IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No. 265 of 2017-G .
Judgment reserved on: 14.6.2017 Date of Decision : July 13 , 2017 . Pp>
Kuldeep & another f … Pe H titioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others …Respondents
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Coram: t The Hon'ble Mr. Justice San u jay K r arol, Acting Chief Justice, The Hon'ble Mr. Justice, Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for re o porting?1Yes. For the petitioner C : Ms. Vikramjit Banerjee, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Anshul Bansal & Mr. Vaibhav Chadha, Advocates, for the petitioners. For the r h espondent : Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Advocate General with Mr. g
Anup Rattan & Mr. Romesh Verma, Addl. i
Advocate Generals and Mr. J. K. Verma, Dy. A.G. for respondents No. 1,2 and 4. H
Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Senior Advocate, with Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No. 3. Sanjay Karol, ACJ.
The short issue which arises for consideration in the present petition is as to whether the State is well within
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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its right in providing "assistance", in the shape of
"goods"/"articles" such as "bicycle", "induction heater/solar .
cooker with utensils", "solar lamp" or "washing machine P ", in place of "cash" to the beneficiaries (male and/ H or fem . ale) in view of clause (h) of sub-Section (1) of S ection 22 and Section 62 of The Building and Other Con f struction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Cond o itions of Service) Act,
1996 (hereinafter referred to as t t he Act).
2. By invoking the p r rovisions of ejusdem generis, Mr. Banerjee, lear o ned u Senior Advocate, contends that amendments carried out and/or insertions made in Rule 283(B), 283(C C ), 283(E) and 283(F) of the Himachal Pradesh
Buildin h g an d Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Em g ployment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008 (in i short the 'Rules'), in terms of notification dated 14.8.2014 H
(Annexure P-8), are violative of Section 22 (1)(a) to (g) of the Act, for clause (h) of the said Section, on which reliance is sought for by the State is only residuary in nature; necessarily to be read wholly in conjunction with other
provisions of the Section; the clause has to be read
contextually, restricting the rule making power only to the
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extent of providing "financial assistance" and not making any provision for distribution of goods. Further the act of the .
State in the distribution of goods, which are in the natu P re of
"freebies", in an arbitrary manner, is violative of Art . icle 14 of the Constitution of India, not meeting the tes H t of equality and non arbitrariness. Also distribution is f in the nature of
"hand outs", and rather than allowing o the beneficiary to live a life with basic human dign r ity, t th e State is burdening by fastening the goods upon u them. 3. On the o o ther hand, learned Advocate General, justifies the action to be in public interest and within the permissible le C gislative scope and competence.
Ejusde h m Ge neris 4. g Let us first understand what is this principle of i ejusdem generis (noscitur a soccis), on which much H
emphasis has been laid down by the petitioners. Scanning through several decisions rendered by different Benches (Constitutional or otherwise, of the Supreme Court of India), over a period of time, one finds inter alia, the following
principle to be laid down:-
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a) Application of maxim ejusdem generis, (noscitur a soccis) may be treacherous unless .
the "societas" (the fact or condition of . b P eing associated for a common purpose - Oxford) to which the "socii" (keeping compan y H with another - Oxford) belongs, are known. f The risk may be present when there is no o other factor except
contiguity to suggest t t he "societas" [Godfrey
Phillips India u Ltd. r and another vs. State of U.P. and othe o rs, (2005) 2 SCC 515)(A Five Judge Bench]. b ) C For invoking the principle there must be a h distinct genus or category running through the g
bodies already named. [Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal i
and others, AIR 1967 SC 1857 (A Five-Judge H
Bench)]. c) Where two or more words susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate
sense. They take, as it were, their colour from
and are qualified by each other, the meaning of
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the general word being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. [Godfrey .
