Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 7(1) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) and Section 2(ia) and (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • clause A17 11 Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and Section 360 of the Crl. P.C, 1973,
  • Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11
  • Sub-sections (2)(2A) and (2E) of Section 13.11. Sub-section (2) of Section 13,
  • 1977. Rule 9-A of the Draft Rules read:The Local (Health) Authority
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration (First Amendment) Rules, 1977.
  • Amendment Act 34 of 1976, the penal provisions of this Act
  • Section 3(3) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
  • Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules of 1968,
  • provisions of Section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • 1968 Amendment Rules, and by the 1974 Amendment Rules,
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • Section 13(2) and introduced the present Rule 9-A,
  • Section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
  • Rule 9-A forms part of the present Section 13(2)
  • Act 34 of 1976 in the various provisions of Act
  • SECTION 7 PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT 1950
  • provisions of Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 1 of 1974),
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules of 1955,
  • Rule 7(3) by the 1977 (First Amendment) Rules,
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955
  • Rule in substitution of the old Rule 9(j).
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11
  • Section 13(2C); forthwith in Section 6(2);
  • added.9. Sub-section (2) of Section 13
  • Rule 9-A, the Local (Health) Authority
  • Section 13(2) as per Act 34 of 1976
  • Sections 353(1) and (4) and 363 (2).84.
  • Rule 9-A after deleting Rule 9(j)
  • Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A,
  • Section 23. Therefore, Rule 9A
  • Section 3(1) and Section 24(2);
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 13
  • provisions in Section 13(2)
  • provisions of Section 13(2)
  • rule analogous of Rule 9(j)
  • Section 13(2), which section
  • Section 11(1)(c). Clause (i), (ii)
  • provision of Section 13(2)
  • Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A
  • Amendment Act 34 of 1976
  • Clause (c) of Section 11(1),
  • Amendment) Rules, Rule 9(j)
  • Rule 9(j). While Rule 9(j)
  • Section 13 or Rule 9A
  • Section 13(2) and Rule
  • Rule 9-A of the Rules
  • Rule 9(j) of the Rules,
  • Sub-Rule (j) to Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7,
  • Section 313, Crl. P.C,
  • Section 13(2).28.
  • Sub-section 2(B)
  • Section 13(2); (c)
  • Section 11(1)(c),
  • Section 20(AA),
  • Section (1)(c), (i)
  • Rule 9(j),
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 7(1) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) and Section 2(ia) and (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • clause A17 11 Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and Section 360 of the Crl. P.C, 1973,
  • Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11
  • Sub-sections (2)(2A) and (2E) of Section 13.11. Sub-section (2) of Section 13,
  • 1977. Rule 9-A of the Draft Rules read:The Local (Health) Authority
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration (First Amendment) Rules, 1977.
  • Amendment Act 34 of 1976, the penal provisions of this Act
  • Section 3(3) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
  • Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules of 1968,
  • provisions of Section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • 1968 Amendment Rules, and by the 1974 Amendment Rules,
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • Section 13(2) and introduced the present Rule 9-A,
  • Section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
  • Rule 9-A forms part of the present Section 13(2)
  • Act 34 of 1976 in the various provisions of Act
  • SECTION 7 PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT 1950
  • provisions of Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 1 of 1974),
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules of 1955,
  • Rule 7(3) by the 1977 (First Amendment) Rules,
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955
  • Rule in substitution of the old Rule 9(j).
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11
  • Section 13(2C); forthwith in Section 6(2);
  • added.9. Sub-section (2) of Section 13
  • Rule 9-A, the Local (Health) Authority
  • Section 13(2) as per Act 34 of 1976
  • Sections 353(1) and (4) and 363 (2).84.
  • Rule 9-A after deleting Rule 9(j)
  • Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A,
  • Section 23. Therefore, Rule 9A
  • Section 3(1) and Section 24(2);
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 13
  • provisions in Section 13(2)
  • provisions of Section 13(2)
  • rule analogous of Rule 9(j)
  • Section 13(2), which section
  • Section 11(1)(c). Clause (i), (ii)
  • provision of Section 13(2)
  • Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A
  • Amendment Act 34 of 1976
  • Clause (c) of Section 11(1),
  • Amendment) Rules, Rule 9(j)
  • Rule 9(j). While Rule 9(j)
  • Section 13 or Rule 9A
  • Section 13(2) and Rule
  • Rule 9-A of the Rules
  • Rule 9(j) of the Rules,
  • Sub-Rule (j) to Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7,
  • Section 313, Crl. P.C,
  • Section 13(2).28.
  • Sub-section 2(B)
  • Section 13(2); (c)
  • Section 11(1)(c),
  • Section 20(AA),
  • Section (1)(c), (i)
  • Rule 9(j),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Ratnavel Pandian, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused (owner and licensee of Rani Stores, Sowrashtra Big Street, Kumbakonam) was tried for an offence under Section 7(1) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) and Section 2(ia) and (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. On 30 November 1977 a Food Inspector (P.W.1), in the presence of P.W.2, took a 375 gram sample of gingelly oil from the shop after following procedural formalities; a cash receipt (Ex. P2) and Form VI and VII notices (Exs. P1 and P3) were produced. The public analyst's report (Ex. P4), received by the Local (Health) Authority on 19 December 1977, showed free fatty acids at 110% over the allowable limit (the Rules permit up to 3.0% for gingelly oil). A complaint was filed in the trial Court on 22 March 1978. After trial, the Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment for two months. The accused's appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 1978) was dismissed by the Sessions Court which confirmed the conviction. The accused filed this revision petition challenging the legality and correctness of that conviction and sentence.

Relevant procedural facts relied upon in the opinion: the Local (Health) Authority served a copy of the public analyst's report (Ex. D1 / Ex. P6) with a memo of intimation (Ex. P5) on 3 April 1978 (twelve days after institution of the prosecution). The accused contended there was inordinate delay both in instituting prosecution (more than three months after receipt of Ex. P4) and in forwarding the analyst's report after institution, with resulting prejudice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the non-compliance with the statutory requirement in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, read with Rule 9-A of the Rules (to forward a copy of the public analyst's report to the person from whom the sample was taken immediately after the institution of the prosecution), is mandatory and, if violated, vitiates the trial.
  2. What is the proper legal meaning of the word "immediately" as used in Rule 9-A and, relatedly, how promptly must the Local (Health) Authority forward the analyst's report after institution of prosecution.
  3. Whether an inordinate delay in launching the prosecution (more than three months here) deprived the accused of the valuable right to challenge the analyst's report (under Section 13(2)) and thereby caused prejudice sufficient to vitiate the proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • There was a flagrant violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act and Rule 9-A of the Rules: the Local (Health) Authority failed to forward the public analyst's report to the accused in the prescribed manner "immediately" after institution of the prosecution.
  • The prosecution was launched after an inordinate and unusual delay (more than three months after receipt of the public analyst's report), thereby depriving the accused of the valuable right to challenge the analyst's report under Section 13(2) and causing grave prejudice; such delay vitiates the trial.
  • The word "immediately" in Rule 9-A should be construed strictly; numerous authorities interpreting "immediately" were relied upon to emphasise prompt and peremptory action.

