1. This order will also dispose of Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 173, 174, 182 and 199 all of 1952.

2. The petitioner Bhaurao is the occupant of survey Nos. 46/4 and 67, having a total area of 37 acres and 36 ‘gunthas’, situate at mouza Bhapki, taluq Morsi. He leased these fields to respondent No. 2 for cultivation for the agricultural year 1951–1952 for Rs. 1300/-. According to him, on the expiry of the lease the latter delivered possession to him and thereafter attempted to disturb his possession. According to respondent No. 2, he continued in possession after the expiry of the lease but was dispossessed by the petitioner. On 8-5-1952, he made an application, to respondent No. 1 under Section 10 and Section 19(2) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. (24 of 1951), which came into force on 28-9-1951, for reinstatement of possession and for fixation, of a reasonable lease money for the year 1952–1953 and onwards for five years. The proceedings for delivery of possession were stayed by this Court till the disposal of this petition. The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition against respondent No. 1 restraining him from deciding respondent No. 2's application dated 8-5-1952 on the grounds that he (respondent No. 1) has no jurisdiction to grant relief to respondent No. 2 because the Act is ‘ultra vires’ inasmuch as Ss. 3, 4, 10 and 19 abridge the freedom of the petitioner to hold and dispose of his property guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution by enabling the respondent No. 2 to deprive the petitioner of possession and enjoyment of the property in dispute and by creating virtually perpetual leasehold rights in his favour. The provisions are also impugned under Article 19(1)(g) because they interfere with the petitioners profession of an agriculturist by creating protected tenancies in favour of persons who may happen to be lessees in the year 1951–1952.

3. It is also alleged that the Act imposes restrictions on these fundamental rights of the petitioner which are neither reasonable nor in the interests of the general public. The Act does not limit its application to absentee owners or confer benefits on persons engaged in the business of agriculture for any considerable period. It is, therefore, submitted that the Act does not promote the interest of efficient agriculture in Berar. The petitioner further alleges that the Act is in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as it has denied to the petitioner and other land owners in Berar, similarly situated, equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. It is said that there is discrimination, against the landholders in Berar as the Act is made applicable only to Berar and not to the whole State.

4. Several other grounds were alleged to impugn the validity of the Act, including trios-sunder Article 31(1) and Article 31(2) of the Constitution, but they were abandoned at the hearing.

5. According to its long title and preamble, the impugned Act is an Act to provide for long-term leases of agricultural lands to ensure fixity of tenure in the interest of efficient agriculture in Berar. The impugned provisions so far as they are relevant for the purpose of the present controversy are:

“Section 3(1): Every lease of land by a landholder entitling the lessee to hold land in the agricutural year 1951–1952 shall, subject to the provisions of S. 4, be deemed to be for a period of five years from the commencement of that year unless such lease is for a period in excess of Ave years from such commencement.

Section 3(3): Every person who holds land from a landholder on a lease for a term of five years or more, or whose term of lease is deemed to be five years under the provisions of sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) shall be deemed to be a protected lessee.”

6. (These provisions are made inapplicable to leases from landholders who were under disability as defined in the Act at the time of granting leases and to leases granted in compliance with Section 5-A of the Central Provinces and Berar Cultivation of Fallow Land Act, 1948).

“Section 4(1): No person shall, at any time, be deemed to be a protected lessee in respect of any area in excess of fifty acres.

Section 4(2): If the area in which a lessee is entitled Under S. 3 to be deemed to be a protected lessee at any time together with any other area, if any, held by him as protected lessee, exceeds fifty acres, he shall select so much only of the first mentioned area as would make the total area to be held by him as protected lessee equal to fifty acres, and he shall give an intimation in writing to the landholder or landholders, as the case may be, and to the Revenue Officer and thereupon he shall be deemed to be a protected lessee of the area so selected.”

7. A protected lessee is entitled to renewal of his lease for a further period of five years if he satisfied the Deputy Commissioner that he had cultivated the land in an efficient manner in accordance with the standard prescribed in that behalf. In this way, if a lessee efficiently cultivates land, he is entitled to hold the land in perpetuity. Restrictions are placed on the protected lessee's right of transfer except to the extent specified in the Act, namely, to secure payment of an advance made under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or the Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884, or made by a registered co-operative society. The landholder has a right to terminate the lease on any of the grounds specified in S. 8 of the Act. He is also entitled to determine the lease, if he requires the land for cultivation personally provided the area in his possession available for cultivation is or has diminished below fifty acres. Section 10 provides for determination of a reasonable lease money at the instance of either party. Section 19(1) enables the landholder to apply to a Revenue Officer to eject a protected lessee in certain circumstances. Section 19(2) enables a protected lessee to apply to him for reinstatement of possession.

