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citation codes
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  • Limitation Act, XV of 1877, Sch. 2, Art. 179 (corresponding to Art. 182 of the present Limitation Act).
  • Art. 182 (5) of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act.
  • Art. 179(4) of Sch. II of the Limitation Act of 1877.
  • Art. 182, Schedule I of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 179 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 179, Sch. II of the Limitation Act.
  • Art. 182 (5) of the Limitation Act,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Limitation Act, XV of 1877, Sch. 2, Art. 179 (corresponding to Art. 182 of the present Limitation Act).
  • Art. 182 (5) of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act.
  • Art. 179(4) of Sch. II of the Limitation Act of 1877.
  • Art. 182, Schedule I of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 179 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 179, Sch. II of the Limitation Act.
  • Art. 182 (5) of the Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from an order of the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Calicut reversing the District Munsif and holding that the decree-holder appellant's application to transfer the decree in O. S. No. 226 of 1916 from the Alatur District Munsif's Court to the District Munsif's Court of Vayitri for execution was barred by limitation.

Relevant dates and procedural steps in the opinion:

  • Decree in O. S. No. 226 of 1916 (underlying decree).
  • Execution petition E. P. No. 458 of 1919 presented on 4 July 1919.
  • Judgment-debtor filed an application to record satisfaction of the decree on 1 August 1919.
  • The appellant (decree-holder) filed a statement on 18 August 1919 praying that the judgment-debtor's petition to record satisfaction should be dismissed.
  • The present application for transfer was made on 26 July 1922.

The appellant contended that time for limitation should be computed from 18 August 1919—the date of the appellant's written statement—on the ground that that statement was an "application to take some step-in-aid of execution" under Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act. The Subordinate Judge rejected that contention, relying on the decision in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar, and dismissed the petition. The present appeal challenges that ruling.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree-holder's written statement filed on 18 August 1919, objecting to the judgment-debtor's application to record satisfaction of the decree, constitutes "an application to take some step-in-aid of execution" within the meaning of Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act such that time should be computed from that date.
  2. Relatedly, whether the existence of a pending execution petition affects the characterization of such a written statement as a step-in-aid of execution (i.e., whether the presence of a pending execution petition makes it more likely that an objection-statement will qualify as an application to take a step-in-aid of execution).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant urged that the written statement of objections filed on 18 August 1919 should be treated as "a step-in-aid of execution" under Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act, so that limitation for the present application should be calculated from that date rather than from the earlier execution petition date.
  • The appellant's counsel sought to distinguish the decision in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar on the ground that that case had no pending execution application; he argued that if a pending execution petition had existed in that case the learned judges would have come to a different conclusion.
  • The appellant also relied on various other decisions (from different High Courts) that, according to his counsel, supported the proposition that a decree-holder's statement or application in circumstances like the present could be a step-in-aid of execution.

Court/Subordinate Judge's Position (as represented in the appeal)

