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citation codes
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  • section 45 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966
  • provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.5.
  • SECTION 92 EVIDENCE ACT
  • (1) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 100(4) of Civil Procedure Code
  • Sub-section (4) of section 100
  • sub-section (1) of section 92
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 45 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966
  • provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.5.
  • SECTION 92 EVIDENCE ACT
  • (1) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 100(4) of Civil Procedure Code
  • Sub-section (4) of section 100
  • sub-section (1) of section 92
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal by the appellant (original plaintiff) against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Buldana in Regular Civil Appeal No. 271/79. The District Judge's decision arose from an appeal filed by the original defendant against the judgment of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Malkapur in Regular Civil Suit No. 50/77.

At trial, the Civil Judge found that a sale-deed dated 23-11-1972 was nominal and in the nature of a simple mortgage, cancelled that sale-deed, and directed the plaintiff to deposit Rs. 10,000 with interest at 6% per annum; accordingly the plaintiff's suit was decreed. The lower Appellate Court reversed the trial Court, holding that the 1972 transaction was an out-and-out sale, and allowed the defendant's appeal. The present second appeal challenges the Appellate Court's finding that the transaction was an absolute sale.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is barred from leading oral evidence to prove that the sale-deed dated 23-11-1972 was a sham, nominal and never intended to be acted upon by the parties (i.e., whether subsection (1) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act bars such oral evidence).
  2. Whether the High Court in a second appeal can reappreciate evidence and interfere with the findings of fact recorded by lower courts where there is alleged misappreciation of evidence that goes to the root of the matter.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (learned Counsel Smt. V.A. Naik)

  • The averments made by the plaintiff in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the plaint were not specifically denied by the defendant; therefore, under the principle in Badat & Co. Bombay v. East India Trading Co., such facts should be taken as admitted.
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act does not apply where the case is that the document was a sham and the transaction recorded was never intended to be acted upon; relying on Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai, oral evidence is admissible to show a document was not intended to operate as the agreement recorded.
  • Relying on Supreme Court authorities (Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh; Mohd. Yunus v. Gurubux Singh), where there is a gross misappreciation of evidence going to the root, the High Court in second appeal can interfere; therefore the Appellate Court's misappreciation warrants interference.

Respondent's Arguments (learned Counsel Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari)

