1. This is a revision petition filed by the tenant and the matter arises under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.

2. The respondent filed an eviction petition on several grounds but only two grounds survived before the appellate authority viz., those relating to wilful default and bonafide requirement. On these two points the appellate authority disagreed with the Rent Controller and held in favour of the respondent-landlord and ordered eviction. The tenant therefore preferred this revision questioning the findings relating to wilful default as well as bona fide requirement of the landlord. On the question of wilful default the case of the respondent landlord in this petition was that the rent was Rs. 33/- per day and that the petitioner had committed wilful default. The trial court did not accept this contention. But on appeal the appellate authority proceeded on the basis that the rent was Rs. 88 per day and not Rs. 33 per day, and that the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of that rent.

3. It has been urged in this revision petition by Sri. C.V.N Sastry for the tenant-petitioner that there was no plea that the rent was Rs. 88 per day and that the subsequent agreement relied upon by the landlord would show that the enhancement was treated as damages and not as rent. He also wanted to argue that the extra amount claimed was in the nature of a premium.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord Sri. T. Veerabhadrayya.

5. I am of the view that when the landlord pleaded default in respect of rent at Rs. 33 per day it was not open to the appellate authority to make out a new plea for the landlord that the rent was Rs. 88 per day and that there was wilful default in payment of rent of Rs. 88 per day. The appellate authority should have decided the case only on the basis that the rent was Rs. 33 per day.

6. So far as the rent of Rs. 33 per day is concerned the appellate authority was not prepared to treat that there was any wilful default upto the date of the eviction petition.

7. In that view of the matter there can be no doubt that the appellate authority erred in holding that the tenant was liable for eviction on the ground of wilful default in not paying a rent of Rs. 88 per day. The finding of the appellate authority is set aside only on the ground that there was no such plea made by the landlord in the eviction petition presented before the Rent Controller.

8. It is not necessary in this C.R.P to go into the question whether the extra amount agreed to between the parties was in the nature of damages or premium as contended by the learned counsel for the tenant.

9. On the question of bona fide requirement it has been contended on behalf of the tenant by Sri. C.V.N Sastry that the landlord has not specified the nature of the business for which he wants the premises. According to him, unless the petition sets out the details of the nature of the business for which the landlord proposes to use the premises, the eviction petition is not maintainable. That, according to him, is a condition precedent for the maintainability of the eviction petition.

10. On the otherhand it is contended by Sri. T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord that even assuming that there was no specific plea in that regard the parties understood at the stage of evidence that the landlord could adduce evidence in regard to the purpose for which he wanted the premises. Accordingly the parties who knew about the nature of the issue involved led evidence in the case even regarding the purpose for which the building is to be used. He Page: 68contends that the submission for the tenant that the eviction petition itself is not maintainable cannot be accepted.

11. There are rulings of this Court taking divergent views on this question. Jeevan Reddy, J. in Tiruveedhi Ramanjaneyulu,… v. Araveti Venkata Subbamma,…. (1): 1980 (2) A.L.T 315 Punnayya, J. in Naganath v. Abdul Waheed (2) 1981 (1) A.P.L.J 62: Seetharam Reddy, J. in P. Latchanna v. G. Appa Rao (3) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J 137: have ruled that it is incumbent on the landlord to specify in the petition for eviction, the nature of the business which he wants to start. P.A Choudary, J. in Vishnu Prasad Bhatt v. K. Narayana Rao (4) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J 223; Ramachandra Raju, J. in K.L Setty v. M.L.K Setty (5) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J 345; and Rama Rao, J. in S. Narayana… v. V. Paidiraju…. (6) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J 193 have taken the view that it is not incumbent on the landlord to set out the nature of the business in the eviction petition itself and that if the parties knew the nature of the issue and have proceeded to the evidence on the understanding that the details of the proposed business could be proved by the evidence, there is no prejudice to the tenant and that the argument that the eviction petition itself is not maintainable cannot be accepted.

