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  • section incompatible with Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 53
  • provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 53 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section incompatible with Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 53
  • provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 53 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the wife of the second respondent. In 1931 an association (the plaintiff below) obtained two money decrees against the second respondent totalling Rs. 894. In 1934, during execution of those decrees, the association caused five houses in Madura to be attached as belonging to the judgment-debtor. The appellant objected to that attachment and successfully obtained its removal by claiming title to those houses under a deed of sale executed in her favour by her husband on 16 September 1932.

Following the removal of the attachment, the association instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Madura seeking a declaration that the deed of sale was executed "nominally and colourably" and was a fraud on creditors, and asking for it to be set aside. In the meantime the second respondent was adjudicated insolvent; the association obtained permission from the Official Receiver to institute the suit. The association did not, however, apply for permission under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure to sue on behalf of all creditors and, despite objection, proceeded with the suit in its own interest.

At trial the Subordinate Judge found that the sale was not merely nominal because the appellant had given consideration to the extent of Rs. 8,000, but held that the transfer was a fraud on creditors because the properties were worth Rs. 18,000. The Subordinate Judge therefore declared the sale-deed invalid and annulled it, vacated the order in favour of the appellant in the execution proceedings, and allowed the appellant to rank as a creditor of her husband to the extent of Rs. 8,000.

The appellant appealed. She challenged the maintainability of the association's suit (arguing it should have been brought on behalf of all creditors) and disputed the Subordinate Judge's finding of fraud on creditors.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a creditor (including a decree-holder whose attachment has been disallowed) instituting a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to impeach a transfer made to defeat or delay creditors must sue in a representative capacity "on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors" (and hence obtain the court's permission under Order 1, Rule 8, CPC).
  2. Whether Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which permits a decree-holder whose attachment has been disallowed to have the question decided by suit) operates independently of, or is inconsistent with, the requirement of Section 53 that such a suit be instituted on behalf of all creditors.
  3. Whether, on the merits, the deed of sale executed in favour of the appellant was a sham or a fraudulent transfer entered into with intent to defeat or delay creditors (i.e., whether the transfer should be set aside as a fraud on creditors).
  4. Whether the association should be permitted to amend its plaint after trial to convert the suit into a representative action.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The suit as framed by the association did not lie because, under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act (as amended by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929), any suit by a creditor to impeach a transfer made with intent to defeat or delay creditors must be instituted on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all creditors.
  • The association therefore should have sought the court's permission under Order 1, Rule 8, CPC and sued in a representative capacity; failure to do so renders the suit untenable.
  • The appellant also contested the finding that the transaction was a fraud on creditors (disputing the merits), but if the procedural objection succeeds the Court need not reach the merits.

Association's Arguments

  • The association relied on Order 21, Rule 63, CPC, which gives a decree-holder whose attachment has been disallowed the right to have the question decided by suit; it argued this rule should be read independently of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and permits the association to sue for its own benefit.
  • The association had obtained leave from the Official Receiver to institute the suit (permission which the association relied upon in support of its ability to proceed).
  • Separately, the association advanced the substantive case that the sale was either a sham or a fraudulent transfer intended to defeat and delay creditors.

Counsel for the Association (application to amend)

