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  • S. 7(1) read with Ss. 16(1)(a) and 2(i)(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • provisions of S. 173(4) read with Section 207-A(3) of the Criminal P.C 1898,
  • S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,
  • provisions of Rule 9(j) of the Rules
  • provisions of Section 13(2)
  • time.10. Rule 9
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • S. 7(1) read with Ss. 16(1)(a) and 2(i)(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • provisions of S. 173(4) read with Section 207-A(3) of the Criminal P.C 1898,
  • S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,
  • provisions of Rule 9(j) of the Rules
  • provisions of Section 13(2)
  • time.10. Rule 9
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter is a criminal revision referred to the Bench by order of the Chief Justice at the suggestion of one of the Judges (Maheswaran, J.) because the question raised was of considerable importance.

The revision petitioner was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kumbakonam, under S. 7(1) read with Ss. 16(1)(a) and 2(i)(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs. 500. The conviction was based on the following factual findings: on 30-4-1976 at about 6 a.m., P.W. 1 (a Food Inspector of Kumbakonam Municipality) purchased 700 ml of cow's milk from the petitioner's milk depot for analysis; a sample was sent to the Public Analyst who opined that the sample was adulterated, being deficient in solids-not-fat content to the extent of 85% (as reported by the Public Analyst). On appeal, the Sessions Judge of West Tanjavur Division confirmed the conviction and sentence.

The petitioner challenged the conviction on the ground that the Food Inspector had failed to comply with S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The principal question identified for determination by the Court was whether non-compliance with Ss. 11 and 13(2) of the Act vitiates the entire proceedings, and whether those provisions are directory or mandatory in nature.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with the provisions of Ss. 11 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act vitiates the entire proceedings.
  2. Whether the provisions of Ss. 11 and 13(2) of the Act are directory in nature or mandatory.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (Appellant)

  • The trial and the conviction were vitiated because the Food Inspector failed to comply with S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (i.e., the procedure of informing the person from whom the sample was taken and enabling the exercise of the right to have the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory).

Public Prosecutor (Respondent)

  • It was argued that the provisions in question are directory and not mandatory; hence any non-compliance would not vitiate the trial or conviction.
  • The Public Prosecutor relied on authorities emphasizing that determination of whether a provision is mandatory or directory depends on the scheme and object of the provision and the context (cited: Satyanarain v. Dhura Ram and State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co.).
  • The Public Prosecutor also cited Narayana Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (and related reasoning) to support the contention that certain statutory omissions may be treated as directory depending on context; the Court, however, distinguished that authority in the present case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satyanarain v. Dhura Ram, (1974) 3 SCR 20 The question whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory must be decided with reference to the scheme and object of the provision. The Court accepted the guiding proposition that contextual analysis is needed in deciding mandatory vs. directory, and applied that approach to S. 13(2) of the Act.
State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., (1967) 1 SCJ 815 The use of the word "shall" does not always make an enactment mandatory; context and circumstances matter. The Court used this principle to consider whether the textual use of "shall" in the rules/statute rendered the provisions mandatory, but concluded that context and the rights conferred by S.13(2) made it mandatory.
Bholanath v. State, 1977 Cri LJ 154 (Cal) R.9(j) (as amended) intends to give opportunity to person from whom sample was obtained to have it examined by an expert of his choice; substantial delay in supplying the analyst's report can cause prejudice. The Court cited this decision as supporting the view that failure/delay in providing the report can prejudice the accused and that the right to have the sample examined is significant.
M.B. Risaldar v. C.A. Gandhi, 1978 Cri LJ 1032 Held that Rule 9(j) (manner of sending copy of Public Analyst's report) could not be considered mandatory despite the use of "shall". The Court noted this contrary view but expressly stated it was unable to subscribe to that view and rejected it for the purposes of this case.
Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. Murlidhar, 1977 Cri LJ 1634 Delay in sending the Public Analyst's report is context-dependent; if the report was not sent even until filing of the complaint, the accused could be acquitted without pleading prejudice. The Court referred to this authority to acknowledge that delay must be judged on facts, but used other authorities and statutory analysis to hold the provisions mandatory in this case.
Belgaum Borough Municipality v. Shridhar Shankar, AIR 1968 Mys 196 Rules under the Act (Rr.7 and 18) are mandatory; non-compliance affects evidentiary value of Public Analyst's report and certificate and may vitiate conviction in absence of extraneous evidence. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that certain procedural rules under the Act are mandatory and that non-compliance can vitiate convictions.
Mangilal Chamnaji v. State, 1975 Cri LJ 614 The requirements of S.13 (sub-sections) and Rules 7, 16, 17 and 18 are mandatory and strict compliance is necessary. The Court cited this decision to reinforce the conclusion that the procedural safeguards in the Act and Rules are mandatory.
Narayana Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1957) 2 Mad LJ (SC) 139 Non-compliance with provisions of S.173(4) read with Section 207-A(3) Cr.P.C. 1898 held to be directory in that context; omission may be an irregularity curable in interest of justice. The Court explained that the Narayana Rao principle, relied upon by the Public Prosecutor, was not applicable to the present case because the provisions and rights under S.13(2) of the Act are of a different character and confer a valuable right on the accused.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, (1967) 2 SCR 116 S.13(2) confers a valuable right on the accused vendor to have the sample analysed by the Director, and denial of that right through deliberate conduct could cause serious prejudice and vitiate conviction based on Public Analyst's report. The Court relied on this authority to stress that S.13(2) confers a valuable right and that denial of that right can lead to vitiation of conviction; this supported the conclusion that S.13(2) is mandatory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the sole question for decision: whether non-compliance with Ss. 11 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act vitiates the proceedings, which required consideration of whether those provisions are directory or mandatory.

