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  • S. 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act for short)
  • Section 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • S. 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act for short)
  • Section 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. (with S. N. Sanyal, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

A Food Inspector of Birbhum, with the written consent of the Local (Health) Authority, filed a complaint under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 alleging that on September 21, 1978 the petitioner exposed mustard oil for sale which, on analysis, was found to be adulterated. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs. 500/-, with a default sentence of one month rigorous imprisonment. The Additional Sessions Judge, Second Court, Birbhum dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence. The petitioner moved the High Court in revision and obtained a Rule.

Factual chronology relevant to the statutory question (as found by the courts below):

  • Samples taken: 21 September 1978.
  • Samples sent for analysis: 22 September 1978.
  • Public Analyst's report to Local (Health) Authority: 30 October 1978.
  • Local (Health) Authority sent report to Food Inspector: 27 November 1978.
  • Complaint filed by Food Inspector in the Magistrate's Court (with written consent): 7 December 1978.
  • On 7 December 1978 the Local (Health) Authority also sent a copy of the Public Analyst's report to the petitioner by registered post and informed him he could, if desired, apply within ten days to have the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory; the petitioner received that report on 13 December 1978.
  • The Magistrate took cognizance on 29 December 1978 and issued process.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the meaning of the phrase "institution of prosecution" in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 — does it refer to the filing of the complaint (the statutory initiation of prosecution under the Act) or to the later stage when the Court takes cognizance of the complaint?
  2. If "institution of prosecution" is interpreted to mean taking cognizance by the Court, did the purported non-compliance with Section 13(2) prejudice the petitioner by depriving him of the opportunity under Section 13(2A) to apply for analysis by the Central Food Laboratory?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Submitted by Mr. Roy for the petitioner: the obligation on the Local (Health) Authority under Section 13(2) to send the Public Analyst's report arises after the "institution of prosecution." He contended that "institution of prosecution" contemplates the stage when the Court takes cognizance.
  • Because the Local (Health) Authority sent the report on the date the complaint was filed (7 December 1978) and not after the Magistrate took cognizance (29 December 1978), there was alleged non-compliance with Section 13(2).
  • As a result of that alleged non-compliance, the petitioner was said to have been deprived of the valuable right to apply under Section 13(2A) for analysis by the Central Food Laboratory, and thus seriously prejudiced in his defence.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's (prosecution/State) separate legal arguments in opposition; the court's reasoning reflects the response to the petitioner's contention and statutory interpretation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah, AIR 1964 SC 1541 Authority that "institution of a case" in a Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offences alleged. The court relied on this authority to explain that under the Code of Criminal Procedure a "case" is instituted when the Court takes cognizance, distinguishing that concept from "institution of prosecution" under the Act.
Maqbool Hossain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 Definition of "prosecution" as the initiation or starting of criminal proceedings before a court or judicial tribunal according to the procedure prescribed by the statute creating the offence. The court used this definition to show that "institution of prosecution" must be understood with reference to the statutory procedure for starting prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (in particular Section 20(1)).
Bhimappa v. Luxman, AIR 1970 SC 1153 Holding that "case instituted upon a complaint" (in the Code) means a case where cognizance has been taken on a complaint and not merely where a complaint has been filed but no cognizance taken. The court cited this to reinforce the distinction between a "case instituted" (post-cognizance under the Code) and the statutory "institution of prosecution" under the Act.
Sk. Osman Goni v. Baramdeo Singh, 63 Calcutta Weekly Notes, p. 181 Division Bench observation that "case instituted on a complaint" means the court has initiated proceedings on the complaint; there is no cause before the court until it initiates proceedings. The court relied on this exposition to support the view that institution of a "case" under the Code occurs when the court initiates proceedings (takes cognizance), separate from the statutory act of instituting prosecution under the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the dispute as a question of statutory construction: whether the phrase "after the institution of prosecution" in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act refers to (A) the filing of the complaint in the Court after compliance with the Act's prerequisites or (B) the later procedural stage when the Court takes cognizance of the complaint (the "institution of a case" under the Code of Criminal Procedure).

The court undertook a two-step analysis:

  1. It first examined the meaning of "institution of a case" under the Code of Criminal Procedure by reference to Jamuna Singh and Sk. Osman Goni, concluding that under the Code a "case" is instituted only when the Court takes cognizance and initiates proceedings (i.e., post-cognizance). The court emphasised that the Code distinguishes cases instituted on complaint from those instituted on police report, and in both instances the relevant moment is cognizance by the Court.
  2. It then considered what "institution of prosecution" means with reference to Maqbool Hossain's definition of "prosecution" and to the statutory procedure contained in Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Section 20(1) prescribes that no prosecution under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the appropriate authority, and contains a proviso regarding a purchaser instituting prosecution with a public analyst's report.