  • The defendant did deny the plaint averments in the written statement by denying in every paragraph, and therefore it cannot be said facts were admitted for want of specific denial.
  • The Appellate Court had considered all evidence in minute detail; where findings of fact rest on appreciation of evidence the High Court in second appeal should not interfere — reliance placed on Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfilal and Shyam Sunder Dutta v. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee.
  • On valuation/possession points (e.g., valuation of property), those are factual matters not to be gone into in second appeal — reliance on P. L. Bapuswami v. N. Pattay Gounder.
  • The trial judge's observations from spot inspection cannot be used as substantive evidence or made the foundation of the judgment; reliance was placed on T. Krishnaswami Rao v. Dundappa and Ugam Singh v. Kesrimal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Badat & Co. Bombay v. East India Trading Co., AIR 1964 SC 538 Allegations in plaint not specifically denied shall be taken as admitted, subject to proviso allowing court discretion in mofussil pleadings. The Court considered this authority but held it of no avail to the appellant because the defendant had denied the plaint averments in every paragraph; thus the general denial meant facts were not deemed admitted.
Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai, (1982) 1 SCC 4 : AIR 1982 SC 20 Section 92(1) Evidence Act bars oral evidence to contradict/modify a document when a party relies on the document; but if the document was a sham and never intended to operate, oral evidence is admissible to show that fact. The Court applied this principle to hold the plaintiff could lead oral evidence to prove the 1972 sale-deed was nominal/sham and not intended to be acted upon; evidence was therefore admissible despite Sections 91/92.
Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfilal, (1995) 6 SCC 580 Second appeal under Section 100 CPC requires formulation of a substantial question of law; ordinarily a second appeal cannot reappreciate findings of fact. The Court distinguished this authority because here the High Court had formulated a substantial question of law (regarding admissibility of oral evidence to prove sham document), so Ranbir Singh did not preclude interference in this second appeal.
Shyam Sunder Dutta v. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (Dead) by L.Rs, (1994) 6 SCC 545 High Court should not re-examine findings of fact recorded by courts below; interference on pure factual issues is inappropriate. The Court noted the principle but held it inapplicable here because a substantial question of law was involved and the Court found gross misappreciation of evidence by the Appellate Court.
V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar Supports the principle that High Court cannot interfere in second appeal merely on erroneous appreciation of evidence (cited within Ranbir Singh discussion). Cited as part of the jurisprudence that ordinarily prevents factual reappreciation in second appeal; the Court relied on contextual differences to distinguish its application here.
Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur Reiterates the rule that second appeal jurisdiction is limited and not a forum to substitute appreciation of evidence. Referred to in the same context as Ramachandra Ayyar; the Court explained why those precedents did not block interference in this case.
P. L. Bapuswami v. N. Pattay Gounder, AIR 1966 SC 902 Valuation of property is a question of fact and not ordinarily amenable to re-examination in a second appeal. Respondent relied on it; the Court accepted the proposition but observed that beyond valuation there was a substantial question of law and alleged gross misappreciation, permitting interference.
Kochukakkada Aboobacker (dead) by L.Rs v. Attah Kasim, (1996) 7 SCC 389 High Court may reconsider evidence in a second appeal if the lower appellate court failed to consider relevant evidence properly and the effect of that evidence on parties' rights. The Court invoked this authority to support the proposition that the High Court could reappreciate evidence here because the Appellate Court had misapplied or misweighed material evidence.
Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604 Where there is gross misappreciation of evidence going to the root of the matter, the High Court in second appeal can interfere. Cited by the appellant and relied upon by this Court to justify interference because the Appellate Court's misappreciation was found to be gross and material.
Mohd. Yunus v. Gurubux Singh, (1995) Supp (1) SCC 418 Similar proposition: gross misappreciation of evidence allows second appeal interference. Relied on with Jagdish Singh to support the Court's conclusion that interference was warranted here due to misappreciation going to the root.
T. Krishnaswami Rao v. Dundappa, AIR 1962 Mysore 17 Observations by a judge at the time of inspection are for better following/understanding evidence and to test accuracy; not to be substituted as evidence. Respondent invoked this to criticize trial Court; the Court accepted the principle but found the trial judge did not base the judgment solely on inspection notes, so the principle did not vitiate the trial Court's decision.
Ugam Singh v. Kesrimal, (1970) 3 SCC 831 : AIR 1971 SC 2540 Observations from inspection cannot be made the foundation of judgment if they substitute for evidence; they are admissible only for appreciation of evidence. Applied to assess whether the trial Court's reliance on inspection notes vitiated its decision; the Court concluded the trial judgment was not founded solely on inspection and therefore was not vitiated.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in analytical stages:

  1. Pleading denials: The Court examined the appellant's contention that certain plaint averments were admitted for want of specific denial. It applied Badat & Co. but found the defendant had generally denied the averments in each paragraph of the written statement, so the facts could not be treated as admitted. Therefore Badat was of no assistance to the appellant on that point.
  2. Principal legal question (admissibility of oral evidence): The Court identified the substantial question as whether the plaintiff was barred from leading oral evidence to prove the 1972 sale-deed was sham. The Court relied on Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai to hold that Section 92(1) of the Evidence Act does not bar oral evidence when the contention is that the document was never intended to be acted upon and is a sham. Applying that principle to the pleaded case (that the deed was nominal/security for Rs. 10,000 with agreement to reconvey on repayment), the Court held the plaintiff was entitled to lead oral evidence; therefore such evidence was not inadmissible under Sections 91 and 92.
  3. Evaluation of evidence: The Court reviewed the trial evidence: the plaintiff's testimony that the deed was nominal and executed as security for Rs. 10,000, supported by attesting witnesses Ramdas and Gulabchand who corroborated that reconveyance was promised upon repayment. The Court noted documentary supports (extracts from municipal registers, demand notices, assessment extract, Dakhla certificate, tax receipt) indicating possession remained with the plaintiff. The Court contrasted these with Exhs. 68 and 69 (Town Planning permission and tap-connection charges in defendant's favour), but observed that municipal mutation did not show the suit plot in defendant's name and that the defendant offered no explanation for how permissions were granted despite absence of municipal title. The Court found the Appellate Court erred in placing weight on the defendant's explanation that he believed mutation would be automatic; the Court considered that explanation absurd.
  4. Circumstantial findings: The Court highlighted circumstances favoring the plaintiff: the defendant never got his name mutated nor paid municipal tax after alleged purchase; market value in 1972 appeared much higher than Rs. 10,000 (supported by PW Ghanshamdas and the fact defendant refused reconveyance for Rs. 21,000); claimed minor construction by defendant was not found on spot inspection. These circumstances were held to support the plaintiff's case that the document was nominal and not acted upon.
  5. On the scope of second appeal: The Court addressed the respondent's reliance on authorities preventing reappreciation of facts in second appeal (Dr. Ranbir Singh; Shyam Sunder Dutta). The Court distinguished those authorities because here the High Court had formulated a substantial question of law (regarding admissibility of oral evidence and whether the deed was sham) and found a gross misappreciation of evidence by the Appellate Court going to the root of the matter. The Court relied on Kochukakkada and other authorities (Jagdish Singh; Mohd. Yunus) supporting intervention where misappreciation is gross.
  6. Trial judge's inspection: The Court accepted the legal principle that observations at inspection are for appreciating evidence and cannot substitute as evidence (T. Krishnaswami Rao; Ugam Singh). It examined the trial judge's judgment and concluded the trial judge had considered oral and documentary evidence and the circumstances and had not based conclusions solely on inspection notes. Thus the inspection observations did not vitiate the trial judgment.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: The Court found a gross misappreciation of evidence by the lower Appellate Court which affected the outcome, and therefore the Appellate Court's judgment and decree had to be set aside and the trial Court's judgment restored.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and the judgment of the trial Court is restored.