Phillips India Ltd. (supra)]. P
d) It is merely a rule of const H ructio . n and cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been delibera f tel y used in order
to make the scope o o f the defined word correspondingly w r ide t r. It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words w o ith w u ords of narrower significance is doubtful that the such rule applies.[The State of B om C bay and others vs. The Hospital Mazdoor h Sabha and others, AIR 1960 SC 610]. g
e) When general words follow particular and i
specific words of the same nature, then general H
words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but only a permissible inference, in the absence of an indication to the
contrary. [Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni @
Moopil Nayar vs. The States of Madras and
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Kerala and others, AIR 1960 SC 1080 (A Five Judge Bench) and Maharashtra University of .
Health Sciences and others vs. Satchi P kitsa Prasark Mandal and others, (2010) 3 H SCC 7 . 86 ]. f) The said doctrine, cannot be invoked in cases where the intention of t f he Legislature is clear and free of ambiguity o . [The Corporation of
the City of Nagpu r r vs t . I ts employees, AIR 1960 SC 675].
g) Wh o at ne u eds examination is whether: (i) The statute contains an enumeration by s pe C cific words; (ii) The members of the h enumeration constitute a class; (iii) The class is g
not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) A general i
term follows the enumeration; and (v) There is H
not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. [Jage Ram and others vs. State of Haryana and others, (1971) 1 SCC 671 and
Grasim Industries ltd. vs. Collector of Customs,
Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297].
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h) If a list or string or family of genus- describing terms are followed by wider or .
residuary or sweeping-up words, then the ve P rbal context and the linguistic implica H tions . of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.[ M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) f Lt d. vs. Union of
India and another, (1989 ) 2 o SCC 458] i) The rule mu r st t be confined within narrow limits, and g u eneral or comprehensive words should r o eceive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their i nte C ndment. [State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan, h (1955) 2 SCR 868] g
j) The purpose of this doctrine is to reconcile i
any incompatibility between specific and general H
words so that all words in a Statute can be given effect and no word becomes superfluous. [Satchikitsa Prasark Mandal and others (supra)]
5. We now proceed to examine the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Act came to be notified w.e.f. 19.8.1996. Bare perusal of the provisions reveals that it is a
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socially beneficial legislation, intended to inter alia regulate conditions of service of building and other construction .
workers; provide for their safety, health and we P lfare measures; and for other matters connected H therew . ith or incidental thereto.
6. The Act is divided into eleven c f ha pters. Chapter V (Sections 18 to 27) deals wit h o the constitution and functions of the State Welfar r e B t oards; Chapter VI (Sections 28 to 37) prescribes a u nd provides availability of certain amenities to the w o orkers; Chapter VII (Sections 38 to 41) mandates for taking certain safety and health measures; Chapter XI ( Se C ctions 56 to 64) inter alia deals with the rule making power.
7. g h One only notices that the Act itself provides i establishment and setting up of facilities such as drinking H
water, latrines, urinals, accommodation, creches, first aid, canteen and health related issues amenities. 8. Section 18 mandates constitution of the Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Board and Section
22, with which we are concerned, prescribes functions to be
performed in the following terms:-
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"22. Functions of the Board. -
(1) The Board may -
(a) provide immediate assistance to a .
beneficiary in case of accident;
(b) make payment of pension t . o Pthe beneficiaries who have complete H d the age of sixty years;
(c) sanction loans and a dvances to a beneficiary for constr o uctionf of a house not exceeding such a t mo unt and on such terms and conditions as m r ay be prescribed; (d) pay such amount in connection with premia f u or G oup Insurance Scheme of the beneficiaries as it may deem fit;
(e) o give such financial assistance for the C education of children of the beneficiaries as may be prescribed; (f) meet such medical expenses for treatment h
of major ailments of a beneficiary or, such g
dependent, as may be prescribed; i
(g) make payment of maternity benefit to the female beneficiaries; and
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(h) make provision and improvement of such other welfare measures and facilities as may be prescribed……….." [Emphasis supplied]
9. Section 62 of the Act empowers the 'appropriate Government', so defined under Section 2(1)(a), which in the instant case is the Government of Himachal Pradesh, to
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frame Rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act, relevant clauses whereof, reads as under:- .
"62. Power to make rules. -
(1) The appropriate Government may, . Pafter consultation with the expert committee, by notification, make rules for f car ry H ing out the provisions of this Act.
