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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore dismissing, in effect, O.S. No. 10 of 1940, a suit instituted by the appellant to set aside an order which had allowed the first respondent's claim to certain properties that the appellant had attached before judgment in an earlier action (O.S. No. 98 of 1938).

The earlier suit (O.S. No. 98 of 1938) was instituted by the appellant to recover Rs. 7,800 due on hundies executed by one Babu Sahib and his three sons. The properties in question were attached before judgment on 8 and 9 April 1938; the appellant later obtained decree in that earlier suit on 4 August 1938. Babu Sahib had died in December 1937; his three sons are respondents 2 to 4 in the present appeal. The first respondent is the wife of the eldest son (the second respondent in this appeal). Her claim to the properties rested on a deed of gift executed by Babu Sahib in her favour on 27 September 1937.

The attachment was vacated by an order of the executing court dated 15 December 1938. The subsequent suit (O.S. No. 10 of 1940) seeking to set aside the order was filed on 15 December 1939, which the opinion notes as the last day of limitation under Article 11(1) of the Indian Limitation Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed of gift (Exhibit II) was executed with the intent to defraud creditors (i.e., whether the gift was void as fraudulent as against creditors).
  2. Whether the appellant's suit was barred by limitation.
  3. Whether the amendment of the plaint converting the suit into a representative action under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code, effected the addition of new parties (for the purposes of Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act) so as to make the suit, as regards those additional persons, deemed to have been instituted only on the date of amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondents contended (and the respondent's counsel argued) that the amendment of the plaint had the effect of introducing new plaintiffs because the appellant's capacity was changed from an individual plaintiff to the representative of a body of creditors; therefore, by virtue of Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act the suit, as regards those additional creditors, should be deemed to have been instituted on the date of the amendment (and thus would be barred by limitation).
  • The respondents relied on the decision of Wadsworth, J., in Shankara Menon v. Kuttani (A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659) as authority for treating the post-amendment position as equivalent to the addition of fresh parties after the period of limitation had expired.

Appellant's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • When the framing of the suit was objected to in the written statement, the appellant applied to amend the plaint so as to bring the suit into conformity with the law (an amendment was ordered and carried out on 22 August 1940). The record does not set out extensive, detailed legal argument from the appellant on the point beyond the application for amendment; the opinion records the procedural steps taken by the appellant in response to the objection to framing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madina Bibi v. Ismail Durga Association (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. Example of summary dismissal when a suit is wrongly framed. Cited to show that a suit wrongly framed (i.e., one which should have invoked Order 1, Rule 8 but did not) is liable to be summarily dismissed if the framing objection is sustained.
Shankara Menon v. Kuttani A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659 Held that an amendment converting a suit to a representative action effectively adds a "very large number of fresh parties" and so may attract Section 22 (i.e., suit deemed instituted when added). The court discussed this decision but explicitly rejected Wadsworth, J.'s conclusion as not correct in the present context.
Handford v. Store (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. In representative suits, a plaintiff who sues on behalf of a class retains dominion of the suit until decree; represented persons are not necessarily parties in the full sense. Relied on as part of English authority showing that representative plaintiffs and those represented occupy distinct positions; used to illustrate why represented persons are not to be treated as actual parties for all purposes.
Watson v. Gave A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659 Illustrates that a dissentient member of a represented class, not being an actual party, could not appeal from an order made in the representative suit; the correct route is to apply to be made a defendant. Used to support the proposition that those represented are not necessarily actual parties to the suit and that certain procedural rights (e.g., appeal) depend on actual party status.
Fraser v. Copper, Hall and Co. A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659 Similar theme: a bondholder could apply to be made a defendant to represent dissentients; the decision indicates represented persons may not be actual parties on the record. Adduced to illustrate the procedural mechanics and the distinction between being represented and being actually impleaded.
Wolff v. Van Bollen (1906) 94 L.T. 502 Where the plaintiff's right of action passes to a trustee in bankruptcy, the action cannot be continued with the original plaintiff on the record; the right of action passes by operation of law. Referred to as an example where the right of action passes to another person; used to discuss who is properly a party when rights are transferred by operation of law.
Price v. Rhondha Urban District Council (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. Whether an order for costs can be made against persons represented by the plaintiff in a class action; represented persons who actively participated were nevertheless not actually parties. Used to show the limited scope of the court's power to make orders against represented persons who are not in fact parties on the record.
Sahib Thambi v. Hamid A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659; Sadagopachafi v. Krishnamachari (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 356; Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Arayar Srinivasa Aiyangar (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. Principle that a decree in a representative suit binds those represented only with respect to the property which the representative can represent; personal decrees against non-impleaded persons are not competent. Cited as supporting authority for the fundamental rule governing representative suits under Order 1, Rule 8: those represented are not parties in the full sense and cannot be personally bound unless actually impleaded.
Udmi v. Hira (1920) I.L.R. 1 Lah. 582; Malik Mohamed Sher Khan v. Ghulam Mohamed (1930) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 92; Mt. Afzalunnissa v. Fayazuddin (1931) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 195 Where a member of a class who has not been made a party dies pending action, it is not necessary to bring his legal representatives on the record; principle extended to appeals. Applied to demonstrate that represented persons are not actual parties whose substitution is required when they die, reinforcing the distinction between representation and party status.
Peary Mohan Mookerjee v. Narendra Math Mookerjee (1930) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 92 Privy Council authority relevant to the effect of amendments converting suits into representative actions and whether fresh parties are introduced. Relied upon by the court as a key authority supporting the conclusion that converting the suit into a representative action does not introduce fresh parties for the purpose of Section 22.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner focusing on the limitation question and the legal effect of the amendment which converted the suit into a representative action under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code.

