JUDGMENT (Per S. C. Dharmadhikari, J.)
1 This Petition is one more illustration of how the Pharma Companies continue to resist the Drug Price Control regime and make every attempt to frustrate and defeat it, thereby making it impossible for the common man to procure drugs so essential to fight diseases and illness.
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2 By this Writ Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the Notification bearing No. S.O.1636(E) dated 27thSeptember 2007 (for short, the said Notification) as well as the Order-cum- Demand dated 31stMarch 2015, passed by the respondent No.2 directing the 1stpetitioner-company to deposit an amount of Rs.21,21,95,238/- on account of overcharging of the price of its formulation (Surfaz SN Cream 7 gm) (for short, Surfaz SN Cream) in violation of the provisions of the Drugs (Price Control) Order 1995 (for short, the "DPCO 1995"). Though the impugned Notification has been challenged in the writ petition, Mr Seervai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has not addressed us on the validity or otherwise of the impugned Notification. The thrust of his argument was impugning the action of respondent No.2-National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (for short "NPPA") seeking to apply the said Notification to the 1stpetitioner company's formulation "Surfaz Cream" and the Order-cum-Demand dated 31stMarch, 2015, passed by the respondent No.2. By this order, the 1stpetitioner was directed to deposit an amount of Rs.21,21,95,238/- of which Rs.10,25,06,287/- is the principal amount for the period October
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2007 to June 2008 and interest thereon (calculated at the rate of 15 % p.a. ) upto 15thApril 2015 amounting to Rs.10,96,88,951/-.
3 The broad grounds on which the said impugned order has been challenged by the petitioners and that have been canvassed before us are as follows :-
(a) The said Notification dated 27thSeptember 2007 is inapplicable to the 1stpetitioner company's formulation "Surfaz Cream" as the same applies to an ointment and not a cream. A distinction is sought to be made between an ointment and a cream and for this purpose, reliance is placed on the said Notification itself.
(b) There is admitted non-compliance of paragraph 7 read with paragraph 9 of the DPCO 1995, thereby vitiating the impugned order dated 31stMarch, 2015.
(c) That, in any event, applying the same Notification to the formulation Surfaz Cream by respondent No.2 is a colourable exercise of power in view of the fact that the 1st petitioner-company is a small scale industry (SSI unit) and the
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same has been specifically exempted under the provisions of the
DPCO, 1995.
(d) In the alternative, it has been urged that even we were to hold that the said Notification applied to the formulation "Surfaz Cream", interest could not have been levied on the 1stpetitioner-company from June 2008 till 15thApril 2015 under section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as there was no default committed by the 1stpetitioner-company as contemplated under the said section. These are the broad grounds on which the challenge has been laid to the impugned order dated 31stMarch, 2015.
4 The brief facts giving rise to the present controversy are as follows :-
The 1stpetitioner-company is a SSI Unit manufacturing and marketing various drugs and pharmaceuticals. According to the petitioners, it is a well known and reputed Pharmaceutical Company in India. One of the formulations manufactured by the 1stpetitioner-company was
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known as "Surfaz SN Cream 7 gms". This cream was manufactured by the petitioners between 29thJuly, 2006 and 5th October, 2007. Thereafter, the petitioners manufactured this cream in a pack size of 6 gms.
5 Be that as it may, by Notification bearing No.S.O. 1636(E) dated 27thSeptember, 2007, the respondent No.2 in exercise of powers conferred upon it, as more particularly set out in paragraphs 9 and 11 of the DPCO, 1995 fixed the price of various ointments and creams in various pack sizes. As far as the petitioners' cream is concerned, it is the case of the respondents that the same is covered by item 8 of the said Notification which reads as follows :-
| Sr. No. |
Name of the formulation |
Strength |
Pack Size |
Ceiling Price (Rs) |
Equivalent MRP* (inclusive of all taxes (Rs) |
| 1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
| 1 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
8
| 4 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
Betamethasone+ Neomycin Sulphate + Tolnaftate+ Clotrimaxole+ Chlorocresol Ointment |
Betamethasone 0.05 % Neomycin Sulphate 0.5% Tolnaftate 1.0% Clotrimaxole 1.00% Chlorocresol 0.1% |
7 gm Tube |
6.68 |
7.71 |
| 9 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
.......... |
|
|
|
|
6 According to the petitioners, the said item is inapplicable to the petitioners as the same was applicable to an ointment and not to a cream. Therefore, according to the petitioners, they were not required under any provision of the DPCO, 1995 to conform to and/or comply with the said Notification.
7 On 9thApril 2008, a letter was addressed by respondent No.2 to the petitioners that as per the information
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available with them, the 1stpetitioner-company was not following the ceiling price fixed under the said Notification in respect of Surfaz Cream. In these circumstances, the respondent No.2 called upon the petitioners to explain the reason for non- compliance and further to submit the production and sales details with effect from the date of the said Notification till the date of the said letter. In reply thereto, the petitioners by their letter dated 28thApril 2008 submitted that their formulation was a cream and not an ointment and, therefore, not covered by the said Notification. This contention of the petitioners was rejected by the respondent No.2 by their letter dated 11thJune 2008. According to the respondent No.2, a cream was synonymous with an ointment and hence the respondent No.2 called upon the petitioners to furnish the quantitative information asked for by their letter dated 9thApril, 2008. In the interregnum and before rejecting the contentions of the 1stpetitioner, the respondent No.2 on 5thJune, 2008 issued another Notification No.SO 1371(E) fixing the ceiling price and equivalent MRP for specified pack size for the formulation of creams. The entry in the said Notification reads as under :-
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| Sr. No. |
Name of the formulation |
Strength |
Pack Size |
Ceiling Price (Rs.) |
Equivalent MRP* (inclusive of all taxes) (Rs) |
| 1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
1 Betamethasone+ Each gm contains 6 gm 6.44 7.09 Clotrimazole+ Betamethasone Tube
Neomycin+ Dipropionate eq.
Tolnaftate + to Betamethasone
Chlorocresol - 0.05% w/w
Cream Clotrimazole -
1.0% w/w
Neomycin
Sulphate - 0.5%
w/w
Chlorocresol -
0.1% w/w
8 Therefore, this Notification clearly included the cream manufactured by the 1stpetitioner and was brought within the purview of price control under paragraphs 9 and 11 of the DPCO, 1995. On 12thJune, 2008 the respondent No.2 addressed a letter to Drug Controller (DC), Chennai with a copy marked to the 1st petitioner and directed the Drug Controller to start collating the required information alongwith the documentary evidence such as subsequent sample packs, copies of strips / cartons of the formulations, batch-wise details of production based on which demand notice can be sent by the respondent No.2 to the petitioners.
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9 In reply to the aforesaid letter, 1stpetitioner responded to the same by their letter dated 2ndJuly, 2008, and reiterated and reaffirmed its stand that a cream and an ointment were two different formulations and the Notification dated 27th September, 2007, was inapplicable to their formulations. They further stated that this was also evident from the subsequent Notification issued by respondent No.2 on 5thJune, 2008, which specifically brought the formulation Surfaz Cream within the ambit and purview of price control under paragraphs 9 and 11 of the DPCO, 1995. The respondent No.2 was further informed that since their cream was brought under price control by virtue of Notification dated 5thJune, 2008, the petitioners had stopped manufacturing of the said cream. Despite this, the respondent No.2 by its letter dated 29thJuly, 2008, sought to contend that the said Notification was applicable and requested the petitioners to send the required details. In response thereto, the petitioners once again reiterated that their product was a cream and not an ointment and further stated that they have discontinued manufacturing of the said cream.
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10 Thereafter, on 15thSeptember, 2008, the petitioners addressed a letter complying with the request of the respondent No.2 and submitted the price list in form V under DPCO 1995, with a copy marked to the Commissioner, Food and Drugs, Tamil Nadu.
11 After this, the respondent No.1 issued a show cause notice to 1stpetitioner alleging that the Petitioner No.1 was manufacturing and selling the said cream contrary to the price of Rs.6.68 per tube as specified under the Notification and, therefore, the respondent No.2 suo motu estimated an amount of Rs.10,25,06,287/- as being due and payable by petitioner No.1 as being the alleged overcharged amount and called upon the petitioners to show cause within 21 days why action should not be taken against them.
12 In reply thereto, the 1stpetitioner once again by its letter dated 31stOctober, 2010, reiterated their stand that their formulation "Surfaz SN Cream 7 gm" was a cream and not an ointment and hence was not covered under the said Notification dated 27thSeptember, 2007. They further informed the
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respondent No.2 that in light of the Notification dated 5thJune, 2008 (and on the basis of which now the formulation of the petitioners viz. "Surfaz SN Cream 7 gm" was brought under price control), the petitioners had discontinued manufacturing and marketing of the said cream.
13 Be that as it may, the aforesaid explanation given by the petitioners was not accepted and accordingly, the respondent No.2 raised their demand of Rs.10,25,06,287/- together with interest of Rs.10,96,88,951/- under section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act. It is the case of the petitioners that before raising this demand, no hearing was given to them. A similar demand was again raised by respondent No.2 by their letter dated 2ndDecember, 2008, and it was received by the petitioners only on 9thDecember 2008.
14 Be that as it may, in the interregnum, on 4th December, 2008, the petitioners submitted a detail submission and requested for a personal hearing. A similar letter seeking a personal hearing was also addressed to the Chairman of respondent No.2.
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15 The respondent No.2 rejected the petitioners' request for personal hearing and directed the petitioners to forthwith deposit an amount as mentioned in their earlier letter. The petitioners thereafter on 16thDecember, 2008, filed a Review Petition with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers and made a detailed submission which was rejected on the ground that it was time barred being beyond the period envisaged for filing a Review under paragraph 22 of the DPCO 1995.
16 Being aggrieved by the show cause notice dated 23rd September, 2008 as well as the order-cum-demand notices dated 10thNovember, 2008, and 2ndDecember, 2008, the petitioners approached this Court in its writ jurisdiction by filing Writ Petition No.424 of 2009. By an order dated 1stApril, 2009, this Court disposed of the Writ Petition with a direction to the respondents to hear the petitioners and after hearing them, pass appropriate orders on merits. This Court also ordered that the order passed by the respondents should be a reasoned one.
17 Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the petitioners by their detailed written submissions to the respondent No.2 and
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the petitioners were even granted a personal hearing on 8thMay 2009. It is the case of the petitioners that despite having filed detailed submissions, the respondent No.2 without considering all the submissions held that the petitioners' cream was covered by the said Notification; that the SSI unit under exemption Notification dated 2ndMarch, 1995, did not apply to the said formulation; that the petitioners had illegally overcharged these consumers and directed the petitioners to deposit an amount of Rs.12,11,86,652/- with respondent No.2 being the amount allegedly overcharged, together with interest at the rate of 15% p.a.
18 This order passed by the respondent No.2 was once again challenged by the petitioners before this Court by filing Writ Petition No.1508 of 2009. This Court by its order dated 28thJuly, 2010, read with its order dated 6thAugust, 2010, opined that the order passed by the respondents indicated that the contentions raised by the petitioners were not considered and, therefore, showed a clear non-application of mind to the relevant facts raised by the petitioners. Accordingly, the order dated 19thMay, 2009, raising a demand on the petitioners in the sum of
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Rs.12,11,86,653/- was set aside and the matter was remitted back for de novo consideration.
19 Being aggrieved by the order of this Court, the second respondent filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India challenging the aforesaid orders. This Special Leave Petition was tagged with other matters and converted into Civil Appeal Nos.7831 to 7834 of 2014 and 7836 to 7838 of 2014. Finally on 20thAugust, 2014, the Supreme Court, after hearing the parties, confirmed the orders passed by this Court with a direction to complete the exercise of hearing as early as possible and preferably within a period of six months.
20 In view of this order, the respondent No.2 on 2nd September, 2014, addressed a letter requesting the petitioners to attend for a de novo hearing. Thereafter, hearing took place on 7thJanuary, 2015. At this hearing, the advocates for the petitioners made oral submissions and also filed written submissions. On 15thJanuary, 2015, the respondent No.2 also circulated the minutes of the meeting of the hearing that took place on 7thJanuary, 2015.