8. It is contended that the Act violates Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as it is not made applicable to the whole of the State of Madhya Pradesh but to one territorial unit which is known as Berar. Article 14 reads thus:

“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

9. It is well-settled that there is a strong presumption in favour of the constitutional validity of a law made by a competent Legislature; and it is the duty of the Courts to adopt such construction as will, without doing violence to the language of the statute or words used, reconcile it with the Constitution. In order that the Act may be invalid, the opposition between the Constitution and the Act must be of the clearest possible nature. As Fazl Ali, J. pointed out in — ‘Charanjit Lal v. Union of India’, AIR 1951 SC 41 at p. 47 (A):

“Article 14 of the Constitution lays down an important fundamental right, which should be closely and vigilantly guarded, but, in construing it, we should not adopt a doctrinaire approach which might choke all beneficial legislation.”

10. The learned Counsel has not submitted that the words “within the territory of India” in the Act mean that there must be one uniform rule throughout all the territories of India. His submission was that there must be one uniform law throughout a component State and not different laws for different territories within the State in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions. The equal protection clause in the Constitution of the United States of America, on which the learned Counsel relied, contemplates the protection of persons against arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination by the State between subject and subject. As stated in Willis' Constitutional Law, page 579, the equal protection clause in the American Constitution:

“forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.”

11. Reference may be made to — ‘Bowman v. Lewis’, (1880) 101 US 22 at p. 30 (B) and — ‘Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.’, (1926) 272 US 365 (C) where zonal or geographical classification has been upheld. It is not necessary for a law to be valid that it must operate in the entire territory of the State. In (1880) 101 US 22 (B) it is stated.

“We might go still further, and say, with undoubted truth, that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory. If the State of New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its method of procedure for New York City and the surrounding countries and the common law and its method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so. This would not, of itself, within the meaning of the 14th amendment, be a denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. If every person residing or being in either portion of the State should be accorded the equal protection of the laws prevailing there, he could not justly complain of a violation of the clause referred to. For as before said, it has respect to persons and classes of persons. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances.”

12. In ‘Charanjit Lal v. Union of India’ (a) (cit sup.) Mukherjea, J. (Kania, C.J concurring) stated at page 57:

“It must be admitted that the guarantee against the denial of equal protection of laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India in spite of difference of circumstances and conditions. As has been said by the Supreme Court of America, ‘equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws’…… and this means ‘subjection to equal laws applying alike to all in the same situation’. In other words, there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of the legislation their position is the same. There can certainly be a law applying to one person or to one group of persons and it cannot be held to be unconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character. The Legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice in determining and classifying the subject of its laws, and if the law deals alike with all of a certain class, it is normally not obnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection; but the classification should never be arbitrary. It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is made; and classification made without any substantial basis should be regarded as invalid.”

13. A State Legislature within its legislative sphere is supreme and is entitled to classify according to objects or territories when such classification is based upon a rational ground relevant to the matter in question. — ‘State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh’, AIR 1953 SC 10 (D). A similar objection taken to the validity of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act (1 of 1951) was negatived in — ‘Ganpatrao Pande v. The State of Madhya Pradesh’, ILR (1953) Nag 1 (E). A State is not compelled to extend application of any particular law to all classes of subjects or to all territories within the jurisdiction of the State. — ‘Rampratap v. Dominion of India’, AIR 1953 Bom 170 at p. 173 (P). There the Act was not made applicable to premises belonging to Government or local authorities.

14. It is next contended that the classification on the territorial basis is not reasonable, having regard to the object of the legislation. It is said that it is destructive of its very object. As stated in Willis' Constitutional Law, at page 580,

“in determining judicially the question of reasonableness the Court must find some economic, political, or other special interest to be secured, and some relation of the classification to the objects sought to be accomplished. In doing this the Courts may consider matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times, and to sustain it they will assume every state of facts which can be conceived of as existing at the time of legislation.”

15. The object of the impugned legislation is to provide for long-term leases of agricultural land to ensure fixity of tenure in the interest of efficient agriculture in Berar. It is well known that the tenancy law in the Central Provinces is different from that in the merged territories or that prevailing in the alienated and unalienated villages in Berar. The classification complained of already existed in the State. It is not introduced for the first time by the impugned legislation. The protection afforded to tenants of unalienated lands in Berar under the Berar Land Revenue Code was very limited. The agricultural, social and economic conditions in the three territories are also different and require different treatment to achieve the goal of efficient agriculture. It is, therefore, reasonable to make different provisions for these three territories even though the object, i.e efficient agriculture, is the same. As to the need for different legislation for different areas in the State, the judgment of the Legislature must be regarded as final. The question of their reasonableness is no doubt justiciable. As stated by Mukherjea, J. in — ‘Ameerunnissa v. Mahboob Begum’, AIR 1953 SC 91 at p. 94 (G)—

“It is well settled that a Legislature which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must, of necessity, have the power of making special laws, to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not ‘per se’ amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause, it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view.”

16. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned provisions violate the fundamental right of the petitioner and others similarly situated under Article 19(1)(f) to hold and dispose of their property. According to him, the petitioner had obtained possession of the land on the termination of the lease of respondent No. 2 by efflux of time and was entitled to retain possession and enjoy his property as he liked. It is further submitted that the Act deprives the land owner of his right to determine the lease and cultivate the lands at home if on the determination of the lease his holding exceeds 50 acres.

17. According to the learned Counsel for the State, the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) is not infringed because the right of ownership is not affected. Reliance was placed on the following observations of Mudholkar, J. (Mangalmurti, J. concurring) in — ‘Manohar v. G.G Desai’, AIR 1951 Nag 33 (H) quoted with approval by Mudholkar, J. (My Lord the Chief Justice concurring) in — ‘Bhaskar v. Mohammad Alimulla Khan’, AIR 1953 Nag 40 at p. 49 (I):

“The relevant part of Article 19 guarantees a citizen the right to ‘acquire, hold and dispose of property’. According to the learned counsel ‘hold’ means ‘to possess’ and as the act of requisitioning interferes with that right, it is unconstitutional. The word ‘hold’ has several meanings one of which is no doubt ‘possess’, but then it also means ‘be the owner of property’. Whether to give the word the meaning contended for by counsel or some other meaning would depend upon the context.

Taken in the context of the preceding word ‘acquire’ and that of the following words ‘dispose of it seems that the word ‘hold’ can have no other meaning than ‘own’ or ‘be the owner of.’ To assign this meaning to the word would, in our view, be in consonance with the well established canons of interpretation. By the act of requisitioning the ownership of the owner would not be affected. For, despite requisitioning, the owner would continue to have the power to deal with his property in any manner he likes, except letting it out or be in possession thereof. Such an abridgement of his right would not, however, amount to a violation of Article 19(1)(f).”

18. According to the learned Counsel, since the creation of protected tenants under the impugned Act does not deprive the land-holder of the ownership of the land, it does not violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f).

19. It is well settled that the rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) can be exercised and will continue till the owner is deprived of his property. — ‘A.K Gopalan v. State Of Madras.’, AIR 1950 SC 27 (J). The right to hold property is something in addition to the right of ownership. In — ‘Ramhari v. Nilmoni Das’, AIR 1952 Cal 184 at p. 185 (K) it was held:

“There is also little doubt that this provision in Section 5 of the Bargadar Act which requires an order of the Board for termination does infringe the constitutional right to hold property because right to hold property must include in its amplitude the right to hold it in any manner that the owner chooses freed from the right of Bargadars or other interests.”

20. By S. 5 the land owner could terminate the lease of a Bargadar on the ground that the owner desired to cultivate the land by himself or by members of his family or by servants or labourers, but he could not do so except under the order of a Board constituted under the Act. In — ‘Iswari Prosad v. N.R Sen’, AIR 1952 Cal 273 (FB) (L) Harries, C.J in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench observed:

“Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution gives a citizen a right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and it appears to me that the right to hold property includes the right to enjoy the same. A restriction on the right to hold property may be something less than a deprivation of such property. Deprivation of property is dealt with in Article 31 of the Constitution ….”

21. In — ‘Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer’, AIR 1953 SC 373 (M) the provisions which suspended a landholder's right to manage his estate and enjoy possession thereof indefinitely until such time that the Court of Wards chose to withdraw the suspension was held to be an abridgement of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f).

22. It will be seen that the right to hold property includes the right to enjoy it in any manner he likes, and there can be no doubt that the impugned Act abridges this fundamental right. But the most important question is not whether the provisions infringe this fundamental right but whether such infringement is reasonable having regard to cl. (5) of Article 19 which runs thus:

“Nothing in sub-cls. (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.”

23. If, therefore, the impugned provisions impose a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to hold and dispose of property in the interests of the general public, the provisions cannot be ‘ultra vires’ the State Legislature.

24. In determining the test of reasonable restrictions it was observed in — ‘Bhaskar v. Mohammad Alimulla Khan (I)’ (cit sup.):

“……restrictions should not be greater than the mischief it is intended to prevent and it should be in the interest of the general public to place them. It is for the Legislature to scrutinize the need for restrictions and also, in the first instance, to decide upon their reasonableness. As to the need for restrictions, the judgment of the Legislature must be regarded as final as has been so often laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council. The question of their reasonableness is justiciable and a Court has undoubtedly the power to go into that question when reasonableness of the restrictions is challenged before it.” (Page 49)).

