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citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • clause (h) of sub-Section (1) of S ection 22 and Section 62
  • Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008
  • Clauses (c), (e) and (f) C of sub-Section (1) of Section 22,
  • Security Interest Act, 2002 and Companies Act, 1956)
  • provisions of Rules 283 (B), 12 283(C), 283(E) and 283(F)
  • clause (h) of sub- section (1) of section 22; (o)
  • Section 24 22, rule
  • (Rule 283-C). With the Rules
  • clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 22;
  • clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22
  • Clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22 o P f the Act.
  • Appropriation Act under Article 266(3) read t with Article 114 of the Constitution.
  • Service) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • clause (h) of sub-Section (1) of S ection 22 and Section 62
  • Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008
  • Clauses (c), (e) and (f) C of sub-Section (1) of Section 22,
  • Security Interest Act, 2002 and Companies Act, 1956)
  • provisions of Rules 283 (B), 12 283(C), 283(E) and 283(F)
  • clause (h) of sub- section (1) of section 22; (o)
  • Section 24 22, rule
  • (Rule 283-C). With the Rules
  • clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 22;
  • clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22
  • Clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22 o P f the Act.
  • Appropriation Act under Article 266(3) read t with Article 114 of the Constitution.
  • Service) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners challenged the State of Himachal Pradesh's amendments to the Himachal Pradesh Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008, particularly provisions allowing the State Welfare Board to provide "assistance" in the form of goods such as bicycles, induction heaters, solar cookers, solar lamps, and washing machines instead of cash to beneficiaries under the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996. The petitioners contended that such distribution of goods was beyond the legislative competence and violated constitutional principles. The High Court reserved its judgment on June 14, 2017, and delivered its decision on July 13, 2017.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State is within its rights to provide assistance to beneficiaries in the form of goods rather than cash under clause (h) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22 and Section 62 of the Building and Other Construction Workers Act, 1996.
  2. Whether the principle of ejusdem generis restricts the rule-making power to only financial assistance and excludes distribution of goods as welfare measures.
  3. Whether the distribution of goods as "freebies" violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India by being arbitrary and lacking equality.
  4. Whether the amendments to the Rules empowering the Board to provide goods are unconstitutional, illegal, or arbitrary.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Invoked the principle of ejusdem generis to argue that clause (h) of Section 22 is residuary and must be read in conjunction with clauses (a) to (g), which refer only to financial assistance, thereby excluding distribution of goods.
  • Contended that the State's distribution of goods is arbitrary and violative of Article 14, as it constitutes "hand outs" rather than enabling beneficiaries to live with dignity.
  • Asserted that providing goods as freebies has no connection with the objects of the Act and does not satisfy the Heydon's test of statutory interpretation.
  • Argued that the distribution of goods is not directly related to the constitutionally recognized right to live with basic human dignity.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Justified the amendments as being within the permissible legislative scope and in public interest.
  • Asserted that the distribution of goods enhances the efficiency and quality of life of beneficiaries, particularly female workers who are socially and economically disadvantaged.
  • Maintained that the provision of goods as welfare measures falls squarely within the legislative intent of the Act and Rule-making powers.
  • Contended that the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be used to defeat the dominant statutory purpose of the socially beneficial legislation.
  • Argued that distribution of goods as State largesse is linked to directive principles of State policy and is not violative of Article 14.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. and another vs. State of U.P. and others, (2005) 2 SCC 515 Application and limitations of the ejusdem generis principle Used to explain that ejusdem generis applies only when the common purpose ("societas") is clear and not merely by contiguity.
Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal and others, AIR 1967 SC 1857 Requirement of a distinct genus or category for invoking ejusdem generis Referred to emphasize that the general term must relate to the same kind as the specific terms.
State of Bombay and others vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, AIR 1960 SC 610 Limits of ejusdem generis and when wider words are deliberately used Applied to show that the rule of ejusdem generis cannot override clear legislative intent.
Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni @ Moopil Nayar vs. The States of Madras and Kerala and others, AIR 1960 SC 1080 Permissible inference in applying ejusdem generis Used to illustrate that the rule is not inviolable and depends on legislative intent.
The Corporation of the City of Nagpur vs. Its employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 Non-application of ejusdem generis where legislative intent is clear Supported the Court's view that clear legislative language prevails over the rule.
Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, (1979) 4 SCC 573 Statutory interpretation considering general purpose of the Act Emphasized reading the statute as a whole to find legislative intent beyond mechanical literalism.
Transport Corporation of India vs. ESI Corporation, 2000 1 SCC 332 Liberal interpretation of beneficial legislation Applied to justify a purposive and liberal approach to social welfare laws.
R. L. Arora vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others, AIR 1964 SC 1230 Contextual and purposive interpretation over literalism Supported the approach of interpreting statutory provisions in light of context and purpose.
Lanco Anpara Power Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2016) 10 SCC 329 Purposive interpretation in social amelioration legislation Used to affirm that social welfare legislation requires purposive interpretation to fulfill legislative intent.
Babaji Kondaji Garad vs. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Nasik and others, (1984) 2 SCC 50 Challenge to distribution of goods as unrelated to statutory object Court respectfully disagreed with petitioners’ reliance, distinguishing the facts.
Common Cause, a Registered Society vs. Union of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 530 Allegation of arbitrariness in State largesse Held that the case did not deal with the issue in present controversy.
Meerut Development Authority vs. Association of Management Studies and another, (2009) 6 SCC 171 Allegation of arbitrariness in State largesse Distinguished as not relevant to the present issue.
S. Subramaniam Balaji vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, (2013) 9 SCC 659 Legitimacy of State largesse and freebies under Article 14 and public purpose Accepted that distribution of goods as State largesse is linked to directive principles and is not unconstitutional if done following due process.
Bhim Singh vs. Union of India, (2010) 5 SCC 538 Government expenditure and requirement of legislative backing Clarified that government schemes involving expenditure must be backed by law, which was satisfied here.
Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279 Interpretation of "and" as disjunctive or conjunctive Applied to hold that the expression "and" in the Act should be read disjunctively, supporting separate categories.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the principle of ejusdem generis, explaining its application and limitations through established precedents. It concluded that the principle cannot be mechanically applied to restrict the rule-making power under the Act, especially when the legislative intent is clear and unambiguous.