  • Mr. Bashyam (for the association) requested leave to amend the plaint to convert the suit into a representative action, pointing out the Official Receiver's leave and that the declaration sought was that the transaction was a fraud on creditors.
  • He argued that if the failure to sue in a representative capacity were an oversight, the court might permit amendment to cure the defect.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Aiyar (1933) 65 M.L.J. 87; L.R. 60 I.A. 278; I.L.R. 56 Mad. 657 (P.C.) Affirmed that where a suit must be brought in a representative capacity it can only be maintained if instituted in compliance with Order 1, Rule 8, CPC. The Court relied on this Privy Council authority to support the conclusion that Section 53's requirement that a suit be "on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors" imports the Order 1, Rule 8 requirement.
Pokker v. Kunhamad (1918) 36 M.L.J. 231; I.L.R. 42 Mad. 143 Held by this Court (pre-amendment) that a decree-holder whose attachment was disallowed was not necessarily required to sue in a representative capacity. Cited as part of the historical conflict of opinion prior to the 1929 amendment; the Court observed that the amendment appears to resolve that conflict against this view.
Ramaswami Chettiar v. Mallappa Reddiar (1920) 39 M.L.J. 350; I.L.R. 43 Mad. 760 (Full Bench) Full Bench decision of this Court holding that representative suability was not necessary (pre-amendment context). Noted as part of pre-amendment authorities; the Court treated the 1929 amendment as intended to put the controversy to rest in favour of representative requirement.
Hakim Lal v. Mooshahar Sahu (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 999 Calcutta High Court authority holding that plaintiff must sue in a representative capacity in such suits. Used to illustrate the conflicting judicial views that the 1929 amendment addressed; the Court regarded this line as consistent with its conclusion.
Burjorji Dorabji Patel v. Dhunbai (1891) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 1 Bombay High Court authority indicating a suit of this nature should be brought in a representative capacity. Referred to as part of the view supporting compulsory representative suits prior to amendment; contributes to the historical context.
Ishvar Timappa v. Devar Venkappa (1902) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 146 Another Bombay decision indicating representative capacity should be employed. Also cited in the survey of pre-amendment case law that the legislature intended to resolve.
Ekkari Ghose v. Sidheswar Ghose (1935) 62 C.L.J. 548 Calcutta High Court decision adopting the view that a creditor's suit under Section 53 must be instituted on behalf of all creditors. The Court cited this as authority in support of the conclusion that Section 53 requires representative suability.
A.K.A.C.T.V. Chettiar v. R.M.A.R.S. Firm (1934) I.L.R. 12 Rang. 666; Maung Tun Thein v. Maung Sin (1934) I.L.R. 12 Rang.; Asgar Ali v. C.V.R.M. Firm (1935) I.L.R. 14 Rang. 81 Rangoon High Court decisions taking the view that the suit must be representative under the relevant provision. Cited as additional authority from Rangoon consistent with the Court's interpretation that Section 53 requires representative suits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Scope of Section 53: The Court first concluded that the association's suit plainly fell within Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act because it was not merely a declaration that the transaction was bogus but sought to have the transaction set aside on the ground that it was a fraud on the creditors.
  2. Interaction with Order 1, Rule 8: The Court observed that the phrase "on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors" in the amended Section 53 is taken from Order 1, Rule 8, CPC, and that when a suit must be brought in a representative capacity it can only be maintained if instituted in compliance with that rule. The Privy Council decision in Kumaravelu Chettiar was cited to support this principle.
  3. Pre-amendment conflict and legislative intent: The Court reviewed conflicting authorities prior to the 1929 amendment—some decisions of this Court (including a Full Bench) had taken the view that a decree-holder was not required to sue in a representative capacity, while Calcutta and Bombay precedents had required representative suits. The Court considered the 1929 amendment to Section 53 (with the explicit inclusion of decree-holders within the term "creditor") as intended to resolve that conflict in favour of requiring representative suits.
  4. Order 21, Rule 63 considered: The association's contention that Order 21, Rule 63 independently entitled a decree-holder to sue for his own benefit was rejected. The Court held that nothing in Section 53 is incompatible with Order 21, Rule 63, but since the suit is of the nature contemplated by Section 53 the statutory requirement to sue on behalf of all creditors must be applied.
  5. Policy and practical considerations: The Court reasoned that the requirement to sue in representative capacity does not deprive a disappointed decree-holder of the right to sue; it merely requires the suitor to proceed for the benefit of all creditors. The Court explained that the requirement avoids unnecessary suits and prevents harassment of the judgment-debtor by multiple creditors. If the judgment-debtor is insolvent, the decree-holder's remedy shifts to the Insolvency Court.
  6. Amendment application refused: On the request to allow amendment to convert the suit into a representative action, the Court refused. The Court relied on the fact that the appellant had pleaded the procedural objection in her written statement and an issue on that question had been framed and contested at trial. Having gone to trial on that issue, it was too late (and inconsistent with principle and authority) to permit amendment. The Court stated that the association should have applied earlier for permission to sue on behalf of all creditors.
  7. Conclusion on maintainability: Because the association had not sued in a representative capacity and had not obtained the required permission under Order 1, Rule 8, the suit could not be maintained and therefore must fail.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court held that the association's suit was required by Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act (as amended) to be instituted on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors and therefore had to be brought in a representative capacity with the court's permission under Order 1, Rule 8, CPC. The association had not complied with that requirement, and accordingly the suit could not be maintained. The Court refused the association's late application to amend the plaint to cure this defect. The appeal was allowed with costs in this Court and below.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Court's conclusion that the association's suit must fail means that the association is "out of Court" in respect of the claim it prosecuted in its own name without permission to act for all creditors. The association's request to amend to a representative suit was denied because the procedural objection had been taken and contested at trial.
  • No broader doctrine announced beyond application of the statutory text and existing authorities: The Court applied Section 53 (as amended) and Order 1, Rule 8 together and relied on established authorities; the opinion resolves the maintainability question by reference to legislative amendment and precedent rather than by announcing a new legal principle. (The opinion refers to existing case law and treats the amendment as intended to settle earlier conflicts.)