  1. Characterization of the original suit: The court noted that the original pleading framed the action as one to set aside a summary order under Order 21, Rule 63, and to declare the suit properties liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 98 of 1938. The essential allegation was that the deed of gift (Ex. II) was executed when the donors were heavily indebted, and with the object of cheating creditors. The court observed that in substance the suit was one under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and ought to have been instituted on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all creditors rather than solely for the plaintiff.
  2. Procedural defect and amendment: Because Order 1, Rule 8 had not been invoked initially, an objection to the framing was taken in the written statement. The plaintiff then applied for, and obtained, an amendment to the plaint (ordered and carried out on 22 August 1940) to convert the suit into a representative action under Order 1, Rule 8. If the date of the amendment were the relevant date for instituting the suit as to those represented, the suit would be barred by limitation.
  3. Section 22(1) Limitation Act argument: The respondents argued that Section 22(1) required that when a new plaintiff is added after institution of a suit, the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted as regards him only when he was made a party. The court therefore considered whether the amendment in fact "added" new plaintiffs within the meaning of Section 22(1).
  4. Review of authorities and interpretive approach: The court examined English and Indian authorities concerning representative or "class" actions and the practical consequences of allowing representative suits. It reviewed decisions such as Handford v. Store, Watson v. Gave, Fraser v. Copper, Hall & Co., Wolff v. Van Bollen, and Price v. Rhondha Urban District Council to show how English courts had treated the position of persons represented in a class action. The court emphasized distinctions between (a) persons actually on the record and (b) persons merely represented who are bound in respect of their common interest but are not actual parties in the full sense.
  5. Statutory construction of Order 1, Rule 8 and Section 11, CPC: The court analysed Order 1, Rule 8 (and Sub-rule (2)) alongside Section 11, Explanation 6 of the Civil Procedure Code. It observed that Sub-rule (2) expressly allows persons on whose behalf a suit is instituted to apply to be made a party, which presupposes they are not parties until the Court makes them so. Section 11, Explanation 6 states that persons litigating bona fide for a public right or a private right claimed in common shall be deemed, for the purposes of the section, to claim under the persons so litigating — a formulation the court read as a deeming provision for the purpose of that section rather than a statement that those persons are actual parties.
  6. Legal conclusion on amendment and Section 22: The court concluded that an amendment which merely converts a plaintiff's capacity (so that a plaintiff becomes a representative under Order 1, Rule 8) does not amount to the addition of fresh parties so as to attract Section 22 of the Limitation Act. The court held that persons not on the record are not parties in the full sense and that the amendment here did not introduce new parties even though it changed the plaintiff's capacity.
  7. Rejection of contrary authority: The court expressly stated it was unable to accept Wadsworth, J.'s decision in Shankara Menon v. Kuttani as correct on this point, and relied instead on Privy Council and other authorities (e.g., Peary Mohan Mookerjee) supporting the view that converting a suit into a representative action does not introduce fresh parties for the purpose of Section 22.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed with costs both in the present Court and in the Court below. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in terms of prayer (a) in paragraph 14 of the plaint. The first respondent's memorandum of objections is dismissed, but without costs.