The Court analyzed the provisions of the Building and Other Construction Workers Act, 1996, noting that the Act is a socially beneficial legislation aimed at regulating conditions of service and providing welfare measures for construction workers. It highlighted that Section 22(1)(h) empowers the Welfare Board to "make provision and improvement of such other welfare measures and facilities as may be prescribed," which is a separate and distinct category from clauses (a) to (g) that deal with financial assistance.

The Court emphasized that the word "other" in clause (h) indicates a distinct genus that includes welfare measures beyond financial assistance, thus permitting the provision of goods as welfare facilities. The rule-making power under Section 62 further authorizes the State to frame rules for such welfare measures, which the State exercised by amending the Rules to include distribution of goods like bicycles and washing machines.

The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that distribution of goods is arbitrary or violative of Article 14, holding that the distribution is aimed at enhancing the beneficiaries’ efficiency and living conditions, particularly for socially and economically disadvantaged female workers. It found no evidence of mala fide or sub-standard goods being supplied.

The Court adopted a liberal and purposive interpretation of the Act, consistent with the principles governing beneficial legislation. It relied on several precedents affirming that social welfare statutes should be construed to fulfill legislative intent and not be confined to narrow literalism.

Further, the Court noted that State largesse in the form of goods is linked to the directive principles of State policy and does not violate Article 14, as the principle of treating unequals equally applies only where the State imposes burdens, not where it confers benefits. It acknowledged the limited financial resources of the State and the need for gradual extension of benefits.

Finally, the Court dismissed the petition, holding the State's amendments to the Rules and the distribution of goods as welfare measures to be constitutionally valid, rational, and within legislative competence.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed.

The Court upheld the amendments empowering the Welfare Board to provide assistance in the form of goods to beneficiaries under the Building and Other Construction Workers Act, 1996. This decision affirms the permissibility of providing welfare measures beyond mere financial assistance, recognizing the legislative intent to enhance the dignity and living conditions of construction workers, especially female beneficiaries. The ruling clarifies that the principle of ejusdem generis cannot override clear statutory intent in social welfare legislation. There is no finding of arbitrariness or constitutional violation in the State's scheme, and no new precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties was established.

    Kuldeep & Another Petitioners v. State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others S

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    CWP No. 265 of 2017-G .

    Judgment reserved on: 14.6.2017 Date of Decision : July 13 , 2017 . Pp>

    Kuldeep & another f … Pe H titioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others …Respondents

    o

    Coram: t The Hon'ble Mr. Justice San u jay K r arol, Acting Chief Justice, The Hon'ble Mr. Justice, Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

    Whether approved for re o porting?1Yes. For the petitioner C : Ms. Vikramjit Banerjee, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Anshul Bansal & Mr. Vaibhav Chadha, Advocates, for the petitioners. For the r h espondent : Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Advocate General with Mr. g

    Anup Rattan & Mr. Romesh Verma, Addl. i

    Advocate Generals and Mr. J. K. Verma, Dy. A.G. for respondents No. 1,2 and 4. H

    Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Senior Advocate, with Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No. 3. Sanjay Karol, ACJ.

    The short issue which arises for consideration in the present petition is as to whether the State is well within

    Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

    1

    2

    its right in providing "assistance", in the shape of

    "goods"/"articles" such as "bicycle", "induction heater/solar .

    cooker with utensils", "solar lamp" or "washing machine P ", in place of "cash" to the beneficiaries (male and/ H or fem . ale) in view of clause (h) of sub-Section (1) of S ection 22 and Section 62 of The Building and Other Con f struction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Cond o itions of Service) Act,

    1996 (hereinafter referred to as t t he Act).

    2. By invoking the p r rovisions of ejusdem generis, Mr. Banerjee, lear o ned u Senior Advocate, contends that amendments carried out and/or insertions made in Rule 283(B), 283(C C ), 283(E) and 283(F) of the Himachal Pradesh

    Buildin h g an d Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Em g ployment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008 (in i short the 'Rules'), in terms of notification dated 14.8.2014 H

    (Annexure P-8), are violative of Section 22 (1)(a) to (g) of the Act, for clause (h) of the said Section, on which reliance is sought for by the State is only residuary in nature; necessarily to be read wholly in conjunction with other

    provisions of the Section; the clause has to be read

    contextually, restricting the rule making power only to the

    3

    extent of providing "financial assistance" and not making any provision for distribution of goods. Further the act of the .