(2) In particular and w ith o out prejudice to the generality of the for t egoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, name u ly: - r (a) …
(n) the a o mount payable as house building loans o r C advances, the terms and conditions of such payment under clause (c), educational h assistance under clause (e) medical expenses g
payable and the persons who shall be the i
dependent of the beneficiaries under clause (f), H
and the other welfare measures for which provision may be made under clause (h) of sub- section (1) of section 22; (o) the limits of grants-in-aid payable to the local authorities and employers under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 22;
…"
[Emphasis supplied]
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10. In exercise of its rule making power, the State Government vide notification dated 4.12.2008 framed the .
"Rules". Part-V, Chapter-XXX of the said Rules provid P e for assistance by way of disbursement of money. H Such . Rules came to be amended from time to time with the issuance of notifications on 8.7.2010 (page 154) and f 17.11.2011 (page
155) when for the first time provision o s for making payment as maternity/paternity be r nef t its and other financial assistance under vario u us heads, including purchase of bicycle to a lady o worker (Rule 283-B) came to be introduced. With the issuance of notification dated 9.5.2013 the Rules c am C e to be further amended by incorporating a provisi h on for grant of financial assistance for marriages (R g ule 282); enhancing the limit of financial assistance from i ` 2,000/- to ` 3,000/- for purchase of bicycle to female H
workers (Rule 283-B); and providing financial assistance for purchase of kerosene/diesel stoves (Rule 283-C). With the Rules being amended further (fourth time), with the issuance of impugned notification dated 14.8.2014
(Annexure P-8), inter alia, the provisions of Rules 283 (B),
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283(C), 283(E) and 283(F) came to be substituted/incorporated in the following terms:- .
"283 (B) Bicycle to the female beneficiaries. - The female beneficiary after completion of two mont P hs of the membership may be provided a bicycle on.ly once by the Board on rate contract f ap pr H oved by the Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh and this assistance will be provided to one female beneficiary in the family. Those fema le o beneficiaries who have already availed such conveyance assistance of `
3,000/- (Rupees thr r ee t thousand only) shall not be eligible for gett u ing this assistance. The application for this assistance shall be submitted by the said beneficiar o y to the Secretary or authorized officer in form C No. XLVIII alongwith requisite documents.". …… . … … … … h "283(C) Induction heater with four utensils or Solar g
cooker. - The Board may provide one induction i
heater alongwith four specific utensils through rate contract approved by the Controller of Stores,
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Himachal Pradesh or one solar cooker through Himurja to a beneficiary or his family once. The application for this assistance shall be submitted by the beneficiary to the Secretary or authorized officer of the Board in Form No. XLVIII alongwith requisite
documents.".
… … …
"283 (E) Solar lamp. - The Board may provide one Solar lamp as a one time incentive, on rate contract
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approved by the Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh, to the beneficiary. The application for this assistance shall be submitted by the beneficiary to .
the Secretary or authorized officer of the Board in form No. XLVIII alongwith requisite documents . ." P
… … …
"283 (F) Washing Machine for female H beneficiary. - The Board may provide one wash ing machine to female beneficiary as a onetimef incentive on rate contract approved by t the o Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh. T r his be nefit will be provided only once per family. The application for this assistance shall be sub u mitted by the beneficiary to the Secretary or authorized officer of the Board in form No. XLVIII o alongwith requisite documents.". C [Emphasis supplied] 11. I t is not in dispute that the Rules continued to be implem h ented and for the first time, challenge came to be la g id with the filing of the present petition on 8.2.2017. i Principles of interpretation of Statutes H
12. We now proceed to examine the principles to be applied for interpreting the Statute. Every Statute consists of two parts i.e. letter and the sense. It is the internal sense of the letter that would make the law and not mere letter.
The primary rule of interpretation of statutes may be the
literal rule, however, in the case of beneficial legislations
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and legislations enacted for the welfare of employees/workmen, the Court has adopted liberal rule of .
interpretation to ensure that the benefits extend to t P hose workers who need to be covered based on the H inten . tion of the legislature do remain the same.