Direct consequences:

  • The Appellate Court's finding that the 23-11-1972 transaction was an out-and-out sale is overturned.
  • The trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiff is restored — that decree had cancelled the sale-deed dated 23-11-1972 on the basis that it was nominal/mortgage and had directed the plaintiff to deposit Rs. 10,000 with interest at 6% per annum (as recorded in the factual background of the opinion).
  • There shall be no order as to costs between the parties in this appeal.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and follows existing Supreme Court authorities on the admissibility of oral evidence to prove a document is a sham (Smt. Gangabai) and on the limited circumstances in which a High Court in second appeal may reappreciate evidence (Jagdish Singh; Kochukakkada). The Court did not purport to lay down a new principle of law beyond applying those authorities to the facts; rather, it applied existing precedent to find the Appellate Court had misappreciated material evidence.

Appeal allowed.

    Shankarlal Ganulal Khandelwal Since Deceased Through L.R Rameshchandra Shankarlal Khandelwal… v. Balmukund Surajmal Bharuka Since Deceased Through L.Rs Anil Balmukund Bharuka And Others…

    1. By this second appeal, the appellant/original plaintiff challenges the judgment and decree passed against him by the learned District Judge, Buldana in Regular Civil Appeal No. 271/79. That appeal was filed by the original defendant challenging the judgment and decree passed against him by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Malkapur in Regular Civil Suit No. 50/77. The trial Court found that the sale-deed dated 23-11-1972 as nominal and in the nature of simple mortgage. The trial Court, therefore, cancelled the said sale-deed by directing the plaintiff to deposit the amount of Rs. 10,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. As a result, the suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed. In appeal, the lower Appellate Court negatived the aforesaid findings of the trial Court holding that the transaction evidenced by sale-deed dated 23-11-1972 was out and out sale. In the result, the appeal came to be allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court were set aside. It is the said finding of the lower Appellate Court which is challenged in this appeal.

    2. At the outset Smt. V.A Naik, the learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that the averments made by the plaintiff in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of his plaint were not specifically denied by the defendant. The denial of the said facts is not specific but evasive and when the denial of any fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact will have to be taken as admitted. For this she placed reliance on a decision in Badat and Co. Bombay v. East India Trading Co. reported in AIR 1964 SC 538. It is no doubt true that in the aforesaid case, the Apex Court held that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted. However, in the said case, the Apex Court has observed as under:—

    “…..But in mofussil Courts in India, where pleadings were not precisely drawn, it was found in practice that if they were strictly construed in terms of the said provisions, grave injustice would be done to parties with genuine claims. To do justice between those parties, for which Courts are intended, the rigor of R. 5 has been modified by the introduction of the proviso thereto. Under that proviso the Court may, in its discretion, require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. In the matter of mofussil pleadings, Courts, presumably relying upon the said proviso, tolerated more laxity in the pleadings in the interest of justice….”