The Court analysed the statutory language of S.13(2) both in its pre-amendment form and as amended. The pre-amendment text permitted the accused vendor or complainant, after institution of prosecution, to apply to the Court for sending part of the sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory; the Court would first ascertain that marks and seals were intact and then could despatch the part of the sample under its seal for a certificate within one month.

The post-amendment S.13(2) placed an express duty on the Local (Health) Authority: upon receipt of a Public Analyst's report showing adulteration, and after institution of prosecution, to forward a copy of the report to the person from whom the sample was taken, informing that person that he may, within ten days of receipt, apply to the Court to have the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. The Court observed that this amendment both gives a copy of the analyst's report to the person and brings to his attention a time-limited right to seek further analysis.

The Court reviewed the Rules (R.9(j) and its subsequent substitutions/amendments, including R.9-A under S.R.O. No. A.43/77 and earlier amendment S.R.O. No. A.88/74) which imposed duties on the Food Inspector/Local Health Authority to send copies of the Public Analyst's report to the person from whom the sample was taken, and in some versions to do so within ten days or immediately after institution of prosecution. The Court noted this prosecution began before the later S.R.O. No. A.43/77 was passed, but the statutes and earlier rules nonetheless evidence a legislative intent to protect the procedural right.

Considering the statutory scheme and object, the Court concluded that the amendments and rules show that Parliament intended to confer a valuable right on the accused: timely notice of the analyst's report and the right (with a time-limit) to apply for analysis by the Central Food Laboratory. Because the right is valuable and central to a fair defence (enabling the accused to obtain a certificate that can supersede the Public Analyst's report under S.13(3) and the proviso to S.13(5)), the Court held that the provisions of S.13(2) are mandatory.

The Court considered the opposing authorities cited by the Public Prosecutor (including Narayana Rao and M.B. Risaldar) but distinguished Narayana Rao on its facts and statutory context (relating to Cr.P.C. provisions) and rejected the reasoning in M.B. Risaldar that Rule 9(j) was not mandatory. The Court relied on decisions (Belgaum Borough Municipality; Mangilal Chamnaji; Bholanath; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram) supporting the mandatory character of analogous procedural protections, and on the principle that denial or delay of the statutory right could cause prejudice to the accused.

Given that in the present case the Local (Health) Authority did not comply with the requirement to send the analyst's report and to inform the accused of the ten-day right, the Court found that the accused was deprived of the right created by S.13(2), and that such non-compliance vitiates the proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the provisions of Ss. 11 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are mandatory and that non-compliance with those provisions vitiates the entire proceedings. As a result, the criminal revision petition was allowed: the conviction and sentence of the revision petitioner were set aside and the revision petitioner was acquitted of the offence. The Court ordered that any fine paid shall be refunded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The revision petitioner is acquitted; the sentence and conviction are quashed; any fine paid is to be refunded.
  • Legal consequence stated by the Court: A failure by the Local (Health) Authority (or Food Inspector acting on its behalf) to comply with S.13(2) — in particular the duty to forward the Public Analyst's report and to inform the person of the ten-day right to apply to the Court for Central Food Laboratory analysis — can vitiate the proceedings because that statutory right is valuable to the accused's defence.
  • The Court distinguished authorities that treated certain procedural omissions as merely directory, explaining that those authorities were in different statutory contexts; on the present facts and statutory scheme, the Court concluded the provisions are mandatory.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that opinion.

