B.N Kirpal and Prakash Narain, JJ.:— This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23-5-79 of the learned Single Judge who had allowed the writ petition of the respondent B.C Gupta and had quashed the order passed under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) whereby the services of B.C Gupta had been terminated.
2. B.C Gupta had joined as a Junior Engineer (Electrical) in the Central Public Works Department on 16th August, 1976. The appointment of B.C Gupta was temporary. According to the letter of appointment B.C Gupta was to be on probation for a period of two years. This probationary period could be extended at the discretion of the appointing authority. Failure to complete the period of probation to the satisfaction of the competent authority enable the said authority to discharge him from service.
3. B.C Gupta was initially posted at Sambha(J & K). The Assistant Engineer (Electrical) under whom he worked at Sambha was one Shri M.L Tikku and the Executive Engineer Electrical; stationed at Jamntu was at that time one Shri S.K Chawla, B.C Gupta was transferred by order dated 6th December, 1976 from Sambha to Madhopur where he worked under Assistant Engineer Shri G.L Raina. Thereafter B.C Gupta was once again transferred from Madhopur to Udhampur. All these orders of transfer were under the signatures of Shri S.K Chawla. It appears that the petitioner as well as his wife made representations against the said transfers but no action appears to have been taken on the same. On 23rd June, 1978 an incident took place at Udhampur in which B.C Gupta got involved in a controversy with his immediate superior, namely, Shri R.C Sharma who was the Assistant Engineer. The incident resulted is reports of assault being lodged by both the officers with the police the incident of 23rd June, 1978 was brought to the notice of the Superintending engineer who asked the then Executive Engineer Shri S.P Bansal to hold a preliminary enquiry. This preliminary enquiry report is dated 27th June, 1978 which contains facts regarding the incident of 23rd June, 1978. Paragraph 4 of the said report is very relevant and reads as under:—
“4. Shri B.C Gupta Junior Engineer, who joined this department on 17-8-76 was adversely reported by the then A.E (Elect) Er. M.L Tikku and on the basis of the report, he was shifted from Samba to Madhopur at Midhopur too he had alternation with the store Clerk and with Junior Engineer and was administered a warning by the A.B (Elect) Shri G.L Kaina. Even this warning proved in fructuous and complaints against him continued to be received from Er Raina as a result of which he was transferred from Madhopur to Udhampur. In this connection, reference is requested to this office letter No. EE/Conf/JCED/Conf.—84 dated 31-1-1978.”
4. The recommendation of the Executive Engineer is contained in para 5 of the said report which reads as under:—
“5 From the above, it may, kindly be adjudged that Shri B.C Gupta's performance during the probationary period is far from satisfactory and by his conduct and behaviour he has proved that he is not a fit person to be retained in Govt. Service. He has also failed to amend himself in spite of the two chances given to him. It is, therefore, recommended that his services may please be terminated by invoking the provisions of condition No. 24 of the offer of appointment issued in favour of Shri B.C Gupta by the Superintending Engineer (Coord) Delhi Central Electrical Circle No. 1, C.P.W.D New Delhi vide his Memo No. 8(23)/75—ECI/Coord dated 27-7-76, a copy of which was also endorsed to your office.”
5. Thereafter on 1st July, 1978 the impugned notice under Rule 5 of the said Rules was issued terminating Shri B.C Gupta's services.
6. B.C Gupta filed a writ petition being Civil Writ No. 962 of 1978 challenging the aforesaid order of termination. It was contended by B.C Gupta that the impugned order was punitive in nature and was based on a false report of the incident by the Assistant Engineer, R.C Sharma. It was alleged that the impugned order had been passed without affording the petitioner B.C Gupta any opportunity of being heard and further that the alleged incident of 23rd June, 1978 was the foundation of the passing of the said order B.C Gupta also alleged mala fides against Shri S.K Chawla in the said petition.
7. It is the case of B.C Gupta that Shri S.K Chawla who was his reviewing officer gave him certain adverse remarks with respect of the period from 1st April, 1977 to 14th January, 1978 even though the reporting officer had given good remarks to the petitioner. It is stated by B.C Gupta that the Executive Engineer Shri S.K Chawla was prejudiced against him and it is for this reason that the confidential report contained the adverse remarks of Shri S.K Chawla. It may by stated that the remarks of the reviewing officer were conveyed to B.C Gupta who filed a representation on 21st June, 1978 against the same to the Superintending Engineer. The said representation was never disposed of. But in the meantime the impugned order under rule 5 was passed.
8. The petition was opposed by the appellants herein. During the hearing of the writ petition the Union of India produced the personal file of B.C Gupta in Court and the learned Single Judge referred to the aforesaid report dated 27th June, 1978 of the incident which had taken place on 23rd June, 1978. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the impugned order had been passed on the basis of the said report in which report the Executive Engineer had recommended that in services of B.C Gupta may be terminated. The learned Single Judge held that the decision to terminate the services of B.C Gupta had its genesis in the incident dated 23rd June, 1978 and the report with regard thereto. He accordingly held that the impugned order was punitive in nature and the same was quashed.
9. In appeal before us Shri Daljit Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants, has contended that the aforesaid incident of 23rd June 1978 was not the foundation for the passing of the said order. The learned counsel has referred to a large number of authorities wherein such innocuously worded orders have been upheld Some of these authorities are: State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhoop Singh Verma, (1979) 2 SCC 111 : A.I.R 1979 Supreme Court 684, The State of U.P v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, 1976 (2) S.L.R 859 Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union Of India ., A.I.R 1964 Suprems Court 1854, The Manager, Govt. Branch Press v. D.B Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 429, The State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, A.I.R 1968 Supreme Court 1089, The State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra, (1970) 2 SCC 871 : A.I.R 1971 Supreme Court 1011 and Union of India v. R.S Dhaba, 1969 S.L.R 442. The conte at ion of the learned counsel is that all these authorities are unanimously of the view that if a single incident of misconduct is not the basis on which the services of a temporary servant have been terminated then ordinarily, the order cannot be challenged as being punitive in nature.
