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  • It is settled law that a Receiver when appointed to manage the suit property acts as an officer of the court. Unless the court grants permission to induct any third party into the possession as a tenant in accordance with the directions contained in the order or as per the law then prevailing
  • Section of the Bengal Tenancy Act (no specific section mentioned)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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  • It is settled law that a Receiver when appointed to manage the suit property acts as an officer of the court. Unless the court grants permission to induct any third party into the possession as a tenant in accordance with the directions contained in the order or as per the law then prevailing
  • Section of the Bengal Tenancy Act (no specific section mentioned)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Title Suit No. 40 of 1927 was instituted by the appellant’s mother seeking partition of the plaint-schedule properties. A court-appointed Receiver took charge on 3 May 1933 and, during his management, placed the present respondents in possession, describing them as tenants. The suit ended in a decree in January 1940 and the Receiver was discharged in December 1941.

After attaining majority, the appellant brought a fresh partition action—Title Suit No. 53 of 1944—covering additional properties and sought an interim injunction against the respondents. A preliminary decree was passed on 30 April 1944 and a final decree on 7 November 1949. Persisting threats of dispossession prompted a third action, Title Suit No. 164 of 1955, in which the appellant sought a declaration that the respondents had no tenancy rights and prayed for a permanent injunction.

The trial court dismissed the third suit on 30 May 1959. In Title Appeal No. 773 of 1959, the District Court (first appellate court) reversed that decision on 17 January 1974, declaring that the land was in the joint possession of the appellant and his co-sharers and that the respondents had no tenancy or right of possession. The respondents then filed Second Appeal No. 153 of 1975 before the High Court, which on 16 August 1984 restored the trial court’s dismissal, holding that the respondents had acquired tenancy rights by adverse possession. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether possession by the respondents—originally inducted by a court-appointed Receiver—could mature into tenancy rights by adverse possession after the Receiver was discharged.
  2. Whether the High Court, in second appeal, was entitled to re-evaluate factual findings regarding possession that had been conclusively determined by the District Court.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, 1957 SCR 195 (AIR 1957 SC 314) Possession of a Receiver, being that of a court officer, cannot be tacked to a party’s possession to establish adverse possession; a Receiver’s inductee has only a limited, court-controlled interest. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that the respondents’ occupation during the Receiver’s tenure could not be counted towards adverse possession or confer tenancy rights after the Receiver’s discharge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reiterated that a Receiver is an officer of the court; any person placed in possession by the Receiver occupies merely under a licence that ends when the Receiver is discharged. Consequently, such possession cannot ripen into tenancy or ownership by prescription.

Applying Lakshmi Reddy, the Court held that the period from 1933 to August 1945—when the respondents were allegedly in occupation—could not be treated as adverse to the appellant, because it was grounded solely in the Receiver’s authority. Once the Receiver was discharged, the respondents’ right to remain ceased.

On the factual plane, the District Court had expressly found that the appellant and his co-sharers had been in actual physical possession of the suit land since August 1945, and that the respondents had failed to prove continuous possession thereafter. The High Court’s contrary finding was reached without analysing all testimonial and documentary evidence (notably PWs 2-5) and thus transgressed the limited re-appellate jurisdiction under a second appeal.

Because the High Court’s conclusions on possession and adverse possession rested on an erroneous legal premise and an unwarranted re-appreciation of facts, its decree was set aside.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment and decree dated 16 August 1984, and restored the District Court’s decree of 17 January 1974 declaring that the respondents have no tenancy rights and permanently restraining them from interfering with the appellant’s possession.

Implications are confined to the parties: the respondents lose any claim to tenancy; the appellant’s possession is affirmed. The decision primarily reiterates existing law on the limited effect of possession under a court-appointed Receiver and does not establish a new precedent.

    Shyam Sunder Dutta v. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (Dead) By Lrs. And Others

    Order

    1. This case has a chequered career. Initially, Title Suit No. 40 of 1927 was filed for partition of the plaint-schedule-properties by the mother of the appellant. Pending suit, a Receiver was appointed on 3-5-1933. During the course of the administration of the plaint-schedule-properties, he had inducted the respondents into possession purporting to be as tenants. Ultimately, the suit was decreed in January 1940 and the Receiver was discharged in December 1941. Thereafter, the appellant on attaining majority, filed a second partition suit — Title Suit No. 53 of 1944, for partition of other properties and also the suit property which was jointly in possession and enjoyment of him and his co-sharers. He also filed an application for ad interim injunction to restrain the respondents from interfering with his possession when there was a threat of dispossession. On 30-4-1944, a preliminary decree in the Title Suit No. 53 of 1944 was passed followed by a final decree of 7-11-1949. Thereafter in November 1955, the third suit — T.S No. 164 of 1955, was filed against the defendants when the threat of dispossession to the extent of 2 acres and 21 cents was persisting for a declaration that the lands therein together with the garden and fruit-bearing trees belong to the appellant and his co-sharers and the respondents have no tenancy rights created by the Receiver and for perpetual injunction restraining them from interfering with their possession. The trial court dismissed the suit on 30-5-1959, in Title Appeal No. 773 of 1959, by judgment and decree dated 17-1-1974.

