P., W.P. (S) No. 6667/2006 Referenced (in Priyanka Dixit) as support for the view that a family member living separately may not be considered part of the family for certain policy applications. The present Court noted this case as part of the chain of authority relied upon in Priyanka Dixit but did not treat it as decisively establishing the meaning of "member of family" for the 2008 Policy.
Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh, (1998) 5 SCC 452 : AIR 1999 SC 551 Interpreted "dependents" in the context of reservation for dependents of ex-servicemen; held reservation is intended for those not gainfully employed (i.e., dependence requires not being gainfully employed). The present Court held that Harinder Singh dealt with reservation policy for dependents and not with compassionate appointment policy; therefore using it to interpret "member of family" under the compassionate appointment Policy is misplaced.
Mst. Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 Principle that the meaning of a word depends upon the context and purpose of the particular statute (or instrument) being interpreted. The Court used this principle to emphasise that "member of the family" must be interpreted in the context and purpose of the compassionate appointment Policy, not by applying a fixed or out-of-context meaning.
Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad, (2000) 2 SCC 20 Interpretation of the word "reside": it covers permanent dwelling and also places where a person has resided for a "considerable time"; the meaning is not limited to strict domicile. The Court relied on this definition to conclude that mere separate residence by a family member does not automatically exclude that person from being treated as a member of the family under Clause 4.1 of the Policy.
Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 Compassionate appointment is an exception to merit-based recruitment designed to provide immediate relief to dependents of a deceased employee; it is not an alternate mode of recruitment. The Court cited this authority to stress the object of compassionate appointment — ameliorative relief to prevent penury — and to interpret Clause 4.1 in light of that object.
Mumtaz Yunus Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 384 Reiterates that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment but a benevolent scheme to enable a bereaved family to overcome sudden financial crisis. The Court relied upon this authority to reinforce that the primary purpose of the Policy is relief from financial distress and that Clause 4.1 should be read in that light.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the issue narrowly: whether Clause 4.1 of the Policy dated 18-8-2008 prevents entitlement to compassionate appointment when another family member is in Government service but not residing with the deceased's family.

The Court examined the Policy's relevant provisions:

  • Clause 2.2 (eligibility): identifies classes of persons eligible for compassionate appointment (son, unmarried daughter, widowed/divorcee daughter, etc.) subject to dependency and "living with" the deceased Government servant.
  • Clause 4 (ineligibility): provides categories of persons ineligible; Clause 4.1 states ineligibility if "any eligible family member of the deceased government servant is already employed in government service, or corporation, board, council, commission etc." Clause 4.7 reiterates that no other member shall be eligible except those wholly dependent indicated in Clause 2.

The Court then carefully assessed the prior case-law relied upon by the appellant:

  • Ku. Priyanka Dixit — The Court observed that Priyanka Dixit turned on facts and contained an observation that a brother "living separately" does not come within "family." The present Court noted that the Priyanka Court was not called upon to undertake a detailed contextual interpretation of "member of family" for the Policy and therefore that observation did not require blind adoption.
  • Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh — The Court found this decision concerned reservation policy for dependents of ex-servicemen, not compassionate appointment policy; accordingly the present Court found reliance on it to construe "member of family" misplaced.
  • Prakash Parmar — The Court noted Prakash Parmar borrowed definitions of "family" from the M.P. Fundamental Rules and the 1958 Rules. However, the present Court brought to notice clarifications and context (such as the 1960 circular) which show that "residing with" can include members kept away for education, treatment or convenience and therefore Prakash Parmar's emphasis on exclusion was incomplete.

The Court turned to principles of interpretation:

  • Applying Mst. Jagir Kaur, the Court emphasised that meaning depends on context and purpose; the Policy's purpose (ameliorative relief to prevent penury) must guide interpretation.
  • Invoking the interpretation of "reside" in Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad, the Court held that "reside" is not strictly limited to a permanent abode; it can include a place of settled or considerable residence. Thus mere separate residence by an employed family member does not automatically mean exclusion from "family."

On policy grounds, the Court reiterated that compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of merit-based public appointments (citing Hakim Singh and Mumtaz Yunus Mulani). The object of the Policy is to provide immediate relief when a family is thrown into penury by the untimely death of a breadwinner.