10. On behalf of the respondent it has been urged by the learned counsel Shri G.D Gupta that the impuged order is by tray of punishment. It has been contended that even if the order is innocuously worded it is apparent that the order has been passed because of the aforesaid incident dated 23rd June, 1978. The learned counsel has referred to a large number of authorities and has contended that the facts in the present case are similar to the facts in the cases on which he relies upon. The authorities which have been referred to by him in detail are:—
Comptroller and Auditor-General v. Samar Singh, 1976 Rajdhani Law Reporter 150, Ram Chander Sagar v. Delhi Administration, 1975 (1) S.L.R 216, The State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra, 1970 S.L.R 863, Appar Apar Singh v. The State of Bihar, 1971 (2) S.L.R 71, K.H Phadnis v. State Of Maharashtra† ., 1971 (2) S.L.R 345, R.C Roy… v. Union Of India & Others…S, I.L.R (1971) 1 Delhi 584, Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1974 (2) S.L.R 701 and The Manager, Govt. Branch Press v. D.B Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 : A.I.R 1979 Supreme Court 429.
11. In all the authorities which have been cited by counsel for both the parties it has been consistently held that if any particular incident of misconduct is merely a motive and not a foundation for the passing of the innocuous order under rule 5, then such an order cannot be successfully challenged. Shri G.D Gupta has strongly relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra's case (supra) and has sought to contend that the impugned order is punitive in nature. In the said case the Supreme Court has reiterated that the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is mere motive or is the very foundation of the order. The other authorities relied upon by Shri G.D Gupta refrerate what has been said by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. In our view merely because a preliminary enquiry is held before the decision to terminate the services is taken cannot possibly vitiate the said decision in Champaklal's case (supra) the supreme Court had upheld the Government right to hold such a preliminary enquiry in order to decide as to what course of action the Government should take in the case of a temporary servant. The Supreme Court held that whether such a termination which takes place after a preliminary enquiry can be held to amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311(2) would depend upon facts of tach case and the action taken by Government which finally leads to termination of service. In ultimate analysis, therefore, in each case the Courts have to see whether an act of misconduct is the motive or the foundation for the impugned order being passed.
12. It will be difficult to lay down or enunciate as to under what circumstances it can be said that an act of misconduct is the foundation or the motive of the order. It is obvious that before any order is passed terminating the services of a temporary employee some reasons must necessarily be recorded for taking such an action. If no reasons are found on the files an aggrieved employee would be justified in challenging the same as being arbitrary. In our opinion if a specific incident of ??? is gone into and a finding of guilt is recorded ex-parte even in the preliminary enquiry and action is taken terminating the services of a temporary employee on the basis of such any enquiry report then in that case it could be justifiably said that the incident of misconduct is the foundation for the said action. In such a case there would be no other reason for taking action against a temporary employee. If, on the other hand, such an incident of misconduct is one of the factors which is taken into consideration along with a number of other facts at an overall view is then taken to terminate the services of a temporary employee then in those circumstances it cannot be said that the said incident was the foundation of the order of termination. The cases cited by Shri G.D Gupta are mainly those where on single act of misconduct the services had been terminated on the basis of ex-parte enquiries revealing that the officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged.
13. In the present case the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that it is only the incident of 23rd June, 1978 which has resulted in the impugned action being taken, In our view the learned single Judge was wrong to coming to the said conclusion.
14. The reading of the aforesaid paragraphs 4 and 5 of the report dated 27th June, 1978 clearly shows that the Executive Engineer had referred to the conduct of B.C Gupta right from 1976 and ultimately come to the conclusion that his performance, conduct and behaviour during the probationary period was not satisfactory. The said report, in other words, was not confined merely to finding out the correctness of the rival allegations with regard to the incident of 23rd June, 1978. It will be teen that Shri S.P Bansal had recommended that the services of B.C Gupta be terminated by invoking the provisions of Condition 24 of the offer of appointment. Under condition 24 it was open to the Government to terminate the services by holding that the probationary period had not been satisfactorily completed. The Government, however, terminated the services of B.C Gupta, as already stated herein above, by issuing the impugned notice under Rule 5(1) of the said Rules.
15. It may be that the question as to the retention of B.C Gupta came up for consideration as a result of the said incident but the decision to terminate his services was taken by taking into consideration the overall performance, conduct and behaviour of B.C Gupta. The very fact that his conduct since 1976 was commented upon by the Executive Engineer clearly shows that he was commenting on the performance of B.C Gupta by taking hit entire service into consideration and not merely on the incident of 23rd June, 1978. We are, therefore of the opinion that the incident of 23rd June, 1978 may have been the motive for passing of the impugned order but was certainly not the foundation of the said order. The report of Shri S.P Bansal was merely a fact finding report and nothing more. Passing of the impugned order after taking Into consideration the aforesaid report cannot be validly objected to. We also find that there is no force in the allegations of mala fides as contained in writ petition. It has been alleged that Shri L.C Chawla, Executive Engineer, was instrumental in getting the petitioner's services terminated. There is no warrant for making such an averment. Shri S.K Chawla was in no way concerned with the report dated 27th June, 1978 which was sent by another Executive Engineer namely Shri S.P Bansal. There is nothing on record to show that Shri S.K Chawla had anything to do with the ultimate decision to terminate the services of the petitioner.
16. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
17. Appeal allowed.