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21 Thereafter, on 31stMarch, 2015, the respondent No.2 passed the impugned order-cum-demand directing the 1st petitioner to deposit an amount of Rs.21,21,95,238/- within 15 days on account of purported overcharging of the price of its formulation (Surfaz SN Cream 7 gm) in violation of the provisions of DPCO, 1995. This amount of Rs.21,21,95,238/- comprised of the principal amount of Rs.10,25,06,287/- and interest of Rs.10,96,88,951/- at the rate of 15 % p.a. under section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1995, calculated upto 15thApril, 2015. Alongwith the said order, a statement of overcharging with interest thereon was also attached. It is this order that has been challenged and impugned before us.
22 In this factual backdrop, Mr Seervai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that the impugned order-cum-demand directing the petitioners to deposit an amount of Rs.21,21,95,238/- within fifteen days on account of the purported over-charging of the price of its formulation is ex- facie illegal and ultra vires the provisions of the DPCO, 1995. Mr. Seervai, after referring to the list of dates and events, would submit that this petition impugnes the Notification dated 27th
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September, 2007, issued by the respondent No.2 and the order- cum-demand notice. Mr. Seervai would submit that the petitioner No.1 is registered as a small scale industry with the Department of Industries and Commerce and it manufactures a formulation Surfaz SN Cream. Mr. Seervai would submit that the impugned Notification dated 27thSeptember, 2007, is issued under paragraphs 9 and 11 of the DPCO, 1995. The second respondent has sought to apply a specific ointment formulation appearing at Sr. No.8 as being applicable to Surfaz SN Cream. Mr. Seervai emphasizes that had the authorities been aware of the basic distinction between an ointment and a cream, they would never come to the conclusion as noted above. In that regard his complaint is that none of the contentions of the petitioners have been dealt with. The petitioners had come to this Court even on earlier occasions. The essential controversy was present to the mind of both the parties. In that regard, Mr. Seervai would submit that orders passed on 12thJune, 2008, 23rdSeptember, 2008, 10thNovember, 2008, 2ndDecember, 2008 and 19th January, 2009, were impugned in a writ petition bearing No.424 of 2009. This writ petition was disposed of on 1stApril, 2009, and while disposing of the same, this Court was pleased to direct the
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second respondent to hear the petitioner No.1 and pass an appropriate reasoned order on merits. One week's time was given to file written submissions and the respondents were directed to pass an order within two weeks thereafter. An appropriate corporate guarantee was directed to be submitted. The petitioners filed detailed written submissions before the respondent No.2. Even a personal hearing was granted. However, the respondent No.2 held that the petitioner No.1's formulation Surfaz SN Cream was covered by the impugned Notification even though it was a cream and not an ointment, that the SSI exemption Notification dated 2ndMarch, 1995, did not apply to the said formulation. An erroneous conclusion was reached that the petitioner No.1 overcharged its customers and that is how a sum notified in that order of 19thMay, 2009, was directed to be deposited with interest.
23 Even this order was challenged in the second writ petition by filing Writ Petition No.1508 of 2009. On 28thJuly / 6th August, 2010, that writ petition was allowed and the order dated 19thMay, 2009, was set aside. The matter was remitted for a de novo hearing. The Special Leave Petition challenging this order
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filed by respondent No.2 was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, the respondent No.2 did not implement the order of this Court in the garb of the pendency of the SLP and later, after a gap of four years, passed the impugned order. The very same mistakes as highlighted in the earlier rounds have been committed. Apart from the fact that the order is vitiated by non observance of the principles of natural justice, it stands vitiated also by complete non-application of mind. It is inconceivable that the relevant paragraphs of the DPCO were not to the knowledge of the authorities. The second respondent is entrusted with the function and duty and that is of fixation of the price. It must act in accordance with the DPCO and the principles set out thereunder. If that DPCO specifically envisages an exemption from the paragraphs thereof to a small scale unit, then, the impugned order and the conclusion to the above effect therein cannot be sustained. Mr. Seervai also submits that there is a violation of paragraph 7 read with paragraph 9 prior to the price fixation. The Notification dated 25thSeptember, 2007, stands vitiated as being contrary to the DPCO.
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24 Mr. Seervai submits that on a true interpretation of paragraph 9 it is not open to the Government or the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (for short "NPPA") to a fix a ceiling price when there is a single manufacturer of the subject formulation. Mr. Seervai assails the impugned order on the ground that it is vitiated by legal mala fides. Once the NPAA realised that the petitioner No.1 is a small scale industry and paragraph 8 cannot be applied, what has been done is to invoke paragraph 9 and apply it. Thus the respondents have done indirectly what is prohibited directly .
25 Mr. Seervai then makes an alternate submission that assuming that the Drug Price Control Order is traceable to the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and that the power to fix the price of essential drugs is vested exclusively in the respondents, that the exercise undertaken by them is in accordance with law and not required to be interfered with, still, this Court would have to consider whether the demand as raised can be completely sustained. It is not open to the respondents to ignore the earlier orders of this Court and that are binding. Twice the demand raised in the earlier round was quashed and set aside. The matter
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was relegated back to the authorities and once it is so relegated, they could not have imposed a demand with interest. The interest could not have been directed to be recovered. In that regard, our attention is invited to the Essential Commodities Act and the relevant sections empowering imposition and recovery of interest.
26 Mr. Seervai sums up the arguments by reiterating the settled principles that in judicial review, this Court is not empowered to sit as a further Appellate Authority and reverse the view of an expert body like the second respondent only because some other view on the same materials is possible. So long as the authority has acted in accordance with the law and the rules, its decision cannot be set aside on the ground of inadequacy or sufficiency of materials. However, Mr. Seervai submits that there is an exception and if such expert body acts in an arbitrary or mala fide manner or its conclusions can be termed as perverse or vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record, then, in judicial review, such orders can be interfered with and quashed. That is the principle he is pressing into service.
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27 Reliance is placed on the following decisions in support of his arguments :
(1) Remidex Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr. ILR 2000 Kar 2197.
(2) Cipla Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. 2002 (2) ACR 1760
(3) Union of India & National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority vs. M/s. Johnson & Smith Co. & Anr. Order dated 30/10/2012, High Court of Karnataka.
(4) Ishaan Labs Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr., Order dated 6/08/2012, High Court of Karnataka.
(5) Martin & Hariss Laboratories Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2002 Punjab & Haryana 309.
(6) BEST Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2011 (124)
DRJ 390.
(7) M/s. TC Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Anr. dated 20/04/2010.
(8) Shimal Investment & Trading Co. vs. Union of India & Ors. Dated 21/10/2013.
(9) Union of India & Ors. vs. M/s. Cipla Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 329 of 2005 & connected matters decided on 21.10.2016.
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28 On the other hand, Mr. Anil Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon the conclusions rendered in the impugned order and the assertions in the affidavit-in-reply. He would submit that the petition is entirely misconceived and must be dismissed.
29 It is submitted by him that the matter pertains to ceiling prices notified by the respondents under the provisions of the DPCO, 1995, issued in exercise of powers under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The ceiling price fixed and notified under the DPCO, 1995, is required to be implemented from the date of the notification. However, Mr. Singh would submit that the petitioner-company willfully and knowingly overcharged the buyers / consumers while selling the scheduled formulations. The price charged is higher than the notified ceiling price. This is to gain an unjust and unauthorized enrichment at the cost of the consumers. Once the power is conceded and there is an authority in place which determines and decides upon the ceiling price to be fixed so also there are adequate safeguards and in-built checks in the DPCO and several paragraphs thereof, then, this is not a fit case for interference in writ jurisdiction. The petitioners cannot
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dispute and challenge the power, authority and jurisdiction of this competent authority. The DPCO cannot be challenged as it is a valid law. It is traceable to the Essential Commodities Act,1955.
30 Mr. Singh emphasized that the Essential Commodities Act was enacted with an object to provide in the interest of general public, for control of production, supply and distribution of trade and commerce in commodities which are specified in the said Act as essential commodities. Section 2(a) of the Act defines 'essential commodities' and sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) includes the item 'drugs'. Therefore, the price of drugs can be fixed under the DPCO which is established in terms of this power. The maximum ceiling price of the bulk drugs which are included in the First Schedule can be fixed and notified. That is the ceiling price. The prices so notified by the second respondent are required to be implemented by the manufacturers and marketing companies. Mr. Singh brings to our notice the relevant provisions and paragraphs of the DPCO. He submits that we must not forget the duty and function and which is performed by the second respondent. He further submits that DPCO ensures that essential commodities are made available to the consumers at a
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fair and affordable price. Mr. Singh was at pains to point out at the stage of impugning the penalty imposed on petitioner No.1, it is raising the issue of price fixation. That is a stage anterior to the recovery of penalty. In the garb of impugning the penalty imposed, it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the fixation of the price. Precisely that is attempted and, therefore, we should discourage the same. By such a conduct of the petitioners, they are disentitled from claiming any discretionary and equitable reliefs. Consequently, the writ petition be dismissed.
31 Mr. Singh relies on paragraph 8(b) of the DPCO to submit that no manufacturer or importer shall mark a new pack if not covered under paragraph 9 or a new formulation or a new dosage from what is an existing scheduled formulation without obtaining the prior approval of its price from the Government. Once the right of the citizen to obtain essential commodities at fair prices and the duty of the State to so provide them are transformed into the power of the State to fix prices, then, the legal obligation of the manufacturer to charge nothing more than the price fixed comes into force. That obligation is not discharged admittedly and now an attempt is made to question the price fixation itself.
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32 Mr. Singh relied upon the scheme of the DPCO. He submits that from paragraph 16 onwards, in the affidavit-in- reply, it is clarified that the DPCO empowers the Government either on its own motion or on an application made to it in this behalf by a manufacturer in Form III or Form IV, as the case may be, after calling for such information as it may consider necessary, by a notification in the Official Gazette, to fix a revised ceiling price for a scheduled formulation. Paragraph 9 of the DPCO, 1995, also provides that price so fixed shall operate as the ceiling price for all such packs, including those sold under a generic name for every manufacturer of such formulations. Paragraph 11 of the DPCO provides that where any manufacturer or importer of bulk drugs or formulations fails to submit application to fix price, as the case may be, or to furnish information under the DPCO within the specified time, then, the Government may on the basis of such information as may be available with it by order fix a price in respect of such bulk drugs or formulations, as the case may be. Paragraph 14(2) of the DPCO provides every manufacturer or importer shall issue a price list and supplementary price list, if required, of non scheduled formulations in Form IV to the dealers, State Drug
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Controllers and the Government indicating charges from time to time. That in exercise of this power the maximum sale price of scheduled drug bethamethasone has been notified. The respondents have also notified the maximum retail price of scheduled bulk drugs tolneflate vide Notification dated 13th February, 2007. As per the guideline 1/99 followed by the NPPA in respect of price fixation of such scheduled formulation have to apply for price approval to the Government / NPPA within thirty days from the date of fixation of bulk drug price. In this case, the concerned manufacturer did not submit an application for price approval. The Additional Solicitor General also emphasized that it is pertinent to mention that respondent No.2 has notified the norms for conversion cost (CC) packing charges (PC) and process loss of material vide Standing Order dated 21stFebruary, 2006. Norms for packing material cost have been notified on 21st December, 2006. The ointment and cream norms are mentioned as (a)(i) b(7) c(iv) and item-U. They are the same in both the notifications.