12. Therefore, before I can go into the question of bona fide requirement, the conflict of views is be to settled.

13. I therefore, refer the following question of law for decision by a Division Bench:

“Whether in an application for eviction of a non-residential building, it is obligatory for the landlord to specify in the eviction petition the details of the nature of the business he intends to commence and whether in case where parties have already led evidence on the question without objection by the tenant, the latter could be subsequently permitted to raise the objection and contend that the eviction petition is not maintainable for this reason”? the matter is arising day in and day out in this court and in the subordinate courts.

14. I would think that it is desirable that the conflict of views expressed by the two sets of rulings is resolved by a Division Bench as early as possible. The need for an early decision by a Division Bench being imperative, the office is directed to place the papers before. My word the Chief Justice for posting the case before a Division Bench as early as possible.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Amareswari, J.:— These four revision petitions arise out of proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 for short, the Act. The common question involved is whether the eviction petition fails for want of particulars as to the nature of the business which the landlord proposes to commence in the demised premises where eviction is sought under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act. As there is a divergence of judicial opinion, the question is referred to a Division Bench by our learned brother Jagannadha Rao, J. That is how the matters are before us now.

16. We will refer to the parties as Landlord and Tenant for the sake of convenience.

17. Mr. O. Adinarayana Reddy and Mr. C.V.N Sastry, who appeared for the tenants in these cases contended that in a cases where the landlord seeks eviction on the ground that he requires the premises for a business which he proposes to commence, it is necessary to state the nature and particulars of the business in the eviction petition. In the absence of these pleadings the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed not withstanding the fact that evidence was adduced at the trial. In support of this contention, they relied upon three decisions of this Court in Tiruveedhi Ramanjaneyulu,… v. Araveti Venkata Subbamma,…. (1) 1980 (2) A.L.T Page 315 Naganath v. Abdul Waheed (2), 1981 (1) A.P.L.J 62. P. Latchanna v. Appa Rao (3) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J 137.

18. On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. T. Veerabhadrayya and Mr. R. Prasad appearing for the landlords that no provision in the Act requires the nature and particulars of business to be stated in the petition itself and they are matters to be established at the trial by adducing evidence and ultimately the Controller that has to be satisfied that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide. In support of this view, the learned counsel relied upon another three decisions reported in Vishnu Prasad Bhatt v. K. Narayana Rao (4) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J 223 : K.L Setty v. M.L.K Setty (5) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J 345; and S. Narayana… v. V. Paidiraju…. (6) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J 193.

19. To decide these questions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is as follows:—

“10(3)(a):— A landlord may, subject to the provisions of Clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building:—

(i) in case it is a residential building—

(a) ..……

(ii) in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle……

(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential Building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise—

(a) for the purpose of business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or

(b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bonafide proposes to commence:”

20. The rest of the Section is not necessary.

21. We are concerned with 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) in this case. From the language, it is very clear that what is necessary is the satisfaction of the Controller about the requirement of the premises by the landlord for starting a business. The Section does not deal with pleadings at all. It is the satisfaction of the Controller that is important and that satisfaction must be on a consideration of the entire material on record i.e, the pleadings as well as evidence. It is obvious that a decree cannot be given on the basis of mere pleading that the landlord requires the building say for a fancy goods business or any other business for that matter. Ultimately, the question is one of proof. If the contention of the learned counsel is to be accepted, the petition which does not contain the nature and particulars of the business has to be dismissed at the threshold even without calling upon the other side to enter their defence. We do not think that such a situation is contemplated by the framers of the Act. Many things may arise after the filing of the petition. The party may change his mind after filing the petition as to the nature of the business having regard to the exigencies of the situation. But if the statement regarding the business is a necessary pleading, can it be said that the petition cannot be continued? Does he have to file another petition indicating the new business contemplated by him? Mr. O. Adinarayana Reddy submitted that in such a case the petitioner can amend the pleadings and adduce evidence on the amended pleadings. But what guarantee is there that the defence would not resist that a plea contrary to the original pleading cannot be permitted by way of amendment. It is common knowledge that the Rent Control proceedings take a very long time for their disposal from the date of the pleadings Having regard to the exigencies of the situation the nature of the proposed or contemplated business may change and it cannot be said that in such an event the landlord must file a fresh petition. The emphasis in sub-clause (b) is on the opinion of the Controller as to the bonafide requirement of the landlord. It may be any business as there is no limitation in the section, as to the nature or Page: 70type of business. Whether the requirement is bonafide or not depends upon evidence. Inspite of the fact that no particulars are given in the petition if there is sufficient material in the case to show that the requirement of the premises to start a business is bonafide, the relief of eviction cannot be denied. In fact, none of the decisions cited on behalf of the tenants have laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the eviction petition should fail for went of a pleading as to the nature and particulars of the business.