Respondent / Prosecution

The opinion does not contain a full, structured account of the prosecution's oral legal arguments on the Section 13(2) / Rule 9-A point. The record does note a factual explanation: P.W.1 stated the delay in institution of prosecution was due to his availing earned leave (stated to be 30 days in cross-examination). P.W.2 did not support the prosecution. No fuller prosecutorial legal justification is detailed in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gwalior Municipality v. Krishvan Swaroop, A.I.R. 1965 M.P. 180 Delay in launching prosecution can deprive accused of right to challenge public analyst's report under Section 13(2); where right denied by laches, report given no weight. Cited as authority showing that delayed prosecution may vitiate evidentiary value of analyst's report; supports view that procedural safeguards must be respected.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, 1975 (I) FAC 186 Section 13(2) confers a valuable right to vendor to have sample analysed by Director of Central Food Laboratory; prosecution should proceed so this right is not denied. Relied on to stress importance of procedural right and to justify insistence on enabling accused to exercise the right under Section 13(2).
Babulal Ear Govindas v. State of Gujarat, 1972 FAC 18 Where accused made no application under Section 13(2), delay in prosecution does not automatically entitle accused to complain; court distinguished Ghisa Ram on facts. Examined and distinguished: used to show prior decisions sometimes refused relief where accused did not apply under Section 13(2); Court explained difference in factual matrix and that those cases concerned unamended section.
Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh v. State of Maharashtra, 1972 FAC 545 Absence of application by accused under Section 13(2) precludes complaint that right was denied by delay; mere laches in service is insufficient without evidence of prejudice. Referred to as another case where relief for delay was refused on facts; Court noted these precedents concerned unamended Section 13(2) and different factual contexts.
Ram Chandra Banerjee v. A.K. Chatterjee, 1975 (I) FAC 401 Following Babulal: accused cannot complain absent an application under Section 13(2); however, trial court's wrongful rejection of such an application can lead to quashing. Used to illustrate factual distinctions: relief could be granted where trial court improperly rejected an application under Section 13(2).
Nagar Mahapatika, Ghaziabad v. Gopal, 1974 FAC 145 Following Babulal: delay does not automatically prejudice accused. Noted among authorities taking a similar view; Court contrasted such authorities with those holding Section 13(2) mandatory post-amendment.
Ganesh Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1974 FAC 381 Delay in prosecution not necessarily fatal if accused did not seek relief under Section 13(2). Noted as part of the line of cases where non-compliance was not held to vitiate proceedings pre-amendment.
Jairam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 (II) FAC 156 Rejected contention of non-compliance due to delay where accused had not applied to Central Food Laboratory under Section 13(2). Referred as precedent where absence of accused's application was decisive; Court contrasted with present amended regime.
P.K. Moorthy v. Food Inspector, Kumbakonam Municipality, 1980 (1) FAC 40 (Division Bench) Held provisions of Section 13(2) are mandatory and non-compliance vitiates the proceedings. Relied on as a binding local precedent (Division Bench of same High Court) in support of mandatory character of Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A.
State, by Public Prosecutor v. Rangaswami, 1981 L.W. (Crl.) 207 Non-observance of mandatory provisions in Section 13(2) would vitiate entire proceedings. Referred to in support of mandatory interpretation.
Kandaswami v. The Food Inspector, Athoor, 1982 (I) FAC 322 (Bench: Natarajan & Maheswaran, JJ.) Examined whether Section 13(2) as amended is mandatory; held the requirements must be conformed to strictly and that Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A are mandatory. Cited and expressly agreed with; Court follows the Bench's analysis that Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A are complementary and mandatory.
Nabh Raj v. State (Delhi Administration), 1980 (II) FAC 191/192 (Supreme Court) Belated prosecution (wide time gap between analysis and filing) can cause harassment to accused and allow genuine offenders to escape punishment. Quoted for the proposition that excessively belated prosecution may cause harassment and may be fatal to prosecution; supports admonition against delay.
Food Inspector, Gram Panchayat, Nuzvid v. Golla Nageswara Rao, 1980 (1) FAC 355 Held Rule 9-A to be imperative/mandatory and violation fatal to prosecution. Used as supporting authority for mandatory character of Rule 9-A.
Bhaskar Krishna Shetty v. State of Maharashtra Held Sections 13(2) and 13(2A) mandatory and Rule 9A mandatory; breach entitles accused to acquittal. Referred to support view that non-compliance warrants acquittal.
Braj Biharilal v. State, 1981 (1) FAC 1 Authority cited in context of mandatory nature of provisions. Relied on as part of the authorities supporting mandatory view.
Panchami, In re, 1981 L.W. Crl 112 (M.A. Sathar Sayeed, J.) Held Section 13(2) and Rule 9A mandatory; failure vitiates prosecution. Cited as another supporting judicial view.
Public Prosecutor Hyderabad v. J. Murlidhar, 1977 (II) FAC 174 Held (repealed) Rule 9(j) mandatory. Included in the list of authorities that treated the earlier Rule 9(j) as mandatory, to support reasoning by analogy.
Bhola Nath v. State, 1977 (1) FAC 38 Held Rule 9(j) mandatory. Cited as part of the supporting authorities.
The State of Maharashtra v. Jesti Dosa, 1978 (1) FAC 143 Held Rule 9(j) mandatory. Referred to in the compilation of authorities supporting mandatory character.
S.G. Chandmane v. Tamizuddin, 1979 (1) FAO 230 Held Rule 9(j) mandatory (authority cited). Included among supporting precedents.
Beena Stores v. Food Inspector, Perumba Voor, 1980 M.L.J (Crl.) 291 (Kerala) Held Rule 9(j) mandatory. Included as supporting precedent.
State of Karnataka v. Roqueario Menezes, 1980 M.L.J (Crl.) 574 Held Rule 9(j) mandatory. Referred to for supporting view.
Satyanarayan Patwari v. Bharat Prasad Kasera, 1980 (II) FAC 120 Held Rule 9(j) mandatory. Listed among authorities favouring mandatory construction.
Ram Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 (II) FAC 222 Held Rule 9(j) mandatory. Included as supporting authority.
Vijay Singh v. State of U.P., 1981 (1) FAC 191 Held Rule 9(j) mandatory. Included among supporting authorities.
State of Maharashtra v. Janardhan Ramachandra, 1978 (1) FAC 62 Representative of High Courts holding Rule 9(j) not mandatory. Noted by the Court as part of the contrary line of authorities; Court explained reasons to follow mandatory view despite such contrary decisions.
M.B. Resaldar v. C.A. Gandhi, 1978 (II) FAC 49 Held Rule 9(j) not mandatory (Gujarat High Court view referenced). Noted as part of the contrary view; Court disagreed with that view and followed the opposite line.
M.M. Pandya v. Bhagwandas Chiranjilal, 1979 (1) FAC 104 Representative of decisions treating Rule 9(j) as not mandatory. Noted among contrary authorities.
Jai Singh v. State, 1980 (1) FAC 198 Representative of decisions treating Rule 9(j) as not mandatory. Noted among contrary authorities.
Municipal Council of Sri Ganga Nagar v. Nanak Chand, 1979 (2) FAC 45 Contrary authority on Rule 9(j). Noted among contrary authorities.
Gopal Mandal v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 590 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1807 Interpretation of "forthwith": as soon as possible; a reasonably explained delay may not violate mandatory requirement. Cited in the discussion on the meaning of "immediately" / "forthwith" and the allowance that reasonable explanation can excuse short delay.
State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammed, 1978 (1) FAC 145 (Supreme Court) Even if a Rule is recommendatory, it should be observed; directory rules should be substantially complied with by Food Inspectors. Quoted to emphasize that rules should be complied with as far as possible, even if directory; used to strengthen need for strict compliance with Rule 9-A.
Perumal and Ramanarayanan v. Kumbakonam Municipality, 1982 (II) FAC 106 Characterised "immediately" to mean that analyst's report must be sent without delay, i.e., forthwith. Cited in support of strict meaning of "immediately" under Rule 9-A.
Sebastian v. State, 1982 (II) FAC 103 "Immediately" in Rule 9-A denotes action speedily and promptly; a day or two may qualify as "immediately" depending on circumstances. Quoted for the proposition that "immediately" means prompt action and that short delays (a day or two) may sometimes be acceptable factual determinations.
Moqbool Hossain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 Definition: "institution of prosecution" means starting proceedings of a criminal nature before a court per statute procedure. Relied upon to define "institution of the prosecution" for the Act (i.e., filing of complaint by authorized person satisfies institution).
Jamuna Singh v. Bhadaishah, AIR 1964 SC 1541 Explains "institution of a case"—cognizance by court occurs on receipt of complaint or report; distinctions between institution of case and institution of prosecution. Used to draw distinction between "institution of a case" and "institution of prosecution" and help interpret Section 13(2) terminology.
Jyothish Kumar v. State, 1982 (I) FAC 206 (Calcutta) Held "institution of prosecution" under Section 13(2) means filing of complaint (not taking cognizance by Court); sending report on date of filing satisfied Section 13(2). Adopted and followed by this Court in concluding that "institution of the prosecution" means filing of complaint by authorized person.
P. Chockalingam v. Food Inspector, Trivandrum Corporation, 1981 (II) FAC 201 Section 13(2) requires information to be given after the complaint is laid by the Food Inspector before appropriate Court. Quoted in support of interpretation that forwarding must follow the filing of complaint (institution of prosecution).
Public Prosecutor v. Nalla Pydiraju, 1968 M.L.J (Crl.) 290 — 1968 (4) An.W.R. 250 Criminal jurisprudence principle: prosecution should be launched with least delay; unreasonable delay may amount to harassment of accused. Quoted to support general principle that prosecution should not be unreasonably delayed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a structured analysis that proceeded in several stages:

  1. Legislative and historical analysis: The Court traced the legislative history of Section 13(2) and Rule 9(j)/Rule 9-A. It explained that the 1976 Amendment (Act 34 of 1976) materially altered Section 13(2) by directing the public analyst's report to be delivered to the Local (Health) Authority and by providing a statutory process and time-limit (ten days) for an accused person to apply to the Court to send retained parts of the sample to the Central Food Laboratory. Rule 9-A (introduced by the 1977 Rules) replaced earlier Rule 9(j) and requires the Local (Health) Authority to forward a copy of the report in Form III "immediately after the institution of the prosecution."
  2. Functional interpretation and purpose: The Court emphasized the protective purpose of the amended Section 13(2) — to safeguard persons from whom samples are taken by enabling them promptly to challenge an adverse analyst's report (via the Central Food Laboratory certificate) and thereby avoid harassment or injustice. The Court reasoned that Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A are complementary: the statutory duty to forward the report plainly ties into the accused's right to apply to the Court within a short (ten day) window.
  3. Characterisation of mandatory vs directory: Reviewing a wide range of authorities, including a Division Bench decision of this Court (P.K. Moorthy) and the Bench in Kandaswami, the Court concluded that Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A are mandatory, not merely directory. The Court explained that the amendments and explicit language, the statutory time-limits introduced elsewhere in the Act, and the change from "as soon as may be" (draft) to "immediately" (enacted) all indicate parliamentary intent to require strict compliance.
  4. Interpretation of "immediately": The Court reviewed lexicographic definitions and authoritative judicial constructions (English and Indian) and distilled a contextual rule: "immediately" generally means without unnecessary, unreasonable or inexcusable delay; depending on context, it may require exclusion of mesne time where the statute's object requires urgency. Applying the statutory scheme, the Court concluded that Parliament used "immediately" in Rule 9-A with an intention to import a strict, peremptory sense — i.e., the Local (Health) Authority must forward the analyst's report as quickly as possible after institution of the prosecution except for unavoidable circumstances.
  5. Meaning of "institution of the prosecution": The Court, guided by Moqbool Hossain and Jamuna Singh and subsequent authority (Jyothish Kumar), held that under the Act "institution of the prosecution" means the filing of the complaint before the competent Court by the person authorized to launch prosecution (or by the purchaser referred to in Section 12), and not merely taking cognizance by the Magistrate at a later date.
  6. Application to facts: The public analyst's report was delivered to the Local (Health) Authority on 19 December 1977. The prosecution (complaint) was filed on 22 March 1978 (a gap of over three months). The copy of the report, with the memo of intimation, was forwarded and served on the accused only on 3 April 1978 (12 days after institution). The prosecution did not produce evidence explaining the long delay in institution or the delay in forwarding the report after institution. The Court therefore found non-compliance with Rule 9-A and Section 13(2) in the mandatory sense.
  7. Consequence analysis: Because the Court concluded the provisions are mandatory and that no adequate explanation for the delay was given, it held the failure to comply with the mandate vitiated the trial. On this ground, the Court allowed the revision, set aside conviction and sentence and acquitted the accused. The Court expressly noted that because it was allowing the revision on the Rule 9-A mandatory non-compliance ground, it did not need to decide the accused's separate contention regarding prejudice from the overall three-month delay in instituting prosecution.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is allowed; the conviction and sentence passed against the revision petitioner are set aside and he is acquitted. The opinion concludes that Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 9-A of the Rules are mandatory provisions and that non-compliance with them vitiates the trial.

Implications (as stated or necessarily flowing from the opinion)

  • Direct effect on parties: The accused's conviction and sentence were quashed and he was acquitted; any fine paid shall be refunded.
  • Procedural obligation reinforced: Local (Health) Authorities must forward the public analyst's report to the person from whom the sample was taken immediately after the filing of the complaint (i.e., institution of prosecution), together with the prescribed memo of intimation, so the accused can exercise the ten-day right to apply under Section 13(2).
  • Interpretation of "immediately": In the statutory context of Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A, "immediately" was construed strictly — the report must be forwarded without unnecessary, unreasonable or inexcusable delay, save only for unavoidable circumstances. The court did note that very short delays (e.g., a day or two) may be acceptable depending on circumstances, but the statutory scheme manifests an intention for expedited action.
  • Limitation on prosecution delay: The opinion admonishes that prosecution should be instituted without unreasonable delay after receipt of the public analyst's report, since inordinate delay may render retained sample parts unfit for analysis and could prejudice the accused's statutory right to challenge the analyst's report.
  • Precedential stance: The Court expressly aligned with several High Court and bench decisions that treated Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A as mandatory and adopted the stricter interpretation of the forwarding obligation and of "immediately." The opinion emphasizes that non-compliance will vitiate proceedings — this is a substantive ruling about statutory procedure in PFA Act prosecutions.

Decision Text Extracted Outcome

Result in the opinion: "Revision allowed. The conviction and sentence passed against the revision petitioner are set aside and he is acquitted. The fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to him."

Notes on Limits of this Summary

This summary is strictly derived from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments or authorities have been added beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion excerpt.

    Abdul Majeed v. State, By Food Inspector .

    Ratnavel Pandian, J.:— This rcviaion is directed by the accused C.C 77 of 1978 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thanjavur at Kumbakonam, questioning the correctness and legality of the judgment made in Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 1978 on the file of the Court of Session, West Thanjavur, confirming the conviction passed by the trial Court against him, of an offence under Section 7(1) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) and Section 2(ia) and (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months.