Implications:

  • The court held that amendment of the plaint converting the action into a representative suit under Order 1, Rule 8 does not amount to the addition of fresh parties for the purposes of Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the date of such amendment is not, by itself, the date on which the suit is deemed to have been instituted as regards the body of persons represented.
  • As a direct effect in this case, the appellant's suit was not held to be barred by limitation on the ground that the representative-character amendment was made after the period of limitation; the decree was therefore entered for the plaintiff as prayed.
  • The court expressly declined to follow the contrary view in Shankara Menon v. Kuttani (A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659), indicating a preference for the line of authorities holding that represented persons are not actual parties in the full sense and that amendment of capacity does not add fresh parties for limitation purposes.
  • The opinion focuses on the direct consequence for the parties — reversal of the lower court's effective dismissal and entry of a decree for the plaintiff — and frames the ruling as an interpretive application of Order 1, Rule 8 and Section 11, rather than as laying down novel general rules beyond that interpretation.

Note: This summary faithfully reflects only the information expressly contained in the provided opinion. No facts, holdings, or implications have been invented or inferred beyond what the opinion states.

    Seth Nandaramdas Atmaram v. Zulika Bibi

    1. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore dismissing in effect the suit (O.S. No. 10 of 1940) instituted by the appellant for setting aside an order allowing the claim of the first respondent to certain properties which had been attached before judgment by the appellant in an earlier suit. That suit (O.S. No. 98 of 1938) had been instituted by the appellant to recover a sum of Rs. 7,800 due on hundies executed by one Babu Sahib and his three sons. The properties were attached before judgment 0n 8th and 9th April, 1938, and later on 4th August, 1938, the appellant obtained his decree.

    2. Babu Sahib died in December, 1937. His three sons are respondents 2 to 4.The first respondent is the wife of his eldest son Mydeen Batcha Sahib who is the second respondent here. Her claim, to the property is based on a deed of gift executed by Babu Sahib in her favour on. 27th September, 1937. The properties gifted were of considerable value though their value is stated in the deed to be Rs. 9,000 only which there is reason to believe was an under-estimate., The attachment was raised by an order of the executing Court dated 15th December, 1938 and the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed on 15th December, 1939, which was the last day of limitation under Article 11(1) of the Indian Limitation Act.

    3. Two questions were raised in the Court below, namely, (1,) that the deed of gift which has been marked as Ex. II was executed with intent to defraud creditors, and (2) that the suit was barred by limitation. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the plea of limitation was good; but he declined to give effect to it by reason of all order of amendment which he had earlier made during the course of the suit. On the question whether the deed of gift was void as having been executed to defraud creditors he has recorded, a finding which means that his answer was in the negative.