22. In Ramanjaneyulu v. Venkat Subbamma (1) 1980 (2) A.L.T 315. Our learned brother Jeevan Reddy, J., while observing that the express languge of the enactment requires that the authority should be satisfied that the landlord bonafide proposes to commence a business in the premises, added that it is not enough for him simply to be satisfied that the landlord proposes to do some business or other in the premises. With respect to the learned Judge, cannot agree with the latter observations. It is immaterial whether it is business ‘A’ or business ‘B’. What is essential is that the premises is bonafide required for starting a business and that the conclusion can be reached only on appreciation of evidence. It is true as observed by the learned Judge that a general and vague allegations that the landlord wants to do some business hardly enable the Controller to form the basis. But that is only a part of the material and not the entire material which includes evidence. This decision is followed in Naganath v. Abdul Waheed (2) 1981 (1) A.P.L.J 62, by Punnayya, J. The learned Judge while affirming the view that the eviction petition should contain the particulars and nature of the business further observed that failure to aver these facts in the eviction petition would cause prejudice to the defence of the tenant as he has no opportunity to know and meet the case of the landlord. We do not think that we can accept this reasoning. The absence of a pleading regarding the nature and particulars of the business in the petition doss not cause any prejudice. The burden of proof as to the bonafide requirement is always upon the landlord, who has to lead evidence and the other party has an opportunity to cross-examine. Then the tenants have the right to adduce their evidence which would necessarily be after the evidence is closed on the petitioner's side. Hence we do not see that any prejudice is caused by not mentioning the nature of the business in the petition. The proceedings are not in the nature of writ proceedings where mattes are decided on affidavits and counters and adducing evidence is a rare phenomenon.

23. The other decision relied upon by the petitioners is that of Seetharam Reddy, J. in P. Latchanna v. Appa Rao (3) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J 137. The learned Judge merely followed the earlier two decisions about which we have already expressed our view. We now refer to the decisions taking the contrary view.

24. In Vishnu Prasad Bhatt v. K. Narayana Rao (4) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J page 223. P.A Choudary, J., held that it cannot be laid down as a legal principle that unless the details of the proposed business are given in the petition, the Rent Controller cannot satisfy himself though there might be clear and cogent evidence let in by the landlord in a particular case. The same view was taken by Ramachandra Raju, J. in K.L Setty v. M.L.K Setty (5) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J 345. The learned Judge held that it cannot be laid down as a general rule that an eviction petition filed under Section 10(3) of the Act should be dismissed for failure on the part of the landlord to specify the particular business which he propose to commence and that each case has to be decided on its own facts. The learned Judge referred to the decisions of Jeevan Reddy, J., and Punnayya, J., in the earlier decisions and explained stating that those decisions cannot be understood to have laid down as a general rule that an eviction petition filed under Section 10(3) of the Act should be dismissed for failure on the part of the landlord to specify the particular business which he propose to commence and that those observations Page: 71cams to be made because in those cases, the bonafide requirement of the landlords were found against. Thus according to the learned Judge, the earlier two decisions have not laid down as a general rule the eviction petition should fail in the absence of particulars in the petition. Ramachandra Raju, J., was therefore, of the view that each case depends upon the facts of that case and that entire material must be considered. The following observations of the learned Judge at Page 349 are relevant:—

“If the evidence is conclusive on the bonafide requirements of the landlord and the tenant has not suffered any prejudice, it will not be right to refuse the relief of eviction merely on the ground that the business which the landlord proposes to commence was not specified in the petition for eviction.” Thus, it is held that the relief cannot be denied merely on the ground of absence of particulars and that it is a matter for evidence. No doubt, the learned Judge added the words” if the tenant has not suffered any prejudice’. But the prejudice must be referable to some other factors and not to the absence of indication of the particulars in the petition.