From a plain reading of Section 20(1) and Maqbool Hossain, the court concluded that the "institution of prosecution" under the Act occurs when the aggrieved party files the complaint after complying with Section 20(1) (i.e., after obtaining the requisite written consent). Thus, "institution of prosecution" under Section 13(2) of the Act means the filing of the complaint in accordance with the Act's procedural pre-requisites.

The court drew a clear analytical distinction: under the Act "institution of prosecution" = filing the complaint after complying with Section 20(1); under the Code "institution of a case" = the Court taking cognizance and initiating proceedings. Applying these constructions to the undisputed chronology, the Local (Health) Authority sent the Public Analyst's report on the same day the complaint was filed (7 December 1978). Because the statutory "institution of prosecution" (filing in compliance with Section 20(1)) had occurred on that date, Section 13(2)'s requirement to forward the report was properly complied with.

Consequently, the court held that the petitioner's contention — that "institution of prosecution" meant only the later stage of cognizance and that therefore Section 13(2) had not been complied with — failed. The court found no need to examine prejudice under Section 13(2A) because the interpretive point resolved the complaint of non-compliance.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Rule discharged.

Direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The petitioner's application fails and the Rule obtained in his favour is discharged.
  • The petitioner, who was on bail, is required to surrender to his bail bond to serve out the sentence imposed by the Magistrate.
  • S. N. Sanyal, J. agreed with the order; the brief concluding endorsement reads: "Rule discharged."

Broader implications:
The opinion's reasoning confines itself to statutory interpretation of the phrase "institution of prosecution" under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and distinguishes that statutory concept from the Code of Criminal Procedure concept of "institution of a case." The court did not state that it was laying down a novel precedent beyond applying established authorities to the statutory text; it addressed the parties' dispute and resolved it against the petitioner. No broader or further-reaching implications are discussed in the opinion beyond the direct effect on the parties.

    Jyotish Kumar Saha v. The State

    Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J.:—With the written consent of the Local (Health) Authority, Birbhum, Sri Dhirendra Kumar Banerjee, a Food Inspector of Birbhum filed a complaint against the petitioner in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Birbhum under S. 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (‘Act’ for short) alleging that on September 21, 1978 the petitioner exposed for sale mustard oil in his grocery shop, which on analysis was found to be adulterated. The learned Magistrate convicted the petitioner of the said offence and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month more. As the appeal preferred against the said conviction and sentence was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Second Court, Birbhum, the petitioner moved this Court in revision, and obtained the present Rule.

    2. The only point that has been urged in support of the Rule is that the provision of sub-s (2) of the S. 13 of the Act has not been properly complied with and due to such non-compliance the petitioner has been seriously prejudiced in his defence. For proper appreciation of the point so raised it will be necessary to refer to certain facts, which now stand established by the concurrent findings of the Courts below.

    3. The samples of mustard oil were taken on September 21, 1978 and were sent for analysis by the Food Inspector on September 22, 1978. On analysis the Public Analyst found the same adulterated and sent his report to the Local (Health) Authority, Birbhum on October 30, 1978; and the latter in his turn sent the report to the Food Inspector on November 27, 1978. On the basis thereof, the Food Inspector filed the complaint before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 7.12.1978, with the requisite consent of the Local (Health) Authority. On the same day the Local (Health) Authority sent a report of the Public Analyst to the petitioner by registered post; and by the forwarding memo informed the petitioner that if it was so desired he might make an application to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suri within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the report to get the sample of the mustard oil kept by the Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. The report was received by the petitioner on 13.12.78 Though the complaint was received by the learned Magistrate on 7.12.78 he took cognisance upon the complaint on December 29, 1978 and issued process against the petitioner.

    4. Mr. Roy, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, contended that the obligation of the Local (Health) Authority under Sub-s. (2) of S. 13 of the Act to send the report of the analysis was after the institution of prosecution; and since “institution of prosecution” envisaged the stage of taking cognisance there was no proper compliance with the said sub-section as the report of the Public Analyst in the instant case was sent on the date the complaint was filed, that is on December 7, 1978, and not immediately after cognisance was taken on the complaint on December 29, 1978. According to Mr. Roy, due to such non-compliance with the statutory provision of sub-s. (2) of S. 13 the petitioner was deprived of his valuable right of making an application under Sub-s. (2A) of the said section and thereby he was greatly prejudiced in his defence. The only question therefore that falls for determination in this Rule is what is the meaning of the word “institution of prosecution” appearing in S. 13(2) of the Act. If by “institution of prosecution” it means filing of complaint then there cannot be any manner of doubt, from the facts earlier stated, that there was a proper compliance with the provision of S. 13(2) of the Act. If however “institution of prosecution” refers to the stage of taking cognizance of the complaint by the Court, as contended by Mr. Roy, it must be held that there was not a proper compliance with the above provision and in that case it will be necessary to consider whether the petitioner was prejudiced in his defence due to such non-compliance. For answering the above question it will be first necessary to refer to sub-s. (2) of S. 13 of the Act, which, so far as it is relevant for our present purposes, reads as follows:—

    “On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-s. (1) of the Act that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of article of food was taken……..forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person…………, informing such person…………that if it is so desired, either or both of them (he) may make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of the receipt of copy of the report to get the sample of article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.”