  • The Subordinate Judge relied on Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar, which held that a statement filed by a decree-holder objecting to a judgment-debtor's application to enter satisfaction of the decree is not a step-in-aid of execution, and therefore treated the present application as barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar Held that a statement filed by a decree-holder objecting to the judgment-debtor's application to enter satisfaction of the decree is not a "step-in-aid of execution". The decision explains that such a statement, even if successful, does not advance execution. The Court accepted and followed this decision as correctly interpreting Art. 182(5) and applied it to hold the appellant's statement was not a step-in-aid of execution; it governed the present case.
Rangachariar v. P.R. Subramania Chetty Emphasizes that the starting point for limitation is the date of "applying in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution", not the date of taking a step; two essentials: (1) there must be an application and (2) that application must ask the Court to take a step-in-aid of execution. Used to underline the distinction between an application to the Court and a party's mere act; supports the Court's conclusion that the decree-holder's statement is not an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.
Raghunundun Misser v. Kallydut Misser Holds that an application must seek the action of the Court in execution of the decree; a step taken by the judgment-debtor himself is not sufficient. Relied on to reinforce that only applications seeking Court action qualify as steps-in-aid; applied in distinguishing party acts from applications invoking Court's execution powers.
Balaguruswami Naicken v. Guruswami Naicken Held that an application by a decree-holder in those facts was not a step-in-aid of execution; decision based partly on absence of a pending execution application. Cited as supporting the Court's view that the appellant's objection statement could not be treated as a step-in-aid; the Court noted this decision supports its conclusion.
Kewal Ram v. Khadim Husain Stated that an application by a decree-holder praying that the judgment-debtor's objections to sale be disallowed and the sale confirmed is an application from which limitation for a subsequent execution application may be computed. Noted by the Court but described as containing little discussion; recognized as opposed to Kuppuswami Chettiar and not followed.
Shugan Chand v. Ramjas (Allahabad) Followed the view in Kewal Ram that such an application is within the meaning of the article. Cited as an instance where other courts followed the opposite view; not followed by the present Court.
Tamiz-un-nissa Bibi v. Najju Khan Held that an application to the Court executing a decree asking that certain objections be rejected is a step-in-aid of execution. Noted by the Court; the Court observed the judgment contains little discussion and treated it as not persuasive enough to override Kuppuswami Chettiar.
Langtu Pande v. Baijnath Saran Pande Held that mere filing of an answer by the decree-holder resisting a declaration of insolvency is not an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. Cited as a contrary decision from the same jurisdiction; noted divergence among authorities.
Umesh Chunder Dutta v. Soonder Narain Deoit Held that the appearance of a decree-holder by his pleader to oppose an application to set aside a sale is not an "application" within the article; the contemplated application must seek some order of the Court in furtherance of execution. Relied on by the Court as supporting the narrower interpretation that mere appearances or procedural acts are not applications to take steps-in-aid of execution.
Raghunundun Pershad v. Bhugoo Lalland Treated similarly to Raghunundun Misser — taking procedural steps by a party is not the same as applying to the Court for a step-in-aid of execution. Followed in reasoning and cited in support of the Court's view.
Treylokya Nath Bose v. Jyoti Prokash Nandi Cited among cases addressing the scope of steps-in-aid of execution (no detailed rule quoted in the opinion). Referenced as part of the body of authorities considered; used to show consistent positions in some courts.
Gobind Pershad v. Rung Lal Held that an application by a decree-holder praying that a petition to set aside a sale be rejected and the sale confirmed is an application within the article, but facts (a prior review order) made it in furtherance of execution. The Court distinguished this case on its facts (presence of a review order) and treated it as not controlling the present case.
Kedar Nath Dey v. Lakhi Kanta Dey Where execution could not proceed without determining a factual matter (standard of measurement), an application to summon witnesses was a step-in-aid of execution. Distinguished by the Court because in that case the application was necessary for execution to proceed; thus it does not support the appellant here.
Brojendra Kiskhro Roy v. Dil Muhmud Sarkar Filing of list of witnesses and intimating readiness to proceed was taken as an application to have the Court take evidence and repel objections, i.e., a step-in-aid of execution. Noted as partially supportive of the appellant, but the Court observed Calcutta High Court generally took an opposing consistent view in other decisions.
Laxmiram Lallubhai v. Balashankar Veniram (Bombay) Held that an appeal against an order adjudging the judgment-debtor an insolvent was a step-in-aid of execution. Cited by the appellant from Bombay decisions; the Court expressly dissented from that view and did not follow it.
Sheshadsacharya v. Bhimacharyaan Held that an application for extension of time to produce a document for execution purposes was a step-in-aid of execution (Bombay). The Court noted this decision and stated it could not accept the conclusion or reasoning behind it.
Hunhi v. Seshagiridoes (as cited) Held that an application for a certificate to obtain a copy of the Revenue Register (necessary preliminary to execution) was a step-in-aid of execution because production of the register was necessary to enable execution. Recognized as supporting the proposition that an application which is a necessary preliminary to execution can be a step-in-aid; Court used it to illustrate when an application will qualify.
Abdul Kader Rowther v. Krishnan Malaval Nair Held that an application by a decree-holder for an adjournment to enable him to adduce further evidence was a step-in-aid of execution. Cited by appellant and noted by the Court; Ayling, J. (in another case) was unable to concur with that view, so the Court treated it with caution.
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Sethuswami Ayyar Contains judicial commentary in which Ayling, J. dissented from the view that an adjournment application to adduce evidence is a step-in-aid. Used to show judicial disagreement on some points and to caution against treating certain authorities as decisive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds by focusing on the statutory language of Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act and the proper meaning of the phrase "applying to take some step-in-aid of execution." The Court highlights a key distinction: limitation runs from the date of applying to the Court to take a step-in-aid of execution, not from the date a party merely takes some step for the advancement of execution.