13. Such a beneficial piece of legi f sla tion has to be construed in its correct perspective o so as to fructify the legislative intention, underlyi r ng t its enactment. When two views are possible on u its applicability to a given set of employees, that view which furthers the legislative intention should be preferre o d to the one which would frustrate it.
[Transport C or C pn. of India vs. ESI Corpn., (2000) 1 SCC 332]. 14. h A literal interpretation is not always the only in g terpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has i to look at the setting in which the words are used and the H
circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used. [R. L. Arora vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
others, AIR 1964 SC 1230].
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15. It is also one of the cardinal canons of construction that no Statute can be interpreted in such a .
way as to render a part of it otiose. [Satchikitsa Pras P arak Mandal and others (supra)]. .
16. In Organo Chemical Industries v. Un H ion of India, (1979) 4 SCC 573, the Court observed that f :
"23…Each word, phrase o o r sentence is to be considered in the light t of general purpose of the Act itself. A bare mecha r nical interpretation of the words 'devoid of con u cept or purpose' will reduce most of legislation to futility. It is a salutary rule, well establishe o d, that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole."
… …"41 C … . A policy-oriented interpretation, when a h welfare legislation falls for determination, especially g
in the context of a developing country, is sanctioned i
by principle and precedent and is implicit in Article 37 of the Constitution since the judicial branch is, in H
a sense, part of the State. So it is reasonable to assign to 'damages' a larger, fulfilling meaning." 17. In Lanco Anpara Power Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2016) 10 SCC 329, it has been held as under:-
" 40. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative, irrespective of anything else. This is so eloquently brought out in the
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following passage in the case of Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia ., (1988) 4 SCC 284:
"9. Judicial time and energy is more often than .
not consumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other words, the wil . l oPf the people. Blackstone tells us that t H he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by explorin f g h is intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and t pro ba o ble. And these signs are either the wo r rds, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and u reason of the law. See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st Edn. of 176 o 5, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, C p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Poppatlal Shah v. State Of Madras, 1953 AIR(SC) 274 said that each word, h
phrase or sentence was to be construed in the g
light of purpose of the Act itself. But words i
must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them said Judge Learned Hand, a long
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time ago. It appears, therefore, that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislature has used and the true meaning of what words [Ed.: Lord Reid in the aforecited
case had observed: (All ER p. 814) "We often
say that we are looking for the intention of
Parliament, but this is not quite accurate. We
are seeking the meaning of the words which
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Parliament used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said."] as was said by Lord Reid in .
Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papie . rw P erke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G, 1975 1 AllER 810 . We are clearly of the opinion H that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law ."
o (Empfhasis supplied) "42. We would also like t to reproduce a passage from Workmen of Ameri r can Express v. Management of American Express, (1985) 4 SCC 71, which provides complete answ u er to the argument of the appellants based on literal construction:
'4. o The principles of statutory construction are C well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put h
in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian g
dimensions. In construing these legislations the i
imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its
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misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the "colour", the "content" and the "context" of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in
Prenn v. Simmonds, 1971 3 AllER 237 ). In the
same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that
law is not to be left behind in some island of
literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond
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the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal ling P uistic .considerations...' "
Act is a socially beneficial legislation .
18. That the Act is a beneficial legisla tio H n cannot be disputed as in any case, the issue bein f g no longer res integra, stands settled by th t e Ap o ex Court in Dewan Chand Builders and Contractors Versus Union of India and others, (2012) 1 SCC 10 u 1 and r Lanco Anpara Power Limited (supra).
19. In Dewan o Chand Builders (supra) the Apex Court held that:- C
h" [3] The background in which the BOCW Act was g
enacted, is set out in the Statement of Objects and i
Reasons, appended to the Bill preceding its enactment. To better appreciate the legislative H
intent, it would be instructive to refer to the following extract from the Statement of Objects and Reasons : "(1)It is estimated that about 8.5. Million workers in the country are engaged in building and other construction works. Building and other construction workers are one of the most
numerous and vulnerable segments of the
unorganized labour in India. The building and
other construction works are characterized by
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their inherent risk to the life and limb of the workers. The work is also characterized by its casual nature, temporary relationship bet P ween .employer and employee, uncertain working hours, lack of basic amenities and inad . equacy of welfare facilities. In the absenc H e of adequate statutory provisions, the re f qui site information regarding the number and nature of accidents is also not forthcoming. In the absence of such information, it is difficu o lt to fix responsibility or
to take any correctiv e action.
