R. Banumathi, J.— Leave granted. This appeal by way of special leave under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been preferred by the claimant assailing the judgment and order dated 12-7-2016 in K. Subbarayudu v. Collector LAASMP No. 61 of 2015 in LAAS (SR) No. 12334 of 2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh by which the High Court declined to condone the delay of 3671 days in filing the appeal and dismissed the appeal.
2. A Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 1-10-1990 for acquiring land to an extent of Ac.32.77 in Reach No. 11 of Nellepalli Village for foreshore submersion of Kandaleru Reservoir under Telugu Ganga Project. After conducting the award enquiry, the Land Acquisition Officer, Telugu Ganga Project, Rapur passed an award, in Award No. 12/91-92 dated 30-1-1992. The award was passed after taking into account the sale statistics for the preceding three years prior to the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act which was obtained from the Sub-Registrar, Rapur and after verification of all sales, the land value was fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer and approved by the Special Collector, Telugu Ganga Project, Nellore as per norms prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 amended in 1984. The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) awarded compensation for cultivable dry lands at Rs 9000 per acre and for cultivable wasteland at Rs 7000 per acre. The Land Acquisition Officer also awarded compensation of Rs 50-70 for each lime tree and compensation of Rs 32 for each pomegranate tree. The land was taken possession on 2-3-1994 and compensation paid to the landowners.
3. As against compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, reference was made under Section 18 of the Act to the Senior Civil Judge, Gudur. Before the Reference Court, on behalf of the claimants, CW 1 was examined and Exts. A-1 to A-5 were marked. On behalf of the referring officer, one of its employees was examined as RW 1 and the particulars showing the compensation awarded by the LAO, Ext. B-1 was marked. The Reference Court by its judgment and order dated 6-8-2004 in LAOP No. 22 of 1993 enhanced the market value of land from Rs 9000 to Rs 12,000 for cultivable dry land and from Rs 7000 to Rs 10,000 for cultivable wasteland per acre. Further the Reference Court fixed the market value of the trees to Rs 100 per tree as against Rs 50 to Rs 70 awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and confirmed the rate of Rs 32 per pomegranate tree as fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer basing on the age of the trees.
4. Dissatisfied with the enhanced compensation, the appellant claimants approached the High Court referring to the order in LAO v. Peddireddy Madhava Reddy AS No. 1749 of 2004 dated 1-3-2013 and other judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. However, there was a delay of 3671 days in so preferring the appeal. The High Court dismissed LAAS (MP) No. 61 of 2015 in LAAS (SR) No. 12334 of 2014 LAASMP No. 61 of 2015 in LAAS (SR) No. 12334 of 2014 on the ground of inordinate delay of 3671 days since the High Court was of the view that no sufficient cause was shown for the delay and held that the delay sought to be condoned was not on account of a bona fide mistake but was merely intended to make gain basing on the assessment of value of pomegranate trees in the decisions of Peddireddy Madhava Reddy AS No. 1749 of 2004 and Pidugu Seshugari Lakshmi Devi.
5. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellants are before us by way of special leave to appeal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate that the claimants have given satisfactory explanation for the delay of 3671 days in filing the appeal before the High Court and while so the High Court has erred in declining to condone the delay. It was further submitted that in LASS No. 46 of 2015, the High Court was pleased to condone the delay of 3386 days in filing the land acquisition appeal suit subject to the condition that in the event, the appellant claimants succeed in the appeal, she is not entitled to any interest in respect of the period of delay and the same approach ought to have been adopted in case of the appellants also. Insofar as the quantum of compensation is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of this Court in Pidugu Kondala Rayudu v. LAO (2017) 12 SCC 848 dated 29-11-2016 whereby this Court has awarded compensation of Rs 3000 per pomegranate tree in connection with lands acquired for Somashila Project submergence. The learned counsel for the appellant prayed that the same amount of compensation of Rs 3000 per pomegranate tree be awarded to the appellant.
7. Per contra, supporting the judgment of the High Court, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that reason for inordinate delay of 3671 days was not satisfactorily explained and the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in declining to condone the delay. Insofar as the judgment in Pidugu Kondala Rayudu v. LAO (2017) 12 SCC 848 is concerned, it is submitted that the said order relates to Somashila Project submergence of which the award was of the year 1999 and the same cannot be applied to the present case.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. Perused the impugned judgment and considered the documents and other materials placed on record.
9. The High Court dismissed the claimants' appeal mainly on the ground of delay of 3671 days in filing the appeal. On perusal of records, it is seen that the appellants have explained the reason for the delay in filing the appeal stating that they have entrusted the relevant papers to their co-villager, namely, Pullaiah who is well-conversant with the court proceedings and the said Pullaiah has also taken steps to engage an advocate at Hyderabad and the said Pullaiah informed that the appeal was filed and left for Kuwait to eke out his livelihood. Thus the appellant claimants were under the impression that the appeal has been filed. The claimants have further stated that when they inquired the said Pullaiah, he informed them that he went to the house of Shri Jaganmohan Raju, Advocate and he learnt that the said advocate is no more and expired in 2012 itself and on enquiry with the clerk of the said advocate, he learnt that no appeal has been filed and this has caused a delay of 3671 days in filing the appeal. The High Court rejected the explanation given by the appellants on the ground that there are contradictions between the affidavit filed by the said Pullaiah and the stand of the claimants and being not satisfied with the reason for the delay of 3671 days in preferring the appeal, the High Court dismissed the appeal.