    2. The appellate court recorded the findings thus:

    “The entire evidence on record considered together clearly shows that the defendants are out of possession from the suit lands from August 1945 and that the plaintiff and his co-sharers are in actual physical possession of the suit lands from that time.
    The evidence of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 5 considered with the documentary evidence discussed above lends support to the evidence of PW 1 that the defendants were not in possession of the suit lands from August 1945 and that the plaintiff and his co-sharer are possessing the suit properties from that time. I accordingly hold that the defendants failed to prove that they acquired any limited interest of tenancy by adverse possession.”

    The appellate court decreed thus:

    “It is hereby declared that the suit land is in joint possession of the plaintiff and the pro-defendants and that the defendants 1 to 5 have no tenancy therein or any right to possess the same. Defendants 1 to 5 are hereby permanently restrained from interfering in any way with the plaintiff's possession of the suit lands.”

    3. Feeling aggrieved against the appellate decree, the respondents filed Second Appeal No. 153 of 1975 in the High Court. The learned Single Judge, by judgment and decree dated 16-8-1984, reversed the decree of the appellate court and confirmed the decree of the trial court. The High Court held that the respondents remained in possession of the property and they have acquired by adverse possession the limited right of tenancy and that, therefore, the decree of the appellate court is not valid in law.

    4. The question that arises in the appeal is whether the respondents have acquired any tenancy rights pursuant to the tenancy created by the Receiver by adverse possession. This Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy 1957 SCR 195, AIR 1957 SC 314 held that (SCR Headnote)

    “the Receiver's possession could not be tacked on to H's possession, as a Receiver is as an officer of the court and is not the agent of any party to the suit and notwithstanding that in law his possession is ultimately treated as possession of the successful party on the termination of the suit, he could not be considered as the agent of such party with the animus of claiming sole and exclusive title with a view to initiate adverse possession, and during the time of the Receiver's possession the respondent could not sue H, and limitation could not therefore run against him.”

    In that case, one of the contentions raised was that the unsuccessful party in the suit having remained in possession and the Receiver having continued to be in possession of the land taken from the opposite party, the possession of the Receiver should be tagged to compute the period of adverse possession in his favour. This Court negatived the contention and held that the possession was not taken from him by the Receiver and that, therefore, the question of tagging the period due to that contingency did not arise for decision. However, this Court held that the possession of the Receiver is possession on behalf of the Court and a party cannot claim any title adverse to the opposite party when the Receiver remained in possession. It is settled law that a Receiver when appointed to manage the suit property acts as an officer of the court. Unless the court grants permission to induct any third party into the possession as a tenant in accordance with the directions contained in the order or as per the law then prevailing, the person inducted by the Receiver into possession would remain only as a licensee under the Receiver. As soon as the Receiver is discharged, the possession of the licensee being a limited right to remain in possession during the period when the Receiver was in management of the suit property, it comes to an end. On the discharge of the Receiver, the licensee has no right to remain in possession as either a tenant or a licensee. Therefore, the period of his possession cannot be treated or tagged for the purpose of claiming adverse possession. The finding of the courts below the High Court was that the respondents remained in possession from 1933 to August 1945 and during that period, such possession cannot be treated to be adverse to the real owner of the property. Consequently, the declaration given by the High Court that the respondents had acquired the tenancy rights by prescription is clearly illegal.

    5. The question of the respondents to have remained in possession cannot be gone into by the High Court, since the District Court on consideration of the entire evidence had categorically recorded a finding of fact that the appellant and his co-sharers remained in possession from August 1945 and that the respondents were not continuing in possession from that time. This being a finding of fact, the High Court would not have gone into the question. However, it would appear that on the question of limitation under the Bengal Tenancy Act when the arguments were addressed, in consideration of that question, the High Court has gone into the question whether the respondents were not dispossessed from suit lands and recorded a finding that they remained in possession. That finding does not appear to be warranted in view of the fact that the evidence was not discussed and as rightly contended the only evidence the High Court had considered was that of PW 1 but the first appellate court had considered the evidence of PWs 2 to 5 and the documentary evidence and that evidence was found to be in support of the evidence given by PW 1 that the respondents did not continue in possession from August 1945. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court, in fact, was not necessary. Even otherwise, that finding was recorded without adverting to all the material evidence and that, therefore, the finding of possession recorded by the High Court is clearly illegal.

    6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the appellate court is reversed. No costs.

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    Comments

    Shyam Sunder Dutta v. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (Dead) By Lrs. And Others
    (Sep 21, 1994)