Principal points in the Court's reasoning:

  • The Court accepted the interpretation in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar that a decree-holder's mere filing of a statement objecting to the judgment-debtor's petition to record satisfaction does not constitute an application requesting the Court to take a step-in-aid of execution.
  • The Court relied on authorities (including Rangachariar v. P.R. Subramania Chetty and Raghunundun Misser v. Kallydut Misser) which emphatically distinguish between a party's own acts and an application that asks the Court to take action in furtherance of execution; only the latter qualifies under the Article.
  • The Court considered and reviewed numerous decisions from various High Courts that supported both sides of the question. It examined factual contexts in those authorities to determine whether they involved applications that sought court action necessary to the execution process (in which case they qualified) or mere procedural or adversarial acts by parties/pleaders (in which case they did not).
  • Where prior decisions turned on facts showing that the application sought was necessary to enable execution to proceed (for example, obtaining a necessary document, summoning witnesses because execution could not proceed otherwise), those were treated as true steps-in-aid of execution. By contrast, where a decree-holder merely filed objections, appeared by pleader, or filed statements that did not ask the Court to take a specific execution-advancing order, those were not steps-in-aid.
  • Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court concluded that the appellant's written statement filed on 18 August 1919 did not ask the Court to take any step-in-aid of execution; even if successful, it would not have advanced execution beyond the position prior to its filing. Hence it cannot operate as the date from which time for the later application should be computed under Art. 182(5).
  • Given the weight of authority and the Court's view that Kuppuswami Chettiar correctly interprets the Article, that decision governs the present case and requires dismissal of the appellant's contention.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Court held that the filing of the statement by the decree-holder on 18 August 1919 objecting to the judgment-debtor's application to record satisfaction of the decree is not a "step-in-aid of execution" within the meaning of Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act. Therefore the appellant's later application (made 26 July 1922) is barred by limitation.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's transfer/application is time-barred and the appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellant cannot rely on the 18 August 1919 statement to extend or restart the period of limitation under Art. 182(5).
  • Broader legal implication: The Court reaffirmed and applied existing precedent (notably Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar and related authorities) interpreting Art. 182(5) narrowly to require an application that asks the Court to take a concrete step-in-aid of execution before time will run from that application. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond affirming the prior interpretation; it treats the existing decision as governing the present case.
W. S. S. Appeal dismissed.

    M. Krishna Pattar (Petitioner). v. K. Seetharama Pattar (Counter-Petitioner).

    This is an appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Calicut who, reversing the order of the District Munsif, held that the decree-holder appellant's application to transfer the decree in O. S. No. 226 of 1916 from the Alatur District Munsif's Court to the District Munsif's Court of Vayitri for execution was barred by limitation. A prior petition for execution, E. P. No. 458 of 1919 had been presented on the 4th of July, 1919. In the course of that petition an application was put in by the judgment-debtor to record satisfaction of the decree on the 1st August, 1919. A statement was then filed by the appellant on the 18th August, 1919, praying that the judgment-debtor's petition to record satisfaction of the decree should be dismissed. The pre-sent application for transfer was made on the 26th July, 1922. If time is calculated from the date of E. P. No. 458 of 1919, it is admitted that the present application is barred by time; but it was contended before the Subordinate Judge that the written statement of objections filed on the 18th August, 1919, should be taken as “a step-in-aid of execution” under Art. 182 (5) of the Limitation Act, and that if time is calculated from that date the present application is not barred. In Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar, it was held that a statement filed by a decree-holder objecting to the judgment-debtor's application to enter up satisfaction of the decree is not a step-in-aid of execution. Relying on that decision, the learned Subordinate Judge overruled the appellant's contention and dismissed his petition.

    The same contention has again been pressed before us; and the learned vakil for the appellant has tried to distinguish the case in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar on the ground that there was no pending execution application in that case, arguing from this fact that if there was a pending application in that case the learned judges would have arrived at a different conclusion. He has also argued on the authority of various decisions that a statement of objections filed by the decree-holder in circumstances like the present should be held to be a step-in-aid of execution under Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act.