10. Before the High Court, the appellants relied upon Yellasiri Sarojanamma case, in which the High Court condoned the delay of 3386 days in filing the land acquisition appeal suit subject to the condition that in the event, the appellant claimant thereon succeed in appeal, she is not entitled to any interest in respect of the period of delay. The appellants contended that the same approach ought to have been adopted in the case of the appellants also. Insofar as, the reliance placed upon by the claimants in LASS No. 46 of 2015, the High Court seems to have brushed aside the contention of the appellants on the puerile ground that the relevant fact situation in the said case is not forthcoming in the said order. In our view, the High Court was not right in adopting a different yardstick in the case of the appellants in not condoning the delay.
11. The term “sufficient cause” is to receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is attributable to the appellants, the Court should adopt a justice-oriented approach in condoning the delay. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752, it was held as under:
“8. … Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient.”
12. With the acquisition of lands, the lifeline of the agriculturist is lost. There may be omission on the part of the claimants to adopt extra vigilance; but same need not be used as a ground to depict them with negligence or want of bona fides. In case of acquisition of lands of agriculturists, the courts ought to adopt a pragmatic approach to award just and reasonable compensation and not be pedantic in their approach. In Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 14 SCC 127, (2014) 9 Scale 441, it was held as under:
“15. Equities can be balanced by denying the appellants' interest for the period for which they did not approach the Court. The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hypertechnical view of self-imposed limitations. In the matter of compensation for land acquisition, we are of the view that approach of the court has to be pragmatic and not pedantic.”
13. When the court concerned has exercised its discretion either condoning or declining to condone the delay, normally the superior court will not interfere in exercise of such discretion. The true guide is whether the litigant has acted with due diligence. Since the appellant claimants are the agriculturists whose lands were acquired and when similarly situated agriculturists were given a higher rate of compensation, there is no reason to decline the same to the appellants. Merely on the ground of delay such benefit cannot be denied to the appellants. The interest of justice would be served by declining the interest on the enhanced compensation and also on the solatium and other statutory benefits for the period of delay.
14. Insofar as the compensation for the pomegranate trees is concerned, the appellants have placed reliance on the judgment of this Court dated 29-11-2016, in Pidugu Kondala Rayudu v. LAO (2017) 12 SCC 848. Planting, raising and making commercial use of fruit-bearing trees is a painstaking affair and cost of the same is consistently on rise as the years are passing by which is to be kept in view. Award of compensation in relation to fruit-bearing trees depends on facts and circumstances of each case. It has been held in Kerala SEB v. Livisha (2007) 6 SCC 792, in the following terms:
“11. So far as the compensation in relation to fruit-bearing trees are concerned the same would also depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. We may, incidentally, refer to a recent decision of this Court in LAO v. Kamadana Ramakrishna Rao (2007) 3 SCC 526 wherein claim on yield basis has been held to be relevant for determining the amount of compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act, same principle has been reiterated in Kapur Singh Mistri v. State of Punjab 1995 Supp (2) SCC 635, State of Haryana v. Gurcharan Singh 1995 Supp (2) SCC 637, para 4 and Airports Authority of India v. Satyagopal Roy (2002) 3 SCC 527.”
15. In the facts and circumstances of the said case, in Pidugu Kondala Rayudu v. LAO (2017) 12 SCC 848, considering the cost of planting and efforts involved in growing trees in general and in particular raising the pomegranate trees over the efflux of time, this Court deemed it appropriate to award Rs 3000 as compensation for each of the pomegranate tree.
16. However, the compensation of Rs 3000 per pomegranate tree, as has been awarded in the abovementioned case, cannot be made applicable to the present case, considering the fact that award of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer in the said case dated 8-3-1999, as opposed to award in the present case which is dated 30-1-1992. A period of about seven years is a considerable period to be taken note of while computing cost of planting and raising fruit-bearing trees. It is obvious that seven years back a fruit-bearing tree would have fetched lesser income than it would fetch now. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and taking into consideration that the appellants were also awarded compensation for the land, we deem it appropriate to award compensation of Rs 1500 for each pomegranate tree.
17. Insofar as the lime trees are concerned, fresh limes are available throughout the year and have good market and the lime trees are earning income almost throughout the year. The Reference Court enhanced the compensation of Rs 70 to Rs 100 per tree as against the compensation of Rs 52 to Rs 70 awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. While considering the question of awarding compensation to lime trees, in Imambi v. LAO (2011) 11 SCC 639, this Court held as under:
“10. There is no specific documentary evidence in regard to the actual income from the orchard. As the reports of experts of the State Government assessed the gross annual income from each tree as Rs 150-200, it would be appropriate to take the average thereof, namely, Rs 175 as the annual income per tree in this case. If Rs 35 is deducted towards the cost of cultivation and other expenses as recommended by the experts, the net annual income would have been Rs 140 per tree or Rs 1,06,540 for 761 trees.”
Applying the ratio of the above decision, Rs 250 is awarded as the annual income per tree. Compensation of Rs 100 per each lime tree enhanced to Rs 250 is awarded.
18. Compensation awarded to the appellants is enhanced to Rs 1500 for each pomegranate tree and Rs 250 for each lime tree. The appellants are also entitled to all statutory benefits like solatium and other benefits and interest on the same. It is further directed that the appellants shall not be entitled to any interest during the period of delay of 3671 days. The appeal is partly allowed in the above terms. Parties are to bear their respective costs.