33 The learned Additional Solicitor General pointed out that the second respondent has considered the cost of raw
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materials as per applicable norms while notifying the ceiling price vide Standing Order dated 27thSeptember, 2007. The composition of the subject formulation i.e. Surfaz SN Cream is identical to the composition of the formulation mentioned in the said notification. There are notes contained in the notification which have to be mandatorily complied with. The ceiling price of Rs.6.68 was notified for the formulation mentioned at item No.8 in the said notification which was applicable to all companies including SSI units. The petitioners were, therefore, required to follow the notified price from the date of this notification. In case they desired, they could have applied for specific price approval in terms of the note (d) or (e) of the said notification which they did not. Mr. Singh, relying upon the notes to the Price Modification Standing Order dated 27thSeptember, 2007, submitted that this notification was issued under paragraph 9 of the DPCO which casts an obligation on all companies, including SSI units to comply with the ceiling prices fixed thereunder for formulations having same composition. Once formulations manufactured / marketed by the petitioners had the same composition and identical strength in column (3) for Surfaz SN Cream formulation mentioned at Sr. No.3 of the price notification, then, no violation
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of the DPCO can be justified and upheld. There is no compliance with the notification and consequently the DPCO itself. For this reason he would submit that the writ petition be dismissed.
34 Mr. Singh has invited our attention to the fact that the petitioners sold the aforesaid formulation with MRP of Rs.27.60 against the ceiling price of Rs.6.68 fixed for the formulations having same composition. Every opportunity was given, yet, no attempt was made to have the price reviewed by invoking paragraph 22 of the DPCO within the stipulated period. This is a willful act of overcharging in sale of scheduled formulations. A belated review was filed against the price notification. That is more than a year and on 16thDecember, 2008. The demand notice was issued to the petitioners on 10thApril, 2008. The review was rightly rejected. It is in these circumstances that heavy reliance is placed on paragraph 26 of the affidavit-in-reply. It is stated that the composition was having the same ingredients. Both ointment and the cream are used for external application. The characteristics / properties of ointment /cream are set out in this paragraph of the affidavit-in-reply to submit that route of administration in pharmacology is the path by which a drug is
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taken into or applied to the body. In this case, the cream and ointment are both for external application. Hence all the relevant tests and principles have been complied with as set out in paragraph 27 of the affidavit-in-reply. In the circumstances, he would submit that when over-charging can be controlled and regulated by conferring a power in the respondents to recover the over-charged amount, then, all the more, this Court should refrain from interfering in writ jurisdiction. The writ petition, therefore, be dismissed.
35 Mr. Singh relied upon the entire record of the personal hearing to support his submissions. He would submit that no quantitative data from the company was received. There was no option left with the respondent No.2 except to request the State Drug Controller to take up the matter with the petitioners for furnishing the batch-wise production/sales data of the formulation. It is clear that Surfaz SN cream is a scheduled formulation as it contains betamethasone and tolnaflate scheduled drugs. Therefore, the relevant paragraphs of the DPCO are applicable. This undisputed factual position would reveal as to how the authorities have proceeded in accordance with law. Mr
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Singh has emphasized that the ceiling price has been fixed with hundred per cent maximum allowable post manufacturing expenses ("MAPE" for short) which includes trade margin and margin for manufacturer. These principles and equally the price would bind all manufacturing units, including SSI units. One who does not adhere to this mandate of law and the DPCO, therefore, does not deserve any relief. Consequently, he submits that the writ petition be dismissed.
36 Reliance is placed on the following decisions in support of the above contentions.
(1) Union of India vs. Pradeep Kumari & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 736
(2) Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Hooghly Mills Co. Ltd. (2012) 2 SCC 489.
(3) S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 27.
(4) Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Union of India (2009) 164 Delhi Law Times (Delhi High Court) (2014) 2 SCC 753 (Supreme Court)
(5) Union of India vs. Cynamide India Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1802.
(6) M/s. Prag Rice & Oil Mills & Anr. vs. Union of India (1978)
3 SCC 468.
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(7) Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers, Govt. of India vs. Cipla Ltd. & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 1.
(8) Indian Drugs Manufacturers Association & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 2012 (4) BCR 416.
(9) Union of India vs. Swiss Garnier & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 615.
(10) Writ Petition No.4264 of 2003 N.R. Jet Enterprises Ltd. vs. National Pharmaceutical & Anr.
37 Mr. Seervai, in controverting Mr. Singh, has not only reiterated the opening submissions, but invited our attention to the rejoinder affidavit. He submits that the basic fallacy of equating creams with ointments vitiates the whole exercise. That demonstrates how desperate the authorities are to proceed against the petitioners. He would submit that creams are primarily water-based whereas an ointment is oil based product. Creams are emulsions of either aqueous fase into an oil fase and/or non aqueous fase into an aqueous fase requiring addition of emulsifying agents to the emulsion for the formulation of creams. Ointments, on the other hand, being a single fase preparation comprising only of non aqueous greasy fase do not require emulsifying agents. Once emulsifying agents are added in
34
the formulation of a cream, the manufacturing cost of a cream increases. The equipment used in manufacturing creams is far more complicated than that for ointments as a stirrer as well as a homogenizer is required in the manufacturing of a cream and only simple stirrers are used for manufacturing of an ointment. Creams have lighter consistencies spreading over a large area and are easily absorbed by the skin. Ointments, on the other hand, are thinner in their consistency used for small area and, therefore, stay longer on the surface of the skin and not easily absorbed by the skin. Ointments are prescribed for dry skin as they help in keeping the skin moist whereas creams cause the skin to dry faster and are, therefore, prescribed only for oily skin. There are also other distinctions and which he submits are highlighted in the affidavit-in-rejoinder. He would, therefore, submit that we must allow the writ petition.
38 Before we proceed to analyze the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to the basic principles governing any decision in such matters.
35
39 In a case reported in Union Of India & Anr vs Cynamide India Ltd. & Anr. AIR 1987 SC 1802, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that price fixation is neither the function nor the forte of the Court. The Court is concerned neither with the policy nor with the rates. The Court has jurisdiction to enquire into the question in appropriate proceedings, whether relevant considerations have gone in and irrelevant considerations kept out of the determination of the price. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sets out as to how if the policy is to be based on factors and which would guide its determination, the Court will, if necessary, enquire into the question whether the policy and the factors are present to the mind of the authorities specifying the price. The assembling of the raw material and the mechanics of price fixation are the concern of the Executive. The Court will not re- evaluate the consideration even if the prices are demonstrably injurious to some manufacturers or producers. The Court will, of course, examine if there is any hostile discrimination. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of the price fixation by the Central Government under the DPCO in the case of Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Limited vs. Union of India, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 753 in paragraphs 43, 48 and 51 held thus :
36
"43. One finds, therefore, that the price fixation by the Central Government under DPCO is in the nature of legislative measure and the dominant object and purpose of such price fixation is the equitable distribution and availability of commodities at fair price. The whole idea behind such price fixation is to control hoarding, cornering or artificial short supply and give benefit to the consumer. The regulation of drug price being ultimately for the benefit of the consumer, we must now consider the effect of Paras 14(1), (2) and (3), Para 16 (3), Para 19 and Form V.
48. Para 16 of DPCO, 1995 bans sale of bulk drug or formulation to a consumer at a price exceeding the price specified in the current price list or price indicated on the label of the container or pack thereof whichever is less, plus all taxes, if any payable. The expressions 'current price list' and 'whichever is less' in Para 16 are significant expressions. We find ourselves in agreement with the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the current price list is simply the price reflecting the currently operating notified price under the DPCO. Once a price is notified for a formulation, it takes effect immediately and sale of the formulation to the consumer has only to be at the notified price. This is the plain and ordinary meaning of paragraph 16. The expression, whichever is less' further makes it an absolute obligation on all concerned not to sell any formulation to any consumer at a price exceeding price specified in the current price list or price indicated on the label of the container or pack thereof whichever is less.
51. We are of the considered view that if an interpretation of paragraph 14(1),(2)(3), paragraph 16(3) and Para 19 of DPCO,1995 results in frustrating its object and leads to denial of the benefit of current notified price to the consumer, then such interpretation must be avoided. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the construction put to the above provisions by Mr. S. Ganesh."
37
40 Hence, we would be guided by these principles. The whole idea behind price fixation is to control the hoarding, cornering or artificial short supply of drugs, particularly essential drugs and give benefit to the consumer. The whole exercise being for the benefit of the consumer, his interest has to be placed in the forefront.
41 It is this very principle which was evolved and applied even by this Court in a decision reported in Indian Drugs Manufacturers Association & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2012 (4) Bombay Cases Reporter 416. This Court, on consideration of the relevant materials, held that it would be the obligation and duty of every manufacturer or marketeer of drugs to maintain records relating to the sales turnover of individual bulk drugs manufactured and sold. The sales turnover of formulations pack-wise, and also such other records, has been directed from time to time to be maintained by the Government. The Court found that the source of the power to frame the DPCO can be traced thus:
"17. Before we proceed to consider whether the respondents were entitled to proceed under DPCO, 1979 by issuing the notices in question, it will be
38
relevant to note the purport and intent of the DPCOs. The DPCOs have been framed under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The said Act is referable to Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India. The DPCOs provide a price control mechanism by which the Government seeks to control the prices of drugs so that the ultimate beneficiary is the consumer who then stands to get the drug in question at an affordable and reasonable price. The concept of the retention price, pool price and the selling price is, therefore, encompassed in the DPCOs. The DPCOs by the said price fixing mechanism, inter alia, provide for fixing the profit margins which a manufacturer would be entitled to. The said price fixation is done by controlling the prices of the bulk drug which is used in the formulation by the manufacturer. This was done, in the context of the present petition, by the method prescribed by under Para 11 of the DPCO, 1979. The retail price fixed for a formulation allows a manufacturer a particular price at which he can buy the ingredient bulk drug. If he buys the drug at a lower price than the price allowed, he has to deposit in the DPEA the difference between the price allowed and the lower price at which he has bought the bulk drug. By this process, an equilibrium is sought to be struck by the Government so that the manufacturer gets the bulk drug at the controlled price resulting in the retail price of the bulk drug being controlled in a fashion so as to benefit the ultimate consumer.
18. …..............
19. The Apex Court, therefore, has in terms held that profiteering by itself is evil and profiteering of scarce resources of the community and life saving drugs is diabolical is a menace which had to be fettered and curbed. It is further held by the Apex Court that the orders made under the Essential Commodities Act, namely DPCOs have to be understood and interpreted keeping in mind the Directive Principles under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The Apex Court further held that the manufacturer of bulk drugs or indeed formulations are presumed to be well informed persons, well able to take care of themselves, who
39
have the assistance of accountants, Advocates and experts to advice and espouse their cause. That the Court should take judicial notice of the fact that the manufacturers of drugs are generally who know all that is to be known in the price fixed by the Government.
20. As can be seen from a reading of paragraph 7 of the DPCO, 1979, paragraph (2) thereof obligates a manufacturer of formulation who utilises in his formulation any bulk drug, either from his own production or procured by him from any other source, the price of such bulk drug being lower than the price allowed to him in the retail price of his formulation, to deposit in the DPEA account the excess amount. This was the first step in the process of disgorgement of the unjust enrichment or unjust profit. The second step was to direct the sale of the formulation at a revised price to be fixed by the Government. The facts in the instant case disclose that the manufacturers did not adhere to the DPCO, 1979 by depositing the amounts as envisaged by paragraph 7(2) or by filing their returns. This was probably on the ground that the issue of price fixation was pending before the Apex Court in Cynamide's case. As stated by the respondents in their two affidavits, it is only after the decision in Cynamide's case that the respondents could proceed against the manufacturers by issuing them the notices."