Synthesising the textual clauses, the contextual meaning, precedents, and the object of the Policy, the Court concluded:

  • Clause 4.1 should be understood to mean that if any eligible member of the deceased's family is in employment in government service (or related bodies), then other eligible members of that family will not be entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds.
  • Mere separate residence of an employed family member does not exclude that person from being treated as a member of the family under Clause 4.1.
  • Accordingly, the Court disagreed with the narrow interpretation in Ku. Priyanka Dixit and Prakash Parmar that excluded employed family members who live separately from the class excluded by Clause 4.1.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed the view that where any eligible member of the family of a deceased Government servant is in employment in Government service or an instrumentality thereof, any other eligible family member will not be entitled to appointment on compassionate ground under Clause 4.1 of the Policy dated 18-8-2008.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The impugned order dated 22-6-2015 in Writ Petition No. 8843/2015 is upheld and the appellant's claim for appointment on compassionate grounds is rejected. The appeal fails and is dismissed with no costs; the Court explicitly declined to interfere with the writ court's order.
  • On interpretation: The Court rejected prior decisions (Ku. Priyanka Dixit and Prakash Parmar) to the extent they construe "member of family" as excluding employed family members who live separately; the present Court's interpretation affirms that employed members (even if living separately) fall within the disqualification envisaged by Clause 4.1.
  • Policy application: Clause 4.1 is to be read in the light of the Policy's humane/objective purpose (ameliorative relief) and the practical effect that the clause aims to prevent duplication of benefit where an eligible family member is already in government employment.
Appeal dismissed.

Prepared from the judgment text provided. No information beyond the opinion has been added. Sections omitted or stated exactly as in the source where the opinion did not supply additional material.

    Prajesh Shrivastava v. State Of M.P. And Others

    Sanjay Yadav, J.:— This intra-Court appeal under section 2(1) of the M.P Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyay Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, is directed against the order-dated 22-6-2015 passed in Writ Petition No. 8843/2015; whereby, claim of the appellant for appointment on compassionate ground in lieu of the death of his mother, has been turned down, as one of the brother of the appellant was found to be working as Assistant Surgeon in the services of the State Government.

    2. Mother of the appellant, employed as Lab Attendant in Higher Education Department, expired on 30-9-2010. He sought appointment on compassionate ground in lieu of the death of her mother. The claim was turned down vide communication dated 20-5-2011 on the ground that his elder brother is employed in Government service. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred a Writ Petition No. 1637/2013. The petition was disposed of on 8-2-2013 by taking into consideration the contention that the petitioner may be given an opportunity for fresh representation raising the ground that if the brother, who is employed in Government service, is living separately, then petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. On re-representation, the claim was reconsidered and rejected by order dated 2-4-2013 on the ground that the elder son of the Government servant (elder brother of the appellant) being employed as Doctor in Government service, the appellant was not entitled for the appointment.

    3. Aggrieved, appellant again filed a Writ Petition No. 8520/2013, which was disposed of vide order-dated 29-1-2015 with the direction to the respondents to reconsider the claim. Whereon, by order-dated 4-4-2015, the claim for appointment on compassionate ground was turned down by holding:

    4. Apparent it is from the impugned order-dated 22-6-2015 that the Writ Court relied on Clause 4.1 of the Policy for appointment on compassionate ground, brought in vogue by the General Administration Department, vide letter No. C.3-4/1/3/06 dated 18th August, 2008 (brought on record in Writ Petition as Annexure P/15) and opined that “if any one person of the family is already in Government service, then rest of the persons are not eligible to get compassionate appointment”.

    5. Contentions on behalf of the appellant is that though his brother is employed as Assistant Surgeon with the State Government but, since he is living separately, he cannot be construed as a “member of family” as contemplated in the Policy. Inference is drawn from two decisions rendered in Ku. Priyanka Dixit v. State of M.P, Writ Petition No. 3250/2006 (s) decided on 17-7-2007 and Prakash Parmar v. Government of M.P, 2012 (4) M.P.L.J 539.