    The facts of the case in Kuppuswami Ghettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar were as follows.—The decree was dated the 2nd May, 1916, and the only prior execution petition presented by the appellant decree-holder was dismissed on the 7th September, 1916. Admittedly the execution petition out of which the appeal arose wan presented out of time, but it was said as in the present case that prior to the application for execution the judgment-debtor had put in a petition for entering up satisfaction of the decree and that in connection therewith the decree-holder had filed a counter-statement denying the receipt of money and praying that the petition should be dismissed. It was contended that the application to reject the petition to record satisfaction of the decree was a step-in-aid of execution, but this contention was overruled. In the course of his judgment, Ayling, J., (who delivered the leading judgment) stated thus:—

    “The Act. 182 (5) classes together an application for execution and an application to take some step-in aid of execution: and the latter words appear to be intended to cover an application, which is not an initial application for execution, but is an application to take some step to advance an execution proceeding, which is already pending, namely application to bring to sale properties already under attachment, (p. 469), But whatever case may be made out for an application made in connection with a pending execution petition as one for taking a step in aid or furtherance of it an application made at a time when no execution petition is pending stands on an obviously different footing (p. 471”)

    It is argued that two conclusions follow from these extracts (1) that an application to be a step-in-aid of execution should be one made in a pending execution application and (2) that if there was a pending execution application in that case as in the one before us, then the learned Judges should have certainly held that the statement of objections filed by the decree-holder to the recording of satisfaction would be a step-in-aid of execution. As regards the first conclusion sought to be deduced from the judgment no doubt the decision in Balaguruswami Naicken v. Guruswami Naicken supports the appellant's contention; but it is not necessary to discuss the correctness of that conclusion in this case as admittedly here there is a pending execution application. If we really had to decide the question we should hesitate to accept this decision without further consideration of the matter in the light of all the decided cases of our Court which have not been referred to in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar(2). It seems to us that the remarks referred to were made by the learned judge only to distinguish those cases, wherein questions of a similar nature arose in connection with pending execution applications. As regards the second conclusion sought to be deduced from that judgment, we have no doubt that the appellant's contention cannot be accepted because the learned Judge's decision is based upon an interpretation of the decree-holder's objection petition in view of what he considers should be the meaning of the expression “applying to take some step-in-aid of execution” for the learned judge states at p. 470:

    “The petition Ex. E may tend to prevent the Court placing an obstacle in the way of future execution of the decree; but it does not ask the Court to take any step-in-aid of execution. Supposing it to be successful, execution of the decree is no further advanced than it was before the petition was presented.”

    This shows that even if there was a pending execution application, the learned judge would have come precisely to the same conclusion because in his view, the decree-holder did not by filing his objection statement ask the Court to take any step-in-aid of execution. We respectfully accept this view.

    According to the 3rd column of Art. 182 (5) of the Limitation Act, time for execution is to be calculated from “the date of applying in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree or order.” The latter part of this clause specifies the date of applying to the Court asking it to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree or order as the date from which the period of limitation should be computed and not the date of the petitioner's taking some step-in-aid of execution. If this distinction is well kept in mind, much of the diversity of the views among the various High Courts as regards the meaning of the expression “applying to take some step-in-aid of execution” can easily be explained. As pointed out by Oldfield J., in Rangachariar v. P.R. Subramania Chetty

    “It is material that the starting point under Art. 182, Schedule I of the Limitation Act is not the taking of a step-in-aid of execution, but the application to take such a step.”

    In the same judgment Seshagiri Aiyar, J., refers to the same matter thus:

    “Two things are essential. There must be an application and that application must ask the Court to take a step-in-aid of execution…………the bare fact that a party took some steps would not be enough.”

    The distinction we are referring to is nowhere better pointed out than in Raghunundun Misser v. Kallydut Misser. In that case the learned judges were considering whether an application by a decree-holder for leave to bid at a sale in execution of the decree is a step in aid of execution within the meaning of the Limitation Act, XV of 1877, Sch. 2, Art. 179 (corresponding to Art. 182 of the present Limitation Act). In coming to the conclusion that it is not such a step the learned judges state:

    “We do not think an application of this kind is an application seeking the action of the Court in execution of the decree. It may be in one sense a step-in-aid of execution of the decree, but it is not a step by the Court. Before a judgment-creditor can get any benefit he must show that he asks the Court to take some step-in-aid of execution. A step taken by the judgment-debtor himself is noth………sufficient.”