    State in the distribution of goods, which are in the natu P re of

    "freebies", in an arbitrary manner, is violative of Art . icle 14 of the Constitution of India, not meeting the tes H t of equality and non arbitrariness. Also distribution is f in the nature of

    "hand outs", and rather than allowing o the beneficiary to live a life with basic human dign r ity, t th e State is burdening by fastening the goods upon u them. 3. On the o o ther hand, learned Advocate General, justifies the action to be in public interest and within the permissible le C gislative scope and competence.

    Ejusde h m Ge neris 4. g Let us first understand what is this principle of i ejusdem generis (noscitur a soccis), on which much H

    emphasis has been laid down by the petitioners. Scanning through several decisions rendered by different Benches (Constitutional or otherwise, of the Supreme Court of India), over a period of time, one finds inter alia, the following

    principle to be laid down:-

    4

    a) Application of maxim ejusdem generis, (noscitur a soccis) may be treacherous unless .

    the "societas" (the fact or condition of . b P eing associated for a common purpose - Oxford) to which the "socii" (keeping compan y H with another - Oxford) belongs, are known. f The risk may be present when there is no o other factor except

    contiguity to suggest t t he "societas" [Godfrey

    Phillips India u Ltd. r and another vs. State of U.P. and othe o rs, (2005) 2 SCC 515)(A Five Judge Bench]. b ) C For invoking the principle there must be a h distinct genus or category running through the g

    bodies already named. [Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal i

    and others, AIR 1967 SC 1857 (A Five-Judge H

    Bench)]. c) Where two or more words susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate

    sense. They take, as it were, their colour from

    and are qualified by each other, the meaning of

    5

    the general word being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. [Godfrey .

    Phillips India Ltd. (supra)]. P

    d) It is merely a rule of const H ructio . n and cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been delibera f tel y used in order

    to make the scope o o f the defined word correspondingly w r ide t r. It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words w o ith w u ords of narrower significance is doubtful that the such rule applies.[The State of B om C bay and others vs. The Hospital Mazdoor h Sabha and others, AIR 1960 SC 610]. g

    e) When general words follow particular and i

    specific words of the same nature, then general H

    words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but only a permissible inference, in the absence of an indication to the

    contrary. [Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni @

    Moopil Nayar vs. The States of Madras and

    6

    Kerala and others, AIR 1960 SC 1080 (A Five Judge Bench) and Maharashtra University of .

    Health Sciences and others vs. Satchi P kitsa Prasark Mandal and others, (2010) 3 H SCC 7 . 86 ]. f) The said doctrine, cannot be invoked in cases where the intention of t f he Legislature is clear and free of ambiguity o . [The Corporation of

    the City of Nagpu r r vs t . I ts employees, AIR 1960 SC 675].

    g) Wh o at ne u eds examination is whether: (i) The statute contains an enumeration by s pe C cific words; (ii) The members of the h enumeration constitute a class; (iii) The class is g

    not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) A general i

    term follows the enumeration; and (v) There is H

    not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. [Jage Ram and others vs. State of Haryana and others, (1971) 1 SCC 671 and

    Grasim Industries ltd. vs. Collector of Customs,

    Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297].

    7

    h) If a list or string or family of genus- describing terms are followed by wider or .

    residuary or sweeping-up words, then the ve P rbal context and the linguistic implica H tions . of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.[ M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) f Lt d. vs. Union of

    India and another, (1989 ) 2 o SCC 458] i) The rule mu r st t be confined within narrow limits, and g u eneral or comprehensive words should r o eceive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their i nte C ndment. [State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan, h (1955) 2 SCR 868] g

    j) The purpose of this doctrine is to reconcile i

    any incompatibility between specific and general H

    words so that all words in a Statute can be given effect and no word becomes superfluous. [Satchikitsa Prasark Mandal and others (supra)]

    5. We now proceed to examine the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Act came to be notified w.e.f. 19.8.1996. Bare perusal of the provisions reveals that it is a

    8

    socially beneficial legislation, intended to inter alia regulate conditions of service of building and other construction .

    workers; provide for their safety, health and we P lfare measures; and for other matters connected H therew . ith or incidental thereto.

    6. The Act is divided into eleven c f ha pters. Chapter V (Sections 18 to 27) deals wit h o the constitution and functions of the State Welfar r e B t oards; Chapter VI (Sections 28 to 37) prescribes a u nd provides availability of certain amenities to the w o orkers; Chapter VII (Sections 38 to 41) mandates for taking certain safety and health measures; Chapter XI ( Se C ctions 56 to 64) inter alia deals with the rule making power.