    5. In support of his contention that “institution of prosecution” refers to the stage of taking cognizance by the Court, Mr. Roy first referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1541, which is an authority for the proposition that “institution of a case” in a Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, refers to the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offences alleged therein and relying upon the said authority Mr. Roy contended that “institution of prosecution”, within the meaning of S. 13(2) of the Act, and “institution of a case”, within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a Court meant one and the same thing and to supplement his above contention Mr. Roy relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maqbool Hossain v. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1953 SC 325 wherein “prosecution” has been defined. Mr. Roy also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhimappa v. Luxman, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1153 wherein it has been held that “case instituted upon a complaint” within the meaning of S. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 means a case where cognizance has been taken on a complaint and not to a case where complaint has been filed in a Court, but no cognizance has been taken thereupon.

    6. In the case of Jamuna Singh (supra) the Supreme Court, while explaining of the words “institution of a case”, observed as follows:—

    “The Code does not contain any definition of the words ‘institution of a case’. It is clear however and indeed not disputed that a case can be said to be instituted in a Court only when the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. Section 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains the provision for cognizance of offences by Magistrates. It provides for three ways in which such cognizance can be taken. The first is on receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; the second is on a report in writing of such facts—that is, facts constituting the offence—made by any police officer; the third is upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrate's own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed. Section 193 provides for cognizance of offences being taking by Courts of Sessions on commitment to it by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf. Section 194 provides for cognizance being taken by High Court of offences upon a commitment made to it in the manner provided in the Code.

    An examination of the provisions makes it clear that when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence a case is instituted in the Magistrate's Court and such a case is one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer it is a case instituted in the Magistrate's Court on a police report.”

    7. What is meant by the word ‘case’, was succinctly stated by a Division Beach of our Court in the case of Sk. Osman Goni v. Baramdeo Singh, reported in 63 Calcutta Weekly Notes, page 181. While dealing with the provisions of S. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 the Court had to consider the meaning of the words “any case instituted upon a complaint” appearing therein and in interpreting those words the Court pointed out that the Code of Criminal Procedure made a specific distinction between two classes of proceedings or cases, one instituted on the complaint and the other instituted on police report and observed that ‘case instituted on a complaint’ could only mean case in which cognizance was taken upon a complaint. The Court further observed:—

    “The expressions ‘proceedings’ and ‘cases’ in the different sections already noticed appear to me to have been used in the same sense. A case is a cause and there is no cause before the Court until the Court initiates proceedings on the basis of it.”

    8. The above observations made by the Division Bench clearly shows that ‘institution of a case’ relates to a stage when the Court initiates proceeding on a complaint, or a charge-sheet as the case may be. That is to say, when the Court takes cognizance upon the complaint or the charge-sheet it can be said that a ‘case’ is instituted before a Court within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    9. Now that we have found the meaning of the words “institution of a case” in a Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, let us find out the meaning of the words ‘institution of prosecution” with particular reference to S. 13(2) of the Act. In the case of Moqbool Hossain (supra) ‘prosecution’ has been defined to mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a Court of law or judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure. Section 20(1) of the Act provides the procedure for initiation or starting of proceeding; and it reads as follows:—

    “20. Cognizance and trial of offences—(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act (not being an offence under S. 14 of S. 14-4) shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, (the Central Government or the State Government) or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government.

    Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in S. 12, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint.”

    10. From a plain reading of the above sub-section including the proviso thereof, it will be ineluctably clear that as so on as the party aggrieved files the complaint before the Court, after complying with the requirement of S. 20(1) the prosecution is instituted. “Institution of prosecution” under the Act, and for that matter under S. 13(2) thereof, therefore means filing of the complaint after complying with the perquisites of S. 20(1). On receiving the complaint when the Court applies its judicial mind and takes cognizance of the offence disclosed by the complaint, under S. 190(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it amounts to ‘institution of a case’ in a Court, within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as pointed out in the case of Jamuna Singh (supra) and becomes a ‘case instituted upon a complaint’ under S. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ???, as held in the case of Bhimappa (supra). In view of the above discussion the first contention of Mr. Roy fails and the second contention becomes otiose.

    11. The application accordingly fails and the Rule is discharged. The petitioner who is on bail will now surrender to his bail bond to serve out the sentence.

    S.N Sanyal, J.:—I agree.

    Rule discharged.

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    Comments

    Jyotish Kumar Saha v. The State
    (Jul 17, 1981)