    In the present case, Shri S.P Dharmadhikari, the learned Counsel for the respondent, has pointed out from the written statement of the defendant that the defendant has denied the averments made by the plaintiff in each and every paragraph and, therefore, according to him, it cannot be said that there is no specific denial of the facts averred by the plaintiff in his plaint. It is true that the defendant has denied the averments made by the plaintiff in each and every paragraph of his plaint and, therefore, even if there is no specific denial of any particular fact, it cannot be said that the defendant has admitted the same. In this view of the matter, 1 find no substance in the aforesaid submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that as the averments made by the plaintiff in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of his plaint were not specifically denied by the defendant the same may be taken as admitted. I, therefore, find that the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court is of no avail to the appellant.

    3. Now, the only substantial question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiff is barred from leading oral evidence in support of his contention that the sale-deed in question was sham and bogus and it was not to be acted upon by the parties?

    4. In this respect, it is submitted by Smt. V.A Naik, the learned Counsel for the appellant, that sub-section (1) of section 92 of the Evidence Act is not applicable when it is a case of the plaintiff that the transaction recorded in the document in question was never intended to be acted upon by the parties and that the document is a sham. For this, she relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai reported in 1982 Mh.L.J (SC) 1 : (1982) 1 SCC 4 : AIR 1982 SC 20 wherein it is held by the Apex Court as under:—

    “The bar imposed by sub-section (1) of section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub-section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties.”

    It is true that the question as to whether the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon by the parties and that the document was sham and bogus arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose, oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether not recorded in the document was entered into between the parties. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision. In the present case, it is specifically pleaded by the plaintiff that the transaction evidenced by the sale-deed in question was nominal and it was executed by him in favour of the defendant by way of security for the amount of Rs. 10,000/- secured by him from the defendant. It is also pleaded by him that on refund of the said amount with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, the defendant was to reconvey the suit plot to him. According to her, the said document was sham and it was not to be acted upon by the parties. As such, in my opinion, in the light of the observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, the plaintiff was entitled to lead oral evidence in support of his aforesaid averments and, therefore, the evidence led by the plaintiff in this behalf cannot be said to be inadmissible in view of provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    5. Here it is argued by Shri S.P Dharmadhikari, the learned Counsel for the respondent, that the lower Appellate Court has considered every piece of evidence in minute details and, therefore, interference by this Court is not warranted. For this, he placed reliance on the decisions of Supreme Court in Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfilal reported in (1995) 6 SCC 580 and in Shyam Sunder Dutta v. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (Dead) by L.Rs reported in (1994) 6 SCC 545. In Dr. Ranbir Singh's case (cited supra) the Apex Court in paragraph 14 of its judgment held as under:—

    “Sub-section (1) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (4) of section 100 further provides that when the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. But it may be pointed out that the High Court formulated no such question of law on basis of which it proposed to interfere with the findings of facts. It has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. There is a plethora of case-law in support of this view. To quote a few, references may be made to the decision in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar wherein this Court took the view that even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower Appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure and the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court. This view has been reiterated by this Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur. This being the position, the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for the well-reasoned findings recorded by the courts of fact.”

    In the aforesaid case, as the substantial question of law as contemplated under section 100(4) of Civil Procedure Code was not formulated by the High Court, the Supreme Court found that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions but here it is not so. In the case at hand, this Court has formulated a substantial question of law as indicated in paragraph No. 3 above and, therefore, in my view, the aforesaid decision does not help the respondent in this regard.

    6. In Shyam Sunder Dutta's case (cited supra) the Apex Court in paragraph 5 of its judgment held as below:—

    “The question of the respondents to have remained in possession cannot be gone into by the High Court, since the District Court on consideration of the entire evidence had categorically recorded a finding of fact that the appellant and his co-sharers remained in possession from August 1945 and that the respondents were not continuing in possession from that time. This being a finding of fact, the High Court would not have gone into the question. However, it would appear that on the question of limitation under the bengal tenancy act when the arguments were addressed, in consideration of that question, the High Court has gone into the question whether the respondents were not dispossessed from suit lands and recorded a finding that they remained in possession. That finding does not appear to be warranted in view of the fact that the evidence was not discussed and as rightly contended the only evidence the High Court had considered as that of PW 1 but the first Appellate Court had considered the evidence of PWs 2 to 5 and the documentary evidence and that evidence was found to be in support of the evidence given by PW 1 that the respondents did not continue in possession from August 1945. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court, in fact was not necessary. Even otherwise, that finding was recorded without adverting to all the material evidence and that, therefore, the finding of possession recorded by the High Court is clearly illegal.”