    2. The brief facts of the case, which led to this revision, can be summarised as follows: On 30th November 1977, at about 11-40 a.m, P.W 1, the Food Inspector of Kumbakonam Municipality, in the presence of P.W 2, took a sample of 375 grams of gingelly oil on payment of Rs. 3-75 as evidenced by Ex. P 2 (cash receipt) from the grocery shop under the name and style of Rani stores situate at Sowrashtra Big street, Kumbakonam, of which the accused was the owner as well as the licensee, after observing the procedure and formalities laid down under the Act. Exs. PI and P3 are the Form VI and Form VII notices respectively.

    3. Part of the sample of food, viz., the gingelly oil, sent to the public analyst, was found on analysis to have contained “free-fatty-acids” in excess of the maximum allowable limit to the extent of 110 per cent, though as per clause A17 11 Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), gingelly oil should not contain more than 3.0 percent of “free-fatty-acids.” Ex. P4 is the report of the Public Analyst and it was received by the Local (Health) Authority on 19th December, 1977. The complaint was filed before the trial Court on 22nd March, 1978. The Local (Health) Authority, after the institution of the prosecution against the accused, served Ex. Dl, a copy of Ex. P4, with a memo of intimation (Ex. P5.), as required by Section 13(2) of the Act on 3rd April, 1978. Exs. P6 and P7 are the acknowledgements of the accused evidencing the receipt of Exs. Dl and D5. According to P.W 1, the delay in institution of the prosecution, viz., after the expiry of more than three months, was occasioned due to his availing of his earned leave. P.W 2, who has attested Exs. PI and P2, has not supported the prosecution case.

    4. When questioned under Section 313, Crl. P.C, the petitioner denied the offence and stated that P.W 1 took the sample only from a tin which had been kept separately and signatures were obtained outside the shop. He examined three defence witnesses D.Ws 1 to 3 and filed Ex. Dl.

    5. The triai Magistrate, after rejecting the various contentions raised by the petitioner-accused convicted and sentenced him as afore-mentioned. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, the petitioner preferred Crl. App. No. 237 of 1978 before the lower appellate Court, which, for the reasons assigned in its judgment, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. Hence this revision.

    6. Mr. Sriramulu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contends that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is unsustainable as it suffers from manifest illegalities in that (1) there is a flagrant violation of law due to the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act and Rule 9A of the Rules, which impose a statutory obligation on the Local (Health) Authority to forward a copy or the report of the result of the analysis delivered to him under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 immediately after the institution of the prosecution with a memo of intimation, and (2) the inordinate and unusual delay in launching the prosecution on the expiry of more than three months from the date of receipt of the report of the Public Analyst (Ex. P4) has deprived the accused of his valuable right to challenge the report of the Analyst in the manner prescribed under Section 13(2) of the Act and therefore, that laxity on the part of the prosecution has caused grave prejudice to the petitioner and hence it should be construed as vitiating the entire trial of the case.

    7. Mr. Sriramulu, in support of his first contention, laid much stress on the construction of the word “immediately” occurring in Rule 9A of the Rules and took me through a plethora of decisions which have interpreted the said word used in various other enactments. The above contention really raises a question of importance and it has been debated with great fervour on both sides. For a proper appreciation of the points so raised, I feel that it would be necessary to examine the scope and import of Section 13(2) of the Act and R 9-A of the Rules and the effect of the noncompliance of the provisions contained therein, for which one has to traverse through the legislative history behind the present Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act and Rule 9-A of the Rules, because, in my view, it would throw considerable light in under standing the purpose for which these two provisions have been enacted.

    8. Legislative history of Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A and the scope and import of these provisions as they stand at present. Section 13(2), as it was originally enacted, has undergone a change consequent upon the Amendment Act 34 of 1976 which took effect from Ist April, 1976. By this Amendment Act, a change is introduced in Section 13(1) to the effect that the Public Analyst should deliver his report to the Local (Health) Authority instead of to the Food Inspector as was provided under the unamended section. Again major change is effected to the section, by deleting Sub-section (2) as it atood before and in lieu thereof substituting the present Sub-sections (2)(2A)(2B), (2C), (2D) and (2E). Sub-sections (3) and (4) are retained as they were, except that in the place of the words “under Sub-section (2),”, the words, “under Sub-section 2(B)” have been substituted. Sub-section (5) has been retained, but the proviso has been amended and an explanation has been newly added.

    9. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 provides a very good safeguard to the persons from whom the sample of food for analysis is taken and to the persons mentioned in Section 14A, from being subjected to any avoidable harassment, and it prescribes the procedure to be followed by those persons in challenging the report of the Public Analyst.

    10. As the Act stood before the introduction of the Amendment Act 34 of 1976, it was contemplated under Section 11(1)(c). Clause (i), (ii) and (iii), that when the Food Inspector took a sample of food for analysis, he should deliver one of the parts to the person from whom the sample was taken, send another part for analysis to the Public Analyst, and retain the third part for production in case of any legal proceeding being taken or for analysis by the Director of Central Food Laboratory under Sub-section (2) of Section 13. This unamended Section 13(2) gave a discretionary right both to the accused vendor and to the complainant, as the case might be, on payment of the fee prescribed, to make an application to the Court after the institution of the prosecution, for sending the part of the sample mentioned in Sub-clauses (i) or (ii) of Clause (c) of Section 11(1), to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate, Neither under any one of the original sections of the Act, nor under any one of the Rules made thereunder, there was any statutory obligation on the part of the Food Inspector or any of the authorities under the Act to forward to the accused vendor or serve on him, a copy of the report of the analysis. Only after the amendment, as per Section (1)(c), (i) and (iii), the Food Inspector is expected to send one of the parts for analysis to the Public Analyst under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority and the other two remaining parts directly to the Local (Health) Authority for purposes of Sub-sections (2)(2A) and (2E) of Section 13.

    11. Sub-section (2) of Section 13, as it stands now, imposes a statu tory duty on the Local (Health) Authority to forward a copy of the report of the analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken and to the person mentioned in Section 14A, in the manner prescribed, after the in stitution of the prosecution, with a memo of intimation informing the person or persons concerned that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court before which the prosecution is instituted, within a period of ten doys from the date of the receipt of the copy of the report, to get the part or parts of the sample kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. It follows that in case the accused does not prefer to challenge the report of the Public Analyst forwarded to him by the Public Health Authority to whom it is delivered under Rule 7(3), by availing of this valuable right conferred on him under this amended provision, the report of the Public Analyst becomes final and it can be used as conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein in any pro ceedings under this Act or under Sections 272 to 276 of the I.P.C

    12. The report of the Public Analyst in the prescribed Form as required by the Act is a condition precedent for launching a prosecution, and for a successful prosecution, the forwarding of a copy of the report of the analysis accompanied by a memo of intimation to the accused person in the prescribed manner as laid down in the Act is a sine qua non, because in terms of Section 13(2), the accused can take advantage of this provision only after the prosecution is launched against him and after his receipt of the report of the analyst.

    13. Now, let us examine the present Rule 9-A of the Rules. Under the original Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules of 1955, there was no-rule analogous to the present Rule 9-A or any other rule, casting a duty on the Food Inspector or any other authority under the Act to send a copy of the report received by him from the analyst, to the accused vendor. The accused vendor was given only an option of availing himself of the un-amended Section 13(2) of the Act and making an application after the institution of the prosecution requesting the Court to send the part of the sample delivered to the accused himself, or retained by the Food Inspector, for production in Court as mentioned in Sub-Clause (i) or (iii) of Section 11(1)(c), as it stood then, to the Central Food Laboratory, in case the accused vendor intended to challenge the result of the analysis, after coming to know of the report obviously after receipt of the summons from the Court. For the first time, new Sub-Rule (j) to Rule 9 was inserted by the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules of 1968, which came into force from 8th July, 1968. This rule then underwent some change by the subsequent Amendment Rules of 1974, which came into force, as far as this rule is concerned with effect from 23rd May, 1974. Once again this rule has been amended and the present Rule 9-A which has come for interpretation in the present case, has been introduced by the Prevention of Food Adulteration (First Amendment) Rules, 1977. In ortler to have a better understanding of this rule, I would like to give the following comparative table.

    It shall be the duty of the Food Inspector— Rule 9(j) introduced by the Amendment Rules of 1968 (deleted in 1974) (j) to send by hand or registered post, a copy of the report received in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken, in case it is found to be not conforming to the Act or rules made thereunder, as soon as the case is filed in the Court. It shall be the duty of the Food Inspector— Rule 9(j) as it stood after the amendment by the 1974 Amendment Rules (deleted in 1977) (j) to send by registered post a copy of the report received in Form III from the public analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report. However, in case the sample conforms to the provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder, then the person may be informed of the same and report need not be sent. 9-A Local (Health) Authority to send report to the person concerned. Rule 9-A as it now stands after the 1977 First Amendment Rules. The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after the institution of prosecution forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis in Form III delivered to him under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7, by registered post or by hand, as may be appropriate, to the person from whom the sample of the article was taken by the Food Inspector, and simultaneously also to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A of the Act: Provided that where the sample conforms to the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder and no prosecution is intended under Sub-section (2), or no action is intended under Sub-section (2E) of Section 13 of the Act, the Local (Health) Authority shall intimate the result to the vendor from whom the sample has been taken and also the person, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14A of the Act, within 10 days from the receipt of the report from the Public Analyst.

    14. From the above table, it is clear that before the present Rule 9A was intro-duced by the 1977 (First Amendment) Rules, Rule 9(j) as it stood from 1968 till 1974 required the Food Inspector to send a copy of the report of the analyst to the accused person either by hand or by registered post as soon as the case against the accused person was filed.

    15. As per the Rule as amended in 1974, which was in force between 23rd May, 1974, the date from which the 1974 amendment took effect, so far as this Rule was concerned, and 4th January, 1977, the date from which the 1977 First Amendment Rules came into force, the Food Inspector was required to send a copy of the report of the analyst to the accused person by registered post within ten days of the receipt of the said report by him.

    16. The amendment of Rule 9(j) of the Rules, as introduced by the 1968 Amendment Rules, and by the 1974 Amendment Rules, was presumably brought about with the intention of affording an opportunity to the accused-vendor to have a part of the sample mentioned in Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, examined by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, if the accused so desired, at the earliest point of time, so that the article of food might not become unfit for analysis by the Central Food Laboratory (by their being decomposed) due to any intervening causes, and also with the intention of avoiding any prejudice that might be caused to or complained of by the accused vendor due to any possible delay in launching the prosecution. In Rule 9(j) both as it stood in the year 1968 when it was for the first time enacted and in 1974 when it was amended, there was some anomaly. As per the original Rule 9(j) the Food Inspector was required to send the copy of the report of the analyst to the accused-vendor as soon as the case was filed. In other words, the Food Inspector was not required to furnish any copy of the report to the accused before the case was filed. In a given case, if the Food Inspector had filed the case after a long delay and then sent the copy either by hand or by registered post as soon as the case was filed, he would be acting in strict compliance with the rule, but at the same time defeating the object of the Rule by causing a grave prejudice to the accused in availing himself of Section 13(2) of the Act. Presumably, the Parliament, realising this anomaly, had amended Rule 9(j) in 1974. Even after the 1974 amendment, the Rule was not without any anomaly. After the 1974 amendment, as per the Rule, the Food Inspector was, of course, required to send the report of the analyst to the accused person within ten days of the receipt of the said report As per the unamended Section 13(2), with which Rule 9(j) was to be read, an option was given to the accused vendor to take out an application only after the institution of the prosecution in a Court. There was a great difficulty facing the accused. Supposing in a given case the Food Inspector had furnished a copy of the report to the accused person within. the prescribed period of ten days from the date of receipt of the report by him, but delayed in launching the prosecution for a considerable length of time, the accused would not be in a position to avail of Section 13(2) at the earliest point of time, because even though he had got a copy of the report with him, he could not take out an application, because the case would not have been instituted in the Court. Even the institution of the case would be made known to him only when he received the summons from the Court. Assuming that the person receiving the copy of the report approached the Court having jurisdiction over the matter, that Court would not entertain such an application from the said person, because that Court would not be seized of the matter. Thus, the Food Inspector was here again able to defend his action, contending that he had complied with the provisions of the Act, but at the same time defeating the object of Section 13(2) by a delayed institution of the prosecution.