Judgment delivered by Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J.; another judge concurred ("I agree").

    Madina Bibi Sahiba v. Ismail Durga Association

    1. The appellant is the wife of the second respondent. In 1931 the respondent association obtained two money decrees against the second respondent for an aggregate sum of Rs. 894. In 1934, in execution of these decrees the association attached five houses in Madura as property belonging to the judgment-debtor. The appellant objected to the attachment and her objection was successful. The appellant claimed title to the houses and other properties under a deed of sale executed in her favour by her husband on the 16th of September, 1932. As the result of the removal of the attachment the association filed in the Court of the Subordinate judge of Madura the suit out of which this appeal arises for a declaration that the deed of sale was executed in fraud of creditors "nominally and colourably". In the meantime the second respondent had been adjudicated an insolvent and permission of the Official Receiver was sought, and granted, for the institution of the suit. The association, however, did not apply for an order under the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure permitting it to sue on behalf of all the creditors and in spite of objection proceeded with the suit for its own benefit and not for the benefit of the creditors generally. The association based its claim for the relief on two grounds. In the first place it said that the transaction was a sham and in the second place that the transfer was a fraudulent transaction, entered into with a view to defeat and delay the creditors. The alleged consideration for the sale-deed was a sum of Rs. 10,000. The Subordinate Judge held that the transaction was not a nominal one as the appellant had given consideration to the extent of Rs. 8,000, but he considered that the transaction constituted a fraud on the creditors as the properties were worth Rs. 18,000. In accordance with this finding he granted the association a declaration that the sale-deed was invalid, being a fraud on the creditors, and directed that it be annulled. He also vacated the order passed in favour of the appellant in the execution proceedings, but allowed her to rank as a creditor of her husband to the extent of the Rs. 8,000 which she had paid.

    2. The appellant has persisted in her contention that the suit as framed did not lie and she disputes the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the transaction was a fraud on the creditors. If her first contention is sound, it will not be, necessary for the Court to consider the merits of the case. The appellant says that it was incumbent upon the association to sue on behalf of itself and all the other creditors of the second respondent and relies on the provisions of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section says that every transfer of immovable property, made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor, shall be voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed. By the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929, the following provision was-added to the section:

    A suit instituted by a creditor (which term includes a decree-holder whether he has or has not applied for execution of his decree) to and a transfer on the ground that it has been made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor, shall be instituted on behalf of or for the benefit of, all the creditors.

    3. The appellant says that as this provision has not been complied with the suit must fail. On the other hand the association says that Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives to a decree-holder whose attachment has been disallowed the right to have the question decided by suit and the rule must be read entirely independent of the provisions of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    4. The suit clearly falls within the purview of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not a suit merely for a declaration that the transaction Js a bogus one but a suit in which the association also seeks to have the transaction set aside on the footing that it is a fraud on the creditors. The association, accepts this, and does not challenge the finding of the Subordinate Judge that consideration passed from the wife to the husband to the extent of Rs. 8,000. As the suit admittedly falls within Section 53, it can only be maintained if the association has obtained the permission of the Court under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure to sue on behalf of all the creditors. The words "on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors" in Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act are taken from Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of them may, with the permission of the Court, sue pr be sued, or defend on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons interested. If a suit has to be brought in a representative capacity, it can only be maintained when it has been instituted in compliance with the provisions of this rule. This was laid down by the Privy Council in Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Aiyar (1933) 65 M.L.J. 87 : L.R. 60 I.A. 278 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 657 (P.C.).