    In the said case, the High Court had gone into a question of fact regarding possession and hence, the Apex Court held that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the said finding of fact. In the present case, as the substantial question of law as indicated above is involved and, therefore, it cannot be said that no interference with the finding of the Court below by this Court in second appeal is necessary. This decision also in my view is of no avail to the respondent.

    7. Now, if we look at the evidence of the plaintiff, we find that the plaintiff has deposed that in the year 1972 he was in need of money and, therefore, they approached the defendant and demanded the amount of Rs. 10,000/- from him. According to him, the defendant agreed to pay the said amount to him on executing a nominal sale-deed in his (defendant's) favour as defendant had no money-lending licence. It is also deposed by him that at the time of the execution of the sale-deed in question the defendant promised to reconvey the suit plot to him on his (Plaintiff's) repaying the amount of Rs. 10,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. According to the plaintiff, though he had executed the sale-deed in question in favour of the defendant, the possession of the suit plot remained with him. This version of the plaintiff finds support from the evidence of Ramdas and Gulabchand who are the attesting witnesses of the sale-deed (Exh. 58) in question. Both of them have in very clear terms told the Court that at the time of the execution of the sale-deed the defendant agreed to reconvey the suit plot to the plaintiff on his repaying the amount of Rs. 10,000/-. The learned Counsel for the respondent has not shown any reason as to why the evidence of these two independent witnesses should be discarded. The lower Appellate Court has also not given due weight to the evidence of these independent witnesses.

    8. Besides the aforesaid oral evidence, there is documentary evidence such as the extract of Hak Nondini Register (Exh. 24/1) notices for demand of tax (Exhs. 24/2 and 24/3), extract of assessment list (Exh. 59), Dakhla a certificate issued by the Municipal Council, Malkapur (Exh. 60) and tax receipt (Exh. 61) on record to support the plaintiff's version that though the sale-deed in question was executed by him in favour of the defendant, the possession of the suit plot remained with him. It is no doubt true that the Exh. 68 shows that the Town Planning Authority granted permission to the defendant under section 45 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 for the construction of temporary tin shed on the suit plot on 5-3-1977 just prior to the institution of the present suit and Exh. 69 shows that the defendant had paid charges for tap connection. However, it is not known as to how the Town Planning Authority granted such permission to the defendant particularly when the suit plot does not stand in his name in municipal record. There is no explanation put forth by the defendant in this behalf and, therefore, in the absence of any explanation in this regard, I find that the said documents (Exhs. 68 and 69) do not help the defendant in establishing his possession over the suit plot. The finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court in this behalf appears to be perverse because the lower Appellate Court erred in relying upon the explanation given by the defendant that he felt that his name would be mutated in municipal record automatically. This explanation given by the defendant itself appears to be absurd. How can the name of a person be mutated in municipal record unless he moves the municipality by making an application to that effect. So the finding of lower Appellate Court on this count also cannot be upheld.

    9. Not only that, there are certain circumstances which favour the plaintiff in this behalf and go against the defendant. Firstly, though the defendant purchased the suit plot from the plaintiff in the year 1972, he did not take any steps to get his name mutated in the municipal record till today nor he paid the tax of the suit plot at any time. Secondly, the evidence of the plaintiff if read along with the evidence of P.W Ghanshamdas goes to show that the market value of the suit plot in the year 1972 was much more than Rs. 10,000/- which finds support from the fact that when the plaintiff offered the amount of Rs. 21,000/- for reconveyance of the suit plot, the defendant refused for the same. Thirdly, though the defendant contended that he had raised some construction over the suit plot by spending amount of Rs. 2,000/-, nothing was found there at the time of spot inspection by the trial Judge. From these circumstances, it can be gathered that the intention of the parties was to treat the document (Exh. 58) as nominal and not to act upon it. Had the parties really intended to act upon the same, the defendant could have certainly got mutated his name in municipal record. The fact that he did not take any steps in this behalf clearly goes to support the plaintiff's version that the parties had agreed not to act upon the said document.