42 In the case before us, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority has, in the impugned order, arrived at the conclusion that there is no substance in the contentions of the petitioners that the Government could not have fixed a ceiling price in respect of their formulations Surfaz SN cream under paragraph 9 of the DPCO despite the petitioners being the sole
40
manufacturers of the formulation and thereby defeat the exemption granted from the applicability of paragraph 8 of the DPCO. In negating this contention, the second respondent held that under the provisions of the DPCO, all manufacturers of scheduled formulations have to apply for price approval to the Government / NPPA within thirty days from the date of fixation of the bulk drug price. However, in this case the petitioners (manufacturer of concerned formulation) did not submit that application for price approval. Hence the Government notified the price of Surfaz SN cream. The NPPA says that it has notified the norms for conversion cost, packing charges and process loss of material, norms for packing material cost. The ointment and cream norms are mentioned in item-K in the notification dated 21stDecember, 2006. It relies upon the price fixation calculation sheet for Surfaz SN cream. It is stated that NPPA has duly considered the cost of raw materials as per applicable norms. The composition of such formulation is identical to the composition of formulation mentioned in the said notification. It is, therefore, that the ceiling price of Rs.6.68 was notified in the said notification which was applicable to all companies, including SSI units. The petitioners were required to follow this notified price
41
from the date of the notification. In case they desired, they could have applied for specific price approval in terms of note (e) of the said notification which they did not do so. Once the aforesaid price notification was fully applicable to such formulation for the relevant period and the company is liable to deposit amount charged in excess to the notified ceiling price with interest thereon under the provisions of the DPCO, 1995, read with the Essential Commodities Act, then, the petitioners cannot be heard to say that the price fixation is faulty or suffers from any infirmity much less serious in nature. It is a case of gross violation of the provision of DPCO by deliberately not implementing the ceiling price in sale of the formulation, thereby causing irreparable loss to the consumers. The petitioners were required to comply with the notification and apply for specific price, if so desired, for any special feature. Neither of the steps has been taken and now a factual plea is raised.
43 While meeting the argument that there is a difference between ointment and cream and the price for one cannot be charged for another, the second respondent negatived it by referring to a comparative chart.
42
1. Ointments are homogenous, semi- 1. Creams are homogenous, semi- solid preparations intended for solid preparations intended for external application of body external application of body surfaces on (skin of mucous surfaces on (skin or mucous membranes) for emollient membranes) for protective protective, therapeutic or therapeutic purposes. prophylactic purposes.
| 2. They are usually consists of solutions or dispersions of one or more medicaments in suitable bases. |
2. They usually consist of solutions of dispersions of one or more medicaments in suitable bases. |
| 3. They are formulated using hydrophilic, hydrophobic or water- emulsifying bases to provide preparation that are immiscible, miscible or emulsifible with the skin secretion. |
3. They are formulated using hydrophilic or hydrophobic bases to provide preparations that are essentially miscible with the skin secretion. |
| 4. The base should not produce irritation or sensitization of the skin, nor should it retard wound healing, it should be smooth, inert odourless or almost odourless, physically and chemically stable and compatible with the skin and with incorporated medicaments. |
4. The base should not produce irritation or sensitization of the skin, nor should it retard wound healing, it should be smooth, inert odourless or almost odourless, physically and chemically stable and compatible with the skin and with incorporated medicaments. |
| 5. Ointments may contain suitable auxiliary substances such as antioxidants, stabilizers, thickeners and emulsifiers and, when the base might support the growth of microbial contaminants, suitable antimicrobial preservatives. |
5. Creams may contain suitable antimicrobial preservatives unless the active ingredients or the bases themselves have sufficient bactericidal of fungicidal activity. They may contain other suitable auxiliary substances such as antioxidants, stabilizers, thickeners and emulsifiers. |
| 6. If an ointment is specifically intended for use on large wounds or on severely injured skin, it should be sterile. |
6. If a cream is specifically intended for use on large open wounds or on severely injured skin it should be sterile. |
| 7. Ointments should not normally be diluted; if dilution is necessary care should be taken to choose the right diluents to avoid risk of instability or incompatibility. |
7. Creams should not normally be diluted; should dilution be necessary care should be taken to prevent instability and particular, microbial contamination. |
43
44 Going by the broad similarity and the application, the 2ndrespondent concluded that there is no real difference between ointment and cream. The affidavit explains as to how the bulk drug mentioned at item Nos.8 and 36 respectively, are in the First Schedule of the DPCO 1995. Hence, the formulation in question matches in the scheduled drug, the strength and route of administration, namely 'external', would bring it under the ambit of price control. The affidavit explains in great details, by relying on certain judgments and decisions of other High Courts and the Supreme Court, that overcharging of drugs can be subject matter of penal proceedings. It is in that context, Section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 is relied upon. It is finally contended that a detailed and reasoned order is issued, which is in accordance with law.
45 We would then make a reference to the DPCO 1995. The DPCO is issued in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It is issued by the Central Government. Paragraph 2 of the said order contains definitions. For our purpose, the following definitions are relevant:
44
"(a) "bulk drug" means any pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or plant product including its salts, esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives, conforming to pharmacopoeial or other standards specified in the Second Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), and which is used as such or as an ingredient in any formulation;
(c) "ceiling price" means a price fixed by the Government for Scheduled formulations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9;
(f) "drug" includes--
(i) all medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used for, or in the diagnosis treatment, mitigation, or prevention of any disease or disorder in human beings or animals, including preparations applied on human body for the purpose of repelling insects like mosquitoes;
(ii) Such substances, intended to affect the structure or any function of the human or animal body or intended to be used for the destruction of vermin or insects which cause disease in human beings or animals, as may be specified from time to time by the Government by notification in the Official Gazette; and
(iii) bulk drugs and formulations;
(h) "formulation" means a medicine processed out of, or containing one or more bulk drug or drugs with or without the use of any pharmaceutical aids, for internal or external use for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention or disease in human beings or animals, but shall not include--
(i) any medicine included in any bona fide Ayurvedic (including Sidha) of Unani (Tibb) systems or medicines;
45
(ii) any medicine included in the Homoeopathic system of medicine; and
(iii) any substance to which the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) do not apply;
(p) "non-Scheduled formulation" means a formulation not containing any bulk drug specified in the First Schedule;
(s) "retail price" means the retail price of a drug arrived at or fixed in accordance with the provisions of this Order and includes a ceiling price;
(v) "Scheduled formulation" means a formulation containing any bulk drug specified in the First Schedule either individually or in combination with other drugs, including one or more than one drug or drugs not specified in the First Schedule except single ingredient formulation based on bulk drugs specified in the First Schedule and sold under the generic name;"
46 Thus, perusal of these definitions would reveal as to how the "bulk drug" and "drug" is understood. Drug is an inclusive definition. It includes the bulk drugs and formulations. Bulk drug is defined to mean any pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or plant product including its salts, etc., conforming to the requisite standards including those specified in the Second Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and which is used as such or as an ingredient in any formulation. Formulation
46
means a medicine processed out of, or containing one or more bulk drug or drugs with or without the use of any pharmaceutical aids, for internal or external use for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or animals, but shall not include what is set out in paragraph 2 clause (h)(i), (ii) and (iii). Non-Scheduled formulation means a formulation not containing any bulk drug specified in the First Schedule, whereas, Scheduled formulation means a formulation containing any bulk drug specified in the First Schedule either individually or in combination with other drugs, including one or more than one drug or drugs not specified in the First Schedule. The definition of the words "manufacture", "manufacturer", "non- Scheduled bulk drug" and "sale turn-over" may not be reproduced. However, the definition of "sale turn-over" is relevant and that is why we would reproduce the same:
"(w) "sale turn-over" means the product of units of formulations sold by a manufacturer or an importer, as the case may be, in an accounting year multiplied by retail price inclusive of sales tax, if any, paid on direct sales by the manufacturer or importer but does not include excise duty and local taxes, if any;"
47
47 A perusal of this definition would reveal as to how that term is understood to mean a product of units of formulations sold by a manufacturer or an importer in an accounting year multiplied by retail price inclusive of sales tax, if any, paid on direct sales by the manufacturer or importer, but does not include excise duty and local taxes.
48 By paragraph 3 of the DPCO, there is a power conferred in the Government to fix the maximum sale prices of bulk drugs specified in the First Schedule. Sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 indicates as to how the discretion has to be exercised with a view to regulate the equitable distribution and increasing supplies of a bulk drug specified in the First Schedule and making it available at a fair price, that the maximum sale price of a bulk drug specified in the First Schedule can be fixed by the Government. The power in that behalf is conferred to subserve the larger public interest. That is subserved by ensuring equitable distribution of bulk drugs. The equitable distribution comes when drugs are sold and made available at a fair price. Hence, the Government can, after obtaining from the manufacturer the relevant information and making such inquiry as it deems fit, fix
48
the maximum sale price at which such bulk drug shall be sold. The power can be exercised from time to time. By the proviso, it is the obligation of the manufacturer to provide additional information as may be required by the Government. The Government can also take inspection of the manufacturing premises for verification through on the spot study of the manufacturing premises and facilities and records thereof. It is not as if while fixing the maximum sale price of a bulk drug, the Government cannot consider the issue of return on the capital employed. Every opportunity is given to the manufacturer so as to obtain a reasonable return on the investment made by him/her. It is not as if the Government imposes a determination made by it unilaterally. There are enough safeguards within the DPCO, and this particular paragraph, which would ensure that the maximum price is determined by taking into account the factor of return on the investments made. It is, therefore, an obligation of the manufacturer to furnish the details of his manufacturing activities and that is required to be furnished in Form I. Even the additional information about the production and as would be required by the Government, has to be furnished so as to enable the Government to fix the maximum sale price.
49
Finally, by sub-paragraph (5), an opportunity is also granted to a manufacturer to seek revision in the price/maximum sale price determined in terms of earlier sub-paragraph. By paragraph 4, information to be furnished by the manufacturer in relation to the Scheduled bulk drugs has to be furnished and a time limit has been set out for the same. Then, by paragraph 5, information to be furnished by the manufacturer in relation to the non-Scheduled bulk drugs is contemplated. Even the power to fix the maximum sale price in relation to such bulk drug is also conferred in the Government.
49 Then comes paragraph 6, which ensures that there is adequate production whereafter alone, there will be equitable distribution. Thus, the equitable distribution to be regulated by the Government would require the Government to exercise discretion from time to time and direct any manufacturer of any bulk drug to sell such bulk drug to such other manufacturers or formulations as may be specified in such order. By paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (2), the Government may call for such information from the manufacturer, importer or distributor of bulk drug as it may consider necessary, so as to enable him to direct any
50
manufacturer as above. There are definite factors which would guide the Government while acting in terms of paragraph 6.
50 Then comes paragraph 7 of the DPCO, which reads as under:
"7. Calculation of retail price of formulation .- The retail price of a formulation shall be calculated by the Government in accordance with the following formula, namely,- R.P. = (M.C.+C.C.+P.M.+P.C.) X (1+MAPE/100) + ED. Where-
"R.P." means retail price;
"M.C." means material cost and includes the cost of drugs and other pharmaceutical aids used including overages, if any, plus process loss thereon specified as a norm from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf;
"C.C." means conversion cost worked out in accordance with established procedures of costing and shall be fixed as a norm every year by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf.
"P.M." means cost of the packing material used in the packing or concerned formulation, including process loss, and shall be fixed as a norm every year by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf;
"P.C." means packing charges worked out in accordance with established procedures of costing and shall be fixed as a norm every year by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf;
"MAPE" (Maximum Allowable Post-manufacturing Expenses) means all costs incurred by a manufacturer from the stage of ex-factory cost to retailing and includes trade margin and margin for the manufacturer and it shall not exceed one hundred per cent for the indigenously manufactured Scheduled formulations;
"E.D." means excise duty; Provided that in the case of an imported formulation, the landed cost shall form the basis for fixing its price along with such margin to cover selling and distribution expenses including
51
interest and importer's profit which shall not exceed fifty per cent of the landed cost.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this proviso, "landed cost"
means the cost of import of formulation inclusive of customs duty and clearing charges."