(2) Although th t e provisions of certain Central Acts are u appli r cable to the building and other construction workers yet a need has been felt for o a comprehensive Central Legislation for C regulating their safety, health, welfare and other conditions of service." [4] A fairly long preamble to the BOCW Act is h
again indicative of its purpose. It reads thus: g
"An Act to regulate the employment and i
conditions of service of building and other construction workers and to
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provide for their safety, health and welfare measures and for other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
… … …
7. The scheme of the BOCW Act is that it empowers the Central Government and the State Governments to constitute Welfare Boards to provide and monitor social security schemes and welfare
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measures for the benefit of the building and other construction workers". … … …
… … … .
10. It is thus, clear from the scheme of the BOCW Act that its sole aim is the welfare of buildi . ngP and construction workers, directly relatable to their constitutionally recognised right to liv H e with basic human dignity, enshrined in A f rti cle 21 of the Constitution of India. It en o visages a network of authorities at the Centr t al and State levels to ensure that the benefit of th r e legislation is made available to every building and construction worker, by constituting W u elfare Boards and clothing them with sufficient powers to ensure enforcement of the primary p o urpose of the BOCW Act. The means of gen C erating revenues for making effective the welfare p rovisions of the BOCW Act is through the Cess Act, which is questioned in these appeals as h unconstitutional. g
… … … i
17 It is manifest from the overarching schemes of the BOCW Act, the Cess Act and the Rules made
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thereunder that their sole object is to regulate the employment and conditions of service of building and other construction workers, traditionally exploited sections in the society and to provide for their safety, health and other welfare measures". .. … …
(Emphasis supplied)
20. The Apex Court in Lanco Anpara Power Limited (supra), has held that:-
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"45. In taking the aforesaid view, we also agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that 'superior purpose' contained in BOCW Act and .
Welfare Cess Act has to be kept in mind when two enactments the Factories Act on the one ha . ndP and BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act on the ot H her hand, are involved, both of which are welfare f le gislations. (See: Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, (2000) 4 SCC 406, which has been followed o in Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v t . H aryana Concast Limited & Anr, (2016) 4 SCC 4 r 7 in the context of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement o u f Security Interest Act, 2002 and Companies Act, 1956) Here the concept of 'felt necessity o ' would get triggered and as per the Sta C tement of Objects and Reasons contained in B OCW Act, since the purpose of this Act is to take care of a particular necessity i.e. welfare of h unorganised labour class involved in construction g
activity, that needs to be achieved and not to be i
discarded. Here the doctrine of Purposive Interpretation also gets attracted which is explained
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in recent judgments of this Court in Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, (2016) 4 SCC 179 and Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla ., (2016) 3 SCC 619".
21. Applying all the aforesaid principles of law, in our considered view, the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot be pressed into service to defeat the dominant statutory
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purpose of the socially beneficial legislation with which we are dealing. For the language, intent and context of the .
Statute being evidently clear. P
22. It cannot be disputed that for the purp . ose of implementing the provisions of the Act H , complete mechanism is in place, authorizing various f of ficers, enabling them to discharge the statutory fun o ctions, so prescribed under the Act. Labour Co t mmissioner, Labour-cum- Conciliation Officer/Labour In r spector stand authorized to
ensure effective im o plem u entation of the provisions of the Act. State Welfare Board stands constituted. Various benefits stand C conferred to the workers, including providing
basic a h men ities at site; living accommodation near the site; sa g fety and health measures. i 23. Section 22 of the Act prescribes the functions H
which the Board is required to discharge. It is correct that clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22 only refer to making provisions for financial assistance, but then sub- Section (h) which in our considered view, has to be read
disjunctively and not conjunctively, specially empowers the
Board to "make provision" and "improvement" of such
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"other" welfare measures and facilities which may be prescribed. Clause (h) is not species to the genus specified .
in Clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 22 o P f the Act. It is a distinct and separate genus (catego H ry), no . t even analogous or corresponding with financial as sistance to be provided to the beneficiary. The intent, pu f rpose and text is unambiguously clear. The word "othe o r" only amplifies such
intent. "Other" necessarily ca r nn t ot mean same or similar. It is distinct and separate u from the mechanism of providing assistance, financia o l in nature, as envisaged under different and earlier sub-clauses. There is no contradiction in implementin g C the provisions in the manner in which the State i h ntends to do so. "Make provision" would take well w g ithin its sweep, the act of providing for the "goods" as i "welfare measures and facilities" to the beneficiary. H
24. Significantly it is not the Board that has itself made any such provision for discharge of its functions. 25. Provisions for making available amenities in the shape of goods is by virtue of and in exercise of rule making
power of the State under sub-Clause (n) of sub-Section (2)
of Section 62 of the Act. Noticeably, in relation to Section
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22, rule making power is restricted only to clauses (c), (e),
(f) and (h) of sub-Section (1). The language of even this .
Section is evidently clear. It is plain, simple P and unambiguous. Clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Sect . ion 62 itself draws distinction in relation to which th H e State can exercise its power rule making power. f
26. We may reiterate that Sta o te can make rules for making provisions and impr r ove t m ent of "such other" (a) "welfare measures" a u nd (b) "facilities" as may be prescribed. Now the word "such other" necessarily has to be read other than o the one specifically provided in Clauses
(c), (e) and (f) C of sub-Section (1) of Section 22, in relation to which h the State is empowered to frame rules and in relation to g sub-Clauses (b), (d) and (g), for which the Board is i otherwise empowered to discharge its functions in H
accordance with the Act. 27. Noticeably Chapters VI and VII prescribe what all welfare, safety and health measures are required to be taken. Chapter IX castes responsibility upon the employer
and Chapter X deals with the penalties for contravention
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etc. of the mechanism for providing safety measures to the workers. What is important in clauses (a) to (g) is not .
financial assistance, but the purpose for which P such assistance is rendered i.e. to meet the exigency of ac . cident, old age, construction of house, insurance H , education, ailment and maternity benefits, which a f re totally distinct and separate of the "other" welfare m o easures and facilities. 28. There is yet ano r the t r angle from which the Statute needs to be ex u amined. It be only noticed that legislatures have used the word "and" before Clause (h) both in Sections 2 o 2 and 62 of the Act making the said
Clause disti nc C tive and a separate category. It is also in this backdr h op, we find the principle of ejusdem generis not to be ap g plicable. The Apex Court in Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic i Vishwavidyalaya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, H
(2013) 15 SCC 677, observed as under:- "91. As far as the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the State for the proposition that the word "and" in the Preamble, as well as in Section 4 will have to be read conjunctively viz. the decision
in Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. vs. State of
Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279, in the light of our
conclusions based on the context in which the 1995
Act was brought into force and the reading of Section
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4(i) in the said context, the expression "and" used in the said section will have to be necessarily read disjunctively. We do not find any scope to apply the .
said decision to the facts of this case.
95. Applying the ratio as laid down . inP the abovementioned decisions, we are convinced that our above conclusion is fully sup f por te H d by the said principles and therefore, we are not inclined to hold that the expression "and" used in the Preamble, as well as in Section 4 should b o e read conjunctively as
contended by the le r arn t ed counsel for the State. On the other hand, in the context in which the said expression is u u sed, it will have to be read as "or" creating a disjunctive reading of the provision.
97. In f o act in the case on hand we have found that tho C ugh the expression "and" has been used, prior to t he expression "promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit..." and again prior to the set of h expression "for the advancement" and again prior to g
the set of expression "dissemination of knowledge", i
the context in which the legislation was brought into force and reading the said section along with the
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Preamble and other clauses of Section 4, the expression "and" has to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. Therefore, even applying the principle laid down by Lord Scrutton and Lord Halsbury, we are fortified by our conclusion that in the case on hand
the expression "dissemination of knowledge", as well
as "promotion and development of the study of
Sanskrit" and "to make provision for research", were
all expressions which have been used disjunctively
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and not conjunctively with the words Vedic learning and practice."