    4. After discussing the evidence and finding that the gift was made with intent to defraud creditors his Lordship proceeded

    5. We now pass on to the question of limitation which arises in this way The suit as originally framed was merely one to,set aside the summary order made under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code and prayed for that order being set aside and the suit properties declared liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 98 of 1938. The material allegation in the plaint was that the alleged gift (Ex. II) was made at a time when Babu Sahib and his sons were heavily indebted, with the sole object of cheating the appellant and other creditors and placing the properties beyond their reach. Thus the suit was in substance a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and should have been instituted on behalf of or for the benefit of all the creditors and not merely on behalf of the plaintiff alone. The provisions of Order 1, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code, were not invoked. The permission of the Court to sue on, behalf of or for the benefit of all the creditors was not asked. The suit was thus wrongly framed. In these circumstances there was no alternative for the plaintiff but to proceed under Order 1, Rule 8. Otherwise the suit was liable to be summarily dismissed (vide Madina Bibi v. Ismail Durga Association (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad). When objection to the frame of the suit was taken in the written statement, the appellant applied to the Court for an amendment of the plaint so as to bring it in conformity with law and the amendment was ordered and carried out on 22nd August, 1940. If this date is taken to be the crucial date the suit would be barred by limitation.

    6. The contention of the respondent here, as, in the Court below, is that the amendment had the effect of introducing new plaintiffs into the suit because there was a change of capacity on the part of the appellant. Whereas originally he had instituted the suit for himself as an individual he became after the amendment the representative of a group of persons whose common interest it was to get rid of the deed of gift. It was argued that after the amendment all these persons became in the eye of the law, plaintiffs in the suit though not in name yet in effect, by reason of the representative character which the plaintiff thenceforth held. On this line of reasoning the respondent's counsel urged that the suit should as regards the other creditors be deemed to have been instituted only on the day when the amendment was made involving as it is said, their addition as new plaintiffs to the action. Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act on which he relies is as follows:

    Where, after the institution of a suit a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party.

    7. The argument was supported by reference to the decision of Wadsworth, J. in Shankara Menon v. Kuttani A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659 where a suit to redeem a mortgage was instituted against a rnember of an unincorporated association in his personal capacity as a mortgagee. The defendant having taken the objection that he did not hold possession of the mortgaged property in his personal capacity but it was held by an unincorporated association of which he was a member, the plaintiff applied for an amendment of the plaint so as to convert trie suit into one against the defendant as a representative of the association. The amendment was ordered without objection. If the suit be regarded as having been instituted on the date of the amendment it was barred by limitation. This objection was taken and accepted by Wadsworth, J., with the result that the suit was dismissed. The ground of the decision is contained in the following observations of the learned Judge:

    It is not a case to my mind of a person already on the record being by means of an amendment jmpleaded in another capacity or on other grounds. If we look at the essence of the amendment,. it is a case in which by means of an amendment a very large number of fresh parties are added, though fey a special procedure one of their number who happens already to be on the record in his per-sbnal capacity is treated as the representative of the whole association. It seems to me that this is essentially a case of adding fresh parties after the period of limitation has expired.