    P.K Moorthy Accused- v. Food Inspector, Kumbakonam Municipality Complainant-.

    Paul, J.:— This criminal revision case has been posted before us on the orders of the Honourable Chief Justice on the suggestion of one of us (Maheswaran, J.) inasmuch as the question which arises for determinatidn in this case is of considerable importance.

    2. The revision petitioner was convicted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate of Kumbakonam of an dffence punishable under S. 7(1) read with Ss. 16(1)(a) and 2(i)(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and was sentenced to R.I for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 on the ground that on 30-4-1976 at about 6 a.m P.W 1, a Food Inspector of Kumbakonam Municipality visited the milk depot owned by the revision petitioner and he purchased 700 ml of cow's milk for the purposes of analysis and sent one of the sample bottles to the Public Analyst who has given the opinion that the sample was adulterated inasmuch as it was deficient in solids-not-fat content to the extent eft 85%. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge of West Tanjavur Division confirmed the conviction and the sentence. It has been contended before us that the trial and the conviction are vitiated in that the Food Inspector has failed to comply with S. 13(2) of the Act. Therefore, the only question that falls for determination by us is whether non-compliance with the provisions of Ss. 11 and 13(2) of the Act vitiates the entire proceedings. In considering that question we have to find out first of all whether the provisions contained in Secs. 11 and 13(2) of the Act are directory in nature or are mandatory.

    3. Section 13(2) of the Act as it stood before it was amended in 1976 was as follows—

    “After the institution of a prosecution under this Act the accused vendor or the complainant may, on payment of the prescribed fee, make an application to Court for sending the part of the sample mentioned in sub-cl. (i) or sub-clause (iii) of cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 11 to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate; and on receipt of the application the Court shall first ascertain that the mark and seal or fastening as provided in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 11 are intact and may then despatch the part of the sample under its own seal to the Director of Central Food Laboratory who shall thereupon send a certificate to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the sample, specifying the result of his analysis.”

    4. Section 13 after the aforesaid amendment reads as follows:

    “13. Report of Public Analyst:— (1) The public analyst shall deliver, in such form as may be prescribed, a report to the Local (Health) Authority of the result of the analysis of any article of food submitted to him for analysis.

    (2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-s. (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under S. 14-A forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is sd desired either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of his receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.”

    5. Thus a duty has been cast on the Local (Health) Authority to send a copy of the report of the result of the public analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken informing him at the same time that he should make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the aforesaid copy to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. In the case now before us, the abovesaid provision admittedly has not been complied with. Nevertheless, the learned Public Prosecutor has argued that the aforesaid provision is only directory and not mandatory and any non-compliance with the provisions would not vitiate the trial or the conviction, In support of his contention the learned Public Prosecutor has referred to the ruling in Satyanarain v. Dhura Ram, (1974) 3 SCR 20 where it was observed that the question whether a particular provision in the statute is mandatory or directory has to be decided with reference to the scheme and object of the provisions. Again in The State of M.P v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., (1967) 1 SCJ 815, the Supreme Court has held that the use of the word ‘shall’ does not always mean that the enactment is Obligatory or mandatory, but it depends on the context in which the word is used and the other circumstances. It is in accordance with the guidelines thus given by the Supreme Court that we have to consider the question now before us.

    6. Under R. 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, a duty is cast on the Food Inspector to send by hand or registered post, a copy of the report received in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken in case it is found to be not conforming to the Act or Rules made thereunder, as soon as the case is filed in the Court. This Rule was subsequently substituted by S.R.O No. A. 43/77 as under—

    “9-A. Local (Health) Authority to send report to person concerned — The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after the institution of prosecution forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis in Form III delivered to him under sub-r. (3) of R. 7, by registered post or by hand, as may be appropriate to the person from whom the sample of the article was taken by the Food Inspector, and simultaneously also to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars has been disclosed under S. 14-A of the Act.”

    7. This prosecution was launched however before S.R.O No. A43/77 was passed.

    8. By S.R.O No. A88/74 an amendment was made to R. 9(j) casting upon the Food Inspector the duty to send within ten days of the receipt of the report from the Public Analyst by hand or by registered post a copy of the report received in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken.