    6. Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however, submits that the Policy relates to compassionate appointment, it does not create any right in an incumbent for appointment, but only extend a privilege in favour of the wards of Government servant who die in harness and to retrieve the family from financial penury. It is urged that narrow construction given to the expression ‘member of family’ as it appear in the Policy of 2008, that it will exclude such members of the family who are employed and live separately, would run contrary to the mandate of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in the matter of appointment to any office or of any employment under the State, inasmuch as, that even in case where in the family of Government servant, there are members who are in employment in Government service and are not residing with Government servant, but posted elsewhere, other member would claim employment that since the employed member does not live with family, which will frustrate the object of Policy. It is contended that the meaning given to family in these two judgments, therefore, needs reconsideration.

    7. Considered the rival submissions.

    8. The issue which crops up for consideration is whether Clause 4.1 of the Policy dated 18-8-2008 would entitle a member of the family of Government servant, who dies in harness, for appointment on compassionate ground, if another member of deceased Government servant is in Government service, but not residing with the family.

    9. Clause 2 of the Policy envisages class of person eligible for appointment on compassionate ground. Clause 2.2 which, we are concerned with, stipulates:

    10. Careful reading of the Clause reveals that a son or unmarried daughter, or married daughter whose husband has died (widowed daughter) or divorcee daughter, subject to that such unmarried, married or divorcee daughter is wholly dependent on the deceased Government servant and is living with him/her. In case of non-availability of such persons, widowed daughter-in-law, wholly dependent and/or living with the Government servant at the time of death, are the persons eligible for appointment on compassionate ground.

    11. Clause 4 lays down class of persons ineligible for appointment on compassionate ground. These are:

    English translation of these Clauses are:—

    4. Ineligibility for compassionate appointment:

    In the following circumstances, they are not eligible for compassionate appointment:—

    4.1 If any eligible family member of the deceased government servant is already employed in government service, or corporation, board, council, commission etc.

    4.2 If any government servant dies after completing the age of superannuation during extension of service/re-appointment/contractual appointment.

    4.3 The family members of deceased employee of public sector shall not be eligible for compassionate appointment under the government.

    4.4 Any person dismissed by the Central Government or any State Government or any Public Sector or Corporation/Board/Commission under its title or controlled by it.

    4.5 If the deceased government servant has been appointed on the basis of apprentice, ad hoc or contract.

    4.6 The cases rejected or disposed of before 1-1-2007 shall not be considered again.

    4.7 No other member shall be eligible for compassionate appointment except those wholly dependent members, indicated at Serial No. 2.1 to 2.4, of the family of deceased Government servant.

    4.8 Office Head/Appointment Authority shall be personally responsible to ensure that the family of deceased government servant is really in need of compassionate appointment as an immediate aid.

    12. We are presently concerned with Clause 4.1 and 4.7

    14. Case of Ku. Priyanka Dixit (supra) was that she was appointed on compassionate ground in lieu of death of her father Gyan Babu Dixit employed as Health Educator who died in harness on 12-5-2003. Later on, on a complaint received that member of the family of Gyan Babu Dixit i.e his son Devendra Dixit was already in employment, led to passing of an order of withdrawing the compassionate appointment granted to her. On challenge, the Writ Court set aside the order of removal, holding:—

    “6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the original record, which was submitted by the Government Advocate, it is apparent that at the time of submission of the application form, petitioner has mentioned in her application that her brother Devendra Dixit is working as Shiksha Karmi and receiving Rs. 4,500/- per month, but he is residing separately. Similary, her another brother Sandeep Dixit was in the private service and receiving Rs. 2000/- and who is also living separately. It further reveals from the record that Sandeep Dixit and Devendra Dixit both were submitted their affidavits indicating the said fact and thereafter, the order of compassionate appointment dated 9-6-2003 Annexure P/1 was issued in her favour. It is further seen from the record that some complaint was received by the Collector District Rajgarh and on the basis of the said complaint without asking any explanation from the petitioner a report was prepared by him on 21-2-2006 wherein he has recorded the finding of concealment of material fact of the employment of her brother Devendra Dixit while applying for compassionate appointment. Although, the said finding as recorded by the Collector with regard to aforesaid fact is contrary to the record as discussed hereinabove. At the same time, in terms of the GAD Policy dated 20-8-2001, the brother who is living separately does not come within the meaning of expression ‘family’. Once the brother who was in the employment, is not residing along with the deceased and residing separately then it cannot be construed that one of the members of the family of the deceased was in the employment. The guidance may be taken in this respect from the judgment of this Court in the case of Kamal Singh Bamne v. State of M.P, W.P (S) No. 6667/2006 and Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh, (1998) 5 SCC 452 : AIR 1999 SC 551.