    17. There was yet another anomaly with reference to Rule 9(j) conse quent upon the amendment of Section 13(2) as per Act 34 of 1976 which came into force with effect from 1st April, 1976. While, as per Section 13(2) as amended in 1976, the obligation was cast on the Local (Health) Authority to forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis to the accused person, Rule 7(3) as it stood then directed the Public Analyst to send two copies of his report to the Food Inspector who, as per Rule 9(j). was required to serve the copy on the accused as per the rules prescibed from time to time. This anomaly existed, because when the Act was amended with effect from 1st April, 1976 by Act 34 of 1976, no corresponding amendment was brought about in the rule. This continued till 4th January, 1977, on which date the new Rules 9-A came into force. The Parliament thought of deleting the old Rule 9(j) and introducing the new Rule 9-A, obviously on account of the difficulties felt and anomalies experienced by the persons concerned.

    18. As per the present Rule 9-A, the Local (Health) Authority (but not the Food Inspector) to whom the Public Analyst has to deliver the report, has a statutory obligation to forward a copy of the report of the result of the analysis delivered to him by the analyst under the amended Rule 7(3),. to the person from whom the sample has been taken by registered post or by hand, immediately after the institution of the prosecution.

    19. I feel that it is necessary to make further examination of this Rule 9-A so that we can ascertain the real purpose for which the parliament has enacted this Rule in substitution of the old Rule 9(j). The Ministry of Health and Family Planning (Department of Health, Government of India published a notification in the Gazette, dated 24th June, 1976 (G.S.R 420-E) publishing the rules proposed to be introduced or substituted in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 as contemplated in Section 23(1) of the Act, thereby giving information to all persons likely to be affected and calling, for objections and suggestions, if any. It was only after considering the objections and suggestions re ceived from the public and after consulting the-Central Committee for Food Standards constituted under Section 3 of the Act, that the present Rule 9-A has been introduced in the place of Old Rule 9(j), and it has come into force from 4th January, 1977. Rule 9-A of the Draft Rules read:

    ‘The Local (Health) Authority shall, at soon as may be after the institution of the prosecution, forward……”

    20. While Rule 9-A as ultimately enacted reads:

    “The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after the insti tution of the prosecution forward a copy……”.

    21. Though no proviso was added to the draft Rule 9-A, there is a proviso to Rule 9-A as enacted. A cursory glance at the draft Rule 9-A and the present Rule 9-A would clealy indicate that the framers of the Rules, on a careful examination of the meaning of the terms “as soon as may be” and “immediately” have purposely used the latter expression in the place of the former, obviously with the object of compelling the authorities to accelerate the forwarding of Form III without any lapse of time after the institution of the prosecution.

    22. Whether Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A are mandatory or directory: So far as Section 13(2) is concerned, almost all the High Courts, before whom the question whether Section 13(2) is mandatory or not came up for consideration, have held that it is mandatory and not merely directory. Suffice it to say that this Court, in three reported judgments has consistently held that Section 13(2) is mandatory and non-compliance of Section 13(2) vitiates the trial.

    23. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gwalior Municipality v. Kris/van Swaroop, A.I.R 1965 M.P 180, pointed out that where there was delay in launching the prosecution, it deprived the accused of the valuable right to challenge the report of the analyst in the manner prescribed by Section 13(2) of the Act (unamended section) and when this right was denied for no fault of his, but wholly due to the inordinate laches of the prosecution, no weight could be given to the report of the Public Analyst.

    24. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Mam 1975 (I) FAC 186, while examining the import of Section 13(2) as it stood then, observed as follows:—

    “It appears to us that when a valuable right is conferred by Section 13(2) of the Act on the vendor to have the sample given to him, analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, it is to be expected that the prosecution will proceed in such a manner that that right will not be denied to him. The right is a valuable one, because the certificate of the Director supersedes the certificate of the Public Analyst and is treated as conclusive evidence of its contents. Obviously, the right has been given to the vendor in order that, for his satisfaction and proper defence, he should be able to have sample kept in his custody analysed by a greater expert whose certificate is to be accepted by Court as conclusive evidence”.

    25. The judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kishan Swaroop's case (supra) has also been referred in this decision by the Supreme Court.

    26. Basing on the dictum laid down in Ghisa Ram's case 1975 (I) FAC 186, a contention was raised before the Supreme Court in Babulal Ear Govindas v. State of Gujarat 1972 FAC 18, that the appellant therein was not afforded an opportunity to send a sample of the milk left with him to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for certificate, in as much as the complaint itself was launched after a lapse of over four months from the date of the taking of the sample and therefore, in those circumstances the milk could not have been preserved for the appellant to have taken the opportunity afforded to him by Sub-section (2) of Section 13 by sending it to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, for a certificate. The Supreme Court distinguished the decision in Ghisa Rant's case (supra) stating that the decision in that case had no application to the facts in Babulal's case 1972 FAC 18, since in Ghisa Ram's case (supra) the sample of the vendor had been sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory on his application; but the Director had reported that the sample had become highly decomposed and could not be analysed, whilst in Babulal's case 1972 FAC 18, no application had been taken before the Court by the accused vender availing Section 13(2). Having regard to the facts in that case (Babulal's Case) the Supreme Court observed thus:

    “There is also, in our view, no justification for holding that the accused had no opportunity for sending the sample in his custody to-the Director, Central Food Laboratory, under Section 13(2), because: he made no application to the Court for sending it. It does not avail him at this stage to say that over four months had elapsed from the time the samples were taken to the time when the complaint was filed and consequently the sample had deteriorated and could not be analysed.”

    27. In yet another case, viz., Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh v. State Of Maharashtra 1972 FAC 545, the Supreme Court once again, distinguished the decision in Ghisa Ram's Case 1975 (I) FAC 186, and, having regard to the facts before them, followed the ruling in Babulal's case 1972 FAC 18, and held that in the absence of any application by the accused under Section 13(2) for getting the sample analysed by the Director of Central Food Laboratory, the accused could not complain that he was deprived of the right to have the sample analysed by the Director and that the mere delay and laches on the part of the complainant in getting the summons served on the accused, was not, in the absence of evidence to show that the sample had deteriorated when the summons was served, sufficient to hold that the accused was prejudiced by reason of deprivation of the right under Section 13(2).

    28. The Calcutta High Court in Ram Chandra Banerjee v. A.K Chatterjee, 1975 (I) FAC 401 following the decision in Babulal's case 1972 FAC 18, observed that the accused could not have any legitimate grievance in the ab-sence of any application by him under Section 13(2); however, it quashed the proceedings in that casc on the ground that the trial Court had wrongly rejected the application filed by the accused by availing of Section 13 (2) and thereby deprived him of the opportunity afforded to him under that provision.

    29. The Allahabad High Court in Nagar Mahapatika, Ghazhiabad v. Gopal 1974 FAC 145, and in Ganesh Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1974 FAC 381, following the dictum laid down in Babulal's case (supra), held that the plea that he had been prejudiced by a delayed prosecution was not open to the accused vendor.

    30. A single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jairam v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1977(II) FAC 156, following the decision in Babulal's case (supra) rejected the contention raised on behalf of the accused that there was non-compliance of Section 13(2) due to the inordinate delay in filing the complaint, on the ground that the petitioner had not even made an application to the Court to send the sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory.

    31. At the outset, I would like to state that all the decisions which I have referred to above are with reference to Section 13(2) of the Act, as it stood before that Section was amended by Act 34 of 1976. Further, in the above case viz, in Babula's Case 1972 FAC 18, and in Ajit Prasad's case 1972 FAC 545 the question that arose for determination was whether the accused vendor was justified in complaining that because of the inordinate delay occasioned in launching the prosecution, the accused had been deprived of the opportunity of availing of the valuable right vested in him under the unamended Section 13(2), and it was having regard to the facts and circumstances of those cases and the limited question with regard to the delay in launching the prosecution raised on behalf of the accused in those cases, the Supreme Court had held so. Further the facts in the above two cases show that the dates of the offences therein were before Rule 9(j), was introduced for the first time in 1968. The prosecutions were launched by a delay of four months in Babula's case, 1972 FAC 18, and by a delay of about two months in Ajir Prasad's Case, 1972 FAC 545. The question whether the unamended Section 13(2) was mandatory or directory did not arise in those cases, because as per the said section, the accused vendor or the complainant, as the case may be, was given an option to make an application to have the part of the article of food analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory and a certificate got from him. In terms of the above said provision, no time limit was fixed for taking out an application, even though the Director of the Central Food Laboratory was given only one month's time to send his report from the date of receipt of the sample. It is to be noted that unlike the present provision under Section 13(2), no duty was cast upon the Food Inspector to serve a copy of the report of the Analyst on the accused vendor enabling him, if he so desired, to challenge the report of the Public Analyst by taking out an application before the trial Court for a certificate from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Rule 9(j) in and by which the Food Inspector was required to serve a copy of the report of the analyst on the accused as soon as the case was filed, came into force only on 8th July, 1978. Therefore, there was no necessity for the Courts to go into the question as to whether Section 13(2) as it stood before amendment was mandatory or directory.

    32. The Supreme Court, by its observation that in the absence of any evidence that the accused had availed of Section 13(2) as it then stood by taking out an application the accused could not make any legitimate grievance that the delayed prosecution had occasioned prejudice resulting in grave injustice to him, cannot be said to have laid down that the Food Inspector could launch the prosecution at his pleasure even after (sic.) an unreasonable and unexplained delay.

    33. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of Natarajan and Maheswaran, JJ., in Kandaswami v. The Food Inspector, Athoor, 1982(I) FAC 322, wherein the Bench, while examining a question under reference whether there was vio lation of Section 13(2) ai amended, causing prejudice to the accused in case the copy of the report of the Public Analyst had been served on the accused person prior to the institution of the prosecution, referred to the decision in Babulal's case, 1982 FAC 18, and five other decisions following it, viz, Jai Singh v. State 1976 (I) FAC 207, Chandrika Prasad v. State of Assam 1976 (I) FAC 27, Jairam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 (II) FAC 156, The State Of Maharashtra… v. Hariram Hambarram…., 1979 (I) FAC 336, and Gopi Chand v. State 1980 (II) FAC 375 and held that:—

    “in all those cases the Courts did not go into the question whether Section 13(2) of the Act was mandatory or not, but instead rejected the contention of the accused on the ground that they had not made applications at any time to the trial Court for having the sample sent to the Central Food Laboratory and that the plea of non-conformity with the provision of Section 13(2) had been raised for the first time before the High Court in the revision proceedings”, and “hence these decisions are distinguishable on facts and they cannot be taken to mean that in these decisions a view has been taken that Section 13(2) was not mandatory in character, but was only directory.”