25. The last in the series is the decision in S. Narayana… v. V. Paidiraju…. (6) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J 193, in this case, eviction is sought on the ground that the premises is required for carrying on business. The Rant Controller allowed the petition holding that the requirement is benafide. On appeal, the finding was confirmed. In the revision before the High Court, it was argued that since the eviction petition did not contain the nature and particulars of business, hence the petition has to be dismissed. Rama Rao, J. after referring to the various decisions on the subject, observed that the cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances should be taken into consideration and the absence of mention of the nature of business in the eviction petition is not fatal. We think that the view expressed by Rama Rao, J., in this case represents the correct legal position. The Controller has to form his opinion as to the bonafide requirement on a consideration of the entire material on record consisting of the pleadings and evidence in a case where both sides adduce evidence on the basis of the pleadings being fully aware of the mutual stand, no prejudice can be said to be caused. The object of pleadings is to put the other side on notice regarding the case so that the other side is not taken by surprise. By not stating the nature and particulars of a business in the petition, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused as parties adduce evidence. The ultimate question is whether the requirement of the landlord for starting a business is bonafide and for establishing the bonafide requirement, it is not necessary to state the nature and particulars of the business in the petition itself. There may be cases where unless the premises is available for occupation, the landlord would not be in a position to make any preparations. The claim of bonafides can always be demolished in several ways by proving some positive acts like letting out the premises from the occupation of the landlord subsequently or pressing the tenant for enhancement of rent for the premises after he had claimed the eviction or the like.

26. Mr. O. Adinarayana Reddy relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in D.V.V.G Satyanarayana v. S.V Raghavaiah(7) (1987) 1 SCC 254 : A.I.R 1987. Supreme Court, page 406. In support of his contention. In this case, it was held that under the law of pleadings, the facts mentioned in sub-section (8) are to be pleaded in the petition and thereafter proved at the trial for the purpose of an order of eviction and that any amount of proof without an appropriate pleading is of no relevance. There is no quarrel with this principle. The question is what is it that has to be pleaded. For instance, in a petition under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) for eviction the landlord has to plead not only that the premises is required for starting a business, but he has also to plead that he has not occupied any other non-residential building in the city, town or village which in his own or to the position of which he is entitled to under law. Without these pleadings, no proof can be adduced. It is in this context, the Supreme Court observed that the facts Page: 72mentioned in sub-section (3) are to be pleaded. This decision does not lay down that one of the ingredients of Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) is that the nature of the business is to be stated in the petition. On a conspectus of all the decisions and interpretations of Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b), we hold that the eviction petition cannot be dismissed on the sole ground that particulars and nature of business proposed to be commenced are not stated in the eviction petition. We agree in this regard with the view taken in Vishnu Prasad Bhatt v. K. Narayana Rao (4) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J 223 K.L Shetty v. M.L.K Sesty (5) 1982 (1) A.P.L.J 345 and S. Narayana… v. V. Paidiraju…. (6) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J 193, and the question of bonafide requirement has to be decided on a consideration of the entire material on record and by taking the cumulative effect of all the circumstances. In this view, we are unable to agree with the view expressed in Tiruveedhi Ramanjaneyulu,… v. Araveti Venkata Subbamma,…. (1) 1980 (2) A.L.T 315 Naganath v. Abdul Waheed (2). 1981 (1) A.P.L.J page 62 P. Latchanna v. Appa Rao(3) 1982 (2) A.P.L.J Page 137.

27. Bearing these principles in mind, we now proceed to dispose of the revisions on merits since all parties have agreed for this course.