    7. g h One only notices that the Act itself provides i establishment and setting up of facilities such as drinking H

    water, latrines, urinals, accommodation, creches, first aid, canteen and health related issues amenities. 8. Section 18 mandates constitution of the Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Board and Section

    22, with which we are concerned, prescribes functions to be

    performed in the following terms:-

    9

    "22. Functions of the Board. -

    (1) The Board may -

    (a) provide immediate assistance to a .

    beneficiary in case of accident;

    (b) make payment of pension t . o Pthe beneficiaries who have complete H d the age of sixty years;

    (c) sanction loans and a dvances to a beneficiary for constr o uctionf of a house not exceeding such a t mo unt and on such terms and conditions as m r ay be prescribed; (d) pay such amount in connection with premia f u or G oup Insurance Scheme of the beneficiaries as it may deem fit;

    (e) o give such financial assistance for the C education of children of the beneficiaries as may be prescribed; (f) meet such medical expenses for treatment h

    of major ailments of a beneficiary or, such g

    dependent, as may be prescribed; i

    (g) make payment of maternity benefit to the female beneficiaries; and

    H

    (h) make provision and improvement of such other welfare measures and facilities as may be prescribed……….." [Emphasis supplied]

    9. Section 62 of the Act empowers the 'appropriate Government', so defined under Section 2(1)(a), which in the instant case is the Government of Himachal Pradesh, to

    10

    frame Rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act, relevant clauses whereof, reads as under:- .

    "62. Power to make rules. -

    (1) The appropriate Government may, . Pafter consultation with the expert committee, by notification, make rules for f car ry H ing out the provisions of this Act.

    (2) In particular and w ith o out prejudice to the generality of the for t egoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, name u ly: - r (a) …

    (n) the a o mount payable as house building loans o r C advances, the terms and conditions of such payment under clause (c), educational h assistance under clause (e) medical expenses g

    payable and the persons who shall be the i

    dependent of the beneficiaries under clause (f), H

    and the other welfare measures for which provision may be made under clause (h) of sub- section (1) of section 22; (o) the limits of grants-in-aid payable to the local authorities and employers under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 22;

    …"

    [Emphasis supplied]

    11

    10. In exercise of its rule making power, the State Government vide notification dated 4.12.2008 framed the .

    "Rules". Part-V, Chapter-XXX of the said Rules provid P e for assistance by way of disbursement of money. H Such . Rules came to be amended from time to time with the issuance of notifications on 8.7.2010 (page 154) and f 17.11.2011 (page

    155) when for the first time provision o s for making payment as maternity/paternity be r nef t its and other financial assistance under vario u us heads, including purchase of bicycle to a lady o worker (Rule 283-B) came to be introduced. With the issuance of notification dated 9.5.2013 the Rules c am C e to be further amended by incorporating a provisi h on for grant of financial assistance for marriages (R g ule 282); enhancing the limit of financial assistance from i ` 2,000/- to ` 3,000/- for purchase of bicycle to female H

    workers (Rule 283-B); and providing financial assistance for purchase of kerosene/diesel stoves (Rule 283-C). With the Rules being amended further (fourth time), with the issuance of impugned notification dated 14.8.2014

    (Annexure P-8), inter alia, the provisions of Rules 283 (B),

    12

    283(C), 283(E) and 283(F) came to be substituted/incorporated in the following terms:- .

    "283 (B) Bicycle to the female beneficiaries. - The female beneficiary after completion of two mont P hs of the membership may be provided a bicycle on.ly once by the Board on rate contract f ap pr H oved by the Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh and this assistance will be provided to one female beneficiary in the family. Those fema le o beneficiaries who have already availed such conveyance assistance of `

    3,000/- (Rupees thr r ee t thousand only) shall not be eligible for gett u ing this assistance. The application for this assistance shall be submitted by the said beneficiar o y to the Secretary or authorized officer in form C No. XLVIII alongwith requisite documents.". …… . … … … … h "283(C) Induction heater with four utensils or Solar g

    cooker. - The Board may provide one induction i

    heater alongwith four specific utensils through rate contract approved by the Controller of Stores,

    H

    Himachal Pradesh or one solar cooker through Himurja to a beneficiary or his family once. The application for this assistance shall be submitted by the beneficiary to the Secretary or authorized officer of the Board in Form No. XLVIII alongwith requisite

    documents.".

    … … …

    "283 (E) Solar lamp. - The Board may provide one Solar lamp as a one time incentive, on rate contract

    13

    approved by the Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh, to the beneficiary. The application for this assistance shall be submitted by the beneficiary to .

    the Secretary or authorized officer of the Board in form No. XLVIII alongwith requisite documents . ." P

    … … …

    "283 (F) Washing Machine for female H beneficiary. - The Board may provide one wash ing machine to female beneficiary as a onetimef incentive on rate contract approved by t the o Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh. T r his be nefit will be provided only once per family. The application for this assistance shall be sub u mitted by the beneficiary to the Secretary or authorized officer of the Board in form No. XLVIII o alongwith requisite documents.". C [Emphasis supplied] 11. I t is not in dispute that the Rules continued to be implem h ented and for the first time, challenge came to be la g id with the filing of the present petition on 8.2.2017. i Principles of interpretation of Statutes H

    12. We now proceed to examine the principles to be applied for interpreting the Statute. Every Statute consists of two parts i.e. letter and the sense. It is the internal sense of the letter that would make the law and not mere letter.

    The primary rule of interpretation of statutes may be the

    literal rule, however, in the case of beneficial legislations

    14

    and legislations enacted for the welfare of employees/workmen, the Court has adopted liberal rule of .

    interpretation to ensure that the benefits extend to t P hose workers who need to be covered based on the H inten . tion of the legislature do remain the same.