    34. In a recent decision, viz., Nebh Raj v. State (Delhi Administra tion), 1980 (II) FAC 191, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the accused and acquitted him only on the ground that there was a wide time gap from the date of the analysis in the year 1970 until the filing of the case in 1972. While doing so, their Lordships observed thus:—

    “To launch a prosecution at such belated stage may result in causing harassment to the accused in some cases and may also result in genuine offenders escaping punishment.”

    35. Now the present position is entirely different from what it had been before certain Section of the Act were amended by Act 34 of 1976. For a proper appreciation of the distinction between the unamended Section 13(2) and the amended Section 13(2), where there is a material change, I may extract below a comparative table:—

    Section 13(1) & (2), as they stood before the Amendment. Section 13(1) & (2) as they stand at present after the amendment. 13. (1) The public analyst shall deliver, in such form as may be prescribed, a report to the Food Inspector of the result of the analysis of any article of food sub-mitted to him for analysis. 13. (1) The public analyst shall deliver in such form as may be prescribed, areport to the Local (Health) Authority of the result of the analysis of any article of food submitted to him for analysis. 13. (2) After the institution of a prosecution under this Act the accused vendor or the complainant may, on payment of the prescribed fee, make an application to the Court for sending the part of the sample mentioned in Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for a certificate; and on receipt of the application the Court shall first ascertain that the mark and seal or fastening as provided in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 are in tact and may then despatch the part of the sample under its own seal to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory who shall there-upon, send a certificate to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the sample, specifying the result of his analysis. 13. (2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under Sub-Section (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14A, forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons, that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central food Laboratory. (2-A) ………… (2-B) ………… (2-C) ………… (2-D) ………… (2-E) …………

    36. Thus, as per the present Section 13(2), there is a statutory duty cast on the Local (Health) Authority, to whom the Public Analyst has to send four copies of his report, to forward one of the copies to the accused person and to the person mentioned in Section 14A in the manner prescribed, with a memo of intimation informing that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the report to get the part of the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. Consequent upon this. Rule 9A is introduced in the place of Rule 9(j). While Rule 9(j) required the Food Inspector to furnish a copy of the report within ten days from the date of receipt of the report from the analyst, Rule 9A as pointed out earlier, requires the Local (Health) Authority to forward a copy of the report of the analyst, immediately after the institution of the prosecution. Having regard to the rigour of the language used in the present Section 13(2) and Rule 9A various Courts have now laid down that Section 13(2) is mandatory. A Division Bench of this Court consisting; of Paul and Maheswaran, JJ., in P.K Moorthy…Accused- v. Food Inspector, Kumbakonam Municipality…Complainant-. 1980 (1) FAC 40, has held that the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act are mandatory and the non-compliance of the said provisions, would vitiate the entire proceedings. Maheswaran, J., in State, by Public Prosecutor v. Rangaswami, 1981 L.W (Crl.) 207. following the abovesaid Bench decision, has held that the non-observance of the mandatory provisions in Section 13(2) would vitiate the entire proceedings.

    37. Maheswaran, J., in Kandaswami v. Food Inspector, Athoor, 1981 (I) FAC 322, while referring the case before a Bench disagreed with the view taken by Paul, J. in Balu v. State of Tamil Nadu Judgement dated 18th June, 1979 Crl. R.C No. 70 of 1978, in the following terms:—

    “With great respect, I am not in agreement with the observation of Paul, J., that ‘the fact that the result of the analysis was served on the revision petitioner ten days before the prosecution was launched, would not amount to non-compliance with Section 13 or Rule 9A’ I am further of the view that the said observation is against the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in P.K Moorths” case, 1980 (I) FAC 40.

    38. On the said reference, the Bench (consisting of Natarajan and Maheswaran, JJ.) examined the question whether Section 13(2) is mandatory or merely directory, after referring to the unamended and amended provisions of Section 13(2) and held thus:

    “From a reading of the Section before the amendment as well as after the amendment, it may be seen that originally a duty was not cast on the Local (Health) Authority to send a copy of the report of the result of the lanalysis to the person from whom the sample was taken. No time-limit was also prescribed within which the person, from whom the sample was taken, could apply to the court for one of the unutilised samples being sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for his opinion in order to see whether the report sent by the Public Analyst was correct or not. Consequently, a person affected by the report of the Public Analyst could apply to the Court even several months after the institution of the prosecution for a sample being sent to the Director of the Central Fcod Laboratory for obtaining his report. The laxity of the provisions gave room for certain unwanted consequences. Firstly an accused person could delay the trial of the case by applying belatedly for a sample being sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Since no time-limit had been prescribed for the sample being sent, when an application was made in that behalf by an accused person, the court had no alternative but to send the sample to the Central Food Laboratory and adjourn the trial of the case till the report was received. Another concommitant was that by reason of delay the sample preserved was likely to get delayed and be unfit for the Director of the Central Food Laboratory to examine it and give his report. In such a situation, the accused was deprived of a valuable opportunity available to him under law for contradicting the report of the Public Analyst by obtaining a different report from the Central Food Laboratory. It is only to overcome these situations, the Legislature must have amended the Section and enacted it in its present form. Under the presant provision, a duty has been cast under Sub-section (2) on the Local (Health) Authority to send a copy of the result of the analysis to (i) the person from whom the sample of the article of food was take??? and (ii) the person, if any whose name address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A informing him that he should make an application, if he so desired, to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the aforesaid copy, to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local Health Authority, analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. In such circumstances object if the underlying amendment is to be fully ensured it goes without saying, that the requirement of Section 13(2) must be conformed to the letter of the law.”

    39. Then after considering the import of Rule 9A in the background of various authoritative judicial pronouncements, the Bench has finally expressed the view in the following terms:

    “In all these cases it has been held that the terms of Section 13(2) and Rule 9A are mandatory in character and a contravention or non-observance of the provisions had prejudicially affected the interests of the accused and as such, the convictions ought not to have been awarded in such cases.”

    40. A close reading of the judgment would spell out that the Bench is in agreement with the view expressed in the other cases as regards the mandatory nature of Section 13(2) and Rule 9A.

    41. In yet another portion of the judgment, it is pointed out thus:—

    “Thus, a review of judicial authority also leaves no room for doubt that the preponderance of opinion is in favour of holding that Section 13(2) is mandatory in its terms.”

    42. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by the Bench in the above case.

    43. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Food Inspector, Gram Panchayat, Nazwid v. Golla Nakeswara Rao 1980 (1) FAC 355, while examining the scope of R. 9A, has held that R. 9A is imperative and mandatory in character and violation or infraction thereof should be fatal to the prosecution. The Bombay High Court, in Bhaskar Krishna Shetty v. The State of Maharashtra, has ruled that the provisions under Section 13(2) and 13 (2A) are mandatory and the provision under Rule 9A also must be held to be mandatory and not directory, and that any breach of these provisions would entitle the accused to get an acquittal. See also Braj Biharilal v. State 1981 (1) FAC 1. M.A Sathar Sayeed, J., in Panchami, In re 1981 L.W Crl 112, has held that Section 13(2) and Rule 9A are mandatory and that failure to follow the section and the rule vitiates the prosecution.

    44. It would be appropriate to note here that som??? the High Courts have held that even the repealed Rule 9(j) was mandatory: Vide: Public Prosecutor Hyderabad v. J. Murlidhar, 1977 (II) FAC 174,. Bhola Nath v. State 1977 (1) FAC 38, The State Of Maharashtra v. Jesti Dosa* 1978 (1) FAC 143. S.G Chandmane v. Tamizuddin, 1979 (1) FAO 230, Beena Stores v. Food Inspector, Perumba Voor, 1980 M.L.J Crl. 291. (Kerala), P.K Moorthy's Case, (Division Bench of this Court), 1980 (1) FAC 40 State of Karnataka v. Ruqoario Menezes, 1980 M.L.J Crl. 574. (Karnataka), Satyanarayan Patwari v. Bharat Prasad Kasera, 1980 (II) FAC 120, Ram Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 (II) FAC 222 and Vijai Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1981 (1) FAC 191. In P.K Moorthi's Case a Division Bench of this Court, disagreed with the view taken by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in MB. Risaldar v. C.A Gandhi, 1978 (II) FAC 49, that Rule 9(j) cannot be said to be mandatory despite the use of the word “shall” in it, and observed thus:—

    “We are, however, unable to subscribe to that view”.

    45. In other words, the Bench in P.K Moorthy's case has in effect held that Rule 9(j) is mandatory.

    46. I feel that the discussion on this aspect will not be complete without fairly mentioning here that some of the High Courts have taken a contrary view holding that Rule 9(j) is not mandatory: Vide State of Maharashtra v. Janardhan Ramachandra, 1978 (1) FAC 62. M.B Resaldar v. C.A Gandhi 1978 (II) FAC 49. M.M Pandya v. Bhagwandas Chiranjilal, 1979 (1) FAC 104, Jai Singh v. State 1980 (1) FAC 198. Municipal Council of Sri Ganga Nagar v. Nanak Chand, 1979 (2) FAC 45. (Rajasthan). Mahipal v. State of Haryana, 1980 (II) FAC 30. Gopi Chand v. State, 1980 (II) FAC 375. and Kashmirilal v. State of Haryana, 1981 (2) FAC 167. (F.B) of Punjab and Haryana High Court. I think it is not necessary for me to swell this judgment by citing all the decisions of the various High Courts for and against the view that Rule 9(j) is mandatory.

    47. When some of the High Courts inclusive of a Division Bench of this Court have taken a view that Rule 9(j) as it stood then is mandatory, with which view I respectfully agtee and which view I am bound to follow, a fortiorari Rule 9-A should be held to be mandatory for the reasons to be presently stated.

    48. It would be relevant at this stage to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammed, 1978 (1) FAC 145, wherein the Lordships, while examining their nature of certain provisions contained in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules, have held that even if a rule is a recommendatory, it should be observed by the Food Inspector concerned. The observations of their Lordships read thus:

    “…Whether the Rule is recommendatory or mandatory it should be observed by the Food Inspector concerned…They (Food Inspectors) must remember that even directory Rules are meant to be observed and substantially complied with. A Food Inspector committing a breach of the Rule may be departmentally answerable to the higher authorities. He should, therefore, always be cautious in complying, with the Rules as far as possible…………”

    49. In yet another place in the same judgment, it has been observed as follows:

    “In our considered judgment, the Rule (rule 22) is directory and not mandatory. But we must hasten to reiterate what we have said: above that, even so, Food Inspectors should take care to see that they comply with the Rule as far as possible.”

    50. The quintessence of the above judgment is that even rules which are recommendatory in nature should be strictly complied with as far as possible, notwithstanding the fact that the non-observance of those rules may not vitiate the proceedings.