    8. It is clear that the view which prevailed with the learned Judge is that in representative suits or " class actions " as they are termed in England, the parties to the action are not merely the representative or representatives actually on the record but the entire body of persons whom they are allowed to represent. In view of the fact that Order 1 Rule 8 corresponds to Order 16, Rule 9 of the Rules pf Supreme Court in England it is desirable to see how the English Courts have understood the position. In Handford v. Store (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad decided before the enactment of the Supreme Court Rules, the Vice-Chancellor held that where a plaintiff files a bill on behalf of himself and all other persons of the same class, he retains the absolute dominion of the suit until the decree, and may dismiss the bill at his pleasure; but after a decree he cannot deprive the other persons of the same class of the benefit of the decree, if they think fit to prosecute it. It is difficult to understand how a representative plaintiff can alone and without the consent or authority of those represented by him, if the latter are supposed to be also parties to the suit, at his will have the suit dismissed. The position is, of course, different if the suit proceeds to the stage of a decree being passed, as such a decree will enure to the benefit of and bind the other parties by the principle of res judicata. In Watson v. Gave A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659, which was an action commenced by a bondholder on behalf of himself and all other bondholders, the plaintiff obtained an order for a receiver, whereupon one of the bondholders represented by the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the order, applied for leave to appeal. It was held that the order having been made in favour of the class to which the applicant belonged, and having been obtained by the plaintiff, who represented him in the action, he could not appeal against it. The Court indicated that the proper course for the dissentient bondholder was to apply to the Court to be made a defendant to the action. There can be little doubt that the decision proceeds on the footing that the dissentient was not actually a party; for, if he were, his right of appeal would be unquestioned. Fraser v. Copper, Hall and Co. A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659 was a similar case where a bondholder of a Railway Company, sued on behalf of himself and all the bondholders of the company other than the defendant, but without obtaining an order under Order 16, Rule 9, that the defendant should be sued as representing all bondholders who dissented from the plaintiff's claim. One of the bondholders took out a summons whereby he stated that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant properly represented the interests of himself and certain other bondholders, and applied.to be made a defendant. Fry, J., held that the applicant was entitled to represent the bondholders who were dissentients from the plaintiff's view. It would be observed that there would be no necessity for the applicant to be made a party if he was already en the record, though not eo nomine. In Wolff v. Van Bollen (1906) 94 L.T. 502 a receiving order followed by an adjudication in bankruptcy had been made against the plaintiff in an action in which the claim on behalf of himself and all other creditors was for an order setting aside an assignment of personal property by way of settlement made by the first defendant upon his wife, the second defendant, previous to his bankruptcy. '-The question was whether the action can be continued with the plaintiff on the record without the Official Receive-. Being substituted in his place. Kekwich, J., answered the question in the negative. The decision is important in that it is manifest that the Court regarded the right of action as one which passed to the trustee in bankruptcy on the adjudication of the plaintiff and was liable to dismissal if he did not choose to intervene within a time limited by the Court. The following observations are worthy of note:

    As I put it to his counsel in the course of the argument, if he had assigned any debt he could not recover it, and it would put an end to the action. As a matter of course the action would have passed because the right is transferred. It is assigned by act of law; the act of law has assigned it for him. As against that there are two arguments which merit notice. First, it was said that he was a trustee; and that, being a trustee, the debt has not passed to the Official Receiver and trustees in his bankruptcy. Of course, if that is the true view, the matter is unarguable. But he is not a trustee of the action. He can discontinue it, by the leave of the Court, as dominus litis, but what he. would recover he would recover for the defendant's trustee, and, if he succeeds in setting, aside these assignments for the benefit of his creditors, what he recovers vests in the trustee fox them. That would have to be applied for the benefit of the aseditors. He may become a trustee afterwards of the fruits of the action, but he is not a trustee of the action, and therefore the right of action passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. Secondly, it is pointed out that there is a receiver appointed in this action, and it is argued that that is equivalent to a judgment. In the first place the order appointing the receiver is not equivalent to a judgment or anything approaching to it. It is an interlocutory process which is something to protect the property while the rights to it are yet unsettled and where there is to be a judgment.

    9. In Price v. Rhondha Urban District Council (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad, the point that arose for decision was whether an order for costs can be made against persons who were represented by the plaintiffs in a class action brought on their behalf. Eve, J., said that the teachers whom the plaintiff represented had actively supported the litigation brought by the plaintiff on their behalf, and had contributed towards the costs of carrying on the action. They were thus before the Court, and were bound by any decision which the Court pronounced, but they were not in fact made parties to the action. In these circumstances the Court had no jurisdiction to make the order for the payment of costs by them. This decision shows the true position of the plaintiff vis a vis those whom he represents in the suit.

    10. It seems to us that the principles laid down in the English cases have been kept in mind by the Legislature in enacting Order 1, Rule 8 and Section 11, Civil Procedure Code. The provisions of Order 1, Rule 8, are it is obvious, designed to save time and expense and to ensure a convenient trial of questions in which a large body of persons are interested, while avoiding at the same time a multiplicity. of suits and consequent harassment to parties. Much of the benefit intended by, the rule and the simplicity of procedure secured by it would be lost by construing it to mean that the entire body of persons interested in the litigation are or should be deemed to be actually parties to it. Such a construction is to some extent negal-tived by Sub-rule (2) which says that any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit a suit is instituted or defended under Sub-rule (1) may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit. This provision suggests that he is not a party until the Court allows the application and makes him a party. If we turn to Section 11, explanation 6 and examine its language, this inference is confirmed The explanation says:

    Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating."