29. In its own wisdom, the rule making authority .
thought it prudent to make provisions for procuring P and make available "the goods" to the beneficiaries H . Can. we be oblivious of the fact as to who are these be f ne ficiaries? They are poor persons engaged by the contractor as construction workers. Beneficiary is defined t un d o er Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 2 rea r d with Section 12 of the Act. Making provision for supply of washing machine and bicycle, in our c o onsid u ered view, is only to enhance efficiency, ma C king life of a beneficiary who is also a female easy, conve nient and comfortable. Generally ladies working at cons h truction sites are poor & uneducated, hailing from far
iofg f places and the lowest strata of the society. They are migrants, socially deprived and oppressed and economically
H
backward. Hence it is to their advantage that such goods are supplied. Well there is nothing on record to establish that the goods so procured are of sub-standard nature or quality. The action cannot be said to be malafide for it is
not the case of the petitioner either. The Board is
empowered to provide for the goods by way of assistance
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which are approved on rate contract basis by the Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh or supplied through a .
Government agency Himurja. Supply of solar cooker P and solar lamp, perhaps, only fulfills the aims of propa . gating and advancing the benefits renewal energy. Th H e intent and the letter of Act is clear. Method of distrib f uti on is left to the functionaries thereunder. o
30. Even otherwise, we t ar e of the view that the provisions of the Act hav u e to r be construed liberally so as to advance the objec o t of principles of socially beneficial legislation.
31. I n C our considered view, action of the State, in amend h ing the rules, empowering the Board to make av g ailable assistance in the shape of goods cannot be said to i be unreasonable, irrational, illogical and/or arbitrary. What H
is arbitrary, is now well settled. One need not dilate thereupon. 32. To make life of a female building worker convenient and comfortable is only in consonance with the
right to live life with dignity, full of health and happiness in
29
consonance with Article 21 fulfilling the constitutional goal of social justice. .
33. Further Mr. Banerjee, by inviting attention to P the law laid down by the Apex Court in Babaji Kond H aji Ga . rad vs. Nasik Merchants Coo-operative Bank Ltd. Na sik and others, (1984) 2 SCC 50, contends that distri f bution of goods prescribed under the rules, has no co o nnection, in achieving
the objects of the Act and do t es not meet the principle
prescribed in the Heydon u 's tes r t. We are in respectful disagreement, for the object of the Act is very clear and
realities at the grou o nd level alone have prompted the State
in amendin g C the Rules. Thus, in fact, it satisfies the Heydon h 's test referred to in the said Report. 34 g . Inviting attention to the decision rendered by the i Apex Court in Dewan Chand (supra) para-10 whereof H
reproduced supra, Mr. Banerjee with vehemence argues that distribution of goods as largesse and freebies is not directly relating to the constitutionally recognized right to live with basic human dignity. We are afraid, it is the other
way round.
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35. Further to contend that distribution of goods in fact is a freebie as largesse is an arbitrary act on the part of .
the Board/State in the light of the law laid down by the A P pex Court in Common cause, a Registered Society H vs. U . nion of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 530 and Meerut Development Authority vs. Association f of Management
Studies and another, (2009) 6 SCC 17 o 1, is incorrect. In fact, said decisions did not even r de t al with the controversy in issue.
36. In fact, Apex u Court in S. Subramaniam Balaji vs. State of Tamil Nad o u and others, (2013) 9 SCC 659, while answering t he C issue as to whether scheme(s) of distribution of lapto h ps etc., so framed as freebies, is within the ambit of pu g blic purpose and violative of Article 14 or not, observed i as under:- H
"62. The concept of State largesse is essentially linked to the directive principles of State policy. Whether the State should frame a scheme, which directly gives benefit to improve the living standards or indirectly by increasing the means of livelihood, is for the State to decide and the role of the court is
very limited in this regard.