    51. Though Rule 9(j) was to be read along with Section 13(2), the right given to the accused person under Rule 9(j) was independent of the provisions of Section 13(2) till it was amended, which section stood inde-pendent of any rule analogous of Rule 9(j) from 1954 to 1968 in which year, for the first time, the said rule was introduced. The present Rule 9-A forms part of the present Section 13(2) since there is an in-built provision in the amended section to the effect that the copy of the report of the Analyst should be forwarded “in such manner as may be prescribed” in other words, the copy of the analyst's report should be for warded in the manner that is prescribed in any other specific provision of the Act itself or in any Rule to be framed under the Rule-making power given under Section 23. Therefore, Rule 9A has necessarily to be read along with the present Section 13(2), which section de hors that Rule does not become complete by itself, conveying the meaning which the Parliament intended to convey and satisfying the purpose for which it was amended. For the above reasons, this R. 9A has to be treated as part of the statute having statutory force and both Section 13(2) and Rule 9A should be treated as complementary to each other and have therefore, to be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. In this connection, I may add that even a plain reading of the section and the Rule clearly shows that there is a statutory duty on the Public (Health) Authority to forward a copy of the Analyst's report with a memo of intimation to the accused person, thereby conferring a right of liberty to challenge the report of the Public Analyst, if he so desires. For the discussions and reasons mentioned above, I hold that the present Section 13(2) and the newly substituted Rule 9A are mandatory and not directory and that the non-compliance of these provisions would vitiate the trial and entitled the accused person to an acquittal.

    52. Meaning of the word “immediately” occurring in Rule 9A:— The present Section 13(2), when read in conjunction with Rule 9A, means, that the Local (Health) Authority should forward a copy of the report of the analyst delivered to him, to the accused person immediately after the institution of the prosecution with the memo of intimation informing him that if he desired to challenge the report of the result of the analysis, he may file an application before the Court (before which the prosecution is launched) within ten days from the date of receipt of the report sent to him. In case the accused makes such an application, the Court has no other option but to require the Local (Health) Authority to forward the part of the sample for further analysis to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory and as per Section 13(2D), the Court shall not continue with the proceedings of that case until the receipt of the certificate from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. The important question that now arises for my consideration is, what is the meaning to be given to the word “immediately”. At the risk of repetition, I wish to state that the Parliament first of all thought of amending Rule 9(j) by requiring the Food Inspector to furnish a copy of the analyst's report within ten days of the receipt of the report by him, instead of furnishing the copy of the report as soon as the case was filed, which was the expression used before 1974 Now, by the insertion of Rule 9-A after deleting Rule 9(j) the Parliament has in its wisdom provided that the copy of the report of the analyst should be forwarded to the accused person immediately after the institution of the prosecution, though the draft rule read “as soon as may be”. By the Amendment Act 34 of 1976, the penal provisions of this Act are made more severe, enhancing the periods of the substantive sentence of imprisonment as well as fine, at the same time providing an absolute minimum sentence of imprisonment as well as fine. In fact, by Section 20(AA), the application of the benevolent provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and Section 360 of the Crl. P.C, 1973, is completely barred unless the accused person is under 18 years of age. See Pyarali K. Tejani v. M.R Dange, 1974 FAC 74. Keeping the severity of the sentence prescribed under the present penal provisions of the Act in mind and with the avowed object of fairly safeguarding the right of liberty of the citizen, the Parliament has amended Section 13(2) and introduced the present Rule 9-A, by imposing several duties on the Local (Health) Authority so that the accused person can have the fullest opportunity of meeting his case against him in all respects. In the various provisions of the Act, the following phrases are used—in some places in the strict sense of the term and in some others in a liberal sense, depending upon the context in which they are used.

    53. So far as this Act is concerned, the expression “as soon as” is used in Section 3(1) and Section 24(2); “as soon as possible” in Sections 11(4) and 24(3); “as soon as practicable” in Section 13(2C); “forthwith” in Section 6(2); “then and there” in Section 11(1)(a) and (b); “immediately” in Rule 9-A of the Rules; “immediately before” in Section 25(1) and 25(2); “immediately succeeding working day” in Section 11(3) and “immediately, not later than the succeeding working day” in Rule 17(a). The framers of the Act have used the above said various expressions depending, upon the context and in relation to the cause and effect, place or space or time, both in the strict sense and with an enlarged relative meaning. However, the Parliament has thought of using the adverbial form “immediately” in Rule 9-A with a specific purpose.

    54. Now, let us see the meaning of the term “immediately” as lexicographically defined and interpreted by various judicial pronouncements.

    55. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, III Edition, Vol. I, the word “immediately” is defined at page 960 as follows:

    “1. In an immediate way; by direct agency; directly.

    2. With no person, thing, or distance intervening in time, space, order, or succession, closely, proximately; directly.

    3. Without any delay; instantly…………”.

    56. The Lexicon Webster Dictionary, Encyclopaedic Edition, Vol. I, gives the-meaning of the word “immediate” at page 478 as follows:

    “Occurring or done without separation by an interval of space or time, as, in the immediate area, in immediate reaction; instant; related to the present time; as the immediate future; in closest relation; as, the immediate numbers of the family. Acting or occurring without a medium, or without an intervening cause, means, or condition, as the immediate source of the problem; direct”.

    57. The word ‘immediately’ is described therein thus:

    “Without delay; instantly; at once; forthwith, without the inter vention of any space, object, or medium; directly………”.

    58. In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 675, the word ‘immediate ly’ has been described as follows:

    “Without interval of time, without delay, straightway or without any delay or lapse of time………The words ‘immediately’ and ‘forthwith’ have generally the same meaning. They are stronger than the ex pression ‘within a reasonable time’ and imply prompt, vigorous action without any delay………”.

    59. Baldwin's Century Edition Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1928 Edition, explains the meaning of the word “immediately” at page 519 as follows:

    “The words ‘forthwith’ and ‘immediately’ have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression ‘within a reasonable time’, and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay, and whether there hat been such action is a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case………”.

    60. The Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt, 1959 Edition Vol. 2, gives the definition of the word ‘immediately’ at page 937 thus:

    “Immediately, in a statute, usually means within a reasonable time.”

    61. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1972 Edition, defines the words ‘immediate’ and immediately as follows at page 652;

    “immediate…adj. With nothing between: not acting by second causes; direct; present; without delay. adv. immediately”

    62. In Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fourteenth Edition, it is defined at page 493 as follows:

    “immediately, in a statute, means within a reasonable time………”

    63. Mitra's Legal and Commercial Dictionary, Second Edition, (1976) gives the following meaning to the words

    ”Immediately. A provision to the effect that a thing must be done ‘immediately’ means that it must be done as soon as possible in the circumstances, the nature of the act to be done being taken into account…… The word ‘immediately’ is stronger than the expression ‘within a reasonable time’, and imply prompt, vigorous action, with out any delay………The word ‘immediately’ should not be construed so as to require doing something which is impossible……”

    64. Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 37, gives the meaning of the words ‘immediately’ and ‘forthwith’ thus at page 103:

    “There appears to be no material difference between the terms ‘immediately’ and ‘forthwith’. A provision to the effect that a thing must be done ‘forthwith’ or ‘immediately’ means that it must be done as soon as possible in the circumstances, the nature of the act to be done being taken into account.

    65. See also Words and Phrases, Legally Defined by John B. Saunders II Edition, Vol. III, page 4, and Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Vol. 20 page 150. At page 156 of that book, the following passage is found:

    “The word ‘immediately’ when used in a statute, is not synonim-ous with ‘then and there’, but means such convenient time as is reasonably necessary for doing the thing. Taken alone, it excludes all means times. Legal lexiographers define it as being synonimous with ‘within 24 hours’, 1 Bouv. Law Dictionary, 682; 1 Abb. Law Dictionary 581.”

    66. The Corpus Juris Secondum (1944 Edition), Volume XLII, interprets the word at page 390 as follows:

    “I??? Gtneral: The word is an adverb, or the adverbial from, of ‘immediate’, defined above, and, like that word, is an elastic and relative term, admitting of much variety of definition; and, at indicated in the following sub-divisions, it may be used with relation to cause and effect, place or space, and time. Like similar absolute expressions, it is used with less strictness than the literal meaning requires, and is much subject to its context or to its grammatical and other connections, and has been defined generally as having nothing intervening either as to place, time, or action.

    Relating to time: In General. Where it is perhaps most frequently used with reference to time, it has been said that there is no precise definition, so far as time is concerned of the word ‘immediately’. Depending entirely on the circumstances. it has been variously defined, being a relative term, which may have either a strict or an enlarged relative meaning, as indicated in the two following sub-divisions.

    Strict Sense: The word ‘immediately’ in strictness, excludes all mesne time, is generally used to indicate the absence of time between two events, and, under particular circumstances implies prompt, vigorous action without any delay. In its strict sense, it has been defined as meaning at once, forthwith, instantaneously, instanter, or instantly, presently, and it is also defined as meaning promptly; quickly, with-out delay; without interval, or interval or intervention, of time; without lapse of time; without any substantial interval.

    Broader Relative Sense: Although, as stated in the preceding sub-division, the word, in its strict sense excludes all mesne time, when it is applied to time, in a less strict sense, it has no very definite signification, is rarely employed to designate an exact portion of time, but is given a relative signification, and a certain latitude is to be given the significance of the word. As thus used, it does not, in legal contemplation, necessarily exclude all mesne time, but, indeed, has often been construed to mean as soon as an act can with reasonable diligence be performed. In this use, and always having regard to the circumstances or the facts of the particular case, ‘immediately’ has been specifically defined as meaning “as soon as may be,” after the happening of some event; as soon as practicable under the circumstances, in, or within, a reasonable time, proximately, directly, or close to; with due or reasonable diligence, having regard to the circums-tances of the particular case, within a reasonable time, under the circumstances, or under all the facts and circumstances of the case; within such convenient time as is reasonably requisite; or may be reasonably necessary, under the circumstances, to do the thing required; without unnecessary, unreasonable or inexcusable delay, under all circumstances. Cther Terms compared: In one or another of the senses above indicated, and always, of course, depending on the circumstances, the word has been held equivalent to, or synonymous with, “as soon as practicable”, “at once”, “directly”, and “forthwith”. It has been contrasted or compared with, and also disting-uished from “at once”, ‘forthwith’, ‘immediate’, ‘instantaneously’, “instantly”, ‘mediately’ ‘practically’, ‘then and there’, ‘upon the instant’ ‘within a reasonable time’, ‘without any interval of time’, ‘without delay’ and ‘without intervening lapse of time’.”

    67. The word immediately, came up for interpretation in Page v. Pearce, 1841 8 M. & W. 677 = English Reports 151, (Exchequer Division VII), page 1211 at 1212, wherein Lord Abinger, C.B observed as follows:—

    “……when the act says only that the Judge shall certify im mediately after the trial, and does not more especially define the time, it must mean that it is sufficient if it be done within a reasonable time.”