    10. On going through the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, I find that there is a gross misappreciation of evidence which goes to the root of the matter and that the learned District Judge had not considered the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence in its proper perspective. So also he has not considered the aforesaid circumstances in a way in which they ought to have been considered. The impugned judgment and decree of lower Appellate Court, therefore, need to be set aside.

    11. It is then submitted by Shri Dharmadhikari, the learned Counsel for the respondent, that question of valuation of property is one of fact and the High Court is not entitled to go into it in second appeal. For this, he relied upon a decision in P. L. Bapuswami v. N. Pattay Gounder. reported in AIR 1966 SC 902. No doubt, this criticism of the learned Counsel for the respondent is justified in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. However, besides the question of valuation, there is aforesaid substantial question of law involved in this appeal and, therefore, if the High Court in second appeal finds that the lower Appellate Court has not considered the relevant documentary and oral evidence in its proper perspective and the effect of the said evidence on the rights of the parties, the High Court is certainly entitled to reconsider the evidence by drawing inferences from the admitted position. I am fortified in this view by a decision in Kochukakkada Aboobacker (dead) by L.Rs v. Attah Kasim reported in (1996) 7 SCC 389. In this behalf, Smt. Naik, the learned Counsel for the appellant, relying upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604 and in Mohd. Yunus v. Gurubux Singh. reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 418 submitted that where there is a gross misappreciation of evidence which goes to the root of the matter, the High Court in second appeal can certainly exercise its jurisdiction. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in this behalf in the aforesaid decisions, I find much force in the aforesaid submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In the present case, I have held above that there is a gross misappreciation of the evidence by the lower Appellate Court which goes to the root of the matter and, therefore, in my view, interference by the High Court in second appeal is necessary. In this view of the matter, I find no force in the contention of Shri Dharmadhikari, the learned Counsel for the respondent, that the lower Appellate Court has considered each and every aspect of the matter in minute details and hence interference by this Court is not necessary.

    12. Lastly, Shri S.P Dharmadhikari, the learned Counsel for the respondent, submitted that the findings of the trial Court are vitiated because the trial judge decided the matter on what he found on the spot at the time of spot inspection. According to him, the observations of a Judge at the time of the inspection can only be used for the purpose of better following and understanding the evidence adduced in the case or to test its accuracy and it is not the purpose of such inspection to be substituted as evidence in the case or to contradict the evidence placed before the Court and make it the foundation of the judgment. For this, he relied upon the decision of Mysore High Court in T. Krishnaswami Rao v. Dundappa reported in AIR 1962 Mysore 17 and of Supreme Court in Ugam Singh v. Kesrimal reported in (1970) 3 SCC 831 : AIR 1971 SC 2540. On considering the aforesaid decisions, I find much force in the aforesaid submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the observations of a Judge at the time of inspection can be used only for the purpose of better following and understanding the evidence adduced in the case or to test its accuracy. It is true that such inspection cannot be substituted as evidence in the case nor the Judge can make it the foundation of his judgment. In the present case, if the observations made by the trial Court in this behalf are considered in its proper perspective, we find that the learned trial Judge had neither substituted his notes of inspection as evidence nor made the same the foundation of his judgment. On careful scrutiny of the judgment of the trial Court, one can find that the trial Court has considered the entire oral and documentary evidence. It also took into consideration all the circumstances of the case and thereafter took into consideration his own notes of inspection. In fact, the trial Court ought not to have mentioned the observations about the inspection in its judgment because the observations of a Judge at the time of inspection can be used only for appreciation of the evidence. The trial Court had, therefore, committed an error in giving evidentiary value to the observations made by him at the time of inspection. However, it is crystal clear from the judgment of trial Judge that he did not base his conclusions solely on the result of his personal inspection and it is well-settled that when the judgment is not based solely on the result of personal inspection, it is not vitiated as observed by the Apex Court in the decision in the case of Ugam Singh (cited supra). Therefore, I do not find any substance in the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the respondent.

    13. In this view of the matter, I find that the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court need to be set aside and that of the trial Court restored.

    14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court are hereby set aside and that of the trial Court restored. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to the costs.

    Appeal allowed.
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