    13. Such a beneficial piece of legi f sla tion has to be construed in its correct perspective o so as to fructify the legislative intention, underlyi r ng t its enactment. When two views are possible on u its applicability to a given set of employees, that view which furthers the legislative intention should be preferre o d to the one which would frustrate it.

    [Transport C or C pn. of India vs. ESI Corpn., (2000) 1 SCC 332]. 14. h A literal interpretation is not always the only in g terpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has i to look at the setting in which the words are used and the H

    circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used. [R. L. Arora vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &

    others, AIR 1964 SC 1230].

    15

    15. It is also one of the cardinal canons of construction that no Statute can be interpreted in such a .

    way as to render a part of it otiose. [Satchikitsa Pras P arak Mandal and others (supra)]. .

    16. In Organo Chemical Industries v. Un H ion of India, (1979) 4 SCC 573, the Court observed that f :

    "23…Each word, phrase o o r sentence is to be considered in the light t of general purpose of the Act itself. A bare mecha r nical interpretation of the words 'devoid of con u cept or purpose' will reduce most of legislation to futility. It is a salutary rule, well establishe o d, that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole."

    … …"41 C … . A policy-oriented interpretation, when a h welfare legislation falls for determination, especially g

    in the context of a developing country, is sanctioned i

    by principle and precedent and is implicit in Article 37 of the Constitution since the judicial branch is, in H

    a sense, part of the State. So it is reasonable to assign to 'damages' a larger, fulfilling meaning." 17. In Lanco Anpara Power Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2016) 10 SCC 329, it has been held as under:-

    " 40. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative, irrespective of anything else. This is so eloquently brought out in the

    16

    following passage in the case of Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia ., (1988) 4 SCC 284:

    "9. Judicial time and energy is more often than .

    not consumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other words, the wil . l oPf the people. Blackstone tells us that t H he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by explorin f g h is intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and t pro ba o ble. And these signs are either the wo r rds, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and u reason of the law. See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st Edn. of 176 o 5, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, C p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Poppatlal Shah v. State Of Madras, 1953 AIR(SC) 274 said that each word, h

    phrase or sentence was to be construed in the g

    light of purpose of the Act itself. But words i

    must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them said Judge Learned Hand, a long

    H

    time ago. It appears, therefore, that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislature has used and the true meaning of what words [Ed.: Lord Reid in the aforecited

    case had observed: (All ER p. 814) "We often

    say that we are looking for the intention of

    Parliament, but this is not quite accurate. We

    are seeking the meaning of the words which

    17

    Parliament used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said."] as was said by Lord Reid in .

    Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papie . rw P erke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G, 1975 1 AllER 810 . We are clearly of the opinion H that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law ."

    o (Empfhasis supplied) "42. We would also like t to reproduce a passage from Workmen of Ameri r can Express v. Management of American Express, (1985) 4 SCC 71, which provides complete answ u er to the argument of the appellants based on literal construction:

    '4. o The principles of statutory construction are C well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put h

    in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian g

    dimensions. In construing these legislations the i

    imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its

    H

    misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the "colour", the "content" and the "context" of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in

    Prenn v. Simmonds, 1971 3 AllER 237 ). In the

    same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that

    law is not to be left behind in some island of

    literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond

    18

    the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal ling P uistic .considerations...' "

    Act is a socially beneficial legislation .

    18. That the Act is a beneficial legisla tio H n cannot be disputed as in any case, the issue bein f g no longer res integra, stands settled by th t e Ap o ex Court in Dewan Chand Builders and Contractors Versus Union of India and others, (2012) 1 SCC 10 u 1 and r Lanco Anpara Power Limited (supra).

    19. In Dewan o Chand Builders (supra) the Apex Court held that:- C

    h" [3] The background in which the BOCW Act was g

    enacted, is set out in the Statement of Objects and i

    Reasons, appended to the Bill preceding its enactment. To better appreciate the legislative H

    intent, it would be instructive to refer to the following extract from the Statement of Objects and Reasons : "(1)It is estimated that about 8.5. Million workers in the country are engaged in building and other construction works. Building and other construction workers are one of the most

    numerous and vulnerable segments of the

    unorganized labour in India. The building and

    other construction works are characterized by

    19

    their inherent risk to the life and limb of the workers. The work is also characterized by its casual nature, temporary relationship bet P ween .employer and employee, uncertain working hours, lack of basic amenities and inad . equacy of welfare facilities. In the absenc H e of adequate statutory provisions, the re f qui site information regarding the number and nature of accidents is also not forthcoming. In the absence of such information, it is difficu o lt to fix responsibility or

    to take any correctiv e action.

    (2) Although th t e provisions of certain Central Acts are u appli r cable to the building and other construction workers yet a need has been felt for o a comprehensive Central Legislation for C regulating their safety, health, welfare and other conditions of service." [4] A fairly long preamble to the BOCW Act is h

    again indicative of its purpose. It reads thus: g

    "An Act to regulate the employment and i

    conditions of service of building and other construction workers and to

    H

    provide for their safety, health and welfare measures and for other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."

    … … …

    7. The scheme of the BOCW Act is that it empowers the Central Government and the State Governments to constitute Welfare Boards to provide and monitor social security schemes and welfare

    20

    measures for the benefit of the building and other construction workers". … … …

    … … … .