    68. In Thompson v. Gibson, 1841 8 M. & W. 281 = E.R 151, Exchequer Division VII, page 1045 at 1048), Rolfe, B., held that though the word ‘immediately’ in strictness excludes all mesne time and the lapse of any interval of time, having regard to the object of the Act, it must be construed to mean “as speedily and conveniently as can be”. In the same decision, Lord Abinger, holding that the word ‘immediately’ is to be construed literally, observed thus:

    “If they could be construed literally, consistently with common sense and justice, undoubtedly they ought; and if I could see, upon this act of Parliament, that it was the intention of the legislature that not a single moment's interval should take place before the granting of the certificate. I should think myself bound to defer to that declared intention. But it is admitted that this cannot be its interpretation. We are therefore to see how, consistently with common sense and the principles of justice, the words ‘immediately’ afterwards' are to be construed. If they do not mean that it is to be done the very instant afterwards, do they mean within the minutes, or a quarter an hour, afterwards? I think we should interpret them to mean, within such reasonable time as will exclude the danger of intervening facts operating upon the mind of the Judge, so as to disturb the impression made upon it by the evidence in the cause;………”.

    69. In Alexiadi v. Robinson (1861) (175) E.R 1237 at 1239 and 1240=(1861) 2 F. & P. 679 at 683 and 684) the word has been interpreted by Cockburn, C.J as follows:

    “The first point is, what is the effect of the word ‘immediately’ here? Under ordinary circumstances where a man is called upon by a contract to do an act, no time is specified. He ie allowed a reasonable time for doing it what is a reasonable time may depend on all the circumstances of the case. But here the word used being ‘immediately’ which implied that there is a more stringent requisition than what is ordinarily implied in the word ‘reasonable’. Still it must receive a reasonable interpretation so far that it cannot be considered as imposing an obligation to do what is impossible.”

    70. In The Queen v. The Justices of Berkshire (1878-79 (4) K.B.D.P 471), the word ‘immediately’ is interpreted as follows by Cockburn, C.J:—

    “The question is substantially one of fact. It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what is the meaning of the word ‘immediately’ in all cases. The words forthwith; and ‘immediately’ have the same meaning. They arc stronger than the expression ‘with-in a reasonable time’, and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay, and whether there has been such action is a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. Who is to decide the question? Undoubtedly, the Sessions, and unless we can clearly see that they have gone wrong and put some construction on the word ‘immediately’ which it will not bear their decision must prevail.”

    71. In that case, the question arose whether the sessions were right in holding that certain regulatibns as to entering into recognizance immediately after notice of appeal had not been complied with. A notice was given in due time. But, the appellant did not enter into recognizance until four days afterwards. The question related to

    “did this satisfy the words of the statute?”.

    72. In Parker v. Lewis & Peat (1913) 3 K.B 34 Cennedy, L.J has stated that the word ‘immediately’ means “as immediately as the circumstances permit”.

    73. Now coming to the Tndian decisions a single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the decision In the matter of the Government and Nanu K???thare (Relating to the Lord Acquisition Act), I.L.R 30 Bom. 275, while construing certain provisions of Section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, as it stood then, observed that where a statute or written contract provided that a certain thing should be done ‘immediately’ regard must be had, in construing that word, to the object of the statute or contract as the case may be, to the position of the parties, and to the purpose for which the Legislature or the parties to the contract intended that it should be done immediately.

    74. A Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramnarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R 1962 M.P 93, after referring to various English and Indian decisions interpreting the word ‘immediately’ held that the said word has to be reasonably construed so as not to require from the applicant something which is impossible and that the word should be so read as to advance its purpose, and not to defeat justice.

    75. In Keshav Nilkanth Jaglakav v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.R 1957 S.C 28 = 1956 S.C.R 653, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while examining the term “forthwith” occurring in Section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, have referred to a number of decisions wherein the said word has been interpreted and have finally recorded their view as follows:

    “We agree that ‘forthwith’ in Section 3 cannot mean the same thing as “as soon as may be”in Section 7(of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950) and that the former is more peremptory than the latter…. In Section 7, the question is whether the time taken for indicating the grounds is reasonably requisite. Under Section 3(3), it is whether the report has been sent at the earliest point of time possible, and when there is an interval of time between the date of the order and the date of the report. What is to be considered is whether the delay in sending the report could have been avoided.’

    76. A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Keshava v. Ramchandra, A.I.R 1981 Karn. 97, while interpreting the word ‘immediately’ occurring in Art. 134A of the Constitution of India, pointed out that the object of Art. 134A is to avoid unnecessary delay and it is precisely for this reason that the word ‘immediately’ has been used to convey a sense of urgency.

    77. In Gopal Mandal v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 590 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 1807, while interpreting the meaning of the word ‘forthwith’ occurring in Section 3(3) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the Supreme Court has made the following observation:—

    “The word ‘forthwith’ has been interpreted to mean, ‘as soon as-possible’; ‘without any delay’, If there is some delay, which is reasonably explained, then there is no violation of the mandatory requirement of the law.”

    78. In Food Inspector, Grama Panchayat, Nuzvid v. Golla Nageswara Rao, 1979 MLJ Crl. 62 : 1980 (1) FAC 355, it is observed that the word ‘immediately’ should not however be construed to mean that the copy of of the report should be forwarded on the very day of the institution of the complaint and that if the copy is forwarded without any reasonable delay, it would amount to substantial compliance with the Rule.

    79. M.A Sathar Sayeed, J., in Perumal and Ramanarayanan v. Kumbakonam Municipality, 1982 (II) FAC 106, after referring to the meaning of the word in the Law Dictionary, has held that the sum and substance of the word ‘immediately’ is to the effect that the report of the Public Analyst has to be sent to the petitioners without any delay, i.e, forthwith.

    80. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Natarajan. J., and Maheswaran, J., in Kandaswami v. The Food Inspector, Athoor 1982 (1) FAC 322, to, which decision I have already referred, in another context, has recorded its opinion on this aspect by way of an obiter dictum as follows:

    “Therefore, we are of opinion that the forwarding of a copy of the report of (sic) by the Local (Health) Authority should be done only after the institution of the prosecution and not earlier. It is, no doubt, true that the words after the institution of the prosecution should not be construed to mean that the report should be forwarded on the same day on which the complaint is filed and that even a delay of a day or two would not be brooked by law.”

    81. Recently, M.N Moorthy, J. in Sebastian v. State, 1982 (II) FAC 103, while construing the word “immediately” has observed as follows:

    “The word ‘immediately’ under Rule 9-A of the Rules would mean at once or without delay or forthwith. Whatever action is sought to be done, it should be taken speedily and promptly. The word would connote reasonably in quick and prompt time. It certainly implies that whatever has to be done should be done with all possible speed. In my view, a day, or two can be taken as ‘immediately’. If the Local (Health) Authority complies with the provisions of Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A within a day or two, it cannot be said to be violative of the tenor of Rule 9-A and the pith and sub-stance of the word ‘immediately’. This, of course, is a question of fact and is to be determined taking into consideration all the circumstances in a given case. For instance, in a case, for the first one or two days if a holiday intervenes, then three days may be given as ‘immediately,’ because of lack of specific provision, it has become susceptible to varied interpretations.”

    82. Reference can also be had to the judicial opinions collected on this aspect in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, III Edition, Vol. 2, pages 1364 and 1365.

    83. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 1 of 1974), the term ‘immediately’ occurs in Sections 353(1) and (4) and 363 (2).

    84. I think it is not necessary to refer to the other statutes in which, this word has been used. Suffice it to say that the meaning of the term ‘immediately’ has to be construed taking into consideration the context in which the term is used with relation to the cause and effect, place or space, or time, as to whether it has to be interpreted in strictness, excluding all mesne time, or in a liberal sense.

    85. From the various definitions and judicial interpretations, the essence of the expression ‘immediately’ can be stated thus: In general, it means ‘without interval of time, without delay, straightway, or without any lapse of time’. It has two meanings, one meaning indicating the relation of cause and effect as direct and proximate, and the other meaning indicating the absence of time between two events. It is not a word of precise signification and does not, in legal proceedings or statutes, necessarily import the exclusion of interval of time or space, but its meaning must be deter-mined by the context in which it is used and the purpose for which the statute using the term was enacted. Depending upon the context, circumstances and events in connection with which it is used, the word has to be sometimes construed literally and sometimes construed liberally, so as to have the effect of the tenor and spirit of the term, so that it could gather its meaning from its application.

    86. Now, the question is whether the Parliament had used this expression in Rule 9-A literally in the strict sense of the term or only in a liberal sense. There are various provisions in the statute and attending circumstances which would give an indication that the word immediately in Rule 9-A has been purposely introduced to import the meaning of the term in its strict sense: This indication can be inferred from the following circumstances:

    (1) The various expressions used in the different provisions of the Act, which I have extracted above, are used in different senses with full awareness of their cause and effect and implication.

    (2) When the expression ‘as soon as may be’ (used in the Draft Rule 9-A) which imports that the act may be performed in a reasonable time, has been deleted after due consideration and substituted by the words “immediately”, which is more peremptory, it should be construed as excluding all mesne time.

    (3) The fixation of the maximum time limit for the first time by Act 34 of 1976 in the various provisions of Act providing (a) seven days to the Food Inspector under Section 11(4) to produce any adulterated or misbranded article of food seized under Section 10(4) before a Magistrate;(b) ten days to the accused person to make the application before the Court under the latter part of Section 13(2); (c) five days to the Local (Health) Authority to forward the part of the sample to the Court as contemplated under Section 13(2A), and (d) one month to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory to send the certificate as required under Section 13(2B) and the refixation of the maximum time limit of 45 days in Rule 7(3) by the 1974 amendment Rules as against the 60 days' period as prescribed as per the Rules which stood before the Amendment, and the fact that Rule 9(j) which prescribed a period of ten days has been deleted by the substituted Rule 9-A, would all go to show that the Parliament has pur-posefully employed the word ‘immediately’ without adding any qualification to the said term so that the Court could hold that Rule 9-A means what it says in its strict sense and has to be strictly complied with.

    (4) The fact that the proviso to Rule 9-A imposes a duty on the Local (Health) Authority requiring him to intimate the result of the analysis to the vendor from whom the sample has been taken and to the person mentioned in Section 14-A, within ten days from the receipt of the report from the Public Analyst, if the sample conforms to the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder, and in respect of which no prosecution or action is intended, indicates that the Parliament intended not to keep the vendor or the person mentioned in Section 14-A under an animated suspense of any impending prosecution.

    (5) The amendment to Rule 7(3) by the 1977 (First Amendment) Rules, requiring the public analyst to deliver four copies of the report of the result of the analysis, instead of two copies provided under the old Rule 9(j), is obviously to help the Local (Health) Authority to forward one copy of the report to the accused person, without taking any further time on the ground of preparation of the copies of the said report.

    (6) When there is a duty on the authority to forward the copy of the report and when there is a corresponding right in the accused to challenge the said report, if he so desires, the rule must be strictly interpreted.

    (7) When the rule pre-emptorily and imperiously says that the copy of the report must be forwarded to the accused immediately after the institution of the prosecution, the question whether the Court has got the power, on the facts of the case, either to waive any non-compliance or extend the period on the ground that it is only a pure technicality hurting nobody and no prejudice whatever would be caused to anybody just by extending the period, will be out of consideration. Otherwise, it would be defeating the very object of the rule.