67. The concepts of livelihood and standard of living are bound to change in their content from time
31
to time. It is factual that what was once considered to be a luxury has become a necessity in the present day. It is well settled that the concept of livelihood is .
no longer confined to bare physical survival in terms of food, clothing and shelter but also now nec . esPsarily includes basic medicines, preliminary education, transport, etc. Hence, the State distrus H ting largesse in the form of distribution of colou f r T Vs, laptops etc. to eligible and deserving pe o rsons is directly related to the directive principle t s o f the State policy." "68. As a result, w r e are not inclined to agree with the argument of the appellant that giving a colour TVs, laptops, u mixer-grinders, etc. by the Government after adhering to due process is not an expense o for public purpose. Judicial interference is per C missible when the action of the Government is u nconstitutional and not when such action is not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the good h of the State. We are of the view that all such g
questions must be debated and decided in the i
legislature and not in Court." "69. More so, the functioning of the Government is
H
controlled by the Constitution, the laws of the land, the legislature and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. As per Article 73 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union of India is co-extensive with its legislative power.
Similarly, the executive power of the State is co-
extensive with its legislative power (Article 162). In
Bhim Singh vs. Union of India, (2010) 5 SCC 538, this
Court has held that the Government can frame a
32
scheme in exercise of its executive powers but if such a scheme entails any expenditure, then it is required to be backed by law. Article 266 of the .
Constitution lays down that all monies rece . ive P d by the Central Government or by the State Government by way of taxes or otherwise must be c H redited to the Consolidated Fund of India. Article 267 also constitutes Contingency Fund of I f ndi a. If any money (except which is charged on o the Consolidated Fund) is to be withdrawn for an y governmental purpose, then there has to be an Appropriation Act under Article 266(3) read t with Article 114 of the
Constitution. Every r department of the Government
presents its de u mand to the legislature concerned and
the legisl o ature votes on the same, and thereafter, the C Appropriation Act is passed which authorizes the G overnment to withdraw the money from the Consolidated Fund. There are similar provisions h relating to the State. The Contingency Fund can be g
established only by enacting a law in that behalf and i
not by an executive fiat. The law creating the Contingency Fund authorizes the purposes for which
H
the amount in it can be spent. This is how the money is being spent by the Government on its schemes under the control of the legislature." "70. In Bhim Singh (supra), Article 282 of the Constitution in the context of government
expenditure on various projects was considered. In
that case, the Government in question had framed
the scheme empowering the Members of
constituencies. The said Scheme was challenged on
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the ground that the same has been formulated without enacting any law in that behalf. This challenge was negatived by this Court principally and .
the ground that any expenditure which the Government incurs on the said Scheme is aut . hoPrized by the Appropriation Act and the Appropriation Act is a law as contemplated by Article f 2 82 H . This Court also negatived the challenge on the ground that the same is not for public purpos o e." "78. With regard to th t e c ontention that distribution of State largesse in r the form of colour TVs, laptops, mixer-grinders, etc. violates Article 14 of the Constitution a u s the unequals are treated equally. Before we venture to answer this question, we must recall tha o t these measures relate to implementation of the directive principles of State policy. Therefore,
t he C principle of not to treat unequals as equal has no applicability as far as State largesse is concerned. h This principle applies only where the law or the State g
action imposes some burden on the citizen either i
financial or otherwise. Besides, while implementing the directive principles, it is for the Government
H
concerned to take into account its financial resources and the need of the people. There cannot be a straitjacket formula. If certain benefits are restricted to a particular class that can obviously be on account
34
37. No other point urged. We clarify that the scope of the petition was confined only to the issue which we d P ealt .with.
38. Thus, in our considered view, action H of the. State, in amending the Rules, cannot be said to be unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary o or f violative of the provisions of the Statute or that of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. t
With the aforesaid r observations, present petition is dismissed, so also o pen u ding application(s), if any. No order as to costs.
h
C
(Sanjay Karol), Acting Chief Justice. ig
(Sandeep Sharma),
H
Judge. July 13 , 2017 (PK/Purohit)