A perusal thereof would indicate as to how there is a formula evolved for calculating the retail price of a formulation. This power is to be exercised in relation to an imported formulation is also set out in this paragraph. By paragraph 8, the Government is conferred a power to fix the retail price of a Scheduled formulation in accordance with the formula laid in paragraph 7. This power has to be exercised by passing an order. There is, in paragraph 8 itself, enough opportunity and safeguards as well, whereby the Government can fix the retail price of a Scheduled formulation and revise it as well. However, there is a mandate flowing from sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 8, that the retail price of a formulation once fixed by the Government under sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of paragraph 8 shall not be increased by any manufacturer except with the prior approval of the Government. It is not as if this retail price once fixed is static or cannot be changed. It can be revised and the manufacturer is given an opportunity to seek such revision. We
52
do not see how the petitioners before us can complain that the respondents, and particularly the respondent no.2, acted arbitrarily. All of them are exercising powers in terms of this Control Order. All of them are aware of the limit on their power. All of them are aware of the manner in which the power has to be exercised. Each one of them is aware of their obligation and duty and to the members of the public. Once the power, which is discretionary, is conceded to the Government in terms of this Control Order, which is brought in for price control, then, it is futile to urge that the impugned actions are contravening the
DPCO.
51 We have also seen as to how there is a power to fix the ceiling price of Scheduled formulation. That has to be fixed in accordance with the formula laid down in paragraph 7. If the power to fix the ceiling price is consistent with the duty cast and to keep in view the cost or efficiency, or both, of the manufacturers of such formulations before that price shall operate as ceiling price for all packs, including those sold under generic name and for every manufacturer of such formulations, then, we do not see as to how any complaint can be made by the
53
petitioners before us. Further paragraphs of this Order, namely paragraphs 10 and 11, would enable us to conclude that on failure of the manufacturer or importer of a bulk drug or formulation to submit application for price fixation or revision, as the case may be, or to furnish information as required under this Order, within the time specified therein, the Government may, on the basis of such information, as may be available with it, by an order, fix the price in respect of such bulk drug or formulation as the case may be. Once there is no cooperation and assistance from the manufacturers and they fail to abide by their obligation to furnish the requisite information, then it is not as if the Government cannot act to subserve the larger public interest. With a view to uphold it, and by ensuring equitable distribution of bulk drugs or formulations, that power is conferred in the Government to fix price under certain circumstances. By paragraph 12, there is a power to recover dues accrued under the earlier DPCO and to ensure deposit of the same into Drugs Prices Equalization Account (DPEA). By paragraph 13, there is a power to recover overcharged amount which reads as under:
"13. Power to recover overcharged amount -
54
Notwithstanding anything contained in this order, the Government shall by notice, require the manufacturers, importers or distributors, as the case may be, to deposit the amount accrued due to charging of prices higher than those fixed or notified by the Government under the provisions of Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1987 and under the provisions of this Order."
52 A perusal of paragraph 13 would reveal as to how notwithstanding anything contained in the DPCO, the Government shall by notice, require the manufacturers etc. to deposit the amount accrued by overcharging. By paragraph 14, there is an obligation to display the price fixed or revised by the Government and that is on the manufacturer or the importer. It shall be permanently displayed and a proof thereof shall also be furnished. Paragraph 15 talks of display of price of non- Scheduled formulations and price list thereof. The display has to be in accordance with sub-paragraphs of paragraph 15. Paragraph 16 reads as under:
"16. Control of sale prices of bulk drugs and formulations.- No person shall sell any bulk drug or formulation to any consumer at a price exceeding the price specified in the current price list or price indicated on the label of the container or pack thereof, whichever is less, plus all local taxes, if any, payable."
55
53 With a view to control sale prices of bulk drugs and formulations, this paragraph indicates a prohibition against selling them to any consumer at a price exceeding the price specified in the current price list or price indicated on the label of the container or pack thereof. Of course, this price includes all the taxes as well, and they are recoverable. The importance of such provision can be understood by referring to further paragraphs of this DPCO. A loose quantity sale is prohibited. The manufacturer, distributor or dealer cannot refuse to sell drug (see paragraphs 17 and 18). By paragraph 19, price of a formulation sold to the dealer is a price equal to the retail price as specified by an order or notified by the Government (excluding excise duty, if any), minus sixteen per cent thereof in the case of Scheduled drugs. Therefore, the channel through which the drugs move, namely, manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler to retailer and finally to the consumer through the retailer, is taken note of and the DPCO ensures that none in this chain acts in such a way so as to exploit any consumer or create a situation of inadequate or short supply of the formulations. There is an obligation to maintain all records and that obligation is cast by paragraph 20. Paragraph 21 confers a power in any Gazetted Officer of the Central Government or of
56
the State Government authorized by general or special order to enter, search and seize the drug and other materials enlisted therein. There is a power to review conferred in the Government vide paragraph 22. Then there a power to issue guidelines and directions and finally, one can refer and safely on paragraph 24 titled "Penalties". Any contravention of any of the provisions of the DPCO shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Anybody, who wants the Government to consider any manufacture within the meaning of DPCO being affected by its stringent and strict regime, can apply to the Government and seek an exemption from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the DPCO. The Government then can exercise the power conferred by paragraph 25 to grant exemption. Paragraph 26 enables the Government with delegation of powers by the Government and the manner of such delegation is also set out therein.
54 We have surveyed these paragraphs minutely and closely and referred to their details only because Mr. Seervai, learned Senior Counsel complained that there is a violation of the paragraphs of this DPCO. He also complained about the lack of
57
power to impose penalty. We are of the opinion that there is no substance in his complaints at all. Mr. Seervai complains that paragraph 7 has been ignored in as much as the year wise acts ought to be referred. He further submits that paragraph 7 read with paragraph 9 of the DPCO is violated because no inquiry from the petitioners (as mandated and envisaged by paragraph 9) has been made prior to price fixation. The argument is that on a true interpretation of paragraph 9, it is not open to the Government or the 2ndrespondent to fix the ceiling price when there is a single manufacturer of the subject formulation. We are unable to agree with him inasmuch as the DPCO has to be read as a whole. The paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the same have to be read together and harmoniously so as to subserve and uphold the object and purpose sought to be achieved by issuance of the same. One cannot forget that DPCO has to be issued in order to fulfill the mandate of Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. Drugs and medicines have to become available to those who need them and not only to those who can afford them. Irrespective of whether anybody can afford or not, the essential drug required for his treatment or prescribed for it should be available. This would be available provided the prices are within the reasonable
58
limits. The price fixation is, thus, an obligation and in terms of the High Court judgments, to be discharged by the Central Government with a view to ensure equitable distribution of bulk drugs. If the whole purpose is to regulate the distribution of drugs by ensuring that it is equitable, then the power to fix the price and termed as 'ceiling price' must be conceded to the Government. In the impugned order, there is a finding of fact and that the petitioners violated the DPCO. It is held in the impugned order, and with regard to the specific contention that the Government could not have fixed any price with regard to Surfaz SN Cream without following the formula laid down in paragraph 7 of the DPCO and without carrying out any inquiry/study in respect of the case of the manufacturer of the said formulation because the petitioners are the sole manufacturers of the formulation, that the stage at which the petitioners are raising this contention is subsequent to the price fixation. That has already been done and completed. The ceiling price for the formulation was fixed and notified. The norms were followed. The company should have adhered to the price notified by the Government. The cost/efficiency of the manufacturer was duly considered while issuing price fixation notification. The NPPA
59
rightly discarded the attempt of the petitioners to question the price fixation by raising the issue in regard thereto at the stage at which the petitioners were proceeded against for and that was of violation of the DPCO. The NPPA has notified the maximum retail price of the bulk drug and thereafter, notified the ceiling price of the formulations as per available information. It is clear that the company did not furnish any cost details in respect of the manufacture of subject formulation. Therefore, the Government conducted the necessary inquiries and fixed the price. The issue of fixation of the price has been raised by the petitioners at a very belated stage. We cannot render a finding of fact wholly meaningless or otiose by now permitting the petitioners to put before the Court the materials which the petitioners state to be material and relevant. Nothing prevented the petitioners from placing these materials by providing the information in the requisite forms at the time of price fixation. As we have noted above, the scheme of DPCO does not rule out fixation of the price even when bulk drugs/formulations are manufactured by a sole manufacturer. If we accept the argument of Mr. Seervai, then the entire DPCO will be rendered redundant and nugatory. That means the sole manufacturer of any bulk drug/formulation can
60
determine the price himself/herself, sell the product at the same by virtually compelling the consumers to buy his/her product at the price fixed by him/her. The price determined by him/her then remains unchallenged. Nobody, including the Government, can interfere with the fixation of price by such sole manufacturers. Surely, that is not the intent and purpose of the DPCO and in fact, the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Both subserve, as noted above, the larger public interest. In order to regulate equitable distribution of the bulk drug, it is incumbent upon the Government to fix the price. That would be fixed even with regard to such bulk drugs which are manufactured by a single manufacturer. It is for the single manufacturer to convince the Government, by producing all the materials and providing the requisite information, so also the details, that the price fixed by him be accepted, that his plea be accepted in that behalf as he has acted fairly, reasonably and not contrary to the object and purpose of the Act. If all the relevant factors which come in the price determination have been taken into consideration by the manufacturer, we do not see any difficulty for him then to convince the Government as above. The Government can make an inquiry with regard to verification of the information furnished
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by its single/sole manufacturer. If, on inquiry, the Government is satisfied that the sole manufacturer is not exploiting the consumer by overcharging or overpricing, then the Government may grant him such relief as is permissible. However, when the petitioners did not cooperate with the authorities, did not provide any information, neither assist the authorities, nor enable it to collect the information from the requisite sources, then, they can hardly complain. It is their acts which have been taken into consideration by the respondents. The petitioners not only overcharged and recovered the price higher than the ceiling price from the consumers, but refused to abide by the DPCO even when the breach and violation thereafter was brought to its notice. It is thereafter that the petitioners were penalized and by adhering to the principles of fairness, equity and justice. We do not see as to how such a manufacturer can complain and that too, about the price fixation. The petitioners' pleas in that regard are highly belated.
55 In regard to the above, the following observations and conclusions in the impugned order are extremely relevant.
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"C4. It is stated that the Company has sold the aforesaid formulation with MRP of Rs. 27.60 against the Ceiling Price of Rs.6.68 fixed for the formulations having same composition. Applicable norms for the purposes of Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 and the Guidelines 1/99 of the NPPA in respect of processing of price fixation matters have been taken into consideration for price fixation. There is no significant difference in the cost of the basic material including lubricant, binder and disintegrating agent between ointment and cream, in fact, they have same notified norms. Bulk Drug Betamethasone and Tolnaftate is same and it has same strength. Due to use of certain excipients which have minor costs, the company charging four times more price than the notified price at the cost of poor people by putting word dispersible tablets for uncoated plain tablets is unjustified and unreasonable.
C5. The Company charged price exorbitantly as high as four times more than the Notified Price with utter disregard to the norms for specific categories notified for such purpose. By no stretch of imagination, the price of the formulation can be so high having same composition. The respondents deliberately avoided furnishing cost details. They are not entitled to overcharge in the sale of the formulations which have identical composition and strength of ingredients are mentioned in the aforesaid price Notification S.O. 1636 (E) dated 27.9.2007"
56 We do not see how we can enter into this dispute and how we can take cognizance of the petitioners' pleas at this stage.
57 Even otherwise, what we have noted is that the respondents have pointed out that there was no quantitative data supplied by the petitioner-company. There was no option left except to request the State Drug Controller to take up the matter
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finally with the petitioners for furnishing the batch-wise production/sales data of the formulation to the 2ndrespondent. The petitioners did not furnish the requisite information and batch-wise production/sales data. It is therefore, completely the obligation of the manufacturer/ petitioner to seek separate price if the product is having any special feature than the one mentioned in the price notification. Once the Government found that the information was not provided, and that lapse has been highlighted sufficiently in paragraphs 71, 73 and 74 of the affidavit-in-reply, then, we do not see how a factual aspect of the present nature can be probed by us any further. Our attention is also invited to the order dated 21stDecember 2006 of the Government of India published in the official Gazette. This order prescribes the norms for conversion cost, packaging charges and process loss of materials for the purpose of paragraph 7 of the DPCO. It has come into force with immediate effect. We do not see how we can go into the determination of such norms which is a highly technical issue. The experts in the field have applied their minds and evolved these norms from the Notes 1 to 4 below this order and which guide the Government. Thus, the norms for conversion cost,packing charges and process loss of the materials
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have been notified by this order. Thereafter, by another order of the same date, the Government notified the norms for packing materials cost. The Government has published these norms. They were published whereafter the necessary and requisite steps have been taken. The argument is that no notifications/orders were published in the official Gazette specifying the norms for costs of drugs, pharmaceutical aids used including overages. In that regard, our attention was invited to paragraph 7 of the DPCO.