    10. It is thus, clear from the scheme of the BOCW Act that its sole aim is the welfare of buildi . ngP and construction workers, directly relatable to their constitutionally recognised right to liv H e with basic human dignity, enshrined in A f rti cle 21 of the Constitution of India. It en o visages a network of authorities at the Centr t al and State levels to ensure that the benefit of th r e legislation is made available to every building and construction worker, by constituting W u elfare Boards and clothing them with sufficient powers to ensure enforcement of the primary p o urpose of the BOCW Act. The means of gen C erating revenues for making effective the welfare p rovisions of the BOCW Act is through the Cess Act, which is questioned in these appeals as h unconstitutional. g

    … … … i

    17 It is manifest from the overarching schemes of the BOCW Act, the Cess Act and the Rules made

    H

    thereunder that their sole object is to regulate the employment and conditions of service of building and other construction workers, traditionally exploited sections in the society and to provide for their safety, health and other welfare measures". .. … …

    (Emphasis supplied)

    20. The Apex Court in Lanco Anpara Power Limited (supra), has held that:-

    21

    "45. In taking the aforesaid view, we also agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that 'superior purpose' contained in BOCW Act and .

    Welfare Cess Act has to be kept in mind when two enactments the Factories Act on the one ha . ndP and BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act on the ot H her hand, are involved, both of which are welfare f le gislations. (See: Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, (2000) 4 SCC 406, which has been followed o in Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v t . H aryana Concast Limited & Anr, (2016) 4 SCC 4 r 7 in the context of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement o u f Security Interest Act, 2002 and Companies Act, 1956) Here the concept of 'felt necessity o ' would get triggered and as per the Sta C tement of Objects and Reasons contained in B OCW Act, since the purpose of this Act is to take care of a particular necessity i.e. welfare of h unorganised labour class involved in construction g

    activity, that needs to be achieved and not to be i

    discarded. Here the doctrine of Purposive Interpretation also gets attracted which is explained

    H

    in recent judgments of this Court in Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, (2016) 4 SCC 179 and Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla ., (2016) 3 SCC 619".

    21. Applying all the aforesaid principles of law, in our considered view, the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot be pressed into service to defeat the dominant statutory

    22

    purpose of the socially beneficial legislation with which we are dealing. For the language, intent and context of the .

    Statute being evidently clear. P

    22. It cannot be disputed that for the purp . ose of implementing the provisions of the Act H , complete mechanism is in place, authorizing various f of ficers, enabling them to discharge the statutory fun o ctions, so prescribed under the Act. Labour Co t mmissioner, Labour-cum- Conciliation Officer/Labour In r spector stand authorized to

    ensure effective im o plem u entation of the provisions of the Act. State Welfare Board stands constituted. Various benefits stand C conferred to the workers, including providing

    basic a h men ities at site; living accommodation near the site; sa g fety and health measures. i 23. Section 22 of the Act prescribes the functions H

    which the Board is required to discharge. It is correct that clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22 only refer to making provisions for financial assistance, but then sub- Section (h) which in our considered view, has to be read

    disjunctively and not conjunctively, specially empowers the

    Board to "make provision" and "improvement" of such

    23

    "other" welfare measures and facilities which may be prescribed. Clause (h) is not species to the genus specified .

    in Clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22 o P f the Act. It is a distinct and separate genus (catego H ry), no . t even analogous or corresponding with financial as sistance to be provided to the beneficiary. The intent, pu f rpose and text is unambiguously clear. The word "othe o r" only amplifies such

    intent. "Other" necessarily ca r nn t ot mean same or similar. It is distinct and separate u from the mechanism of providing assistance, financia o l in nature, as envisaged under different and earlier sub-clauses. There is no contradiction in implementin g C the provisions in the manner in which the State i h ntends to do so. "Make provision" would take well w g ithin its sweep, the act of providing for the "goods" as i "welfare measures and facilities" to the beneficiary. H

    24. Significantly it is not the Board that has itself made any such provision for discharge of its functions. 25. Provisions for making available amenities in the shape of goods is by virtue of and in exercise of rule making

    power of the State under sub-Clause (n) of sub-Section (2)

    of Section 62 of the Act. Noticeably, in relation to Section

    24

    22, rule making power is restricted only to clauses (c), (e),

    (f) and (h) of sub-Section (1). The language of even this .

    Section is evidently clear. It is plain, simple P and unambiguous. Clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Sect . ion 62 itself draws distinction in relation to which th H e State can exercise its power rule making power. f

    26. We may reiterate that Sta o te can make rules for making provisions and impr r ove t m ent of "such other" (a) "welfare measures" a u nd (b) "facilities" as may be prescribed. Now the word "such other" necessarily has to be read other than o the one specifically provided in Clauses

    (c), (e) and (f) C of sub-Section (1) of Section 22, in relation to which h the State is empowered to frame rules and in relation to g sub-Clauses (b), (d) and (g), for which the Board is i otherwise empowered to discharge its functions in H

    accordance with the Act. 27. Noticeably Chapters VI and VII prescribe what all welfare, safety and health measures are required to be taken. Chapter IX castes responsibility upon the employer

    and Chapter X deals with the penalties for contravention

    25

    etc. of the mechanism for providing safety measures to the workers. What is important in clauses (a) to (g) is not .