    15. Apparent it is from paragraph 6 of the aforesaid decision that the Court was not called upon to interpret the expression ‘family’, but an observation was made that the brother who is living separately does not come within the meaning of expression ‘family’. The nuances to such an interpretation in the background of the Policy being of compassionate appointment, was not gone into. Yet, the Writ Court went on to make an affirmative observation to the effect that once the brother who was in the employment, is not residing along with the deceased and residing separately then it cannot be construed that one of the members of the family of the deceased was in the employment. Trite it is, as held in Mst. Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 that “6 the meaning of the word would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the context and the purpose of a particular statute.” What is true for a statute would be equally true for the Policy of the State Government, having force of law. Therefore, the expression “member of the family” has to be considered in the context of the Policy as a whole in question.

    16. Further, the Writ Court also relied on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh, (1998) 5 SCC 452 : AIR 1999 SC 551. A bare perusal of this decision reveals that, the issue raised before the Supreme Court was-as to whether Respondent, whose claim for appointment on compassionate ground was rejected by Haryana Public Service Commission, was dependent upon his ex-serviceman father or his mother. Taking note of the fact as it appears in paragraph 3 of the said decision that there is a reservation in regard to recruitment for the State Government for dependents of service personnel killed or disabled. Dependents are defined to include, besides the wife and widow, “dependents sons/daughters”. The said categorization which was observed by their Lordships was stated in the reservation policy. Be it noted that the issue before the Supreme Court was-as to the reservation policy and not the policy of compassionate appointment; it was these facts in the background, their Lordships were pleased to observe:

    “7. The whole idea of the reservation is that those who are dependent for their survival on men who have lost their lives or become disabled in the service of the nation should not suffer. The public purpose of such reservation would be totally lost if it were to be made available to those who are gainfully employed. There is no justification for construing the words “dependents of ex-serviceman” in any manner other than that in which the appellant has construed them. This is in accord with the reservation policy itself, as shown by the quotation therefrom aforestated.”

    17. It was thus clear that the expression ‘member of family’, as it appear in the Policy of compassionate appointment, which we are concerned with, was not under consideration before the Supreme Court. Therefore, the support drawn therefrom to interpret the expression “member of family”, in our humble opinion, is misplaced.

    18. In Prakash Parmar (supra), the Writ Court though was dwelling upon Clause 4.1 of the Policy; however, borrowed the definition of ‘family’ from M.P Fundamental Rules and M.P Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1958 (for brevity ‘1958 Rules’).

    19. Under M.P Fundamental Rules,—

    (8) Family means a Government servant's wife or husband, as the case may be, residing with the Government servant and legitimate children and step children residing with and wholly dependent upon the Government servant. Except for purposes of section XVI-A of the Supplementary Rules in Appendix V, it includes, in addition, parents, sisters and minor brothers, if residing with and wholly dependent upon the Government servant.

    (b) For the purpose of section XI, it includes in addition unmarried and widowed sisters and minor brothers if residing with and wholly dependent upon the Government servant.

    Note.-Government servant's wife or husband, as the case may be, legitimate children, step children, father, mother, step mother, unmarried and widowed sisters, minor brothers who reside with the Government servant and whose income from all sources including pension (inclusive of temporary increase/relief in pension and pension equivalent to death-cum-retirement gratuity benefits) does not exceed Rs. 1275 p.m may be deemed to be wholly dependent upon the Government servant.

    Notes.-(1) Not more than one wife is included in the term ‘family’ for the purposes of these rules.

    (2) An adopted child shall be considered to be a legitimate child if, under the personal law of the Government servant, adoption is legally recognised as conferring on it the status of a natural child. [Please see. Chapter II F.R 9]

    20. So far as definition of ‘family’ under 1958 Rules is concerned, it means—

    “(i) The wife or husband of a Government servant,

    (ii) The parents, legitimate children including children adopted legally and step children of such Government servant residing with and wholly dependent on the Government servant.”