58 A careful perusal of the same would indicate as to what material cost means. It includes the cost of drugs and other pharmaceutical aids including overages, if any, plus process loss thereon specified as a norm from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette. Therefore, if the information is not provided in the prescribed format by the petitioners, then, the calculation of retail price of formulation would have to be done by the Government and in terms of its inquiry. In the present case, we have not seen any complaint made. The pleadings in the Writ Petition would indicate as to how petitioner no.1 claims to be manufacturing and marketing various drugs and
pharmaceuticals. The petitioner no.1 claims to be well known and
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reputed pharmaceutical company in India. We are concerned with a formulation known as "Surfaz SN Cream" which was manufactured between 29thJuly, 2006 and 5thOctober 2007. The argument is that the notification dated 27thSeptember 2007, copy of which is annexed to the Writ Petition at Exhibit "B" (see page 57 of the paper book), is otherwise inapplicable to the petitioners. This notification applies only to Ointment and not to Cream. Thereafter, straightway, the petitioners refer to the letter dated 09thApril 2008 in which it was alleged that the petitioners were not following ceiling price in respect of "Surfaz SN Cream 7 gm" as notified in the notification. The petitioners were called upon to explain the reasons for not following the same. Pertinently, in reply to the letter dated 9thApril 2008, petitioner no.1 stated that the product referred to in the notification is an ointment while there product is a cream. Cream is quite different and distinct from an ointment. The product, therefore, is not covered by the notification is the stand taken. Once again, on 11th June 2008, the 2ndrespondent clarified and asserted that there is no major difference in ointment and cream inasmuch as both are used for external application and for same purpose, therefore, the contention of the petitioners cannot be accepted. All that the
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petitioners, and in response to the further demand in this letter, stated that there is a notification issued on 5thJune 2008, specifically covering cream. Hence, by implication, there is an acknowledgment of a difference, and material one, between cream and ointment. The petitioners responded by stating that in view of this notification dated 5thJune 2008, they have discontinued manufacturing and marketing of "Surfaz SN Cream". The petitioners requested that the matter may not be pursued further. At no stage we find that the petitioners questioned the fixation of the ceiling price. Once the petitioners have only responded to the allegations made against them and the demand based thereon, then, it is not possible to accept the contention that the DPCO or paragraphs thereof were not followed in fixing the price. The petitioners never submitted quantitative details which were sought for right from June 2008 by the 2nd respondent. The details were to be furnished as certified by Chartered Accountant/Cost Accountant. All that the petitioners go on contending is that they have discontinued the manufacture of ointment (Surfaz SN Cream 7 gm). This is apparent from the reading of the letter at page 72. Yet, a price list was submitted on 15thSeptember 2008. The petitioners were informed that once
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information as sought was not provided despite repeated reminders, then a case of overcharging under paragraph 13 of the DPCO would have to be initiated. Therefore, estimate of the demand based on overcharge was raised by letter dated 23rd September 2008. The petitioners, even in reply to this, communicated that they have received the letter only on 20th October 2008, hence, they could not immediately respond to it. Thereafter, on 10thNovember 2008, the petitioners' letter dated 31stOctober 2008 was dealt with and replied by 2ndrespondent. They reiterated the demand raised on the petitioners. It is in these circumstances that we must see the stand of the petitioners as reflected in their letter (without prejudice) dated 4thDecember 2008 (see Annexure "O" page 86). The petitioners raised a contention, and completely unconnected, namely, they being an SSI unit, they are not required to go for price fixation. They relied upon paragraph 7 of the Press Release issued by the Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers dated 7thJanuary 1995. Yet, what the petitioners raised, and for the first time, are materials related to price fixation. They relied upon their earlier stand that ointment and cream are two different drug delivery systems. Then, the argument is that even if the pack type or size is different, the
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ceiling price cannot be applied. That is evident from the fact that the NPPA had issued different notifications for different pack sizes and different packing materials. Hence, it is far fetched that the price determined with one set of raw materials can be applied to other formulation in different drug delivery system. That is how the reliance was placed on paragraph 9 of the DPCO. Once the petitioners took a vague and contradictory stand and as is apparent from a reading of this letter, then, it is apparent that they are merely delaying the inevitable. They were aware of the price beyond which the products cannot be sold. In answer to a demand of penalty based on overcharging, an attempt was made to raise issues about price fixation. In these circumstances, we do not feel that any further consideration of the argument based on price fixation is required. That is really unnecessary. The petitioners were aware that a demand is raised on them only because they did not adhere to the ceiling price. If that is how the demand is raised, then, we must find out whether any cogent and satisfactory explanation is given for resisting the same. If the allegations based on which the demand is raised are not controverted and denied by placing material to the contrary, then, we must hold that the said act of the respondents were well
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within their powers. They could not have allowed merely technical pleas or denials to be raised and repeatedly. It has been rightly pointed out that the overcharging is proved.
59 We have not found anything from this Court's earlier orders which would enable us to conclude that the issue of price fixation can be said to be alive and capable of being raised at this stage. All that the petitioners would contend, and time and again, is that their specific plea as raised in the written submissions has not been considered. We do not think that the NPPA-2nd respondent was required to deliver a detailed judgment like a Court of law. Once it is broadly indicated the stand of the petitioners by setting it out issue wise, if that is capable of only a single answer or that is capable of being disposed of by a brief reasoned conclusion, then, that is apparent and as clearly reflected in the impugned order. Mr. Seervai would rely upon the order dated 28thJuly 2010 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1508 of 2009. There, as well, all that is noted by this Court is that the petitioners contended that the Government could not have fixed any price with regard to the product styled as 'Natvie- C-200 capsule' without following the formula laid down in
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paragraph 7 of the DPCO and without carrying out any enquiry/study in respect of the cost and manufacture of the said formulation of the petitioners in view of the fact that the petitioners are the sole manufacturer of the said formulation. We do not see that the charge of non application of mind, as leveled, now will vitiate the impugned orders. All that has been done by this Court in the clarificatory order passed on 6thAugust 2010 is to correct certain mistakes which are apparent, but yet clerical in nature. Eventually, this Court did not, in any manner, take over the function of statutory authorities. All that this Court emphasized is it must, while passing an order and adverse to the interest of the petitioners, take into consideration the objections and contentions, so also the pleas made orally and in writing by the petitioners. That all the written submissions were specifically placed before the NPPA is apparent. That it must, therefore, indicate contention-wise, as to how it considered the same by application of mind is clearly discernible from the impugned order. We do not see how a party like the petitioners can insist on the form of the order. Merely because it is not as detailed and elaborate as desired by the petitioners does not mean that it is vitiated. We have not found from a reading of the impugned order
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that it is either vitiated by non-application of mind or errors of law apparent on the face of the record. The conclusions cannot be termed as perverse. We have not found any material which would indicate that there are legal mala fides. The argument that paragraph 8 is not complied before paragraph 9 of the DPCO is invoked. That nullifies the mandate of paragraph 8. In other words, what is prohibited directly, is done or attempted to be done indirectly. That is how Mr. Seervai would urge that there are legal mala fides. We have not seen as to how the SSI could be said to be not within the purview of the control order. It is in that regard that we, in the foregoing paragraphs, have emphasized as to how the Government has a power to exempt any manufacturer from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the DPCO. In the DPCO itself, the term "manufacturer" is defined in paragraph 2 (m) to mean any person who manufactures a drug. Therefore, it is not as if to a SSI, that there is an automatic exemption from the provisions of the DPCO. That is clearly not the position emerging from a reading of the law. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention also.
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60 The alternate argument of Mr. Seervai is that there was a demand which was raised and later on confirmed by the authority. However, in the Writ Petitions filed in this Court, the demands have been quashed and set aside. Mr. Seervai has invited our attention to the memo of the Writ Petition to submit that the show-cause notice dated 23rdSeptember 2008 demands the sums specified therein. The petitioners responded to this demand. The 2ndrespondent raised another demand together with interest under Section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act and confirmed it as well. A letter dated 2ndDecember 2008 was issued calling upon the petitioners to pay the sum of Rs.11,41,39,346/-. That was not accepted. The petitioners had filed a detailed written submission and sought a personal hearing. Further, the petitioners also filed a review petition with the Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers dated 16thDecember 2008. The review petition was dismissed on 19thJanuary 2009. That is how the first Writ Petition No. 424 of 2009 was filed in this Court. This Court passed an order thereon and Mr. Seervai relies on that order to submit that the 2ndrespondent's exercise and the orders were quashed by this Court. We have carefully perused that order with the assistance of both Mr. Seervai and the learned
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Additional Solicitor General. Learned Additional Solicitor General would submit that Mr. Seervai's arguments are nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the demand. Mr. Seervai would submit that this Court may have directed the competent authority to hear the petitioners and after hearing them, pass appropriate orders on merits. But that does not mean that the demand in the show-cause notice is set aside. The show-cause notice was always alive and could have, therefore, been adjudicated on merits.
61 Mr. Seervai's attempt was to show that after the earlier order was set aside by this Court and another order was passed on 19thMay 2009, equally, that came to be challenged in Writ Petition No. 1508 of 2009. It was challenged on the ground that it is a non-speaking order. That Writ Petition succeeded and our attention is invited to the order dated 28thJuly 2010 and dated 6thAugust 2010. It is clear that this order was confirmed inasmuch as the SLP of the 2ndrespondent against the same was dismissed on 20thAugust 2014. Thus, there was a direction to pass an order afresh / de novo. That is how the impugned order came to be passed. In the above circumstances, we are of the
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opinion that in the facts peculiar to the petitioners' case, the 2nd respondent could not have called upon the petitioners to pay the interest on the overcharged amount under Section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 calculated upto 15thApril 2015. Section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act follows Section 7. Section 7 provides for penalties. Thereafter, Section 7A enables the Central Government to recover certain amounts as arrears of land revenue. Section 7A reads as under:
"7A. Power of Central Government to recover certain amounts as arrears of land revenue.- (1) Where any person, liable to-
(a) pay any amount in pursuance of any order made under section 3, or
(b) deposit any amount to the credit of any Account or Fund constituted by or in pursuance of any order made under that section,
makes any default in paying or depositing the whole or any part of such amount, the amount in respect of which such default has been made shall whether such order was made before or after the commencement or the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1984 (34 of 1984), and whether the liability of such person to pay or deposit such amount arose before or after such commencement be recoverable by Government together with simple interest due thereon computed at the rate of [fifteen per cent] per annum from the date of such default to the date of recovery of such amount, as an arrear of land revenue [or as a public demand].
(2) The amount recovered under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with in accordance with the order under which the liability to pay or deposit such amount arose.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any contrary, no court, tribunal or other authority shall grant any injunction or make any order prohibiting or restraining any Government from recovering any amount as an arrear of land revenue [or as a public demand] in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (1).
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(4) If any order, in pursuance of which any amount has been recovered by Government as an arrear of land revenue [or as a public demand] under sub-section (1) is declared by a competent court, after giving to the Government shall refund the amount so recovered by it to the person from whom it was recovered, together with simple interest due thereon, computed at the rate of [fifteen per cent.] per annum, from the date of recovery of such amount to the date on which such refund is made.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "Government"
means the Government by which the concerned order under section 3 was made or where such order was made by an officer or authority subordinate to any Government, that Government."