    financial assistance, but the purpose for which P such assistance is rendered i.e. to meet the exigency of ac . cident, old age, construction of house, insurance H , education, ailment and maternity benefits, which a f re totally distinct and separate of the "other" welfare m o easures and facilities. 28. There is yet ano r the t r angle from which the Statute needs to be ex u amined. It be only noticed that legislatures have used the word "and" before Clause (h) both in Sections 2 o 2 and 62 of the Act making the said

    Clause disti nc C tive and a separate category. It is also in this backdr h op, we find the principle of ejusdem generis not to be ap g plicable. The Apex Court in Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic i Vishwavidyalaya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, H

    (2013) 15 SCC 677, observed as under:- "91. As far as the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the State for the proposition that the word "and" in the Preamble, as well as in Section 4 will have to be read conjunctively viz. the decision

    in Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. vs. State of

    Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279, in the light of our

    conclusions based on the context in which the 1995

    Act was brought into force and the reading of Section

    26

    4(i) in the said context, the expression "and" used in the said section will have to be necessarily read disjunctively. We do not find any scope to apply the .

    said decision to the facts of this case.

    95. Applying the ratio as laid down . inP the abovementioned decisions, we are convinced that our above conclusion is fully sup f por te H d by the said principles and therefore, we are not inclined to hold that the expression "and" used in the Preamble, as well as in Section 4 should b o e read conjunctively as

    contended by the le r arn t ed counsel for the State. On the other hand, in the context in which the said expression is u u sed, it will have to be read as "or" creating a disjunctive reading of the provision.

    97. In f o act in the case on hand we have found that tho C ugh the expression "and" has been used, prior to t he expression "promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit..." and again prior to the set of h expression "for the advancement" and again prior to g

    the set of expression "dissemination of knowledge", i

    the context in which the legislation was brought into force and reading the said section along with the

    H

    Preamble and other clauses of Section 4, the expression "and" has to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. Therefore, even applying the principle laid down by Lord Scrutton and Lord Halsbury, we are fortified by our conclusion that in the case on hand

    the expression "dissemination of knowledge", as well

    as "promotion and development of the study of

    Sanskrit" and "to make provision for research", were

    all expressions which have been used disjunctively

    27

    and not conjunctively with the words Vedic learning and practice."

    29. In its own wisdom, the rule making authority .

    thought it prudent to make provisions for procuring P and make available "the goods" to the beneficiaries H . Can. we be oblivious of the fact as to who are these be f ne ficiaries? They are poor persons engaged by the contractor as construction workers. Beneficiary is defined t un d o er Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 2 rea r d with Section 12 of the Act. Making provision for supply of washing machine and bicycle, in our c o onsid u ered view, is only to enhance efficiency, ma C king life of a beneficiary who is also a female easy, conve nient and comfortable. Generally ladies working at cons h truction sites are poor & uneducated, hailing from far

    iofg f places and the lowest strata of the society. They are migrants, socially deprived and oppressed and economically

    H

    backward. Hence it is to their advantage that such goods are supplied. Well there is nothing on record to establish that the goods so procured are of sub-standard nature or quality. The action cannot be said to be malafide for it is

    not the case of the petitioner either. The Board is

    empowered to provide for the goods by way of assistance

    28

    which are approved on rate contract basis by the Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh or supplied through a .

    Government agency Himurja. Supply of solar cooker P and solar lamp, perhaps, only fulfills the aims of propa . gating and advancing the benefits renewal energy. Th H e intent and the letter of Act is clear. Method of distrib f uti on is left to the functionaries thereunder. o

    30. Even otherwise, we t ar e of the view that the provisions of the Act hav u e to r be construed liberally so as to advance the objec o t of principles of socially beneficial legislation.

    31. I n C our considered view, action of the State, in amend h ing the rules, empowering the Board to make av g ailable assistance in the shape of goods cannot be said to i be unreasonable, irrational, illogical and/or arbitrary. What H

    is arbitrary, is now well settled. One need not dilate thereupon. 32. To make life of a female building worker convenient and comfortable is only in consonance with the

    right to live life with dignity, full of health and happiness in

    29

    consonance with Article 21 fulfilling the constitutional goal of social justice. .

    33. Further Mr. Banerjee, by inviting attention to P the law laid down by the Apex Court in Babaji Kond H aji Ga . rad vs. Nasik Merchants Coo-operative Bank Ltd. Na sik and others, (1984) 2 SCC 50, contends that distri f bution of goods prescribed under the rules, has no co o nnection, in achieving

    the objects of the Act and do t es not meet the principle

    prescribed in the Heydon u 's tes r t. We are in respectful disagreement, for the object of the Act is very clear and

    realities at the grou o nd level alone have prompted the State

    in amendin g C the Rules. Thus, in fact, it satisfies the Heydon h 's test referred to in the said Report. 34 g . Inviting attention to the decision rendered by the i Apex Court in Dewan Chand (supra) para-10 whereof H

    reproduced supra, Mr. Banerjee with vehemence argues that distribution of goods as largesse and freebies is not directly relating to the constitutionally recognized right to live with basic human dignity. We are afraid, it is the other

    way round.