28. C.R.P No. 4747 of 1981:— In is case, eviction was sought on sevaral grounds including wilful default and bonafide requirement to carry on a business. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition and on appeal, the decision was reversed and eviction was ordered on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and also bonafide requirement. The learned Single Judge set aside the finding regarding wilful default as he found that there is no wilful default. On the question of bonafide requirement, the learned Judge referred the case to the Division Bench. Though a lot of evidence was adduced at the trial to the effect that the landlord intends to do business in manufacture of sofa-cum-beds, it was not considered as the ground that the nature and particulars of business were not stated in the petition. The learned Counsel for the petitioners landlord, argued that the finding is unsustainable. But we think it is unnecessary to go into that question since it is admitted by both parties that the landlord who filed the eviction petition died on 25-3-1986 during the pendency of this revision. It is on record that the landlord filed the petition on his own behalf and as a divided member of the family. In view of the fact that he died’ it is argued that the cause of action does not survive as the premises was required for his own business. Though his three sons were impleaded as Legal Representatives the purpose for which the building was required was not for joint business. There was a partition between the members of the family long prior to the petition for eviction. The business proposed to be carried on is his individual business. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that the petition has to be dismissed on this ground alone.

29. In M.M Quasim v. Manohar Lal (8) (1981) 3 SCC 36 : A.I.R 1981, Supreme Court 1113, it was held that subsequent factors can be taken into account and where the landlord has lost interest in the demised premises, pending the appeal, it was held that he would not be entitled to continue the action after extinguishment of cessation of his interest.

30. To the same effect is another decision of the Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (9) (1981) 3 SCC 103 : A.I.R 1981 Supreme Court, 1711. In this case, the Supreme Court held that when an action is brought by the landlord under the Rent Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement his need must not only shown to be exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree or the date when a higher court deals with the matter and that during the progress and passage of proceedings from Court to Court, if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff the Court has to examine and evaluate the same and would the decree. Reliance was placed on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in P. Venksteswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (10) (1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 Supreme Court, 1409, in which it is held Page: 73that the need must exist not only on the date of the action, but it must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. In P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (10) (1975) 1 SCC 770 : A.I.R 1975, Supreme Court, 1409, the case was one where the subsequent event occurred during the pendency of the revision petition in the High Court which was taken notice of and the relief was negatived on the ground that the cause of action does not survive. In view of these authoritative decisions' we dismiss the petition for eviction. We accordingly allow the Civil Revision Petition, but in the circumstances without costs.

31. C.R.P No. 4726 of 1981:— In this case, the Rent controller ordered eviction on the ground that the landlord bonafide requires the premises for the business. The appellate Court reversed the said decision mainly on the ground that the petition did not contain the nature and particulars of business. The learned appellate Judge has focussed his attention only on the pleadings without considering the evidence. The entire judgment contains only three sentences regarding evidence. The appellate court was more swayed by the fact that the pleadings did not mention the nature of the business. We therefore remit this case to the lower Appellate Court for reconsideration in the light of the law stated by us in this judgment. The order under appeal is accordingly set aside and the matter is remitted to the appellate authority for reconsideration. No costs. C.R.P Nos. 1129 and 1130 of 1981;— These two revisions arise out of the same proceedings. The eviction is sought on the ground of bonafide requirement for starting a business. The particulars of the business are not stated in the petition. The tenant resisted the petition on the ground that the requirement is not bonafide and there is no relationship of a landlord and tenant. The Rent Controller by his order dated 29-3-80 ordered eviction and rejected the plea of the tenant that the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist. During the pendency of the appeal, the landlord filed a petition I.A No. 100 of 1980 for amending the eviction petition giving the nature and details of the business which he proposes to start. The Appellate Judge dismised the said petition. Against which C.R.P No. 1130 of 1981 is filed. Finally, the appellate Judge allowed the appeal of the tenant on the sole ground that since the original petition did not contain the nature and particulars of the business which the landlord proposes to commence, the petition should fail. In the view that we have taken, the reasons of the Appellate Judge cannot be sustained. The matter is therefore, remitted to the lower Appellate Court for reconsideration taking into account the entire material on record. In as much as it is not necessary to state all the details in the eviction petition, the amendment petition I.A No. 100 of 1980 filed by the landlord had become unnecessary. The said petition was filed only with a view to comply with the requirements of law as interpreted by Courts at that time. In this view, C.R.P No. 1130 of 1981 has become unnecessary and it is accordingly dismissed.

32. The lower Appellate Court is directed to consider the evidence on record and decide the question of bonafide requirement on merits and pass appropriate order. C.R.P No. 1129 of 1981 is accordingly allowed and C.R.P No. 1130 of 1981 is dismissed as unnecessary.

33. No costs.