    9. Now, as we have already pointed out under S. 13(2) of the Act, as it stood before the amendment, after the institution of the prosecution the accused vendor or the complainant may, ………make an application to the Court for sending the part of the sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory. Section 13(2) after the amendment requires the Local (Health) Authority to forward a report of the result of the analysis by the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken, informing him that if it is so desired, he may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of the receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. If the Local (Health) Authority fails to send the copy of the report of the food Analyst and fails to inform the person from whom the sample was taken that he may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of the receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, the person from whom sample was taken would not be able to make an application to the Court (within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report). The object of amending S. 13(2) appears to be to not only give the person from whom the sample is taken a copy of the analyst's report but also to draw his attention to his right to have the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory by making an application to the Court within a fixed time.

    10. Rule 9 has also been suitably amended, making it obligatory to send a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample is taken. Therefore it appears to us that by the amendment of Section 13(2) a valuable right is given to the accused of receiving such a notice from the Local (Health) Authority giving a copy of the report of the Public Analyst and also telling him that if he so desired he may have the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory by making an application to the Court. The scheme and object of the provisions of the Act support the view that the provisions of Section 13(2) are mandatory.

    11. In Bholanath v. State, 1977 Cri LJ 154 (Cal) it was held that the intent of R. 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules as amended, is to give an opportunity to a person from whom sample was obtained to have it examined by an expert of his choice and such a right is independent of S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the delay of more than 10½ months in the supply of the copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the accused has caused prejudice to the defence.

    12. In M.B Risaldar v. C.A Gandhi, 1978 Cri LJ 1032, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court was of the view that the provisions of Rule 9(j) of the Rules with regard to the manner in which a copy of the report of the Public Analyst is to be sent to the person from whom the sample was taken, cannot be said to be mandatory despite the use of the word ‘shall’ in it. We are, however, unable to subscribe to that view.

    13. In Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. Murlidhar, 1977 Cri LJ 1634, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed—

    “It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule regarding the delay in sending the report of the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken. Every case will have to depend on its circumstances. But when the report of the Public Analyst was not sent to the accused even until the filing of the complaint, then, to our mind, in such a case, the accused could be acquitted without his pleading prejudice.”

    14. In Belgaum Borough Municipality v. Shridhar Shankar, AIR 1968 Mys 196, a Bench of the Mysore High Court has observed that Rr. 7 and 18 of the Rules framed under the Act are mandatory and the non-compliance of those rules affects the evidentiary value of the report of the Public Analyst and the evidentiary value of the certificate and in the absence of extraneous evidence the conviction is sure to be vitiated.

    15. Again in Mangilal Chamnaji v. State, 1975 Cri LJ 614, a Bench of the Gujarat High Court in considering the language of the provisions of sub-secs. (1), (2) and (5) of S. 13 with the provisions of Rr. 7, 16, 17 and 18, held that the requirements of these provisions are mandatory and that therefore strict compliance with the same is necessary.

    16. The decision in Narayana Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1957) 2 Mad LJ (SC) 139, cited by the learned Public Prosecutor would not apply to the case now before us, because there the Supreme Court considered the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of S. 173(4) read with Section 207-A(3) of the Criminal P.C 1898, and observed that those provisions were only directory because an omission by a police officer to fully comply with the provisions of S. 173 should not be allowed to have such a far-reaching effect as to render the proceedings including the trial before the Court of Session, wholly ineffective. But, if it is shown, in a particular case, on behalf of the accused person that the omission on the part of the police officer concerned or of the Magistrate, before whom the committal proceedings are pending has caused prejudice to the accused, in the interest of justice, the Court may reopen the proceedings by insisting upon full compliance with the provisions of the Code. The omission was a mere irregularity which could be cured under the provisions of Sec. 537, Cr. P.C” In Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, (1967) 2 SCR 116 the Supreme Court has observed as follows—

    “A right is conferred by S. 13(2) on the accused vendor to have the sample given to him by the Food Inspector, analysed by the Director after the prosecution was launched against him. It is a valuable right, because, he could for his proper defence have that sample analysed by a more competent expert, whose certificate supersedes the report of the Public Analyst under S. 13(3) and is to be accepted by the Court as conclusive evidence of its contents under the proviso to S. 13(5) ………… But in a case where there is denial of this right on account of the deliberate conduct of the prosecution, the accused vendor would be seriously prejudiced, in his trial and could not be convicted on the report of the Public Analyst.”

    17. Therefore, in our view, the provisions of Ss. 11 and 13(2) of the Act are mandatory and non-compliance with the provisions of those sections would vitiate the entire proceedings. Hence this criminal revision petition is allowed and the conviction of the revision petitioner and the sentence imposed on him are set aside and the revision petitioner acquitted of the offence. Fine if paid will be refunded.

    18. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    P.K Moorthy Accused- v. Food Inspector, Kumbakonam Municipality Complainant-.
    (Apr 27, 1979)