    11. When the statute says that these persons shall be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating the meaning is that they are not in fact so claiming, but they should only be regarded as doing so for the purpose of the section. Again it will be seen that the rule of res judicata is to be applied not on the footing that these persons are themselves parties to the suit but only as persons claiming under the party or parties litigating.

    12. An amendment which does not seek to bring in a new party but only varies the ground on which the relief was originally sought or asks for a different or additietoal relief without changing she cause of action; does not bring the case within Section 22 of the Limitation Act. It is equally clear that where a party is already on the record either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, an amendment which merely,. alters the capacity in which. he has been impleaded to one of a different character does not involve an addition of parties so as to attract the provisions of section 22. Some of the cases which bear on this aspect of the question have been referred to in the judgment of Wadsworth, J. in Shankma Menon v. Kuttani (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. But this line of cases does not, in our opinion, directly bear on the question which we have to decide in the present case and we do not therefore consider it necessary to examine them in detail. A better guidance is afforded by two principles recognised by the Court in working Order 1, Rule 8. In Sahib Thambi v. Hamid A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 659, Benson and Sundara Ayyar, JJ., stated:

    The general rule of law, undoubtedly, is, that in suits where one person is allowed to represent

    " others as defendant in a representative capacity any decree passed can bind those others only with respect to the property of those others which he can in law represent and no personal decree can be passed against them, although the parties on record eo nomine may be made personally liable. This is the principle applied in suits against a Hindu family as represented by its managing member and in suits to which Order :, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is applicable."
    See Sadagopachafi v. Krishnamachari ( 1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 356 and Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Arayar Srinivasa Aiyangar (1940) 1 M.L.J. 872 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad.?

    13. The basis of the rule is that persons other than those on the record are not parties to the suit in the full sense of the term. They may be bound by the decision passed it affects the common interests of the entire body of persons represented but they cannot be personally bound, by the decree unless they are actually impleaded as parties to the action. If they are not, a fresh suit must be filed, for obtaining such a decree against them.

    14. The point has been considered from another aspect also. If a member of the class who has not applied to be made a party under Sub-rule (2) dies pending the action, is it necessary that his legal representatives should be brought on the record? A negative answer has been given to this question in Udmi v. Hira (1920) I L.R. 1 Lah. 582 and Malik Mohamed Sher Khan v. Ghulam Mohamed (1930) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 92. The principle was extended to appeals in Mt. Afzalunnissa v. Fayazuddin (1931) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 195. This result can be understood only on.the footing that they are not parties to the suit in fact.

    15. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the amendment of the plaint by which the suit was converted into a representative action under Order I, Rule 8, does not involve the addition of fresh parties. It is true that the capacity of the plaintiff changed, for after the amendment he became a representative of a body of persons consisting of himself and the other creditors; but it is impossible to maintain, in the face of the decision of the Privy Council in Peary Mohan Mookerjee v. Narendra Math Mookerjee (1930) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 92 not to mention other cases, that the amendment introduced fresh parties and having been made after the period of limitation, the suit is barred. We are therefore unable with all respect, to accept the decision of Wadsworth, J., in Shankara Menon v. Kuttani A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 639 as correct.

    16. The result is that the appeal is allowed with costs here and in the Court below. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in terms of prayer (a) in paragraph 14 of the plaint.

    17. The first respondent has preferred a memorandum of objections which was wholly unnecessary as it was open to her without these objections to support the judgment in view of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22. It is therefore dismissed, but without costs.

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    Seth Nandaramdas Atmaram v. Zulika Bibi
    (Feb 23, 1943)