    (8) If the framers of the Act had intended to qualify the word ‘immediately’ by another adverbial from, they would have used a qualifying expression as those used either in Section 11(3) reading ‘immediately succeeding working day’ or in Rule 17(a) and (b) reading ‘immediately but not later than the succeeding working day’, especially when they have thought of deleting “as soon as may be” from the draft Rule 9-A after due consideration.

    87. For the reasons stated above and having regard to the scope and object of the Act and the Rules, and the extent of the possible prejudice that may be caused to the accused consequent upon the non-compliance with Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A, I hold that the Public (Health) Authority should take prompt, vigorous and expeditious action under all circumstances of the case, to see that the copy of the report is forwarded to the accused as contemplated under Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A, as speedily as possible without any lapse of time, save such as may be imposed by circumstances which cannot be avoided. In other words, the copy of the report should be despatched without any unnecessary, unreasonable or inexcusable delay having regard to the circumstances of the particular case, consistent with common sense and all principles of justice and also keeping in view the mandatory nature of the above provisions.

    88. Meaning of the Term Institution of the Prosecution:—There is no time-limit prescribed in the Act for instituting the prosecution before the Court, though the sections and the rules prescribe particular periods within which the Local (Health) Authority, the Food Inspector or the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, as the case may be, has to carry out their respective duties imposed on them under the Act.

    89. In State of Rajasthan v. Umashankar 1977 (II) FAC 261, it was ruled that delay in launching the prosecution is not per se a ground to vitiate the proceedings unless such delay is shown to have caused grave prejudice to the accused. In another decision, viz., R.C Banerjee v. A.K Chatterjee 1975 (I) FAC 401, it has been observed by the Calcutta High Court that the delay in initiating the proceedings against the accused person, which delay defeats the scope of making an application under Section 13(2), affects a valuable right given to the accused and materially prejudices him and therefore, the continuation of the proceedings of the case under such circumstances is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court.

    90. If one approaches this aspect, keeping in mind the scheme of the Act and the Rules and the material amendments now brought forth by Act 34, of 1976, one has necessarily to come to the conclusion that the prosecution should be instituted without any unreasonable and undue delay. Further, in a case of this nature, the complainant is in possession of almost all the materials inclusive of the name, address and other particulars of the person mentioned in Section 14-A, even before the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst, and therefore, there is really no reason for him to further delay the launching of the prosecution. There is no question of making any investigation or collecting any more material after the receipt of the analyst's report. If at all there is any such delay, that delay could be attributed only to the actual preparation of the complaint and the obtaining of the order of authorization to prosecute by a special order of authorization by a general order has not been already obtained, except in cases where there are some unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances justifying the delay in instituting the prosecution at the earliest point of time. Otherwise, the delay could be attributed only to the laxity or the negligence on the part of the complainant, which laxity or negligence will have to be viewed strictly in favour of the accused.

    91. Any inordinate delay in the institution of the prosecution after the receipt of the report of the analyst is likely to render the part or parts of the sample kept by the Local (Health) Authority, unfit for analysis, more so in the case of perishable articles, and in such cases there is the likelihood of the sample becoming decomposed and consequently making the analysis impoisible. It has been experienced by Courts, as seen from various judgments, that no useful purpose is served if the sample is sent to the Central Food Laboratory after the lapse of a considerable length of time. Some of the authoritative judicial pronouncements are to the effect that because of the delayed prosecutions, the accused persons have been deprived of their opportunity of availing of their valuable rights conferred under Section 13(2) of the Act. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to refer to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Nabh Raj v. State (Delhi Administration) 1980 (II) FAC 192 wherein their Lordships have clearly pointed out that such a belated prosecution is likely to result in causing harassment to the accused in some cases and may also result ingenuine offenders escaping punishment.

    92. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution should be launched in all criminal proceedings with the least delay and that any unreasonable delay would certainly amount to harassment of the accused: Vide Public Prosecutor v. Nalla Pydiraju 1968 M.L.J Crl. 290 — 1968 (4) An.W.R 250. It was contended at the Bar that when the proviso to Rule 9-A requires the Public (Health) Authority to send a memo of intimation intimating that no prosecution or action is contemplated to the person from whom the sample has been taken and simultaneously to the person mentioned in Section 14-A within 10 days from the date of the receipt of the report, in case that report reveals that the sample of food sent for analysis conforms to the provisions in the Act and the Rules, obviously with the object of not keeping those persons under any suspended animation or under the apprehension of any impending prosecution, afortiorari in case the sample of food does not conform to the provisions in the Act and the Rules the copy of the report should necessarily be made available to the accused much earlier than the abovesaid ten days, which can happen only if the prosecution is also launched within the said ten days, because, as per Section 13(2) read with Rule 9-A, the forwarding of the report would arise only after the institution of the prosecution, and therefore, the prosecution should be launched at any cost within ten days provided the authorization has already been obtained. The proviso to Rule 9-A prescribes a period of ten days apparently for enabling the person, who is shown to be innocent as per the report of the Public Analyst, to take appropriate proceedings for getting release of the articles of food seized by the authorities under the Act before they get deteriorated. Nevertheless, the above argument of the learned counsel cannot be said to be illogical or untenable. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the period within which the prosecution should be launched, since, as pointed out supra, there is no specific provision in the Act or the Rules prescribing the period of limitation for instituting that prosecution, I would like to record my view that a conjoint reading of Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A gives an impression that the prosecution should be launched in all promptitute without causing any undue delay which would be prejudicial to the accused depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, provided the sanction has already been obtained by a general or special order.

    93. Now the question is, what is the meaning of the term institution of the prosecution appearing in Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A? In Moqboo??? Hossain v. State of Bombay AIR 1953 SC 325 = 1952 Crl. L.J 1432, the Supreme Court has defined the word to mean the initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a Court of law or judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in a statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure There is a fine difference between the term “institution of a case” and the term “institution of the prosecution” under Criminal Law. The Supreme Court in Jamuna Singh v. Bhadaishah AIR 1964 SC 1541 = 1964 (2) Crl. L.J 468, which is an authority for the definition of the term “institution of a case in a Court” under the Crl. P.C has explained the term as follows:

    “The Code does not contain any definition of the words ‘institution of a case’. It is clear however and indeed is not disputed that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. Section 190(1) of the Crl. P.C contains the provision for cognizance of offences by Magistrates. It provides for three ways in which such cognizance can be taken. The first is, on receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence: the second is, on a report in writing of such facts, that is, facts constituting the offence made by any police officer; the third is, upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrate's own knowfedge or suspicion that such offence has been committed. Section 193 provides for cognizance of offences being taken by Courts of Sessions on commitment to it by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf. Section 194 provides for cognizance being taken by High Court of offences upon a commitment made to it in the manner provided in the Code.

    An examination of these provisions makes it clear that when a Magistate takes cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitude such offence a case is instituted in the Magistrate's Court and such a case is one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer it is a case instituted in the Magistrate's Court on a police report.”

    94. From the above observations it is clear that when the Court takes cognizance of a case upon a complaint or a charge-sheet, it can be said that the case is instituted before a Court. In Section 13(2) and Rule 9-A the expression used is ‘institution of the prosecution’, and not institution of a case. Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the proviso thereunder, which deal with the procedure for initiation or starting of proceedings under the Act, read as follows:—

    “No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under Section 14 or Section 14-A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government;

    Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Section 12, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint.”

    95. On a reading of the above provisions, it would be expressly clear that the institution of a prosecution under this Act takes place the moment the per-son authorized to launch the prosecution of or the purchaser referred to in Section 12 files the complaint before the Court in compliance with the requirements of the above section. Further, the words following the term “institution of the prosecution”, viz, “by a person authorized in this be-half or by a person referred to in Section 12” clearly indicate that it is different from the taking cognizance of the case by the Court. Therefore, the mere filing of the complaint before the competent Court after complying with the pre-requisites of Section 20(1) either by the person authorised or by the person referred to in Section 12, would satisfy the meaning of the expression “institution of the prosecution”.

    96. A similar question arose before a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jyothish Kumar v. State 1982 (I) FAC 206. The facts of that ease were as follows: The sample of food was taken on 21st September, 1978 and it was sent for analysis on the next day. The report of the analyst was received by the Food Inspector on 27th November, 1978. Thereupon, the Food Inspector filed a complaint before the Court on 7th December, 1978 with the requisite consent of the Local (Health) Authority. On the same day, vi z, on 7th December, 1978 itself, the Local (Health) Authority sent a copy of the report of the public analyst to the accused person by registered post, accompanied by a memo as required by Section 13(2), which report was received by the accused person on 13th December, 1978. Though the complaint was received by the learned Magistrate on 7th December, 1978, he took cognizance of the complaint on 29th December, 1978 and issued process against the accused. The accused challenged his conviction raising a contention before the High Court that the institution of the prosecution envisaged the stage of taking cognizance of the offence by the Court which, according to him took place on 29th December, 1978, and therefore, the forwarding of the copy of the report on 7th December, 1979 should be construed not in strict compliance with Section 13(2). The Division Bench rejected the said contention and held that the institution of a prosecution under the Act and for that matter, under Section 13(2), thereof means ‘filing’ of the complaint after complying with the pre-requisites of Section 20(1) and that when the report of the Public Analyst was sent by the Local (Health) Authority, to the petitioner-accused on the date the complaint was filed, there was compliance with the statutory provisions of Section 13(2). I respectfully agree with the above view.

    97. In this connection, reference can be had to the judgment of the Kerala High Court in P. Chockalingam v. Food Inspector, Trivandrum Corporation, 1981 (II) FAC 201, wherein it has been observed that:

    “Section 13(2) specifically states that the information must be given to him (the accused) after the complaint is laid by the Food Inspector before the appropriate Court.”

    98. Tor the above discussion, I hold that the institution of a prosecution under this Act means the filing of the complaint before the Court which has jurisdiction over the matter.

    99. Now, let me examine the contentions of Mr. Sriramulu in the light of the above principles of law. Admittedly, the report of the Public Analyst was received by the Local (Health) Authority on 19th December, 1977. The prosecution was instituted on 22nd March, 1978 and the copy of the report of the analyst (Ex. P-6) was served by hand on the accused with the memo of intimation, Ex. P5, as required by Section 13(2) of the Act, on 3rd April, 1978, after the lapse of 12 days, as evidenced by Ex. P7 In this case, there is no evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution explaining as to why the copy of the report had been forwarded after such an inordinate and unreasonable delay. Therefore, I am of the view that the prosecution has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Rule 9A which are mandatory.

    68. As regards the second contention raised by the learned counsel, there cannot be any dispute that the prosecution was launched on the expiry of more than three months after the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst by the Public (Health) Authority. Even though P.W 1 in the Chief-examination would state that he was on earned leave, it is brought out in the cross-examination that he had availed of earned leave only for 30 days and therefore P.W 1 could have promptly instituted the prosecution without giving room for a complaint of prejudice or frustration of right by the accused. However, as I am allowing this revision and setting aside the conviction of the accused on the ground that the mandatory requirement of Rule 9-A has not been complied with, I feel that it is not necessary for me to launch a detailed discussion on this contention and record a finding thereon.

    69. In the result, the revision is allowed, the conviction and sentence passed against the revision petitioner are set aside and he is acquitted. The fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to him.

    1. Revision allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Abdul Majeed v. State, By Food Inspector .
    (Nov 13, 1981)