    This case has been followed in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar If this distinction is borne in mind, it is obvious that a statement of objections filed by the decree-holder objecting to the recording of satisfaction cannot in any way be considered to be a step-in-aid of execution. By filing the statement the decree-holder does not ask the Court to take any step-in-aid of execution. In the words of Ayling, J., in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar

    “Supposing it to be successful, execution of the decree is no further advanced than it was before the petition was presented.”

    We will now discuss the cases referred to by the learned vakils on both sides.

    In Kewal Ram v. Khadim Husain(3) it was held that:

    “an application by a decree-holder praying that the objections taken by the judgment-debtor to the sale of the property belonging to him in execution of the decree should be disallowed and the sale be confirmed, is an application from the date of which the period of limitation for a subsequent application for execution of the decree may be computed.”

    This judgment simply records this opinion and does not contain any discussion of the question. It is conceded that the decision in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar opposed to this view. This decision was followed by the Allahabad High Court in Shugan Chand v. Ramjas(4)

    In Tamiz-un-nissa Bibi v. Najju Khan the latest decision of the Allahabad High Court brought to our notice, it was held that an application to the Court executing a decree asking that certain objections to the execution of the decree be rejected is a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Art. 182 (5) of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. Here also the judgment does not contain any discussion of the question. In Langtu Pande v. Baijnath Saran Pande it was held that the mere filing of an answer by the decree-holder resisting an application of a declaration of insolvency filed by the judgment-debtor cannot be deemed to be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Art. 179. This view is opposed to the earlier and the later decisions of the same Court.

    In Umesh Chunder Dutta v. Soonder Narain Deoit was held that the appearance of a decree-holder by his pleader to oppose an application made by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale in execution of the decree is not an application within the meaning of Art. 179 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act to take a step-in-aid of execution. The learned judges stated that:

    “the application contemplated by that article of the Limitation Act is an application to get some order of the Court in furtherance of the execution of the decree. The appearance of the pleader cannot be regarded as such an application.”

    The decisions in Raghunundun Pershad v. Bhugoo Lalland Raghunundun Misser v. Kallydut Misser(5)also take a similar view of Art. 179, Sch. II of the Limitation Act. These cases have been followed in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar(6) as regards the interpretation of the article in question. See also Treylokya Nath Bose v. Jyoti Prokash Nandi(7). On the facts, the decision in Gobind Pershad v. Rung Lal(8) can be distinguished. In that case it was held that an application by a decree-holder, praying that a petition of the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale of property belong-ing to him should be rejected and the sale be confirmed is an application falling within the meaning of Art. 179(4) of Sch. II of the Limitation Act of 1877. The facts of the case show that after the sale was confirmed the judgment-debtor applied for a review of the order confirming the sale and the review was granted in spite of the objections of the decree-holder who appeared and opposed it. Subsequently the decree-holder put in an application praying that the judgment-debtor's application to set aside the sale might be rejected at the same time applying for confirmation of the sale. In view of the “review order” that was passed against the decree-holder, we are inclined to think that the decree-holder's application was in furtherance of execution proceedings. The decision in Kedar Nath Dey v. Lakhi Kanta Dey is also distinguishable. In that case the judgment-debtor raised objections to the delivery of possession by the Commissioner and the Court found it necessary to determine the standard of measurement and for that purpose to take evidence in the matter. An application was then made by the decree-holder for summoning witnesses. It was held that this was a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Art. 182 (6). It is clear from the facts that in the opinion of the Court execution could not proceed without determining the standard of measurement. In this view the application to file a list of witnesses may be deemed to be a step-in-aid of execution. The learned judges in arriving at this conclusion follow the prior decisions of their Court already referred to. In Brojendra Kiskhro Roy v. Dil Muhmud Sarkar when the decree-holder applied for execution of his decree the judgment-debtor put in an objection to its execution. Both parties having been directed by the Court to adduce, evidence in support of their respective cases, the decree-holder filed a list of witnesses and intimated to the Court that he was ready to proceed with his case. The Court held that the filing of the list of witnesses and intimating to the Court that he was ready to proceed with the case implied an application on the part of the decree-holder to the Court to take the evidence which he was prepared to adduce and repel the objection taken by the judgment-debtor, and in effect this should be taken to be an application to the Court to take some step-in-aid of execution. This decision to some extent supports the appellant. Excepting this decision the Calcutta High Court has taken a view consistently opposed to the contentions of the appellant.