    30

    35. Further to contend that distribution of goods in fact is a freebie as largesse is an arbitrary act on the part of .

    the Board/State in the light of the law laid down by the A P pex Court in Common cause, a Registered Society H vs. U . nion of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 530 and Meerut Development Authority vs. Association f of Management

    Studies and another, (2009) 6 SCC 17 o 1, is incorrect. In fact, said decisions did not even r de t al with the controversy in issue.

    36. In fact, Apex u Court in S. Subramaniam Balaji vs. State of Tamil Nad o u and others, (2013) 9 SCC 659, while answering t he C issue as to whether scheme(s) of distribution of lapto h ps etc., so framed as freebies, is within the ambit of pu g blic purpose and violative of Article 14 or not, observed i as under:- H

    "62. The concept of State largesse is essentially linked to the directive principles of State policy. Whether the State should frame a scheme, which directly gives benefit to improve the living standards or indirectly by increasing the means of livelihood, is for the State to decide and the role of the court is

    very limited in this regard.

    67. The concepts of livelihood and standard of living are bound to change in their content from time

    31

    to time. It is factual that what was once considered to be a luxury has become a necessity in the present day. It is well settled that the concept of livelihood is .

    no longer confined to bare physical survival in terms of food, clothing and shelter but also now nec . esPsarily includes basic medicines, preliminary education, transport, etc. Hence, the State distrus H ting largesse in the form of distribution of colou f r T Vs, laptops etc. to eligible and deserving pe o rsons is directly related to the directive principle t s o f the State policy." "68. As a result, w r e are not inclined to agree with the argument of the appellant that giving a colour TVs, laptops, u mixer-grinders, etc. by the Government after adhering to due process is not an expense o for public purpose. Judicial interference is per C missible when the action of the Government is u nconstitutional and not when such action is not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the good h of the State. We are of the view that all such g

    questions must be debated and decided in the i

    legislature and not in Court." "69. More so, the functioning of the Government is

    H

    controlled by the Constitution, the laws of the land, the legislature and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. As per Article 73 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union of India is co-extensive with its legislative power.

    Similarly, the executive power of the State is co-

    extensive with its legislative power (Article 162). In

    Bhim Singh vs. Union of India, (2010) 5 SCC 538, this

    Court has held that the Government can frame a

    32

    scheme in exercise of its executive powers but if such a scheme entails any expenditure, then it is required to be backed by law. Article 266 of the .

    Constitution lays down that all monies rece . ive P d by the Central Government or by the State Government by way of taxes or otherwise must be c H redited to the Consolidated Fund of India. Article 267 also constitutes Contingency Fund of I f ndi a. If any money (except which is charged on o the Consolidated Fund) is to be withdrawn for an y governmental purpose, then there has to be an Appropriation Act under Article 266(3) read t with Article 114 of the

    Constitution. Every r department of the Government

    presents its de u mand to the legislature concerned and

    the legisl o ature votes on the same, and thereafter, the C Appropriation Act is passed which authorizes the G overnment to withdraw the money from the Consolidated Fund. There are similar provisions h relating to the State. The Contingency Fund can be g

    established only by enacting a law in that behalf and i

    not by an executive fiat. The law creating the Contingency Fund authorizes the purposes for which

    H

    the amount in it can be spent. This is how the money is being spent by the Government on its schemes under the control of the legislature." "70. In Bhim Singh (supra), Article 282 of the Constitution in the context of government

    expenditure on various projects was considered. In

    that case, the Government in question had framed

    the scheme empowering the Members of

    constituencies. The said Scheme was challenged on

    33

    the ground that the same has been formulated without enacting any law in that behalf. This challenge was negatived by this Court principally and .

    the ground that any expenditure which the Government incurs on the said Scheme is aut . hoPrized by the Appropriation Act and the Appropriation Act is a law as contemplated by Article f 2 82 H . This Court also negatived the challenge on the ground that the same is not for public purpos o e." "78. With regard to th t e c ontention that distribution of State largesse in r the form of colour TVs, laptops, mixer-grinders, etc. violates Article 14 of the Constitution a u s the unequals are treated equally. Before we venture to answer this question, we must recall tha o t these measures relate to implementation of the directive principles of State policy. Therefore,

    t he C principle of not to treat unequals as equal has no applicability as far as State largesse is concerned. h This principle applies only where the law or the State g

    action imposes some burden on the citizen either i

    financial or otherwise. Besides, while implementing the directive principles, it is for the Government

    H

    concerned to take into account its financial resources and the need of the people. There cannot be a straitjacket formula. If certain benefits are restricted to a particular class that can obviously be on account

    of the limited resources of the State. All welfare measures cannot at one go be made available to all the citizens. The State can gradually extend the benefit and this principle has been recognized by this Court in several judgments."

    34

    37. No other point urged. We clarify that the scope of the petition was confined only to the issue which we d P ealt .with.

    38. Thus, in our considered view, action H of the. State, in amending the Rules, cannot be said to be unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary o or f violative of the provisions of the Statute or that of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. t

    With the aforesaid r observations, present petition is dismissed, so also o pen u ding application(s), if any. No order as to costs.

    h

    C

    (Sanjay Karol), Acting Chief Justice. ig

    (Sandeep Sharma),

    H

    Judge. July 13 , 2017 (PK/Purohit)

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    Kuldeep & Another Petitioners v. State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others S
    (Jul 13, 2017)