    21. However, clarification was issued by the Public Health Department vide its Circular No. 2273/1697.XVII/Med.(iii) dated 5-5-1960, clarifying the expression ‘residing with’ stating-“a question has been under consideration of Government whether the term ‘residing with’ occurring in Rule 2(d)(ii) of 1958 Rules should be held to mean physical residence to the family members of Government servant at his headquarters. Government have now decided that the members of Government servant's family who are kept by the Government servant concerned at a place other than his own residence for Education or treatment or for the sake of convenience to himself should be deemed to be residing with him. The said clarification issued by the Government thus leaves no iota of doubt that under 1958 Rules, if members of the family is kept away from the residence of Government servant or for the sake of convenience to himself is treated to be a member of family.

    22. This aspect seems to have escaped from the consideration in the case of Prakash Parmar (supra).

    23. Furthermore, in Ku. Priyanka Dixit (supra) and Prakash Parmar (supra), the emphasis is on the fact that though an incumbent is a member of the family but cannot be treated as such because living separately and not residing with the Government servant.

    24. The word ‘reside’ came to be considered in Mst. Jagir Kaur (supra) in the context of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for entertaining the petition of a wife for maintenance, wherein their Lordships were pleased to hold—

    “6………The said meaning, therefore, takes in both a permanent dwelling as well as a temporary living in a place. It is, therefore, capable of different meanings, including domicile in the strictest and the most technical sense.”

    25. Similarly, in Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad, (2000) 2 SCC 20, it is held—

    “14. The word “reside” has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary as “dwell permanently or for a considerable time; to have one's settled or usual abode; to live in or at a particular place.” The meaning, therefore, covers not only the place where the person has a permanent residence but also the place where the person has resided for a “considerable time”.”

    26. Therefore, merely because a member of the family of Government servant, who is in the employment in government service, or corporation, board, council, commission etc., has started residing separately, he cannot be excluded from the class under Clause 4.1 of the Policy.

    27. There are other reasons why we are of the opinion that the family member in employment but living separately has to be treated as a member of family of deceased Government servant.

    28. Trite it is that appointment to public service is to be on merit in accordance with the Rules furthering the principle enunciated in Article 16 of the Constitution of India, which mandates that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Exception, however, has been carved out in favour of dependents of employees who die in harness and leaving their family in penury and without any means of livelihood. For that, State Government has evolved a policy for appointment on compassionate ground with an object to provide immediate relief to such bereaved family.

    29. While dwelling upon this aspect, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85—

    “8. The rule of appointments to public service is that they should be on merits and through open invitation. It is the normal route through which one can get into a public employment. However, as every rule can have exceptions, there are a few exceptions to the said rule also which have been evolved to meet certain contingencies. As per one such exception belief is provided to the bereaved family of a deceased employee by accommodating one of his dependents in a vacancy. The object is to give succor to the family which has been suddenly plunged into penury due to the untimely death of its sole bread-winner. This Court has observed time and again that the object of providing such ameliorating relief should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment.”

    30. Thus, while acknowledging the exception carved out for appointment on compassionate ground, it has been categorically observed that “object of providing such an ameliorating relief should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment”. Similarly, in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 384, it is held—

    “11. However, it is now a well settled principle of law that appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the Public Sector Undertaking is to see that the dependents of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.”

    31. The foremost factor for consideration for appointment on compassionate ground, therefore, is to protect the family in question from penury on the death of sole bread earner. It is in the light of this aspect Clause 4.1 is to be understood. It states that in case any eligible member of the deceased family is in Government service, he will not be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. Apparently, the Clause is loosely drafted. If a family member at best residing separately is already in employment in Government service, there is no need for him to file an application for appointment on compassionate ground in lieu of death of father, mother or brother, as the case may be. The need arises only when “no one in the family” is in employment of the State or instrumentality of the State and there is sudden death of the sole bread earner.

    32. We, therefore, respectfully disagree with the interpretation given to Clause 4.1 of the Policy for compassionate appointment in Ku. Priyanka Dixit (supra) and Prakash Parmar (supra) and hold that where in a family of deceased Government servant, any of the member eligible for compassionate appointment is in the employment in government service or corporation, board, council, commission etc., any other member of the family, though eligible, will not be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground.

    33. Accordingly, we decline to interfere with the order passed in Writ Petition No. 8843/2015.

    34. Consequently, Appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Prajesh Shrivastava v. State Of M.P. And Others
    (May 10, 2016)