    The Bombay cases relied upon by the appellant need not be discussed in detail. The latest decision of that Court is reported in Laxmiram Lallubhai v. Balashankar Veniram in which it was held that an appeal against an order adjudging the judgment-debtor an insolvent was a step-in-aid of execution. This has been expressly dissented from in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar. In Sheshadsacharya v. Bhimacharyaan application filed by the decree-holder for extension of time to produce an extract from the collector's record ordered by the Court to be filed within a particular date but which was not so filed was held to be a step-in-aid of execution. With all deference to the learned judges we cannot accept this conclusion or the reasoning on which it is based.

    Thus far, we have discussed the decisions of the other Courts brought to our notice. Our own High Court has always held the position that an application to be a step-in-aid of execution must be one in furtherance of execution proceedings. We have already indicated the interpretation put upon the article by the learned judges in Rangachariar v. P.R. Subramania Chetty. Having reference to the facts of the case the decision in Hunhi v. Seshagiridoes not really help the appellant. In that case it was held that an application by a judgment-debtor to the Court which passed a decree for a certificate that a copy of the Revenue Register of the land is necessary to enable him to obtain such a copy from the collector's office and thereupon to execute the decree by attaching the land, is a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Art. 179 (4). Innes, J., pointed out that.

    “The production of the copy of the register was a necessary preliminary to execution and the application made by the decree-holder to the Subordinate Judge's Court would enable him to obtain it.”

    In this view the application was one in furtherence of execution proceedings and was a step-in-aid of execution. The decision of Abdul Kader Rowther v. Krishnan Malaval Nair no doubt supports the appellant. There it was held that an application by a decree-holder for an adjournment to enable him to adduce further evidence was a step-in-aid of execution. We may point out that Ayling, J., in Masilamani Mudaliar v. Sethuswami Ayyar found it impossible to concur with this view. The latest decision of our own Court is the one in Balaguruswami Naicken v. Guruswami Naichen already referred to in another connection. The facts of the case are as follows:—

    A mortgage decree in favour of the plaintiffs was passed on the 14th September, 1916 and an execution application was filed on the 25th of September, 1917. It was dismissed on the 17th of October, 1917. The application that gave rise to the appeal was dated the 9th of March 1920. A certain sum of money in Court was paid to the decree-holder by order dated the 31st March, 1920, and a cheque was actually issued on the 1st of April, 1920. The money in Court had been paid by a mortgagee of the judgment debtor who had been directed to pay off the decree amount. The decree-holder relied to save his application from the bar of limitation on the date of the order for payment out to him of the money in Court. The learned judges held that the application by the decree-holder is not a step-in-aid of execution. They base their decision on two grounds, (1) that in the circumstances of the case an application for an order for payment out by the Court is not a step-in-aid of execution and (2) that as there was no pending execution application the order relied upon could not be considered to be a step-in-aid of execution. As regards the latter ground, we have already expressed our opinion. It is not necessary to discuss the first ground either as the decision, if correct, certainly supports the view that the application we have got to deal with in the present case is not a step-in-aid of execution. If we hold that the application in that case amounts to a step-in-aid of execution, our opinion cannot help the appellant because as we have already pointed oat his objection application cannot in any sense be deemed to be one in furtherance of execution proceedings.

    The cases examined above show that there has been much diversity of opinion as regards the interpretation of the expression ‘applying to take some step in aid of execution’. In our opinion the decision in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar (see page 470) interprets that expression correctly and the weight of authority is in support of that interpretation. That decision must govern the present case. In this view the filing of statement by the decree-holder in this case objecting to the judgment-debtor's application to record satisfaction of the decree is not a step-in-aid of execution and cannot, therefore, save his last application from being barred by limitation. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.

    W. S. S.Appeal dismissed.

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    M. Krishna Pattar (Petitioner). v. K. Seetharama Pattar (Counter-Petitioner).
    (Mar 11, 1926)