62 The power to hold any person liable to pay any amount in pursuance of any order made under Section 3, or deposit any amount to the credit of any Account or Fund constituted by or in pursuance of any order made under that Section follows a finding of default. In other words, if any person liable to make the above payments or deposit, makes any default in paying or depositing the whole or any part of such amount, amount in respect of such default shall be recovered by the Government together with simple interest. It is not as if this Court has injuncted the Government from exercising this power of recovery. It is not as if the amount of interest cannot be recovered. Even interest can be recovered in terms of this provision or power. Therefore, the power to effect recovery of the amount together with interest is undisputed. The argument is
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that the 2ndrespondent has directed the petitioners not only to deposit the overcharged amount, in addition, to pay interest at 15% on the overcharged amount. There is a calculation up to 15th April 2015. It is held that the company has willfully and knowingly overcharged the scheduled formation in relevant period from October 2007 to January 2008 and has unjustly enriched itself. That is how the interest of Rs.10,96,88,951/- has been sought to be recovered.
63 However, the order overlooks that the demand as confirmed and the attempted recovery in pursuance thereof, were both questioned by the petitioners in two Writ Petitions. In both Writ Petitions, the orders passed by the Central Government -respondent no.2 were set aside and the matter was sent back for de novo consideration. In these circumstances, we do not think that the petitioners could be saddled with interest. They may have questioned the demand and the orders in pursuance thereof, but it is apparent that the petitioners have succeeded in legal proceedings. The order of this Court dated 28thJuly/6thAugust 2010 was challenged by the 2ndrespondent in the Supreme Court of India and till 28thJune 2014, the matter was pending in the
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Supreme Court. Hence, it is not as if the petitioners continued to be in default or have not satisfied a confirmed demand and that is why the interest from the date of default to the date of recovery can be imposed. That imposition, to our mind, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is not justified. At best, the interest could have been claimed, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, from the date of the impugned order till actual payment. Any interest for the prior period on the assumption that there is a default or a continuing default in this case cannot be sustained. Hence, we are of the opinion that, to the extent the impugned order imposes a liability to pay interest of Rs.10,96,88,951/- at 15% per annum on the overcharged amount under Section 7A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 cannot be sustained. From the statement of interest attached to the impugned order, it is apparent that the liability has been reckoned from October 2007. The overcharged amount, as determined on the footing that from 11thJanuary 2007 till 15th April 2015, the same has been held back. This calculation and computation overlooks the fact that the orders confirming the demand passed earlier were quashed and set aside by this Court. In such circumstances, we do not think that the overcharged sum
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can carry interest and in the manner computed and calculated by respondent no.2. The respondents would have to revise their calculations and computations with regard to interest. They would have to deduct from this amount of interest, the periods during which their demands were not operative in law. Hence, the interest would have to be computed by taking into consideration the period from 13thMarch 2015 till the date of this Judgment and actual recovery. It is that sum which can be recovered as interest and under that head. We modify the impugned order accordingly.
64 Now, what remains for consideration are the judgments relied upon by Mr. Seervai. But, before that, we must appreciate that Mr. Seervai has fairly brought to our notice the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 329 of 2005 (Union of India & others vs. M/s. CIPLA Ltd. & another) together with other Civil Appeals, decided on 21st October 2016. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in terms of its earlier views, reiterated that though it is concerned with the stage to actual price fixation, namely, recommending and prescribing the norms that would eventually form the basis for
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fixing retail price and ceiling price of formulations, it concluded that there were recommendations made by the expert committees. The norms were devised by taking into consideration these recommendations, but it is not as if when there is a bundle of factors to be considered and appropriate weightage to be given to each one of them, then, it is not easy to decide such technical and complicated matters of price fixation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard has, in its judgment, held thus:
"Review of the three Reports
67. A review of the Report of the Sankaran Committee, the Report of the Masood Committee and the Report of the Jharwal Committee bring out the following salient points:
1. The drug industry was unwilling to extend its full cooperation in furnishing data required by the Central Government for prescribing the norms as required by the DPCO 1987 and the DPCO 1995. One of the possible explanations for this reluctance put forth by learned counsel for Cipla (it was clarified that Cipla was not a member of any drug industry association after a particular point of time) that the members of the drug industry might not have been willing to part with confidential information which could be used by competitors.
2. Faced with the reluctance of the drug industry to part with necessary data the Central Government had no option but to carry out its exercise of prescribing norms in terms of Paragraph 6 of the DPCO 1987 and Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 for conversion cost, packing charges and process loss of raw materials (other than packing materials in conversion) and packing and process loss of packing materials in packaging. This might have involved some element of ad hoc
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decision making and guess-work but that was necessitated by the circumstances confronting the expert bodies set up by Central Government.
3. The norms prescribed by the Sankaran Committee appeared to be adequate and actually provided a cushion but required a little tweaking at a later stage due to a variety of factors, including inflation. There does appear to be general acceptance by the drug industry of the norms prescribed pursuant to the Report of the Sankaran Committee. Similarly, there does appear to be general acceptance of the ad hoc measures taken post the Masood Committee and eventually the notification issued by the Central Government pursuant to the Report of the Jharwal Committee in respect of conversion cost, packing charges and process loss.
4. The issue of packing material cost was separately addressed by the Central Government through the BICP and also through decisions taken on 7th July, 1994 and February 1998. The norms for the cost of packing material were not prescribed or notified in the Official Gazette. However, the drug industry was entitled to work out the cost of packing material on actuals, and it seemed quite satisfied with the result given that the ceiling was fixed in July 1994 and February 1998.
82. On the basis of the above material, the submission of the learned Solicitor General was that the drug industry did not extend the necessary cooperation expected of it, that the notifications issued by the Central Government prescribing the norms for conversion cost, packing charges and process loss were not mechanically issued but were issued after due application of mind to the available material and that the decisions taken by the Central Government were subject to revision under the provisions of the DPCO 1995 but the manufacturers/formulators did not take recourse to these provisions and instead approached the Courts after much delay and by way of an after-thought. These submissions were refuted by the learned counsel appearing for Cipla and other manufacturers/formulators.
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Judicial review
83. The primary issues before us relate to (i) the legitimacy and soundness of the materials on the basis of which the norms were prescribed for application of the formula given in Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 and on the basis of which the retail price and ceiling price of formulations were fixed under Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the DPCO 1995; (ii) the effect of the failure of the Central Government to prescribe the norms under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 on a yearly basis, and
(iii) the effect of the failure of the Central Government to prescribe the norms for cost of packing material under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995. The issue before us does not relate to the actual norms or actually fixing the retail price or ceiling price of formulations under Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the DPCO 1995 in the sense that there is no dispute that for the purposes of fixing the retail price or ceiling price of formulations under Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the DPCO 1995 the norms were prescribed and the formula given in Paragraph 7 thereof was adhered to. Even otherwise, the actual norms and price fixing on the basis of the norms is out of bounds for us.
86. Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 consists of two parts - prescribing the norms and applying those prescribed norms to the formula for arriving at the retail price of a formulation. In the first instance, we are concerned with prescribing the norms under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 on the basis of the recommendations of the Masood Committee and the Jharwal Committee since it was contended that there was no application of mind in doing so. It may be mentioned that there is no challenge to the norms prescribed as such on the ground of arbitrariness or being ultra vires the DPCO 1995 or the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. What is presently questioned is only the application of mind and the soundness of the materials on the basis of which the norms were prescribed, namely, the Masood Committee Report and the Jharwal Committee Report. Learned counsel had no criticism of the Sankaran Committee Report and indeed generally supported its conclusions and recommendations.
93. In these appeals, we too are presently concerned with a stage anterior to actual price fixation namely recommending and prescribing the norms that would eventually form the basis for fixing the retail price and ceiling price of
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formulations. The view expressed in Rayalaseema Paper Mills (AIR 2002 SC 3699) would, in our opinion, apply to the Reports of the Masood Committee and the Jharwal Committee set up by the Central Government for recommending the norms for the purposes of Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995. The Reports were antecedent materials, non-statutory and recommendatory and could have been rejected by the Central Government. The Masood Committee did not (and perhaps could not) recommend any norms for conversion cost, packing charges and process loss, except for cost of packing material (without process loss). The Masood Committee was alive to the statutory requirement of prescribing the norms on a yearly basis and therefore referred to it.
97. The feel of the expert is important, if not conclusive. Insofar as we are concerned, two expert Committees made their recommendations. These recommendations were then examined and considered by the Central Government and on the basis of the expert conclusions arrived at, the norms were prescribed by a notification dated 13th July, 1999 issued under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995. Under the circumstances, the question of judicial scrutiny of the Reports of the Masood Committee and the Jharwal Committee and the acceptance of their recommendations by the Central Government is not only limited, but in this case it does not arise. It cannot be said that the notification dated 13th July, 1999 was based on no material or was issued without any application of mind. Learned counsel for Cipla may disagree with the contents of the materials, but cannot ignore their existence or that they were considered by the Central Government.
98. Fixing the price of any commodity is not only difficult but also tricky. There is material to be considered, a bundle of factors to be considered and appropriate weight is to be given to the material and the factors. This is not easy to decide and there will always be some criticism with regard to either the material utilized or the factors considered or the weight attached to the materials and factors. In matters pertaining to drug formulations, it is not only an issue of demand and supply but also the ability of a common person to afford the formulation. At the same time, the manufacturer must also
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make some profit and be in a position to invest in research and development. There simply cannot be any mathematical precision in fixing the price of a commodity. More than enough elbow room or a play in the joints is required to be given in such matters - and even then the price fixing authority may commit an error. Once this is appreciated, it will be realized that the task before the Central Government in prescribing the norms was not easy.
103. It is also true that fixing the price of formulations based on the norms prescribed under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 is a legislative activity which the Central Government was obliged to carry out on its own research and assessment, assuming there was no cooperation from the
manufacturers/formulators. The efforts made by the Masood Committee and the Jharwal Committee for prescribing the norms for the purposes of Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 were steps leading up to this legislative activity. It is nobody's case that no preliminary steps were taken or that no exercise was undertaken for arriving at appropriate norms - the steps and exercise were in fact undertaken through expert Committees but the material used in the exercise and the resultant Reports were criticized by learned counsel appearing for Cipla. We are of the view that given the circumstances that the two Committees were faced with and given the virtual non-co- operative attitude of the drug industry, the Central Government prescribed the norms and Cipla and the drug industry were obliged to accept them as notified without much ado. It cannot be that the drug industry does not supply necessary information and data to the expert Committees appointed by the Central Government and then blames the Central Government for taking a decision without necessary information and data.
104. The failure of the drug industry to extend effective cooperation appears to be an endemic problem. A situation somewhat similar to the one that we are concerned with had arisen in Union of India v. SWISS GARNIER LIFE SCIENCES [(2013) 8 SCC 615]. In that decision, it was noticed by this Court that communications were sent to the manufacturers/formulators of a particular formulation to provide reasons why that formulation should not be classified
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as a derivative of another formulation. In paragraph 4 of the Report, it was noted that the requisite information was not furnished, even after a substantial lapse of time and a reminder. This observation was reiterated in paragraph 44 of the Report and it was held that in view of the refusal of the manufacturers/formulators to furnish the detailed information, the Central Government was well within its jurisdiction to resort to Paragraph 11 of the DPCO 1995 and fix the price of the formulation on the basis of information available.
105. Similarly, in Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers v. Cipla Ltd [(2003) 7 SCC 1] it was observed by this Court in paragraph 8.4 of the Report that bulk drug producers did not disclose necessary information to the Central Government, despite a request having been made in that regard and that there was no good reason why the relevant information should be withheld. It was observed:
"Sales of bulk drugs effected during the year by bulk drug producers including some of the respondents herein would have furnished the best indicia of domestic sale turnover of bulk drug. But, those details were not disclosed. Secondly, if the bulk drug produced was consumed by any bulk drug producer or importer and the drug was sold in the form of formulations, the statistics regarding the quantum of bulk drug utilized in such formulations and the value thereof must have been within the knowledge or reach of the writ petitioners and there is no good reason why they should withhold all this relevant information and harp on the ORG data. There is no need to resort to guesswork when the actual figures are available at the doorsteps of the respondents."