    5. Before Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act was amended, there was a conflict in India on the question whether a decree-holder, who was compelled to file a suit as the result of a successful objection to the attachment, was compelled to sue on behalf of himself and all the other creditors. This Court was of opinion that it was not necessary for him to sue in a representative capacity. See Pokker v. Kunhamad (1918) 36 M.L.J. 231 : I.L.R. 42 Mad. 143 and Ramaswami Chettiar v. Mallappa Reddiar (1920) 39 M.L.J. 350 : I.L.R. 43 Mad. 760 (F.B.). The decision in the latter case was that of a Full Bench. The Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts were of the opinion that it was necessary for the plaintiff to sue in a representative capacity. See Hakim Lal v. Mooshahar Sahu (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 999. The decisions of this Court and that of the Calcutta High Court arose out of suits which followed unsuccessful proceedings in execution. The Bombay cases are Burjorji Dorabji Patel v. Dhunbai (1891) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 1 and Ishvar Timappa v. Devar Venkappa (1902) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 146. These cases did not arise directly out of execution proceedings, but the Court indicated that a suit of the nature of the present one should be brought in a representative capacity. It seems to me that the amendment of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act by the insertion of the provision that a suit instituted by a creditor shall be instituted on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors must have been intended to put an end to this controversy. The words in brackets "which term includes a decree-holder whether he has or has not applied for execution of his decree" which follow the word "creditor" in the section, in my opinion, makes this clear. If this is the case the association is clearly out of Court.

    6. But even if the question had to be decided on the reading of Section 53, without taking into consideration what has gone before, it would still be difficult to accept the association's argument. As the suit admittedly is one of the nature contemplated by Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act surely the provisions of that section must be applied, especially as there is nothing in the section incompatible with Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 53 does not take away from the disappointed decree-holder the right to sue. His right to sue is left unaffected. All the section says is that he must sue on behalf of all the creditors, not for himself alone, and this implies no hardship. If the suit is successful and the judgment-debtor has not become insolvent, he has still the right to attach the property. If the judgment-debtor has become insolvent, then the right to attach is gone entirely and the decree holder can only look to the Insolvency Court for payment. The requirement of Section 53 saves the filing of unnecessary suits and saves the judgment-debtor from being harassed by other creditors. I hold that it was necessary for the association to sue in a representative capacity and that, not having done so, the suifrnust fail. The same view of the law has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Ekkari Ghose v. Sidheswar Ghose (1935) 62 C.L.J. 548 and by the Rangoon High Court in A.K.A.C.T.V. Chettiar v. R.M.A.R.S. Firm (1934) I.L.R. 12 Rang. 666, Maung Tun Thein v. Maung Sin (1934) I.L.R. 12 Rang. and Asgar Ali v. C.V.R.M. Firm (1935) I.L.R. 14 Rang. 81.

    7. Mr. Bashyam has asked that the association be allowed to amend the plaint and turn the suit into a representative one. In support of this application Mr. Bashyam has pointed to the fact that before the suit was instituted the association had obtained leave from the Official Receiver and the leave was conditional on the association depositing in Court to the credit of the insolvent's estate any amount realised by him as the result of the suit. Mr. Bashyam has also pointed out that the declaration asked for was a declaration that the disputed transaction was a fraud on the creditors. If the failure to sue in a representative capacity was the result of oversight, the Court might have been disposed in these circumstances to allow the amendment, but that is not the case. The appellant in her written statement raised this very question and an issue was framed on it. The association preferred to contest the validity of the appellant's averment and succeeded in the argument before the Subordinate Judge. Having gone to trial on this issue, it is now far too late in the day for the association to ask for leave to amend. It would be opposed to principle and accepted authority to allow the amendment. The course which the association should have adopted when the question was raised was to apply to the Court for permission to sue on behalf of all the creditors. This the association did not do and it has only itself to blame for the failure of the suit.

    8. The appeal will be allowed with costs in this Court and below.

    Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J.

    9. I agree.

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    Madina Bibi Sahiba v. Ismail Durga Association
    (Feb 29, 1940)