25. It is a matter of common knowledge that at the time the Act was passed the country was in need of increasing agricultural production by resorting to both extensive and intensive cultivation and improved methods of agriculture and wanted to dispense with heavy imports of food-grains from abroad causing a very heavy drain on the finances of the country. It was, therefore, in the interests of the general public to devise ways and means to step up production. It is also a matter of common knowledge that a large percentage of land owners in Berar were habitually letting out their lands on money or produce rent. On account of the insecurity of tenure the tillers of the soil could not and did not take any interest in improving, or at least maintaining the fertility of land and had no incentive to do so.

26. On account of their inability to offer security of land they could not get the necessary working capital at reasonable rates of interest. The Act enables the tillers to raise short-term finance from the State or co-operative societies on the security of their protected tenures, and assures them long-term leases on condition of cultivating the land according to the standards of efficient agriculture to be prescribed under the Act. An economic holding for efficient agriculture is determined at 50 acres. The tiller of the soil does not get protection against the land-holder unless the landholder has surplus land, i.e, in excess of 50 acres. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Act imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right of the landowner to hold his property.

27. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions may not operate as unreasonable restriction on the right of absentee land owners but would certainly operate as such against the petitioner who is the tiller of the soil. As already pointed out, the Legislature has determined 50 acres as an economic holding. If the petitioner is really a tiller of the soil and does not ‘hold’ and cultivate 50 acres of land, he can determine the lease of respondent no. 2 so as to make up that area, Respondent No. 2 will be entitled to reinstatement from the petitioner if the area together with the area held by him as protected lessee does not exceed fifty acres. In either case, the economic holding is aimed at.

28. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Act is discriminatory. A lessee is entitled to protection to the full extent of 50 acres in addition to his own land held by him, while his lessor is prohibited from holding for personal cultivation more than this acreage by ejecting his lessee. This question, however, does not arise in this case and need not be considered.

29. The learned counsel next submitted that the impugned provisions abridge his freedom to I carry on his occupation as a tiller of the soil. Article 19(1)(g) is to be read with cl. (6) which enables a State Legislature to impose reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right conferred by sub-cl. (g). Since provision is made in the Act to secure such land-holders a holding of 50 acres, there is really no unreasonable abridgment of this fundamental right. At any rate, the restriction is reasonable and is necessary for efficient agriculture, as already pointed out.

30. Lastly, it was contended that the impugned Act is ‘ultra vires’ as it is made applicable to leases existing on the date the Act came into force and is thus retrospective in operation. Having regard to the principles of the decision in — ‘United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum’, AIR 1941 FC 16 (N), it can hardly be doubted that the Parliament as well as the State Legislature, unless it infringes some provision in the Constitution, has the competence to enact law retrospectively. ‘Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patei & Co. v. Union of India’, AIR 1952 Nag 139 at p. 142 (O). The provisions of the Act no doubt affect the leases already made, but the conditions of such leases in the past are not altered. They are regulated for the future from the date of the Act. The provisions cannot, therefore, be considered as unreasonable restrictions.

31. We are, therefore, of the opinion that none of the provisions of the Act impugned by the petitioner is ‘ultra vires’. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will be no order for costs. The security deposit may be refunded to the petitioner after deduction of the paper book costs, if any.

32. The facts of Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 173 and 182 of 1952 are similar to those of Miscellaneous Petition No. 172 of 1952. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 174 of 1952 the petitioner leased out to respondents 2 to 5 survey nos. 14 and 16, area 51.33 acres of mouza Nandgaon and survey nos. 15/1 and 17 of mouza Tembhni. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 199 of 1952 the lessee was respondent no. 2 while respondent no. 3 made the application for reinstatement. Otherwise the facts are similar to those in Miscellaneous Petition No. 172 of 1952. In none of these cases have the petitioners stated the extent of lands they cultivate at home. If in Miscellaneous Petition No. 174 of 1952 there is only one lease in favour of the respondents 2 to 5, they will not get protected rights over the entire area. If the respondent no. 3 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 195 of 1952 was not the lessee, his application under S. 19(2) will not succeed. These matters will have to be examined by the Revenue Officer.

33. All these petitions fail with Miscellaneous Petition No. 172 of 1952. There will be no order for costs in these cases. The security deposits will be refunded to the petitioners. One more point arises. Whether under the Act a lessee can get protection to the extent of 50 acres for every village or for the whole of Berar. Since this question was not canvassed at the Bar, we express no opinion.

34. Petitions dismissed.