106. Be that as it may, our conclusion on this aspect of the matter is that the antecedent materials (the Reports) on the basis of which the norms were recommended and then prescribed under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 are subject to lesser judicial scrutiny, limited perhaps only to the application of completely erroneous principles. The burden for demonstrating the application of completely erroneous principles is heavy as it is and it is heavier still if the
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antecedent material is prepared by experts. The onus of discharging the heavy burden must necessarily fall on the challenger, and Cipla has not been able to sustain the challenge. There can be and are differences of opinion but we cannot and will not reconsider the opinion of experts, particularly in matters of economic affairs or other economy related issues unless there is extremely strong reason to do so.
108. For the above reasons we disagree with the Allahabad High Court and hold that the various notifications issued under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 in 1999 and thereafter prescribing the norms for conversion cost, packing charges and process loss of raw materials (other than packing materials in conversion) and packing and process loss of packing materials in packaging were issued after due application of mind and based on available material duly examined by an expert body. The notifications were not arbitrarily issued nor were they discriminatory in any manner at all nor were they issued mechanically nor could it be said that they were issued without any application of mind.
115. No submission was made before us to the effect that the formula given in Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 was not applied proprio vigore by the Central Government. The statutory criterion for price fixing is the formula given in Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995. Whether this formula has been operated as it should be is certainly subject to judicial review. Therefore, while operating the formula, if the Central Government did not take conversion cost into consideration (for example) or took into consideration some factor not in the formula then, the Court could certainly strike down the retail price or the ceiling price so fixed by the Central Government on the ground that relevant factors were ignored or irrelevant factors were taken into consideration. No such allegation was made and no such contention was advanced by learned counsel for Cipla. Therefore, we need not dwell on this aspect.
120. Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 gives the formula for arriving at the retail price of a formulation. The application of the formula is undoubtedly mandatory and the Central Government cannot contend that the retail price of a formulation can be fixed de hors the formula. The question is whether the norms mentioned in Paragraph 7 of the DPCO
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1995 are required to be prescribed every year even if there is no perceived qualitative or quantitative change in them. In other words, is the prescription of norms every year mandatory even though circumstances do not warrant any such prescription and what is the consequence if the Central Government does not prescribe the norms every year - is it fatal to the notifications issued under Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the DPCO 1995 whereby the retail price and ceiling price of formulations was fixed?
128. But be that as it may, although several notifications issued between 1995 and 1999 were collaterally challenged by the manufacturers/formulators, we were not shown any notification in which the retail price or the ceiling price was varied to their detriment. Assuming there was such a notification, a manufacturer/formulator was entitled to question the adverse revision by moving an application under the provisions of Paragraph 8(4) and Paragraph 22 of the DPCO 1995. No such application was moved by any manufacturer/formulator. Paragraph 22 thereof reads as follows:
"22. Power to review.- Any person aggrieved by any notification issued or order made under paras. 3, 5, 8, 9 or 10 may apply to the Government for a review of the notification or order within fifteen days of the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette or the receipt of the order by him, as the case may be, and the Government may make such order on the application as it may deem proper :
Provided that pending a decision by the Government on the application submitted under the above paragraph, no manufacturer, importer or distributor, as the case may be, shall sell a bulk drug or formulation, as the case may be, at a price exceeding the price fixed by the Government of which a review has been applied for."
It was contended that a revision could not be sought since norms were not fixed and for the purposes of challenging the retail price or the ceiling price fixed under Paragraphs 8 and 9 (as the case may be) of the DPCO 1995 it was necessary to know the norms fixed. We propose to deal with this issue a little later.
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129. A question of seminal importance arises, namely, whether the legislative activity of prescription of norms every year is at all necessary even if there is no occasion to change or modify the retail price of a formulation. Is the exercise of determining the norms by the Central Governments required to be mechanically carried out every year as a ritual? Perhaps not. It is not necessary to revise the retail price or ceiling price of every formulation every year - and if there is no such mandate, then it must follow that there is no mandate to prescribe the norms every year under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO just for the sake of it. What consumer interest would an annual change in retail price serve in the context of over 2000 formulations? What has to be seen by the Central Government, in the larger context, is whether the drug industry is losing out in any manner and whether the consumers of formulations are being put to any discomfort. A fine balance has to be struck and if the Central Government has been successful in doing that, as it appears, then carrying out an annual ceremonial procedure or annual academic exercise of determining and prescribing the norms under Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 regardless of whether there is any necessity to do so is not mandatory.
130. The Central Government cannot be compelled to perform a legislative activity or legislative exercise that is of no consequence and is perhaps ritualistic. We are of opinion that while the formula given in Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 must be mandatorily adhered to for fixing the retail price of a formulation, the requirement of prescribing the norms every year is discretionary and would depend upon the exigencies of the situation - it might be every year or less frequently or more frequently.
142. To this we may add that the action of a repository of power is also amenable to judicial review if it is contrary to or violates the mandatory requirement of a subordinate legislation. Therefore, if the Central Government does not adhere to the formula given in Paragraph 7 of the DPCO 1995 and fixes the retail price or ceiling price of formulations without following the formula laid down, the notification issued by the Central Government under Paragraph 8 or Paragraph 9 of the DPCO 1995 (as the case may be) is liable to
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quashed as being contrary to law. However, no instance has been pointed out to us compelling us to use our power of judicial review and quash the notifications under consideration."
65 We have applied these very principles. This judgment in CIPLA and other appeals (supra) was delivered on 21stOctober 2016 and a copy thereafter was made available by Mr. Seervai to us on 21stNovember 2016. That is why the delay in delivering this judgment. We have found that Mr. Seervai has heavily relied upon a Notification dated 2ndMarch 1995. That Notification reads as under:
"DRUGS (PRICE CONTROL) ORDER, 1995
NOTIFICATIONS
Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers (Deptt. Of Chemicals and Petrochemicals) Order No.S.O. 134(E), dated March 2, 1995, published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Part II, Section 3(ii), dated 2ndMarch, 1995, p.2, No. 125 [F.No.5(4)/95-P.T. II]
In exercise of the powers conferred by Paragraph 25 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 the Central Government hereby exempts every drug manufacturing unit registered as small industry unit with any Central Technical Authority or State Directorate of Industries or any other appropriate Authority under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951), from the operation of Paragraph 8 of the said Order relating to fixation of retail price of Scheduled Formulation if such Scheduled Formulation is not covered under Paragraph 9 of the said Order relating to fixation of ceiling price of Scheduled Formulation subject to the conditions that :-
(i) it is an independent unit/company and not a subsidiary of or owned or controlled in any manner by any other undertaking which is not so exempted from the provisions of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995;
(ii) the formulations are marketed by the concerned unit/company in their own brand names and trade marks or
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in the brand or trade name of any other small scale industry unit;
(iii) a declaration complying with conditions (i) and (ii) above along with a copy of Registration Certificate as a small scale industry unit is submitted to the Government within sixty days from the date of commencement of production in case of new units.
Notes:(i)The above exemption to a small scale industry unit or company will no longer be admissible as soon as it ceases to be a small scale industry unit/company.
(ii) The exemption is granted only to those products manufactured in their own factory under their own Registration Certificate or in the factory of any other small scale industry unit.
(iii) Unit/company availing exemption in violation of this Order shall be liable for penal action and to deposit dues to Government with retrospective effect."
66 While it is true that the Central Government has exercised powers conferred by paragraph 25 of the DPCO and it has exempted every drug manufacturing unit registered as small scale industry unit with any other central Technical Authority or State Directorate of Industries or any other appropriate Authority under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, from the operation of paragraph 8 of the DPCO relating to fixation of retail price of Scheduled formulation, but that Scheduled formulation should not be covered under paragraph 9 of the DPCO. Then, there are further conditions, based on which the exemption can be availed of. We do not think that the petitioners have placed any material to show that the Scheduled
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formulation in this case is not covered by paragraph 9 of the DPCO. In fact, the petitioners relied upon paragraph 9 of the DPCO to submit that the ceiling price of the Scheduled formulation in this case is not fixed in accordance with the formula laid down in paragraph 7. Therefore, we do not see how Mr. Seervai can rely upon this Notification to aver that the petitioners were exempted from the operation of paragraph 8 of the DPCO. We have already held above that if there is power to exempt and that power is exercised by the Government conditionally, then, unless and until there is substantiation and proof of satisfaction of these conditions, the benefit of exemption Notification cannot be granted or extended. Exemption cannot be availed of. Hence, this document does not carry the case of the petitioners any further. The reliance on the case of Remidex Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is also misplaced because, there, the validity of fixation made by the respondents in exercise of power conferred under paragraph 9 of the DPCO fixing the ceiling price of the medicinal preparations was raised. It is in that context that the observations relied upon by Mr. Seervai have been made. While it is true that the fixation has to satisfy the test of reasonableness which pervades the Constitutional scheme in the context of
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Article 14 of the Constitution of India, we must bear in mind that we are not at the stage of fixation of the price, but recovery of penalty for overcharging. In other words, the
products/formulations of the petitioners have been sold at a price higher than the ceiling price. For that, the petitioners have to face the proceedings and particularly, the recoveries. It is the recoveries following the confirmed demand which are challenged in this Petition. Therefore, the observations of the High Court of Karnataka can have no application to the facts of the present case. Equally, other judgments relied upon by Mr. Seervai can have no application. In view of the above discussion, the Writ Petition partly succeeds. It succeeds to the extent indicated above. In the circumstances, there will be no costs. Writ Petition (L) No. 1119 of 2016
and
Writ Petition (L) No. 1120 of 2016
67 The only difference in the two matters as highlighted by Mr. Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing in these petitions, is that the Notification in question (referable to DPCO) for price fixation is in relation to tablets. The petitioners manufacture capsules. The petitioners are manufacturing natural
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Vitamin "E" however, the Notification is for Synthetic Vitamin
"E", yet what we find is that the impugned order takes into consideration all such contentions and confirms the demand. We do not see how in the light of the detailed reasons that we have assigned and holding that there is a complete power in the authorities to raise demands by undertaking an elaborate process including comparison of the products, that these two petitions can succeed. However, what the petitioners have pointed out in these petitions is that they have filed Writ Petition No.712 of 2009 in this Court which also was disposed of by setting aside earlier orders. The subsequent order also was challenged in Writ Petition No.1708 of 2009 and that Writ Petition succeeded on 28th July/6thAugust 2010. It is in these circumstances that these petitioners would be entitled to rebate, particularly, in the light of the order passed by this Court on 3rdFebruary 2016 in Writ Petition No.2809 of 2015. That calculation be reworked and interest can be recovered accordingly. These Writ Petitions partly succeed to that extent.
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Writ Petition No. 98 of 2014
68 We do not see any distinction in the two Scheduled formulations in the present case. We have also not noticed any orders of this Court setting aside the earlier confirmed demand. In such circumstances, we do not see how different view can be taken. In view of the order passed in the companion petition being Writ Petition No. 2880 of 2015, this Writ Petition fails. In the present case, there is no question of any relaxation in the quantum of interest. All the more, when the petitioners in this Petition, by their letter dated 5thOctober 2010, have paid the principal amount of Rs.14,54,00,226.00/- vide Demand Draft No.037956 dated 5thOctober 2010, it is only the further quantum recoverable from them. By communication dated 12thof May 2011 and reiterated vide further communications, it will be paid. However, in relation to that, what we have found is the petitioners were granted a personal hearing and after the said personal hearing, order has been passed on 16thAugust 2012. We do not see how in the teeth of the confirmed demand, which also has been partially met, but there is still a substantial sum which is due and payable, that we can grant any relief with regard to interest. Therefore, this Writ Petition is dismissed.
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69 In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
70 At this stage, Mr. Seervai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners prays for continuation of the interim order for a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
71 This request is opposed by Mr. Sharma appearing for the respondents. He would submit that since larger public interest would be adversely affected if the penalty amount is not recovered, such a stay should not be granted.
72 Having noted these contentions, but finding that these Writ Petitions were pending for nearly two years and more, there was an interim stay operating in at least two of them, interest of justice would be served if we continue the interim order for a period of three months from today. Ordered accordingly.
B.P. COLABAWALLA, J. S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J.
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