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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Section 28 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, Act V of 1920,
  • Madras Act I of 1922 into Madras Act V of 1920,
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 13 of the English Ballot Act of 1872
  • Section 115 (c)
  • Rule 4,1
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Section 28 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, Act V of 1920,
  • Madras Act I of 1922 into Madras Act V of 1920,
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 13 of the English Ballot Act of 1872
  • Section 115 (c)
  • Rule 4,1
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a petition challenging the setting aside of an election for the Chairman. Three principal points were argued to the Court: (1) whether the statutory election rules (Rule 4) were broken, (2) whether, having found a breach, the lower Court was required to find that the breach had materially affected the result before setting aside the election, and (3) whether this Court could, and should, interfere on revision and in what manner. The lower Court had set aside the election. The petitioner contended the lower Court erred in law in its interpretation of the rules; the counter-petitioner relied on the lower Court's finding and other authorities. The High Court considered whether the lower Court's actions constituted a material irregularity under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and whether the order should be set aside and the matter reheard.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statutory rules for the election of the Chairman (specifically Rule 4) were broken by the petitioner presiding at the election at which he was a candidate.
  2. Whether, having found that the rules were broken, the lower Court was bound to find that the breach had materially affected the result of the election before it could set aside the election.
  3. Whether this Court can, and if it can, should interfere in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the lower Court omitted to decide whether the breach materially affected the result, and if so, in what manner.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The lower Court's finding that Rule 4 was broken was vitiated by a fundamental misreading of the rules; petitioner argued that the phrase "take part in a ballot" was restricted to the mere act of voting and did not include presiding, opening the ballot box, counting votes or acting as Returning Officer.
  • Petitioner further argued (implicitly through critique of procedure) that the lower Court failed to determine whether the breach materially affected the result and thus had no legal basis to set aside the election.

Counter-petitioner's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • Counter-petitioner suggested that the words "absence" and "incapacity" could be interpreted so that Section 28 of the Madras District Municipalities Act required the Chairman to preside when present (arguing against the Rule 4 restriction as applied by petitioner).
  • Counter-petitioner argued that because the lower Court held the broken rule was mandatory, it must be taken that the lower Court deemed the result materially affected; reliance was placed on the ruling in Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman, Dacca Municipality.
  • Counter-petitioner contended that the onus of showing that the breach did not affect the election lay on the petitioner who violated the rule.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Queen v. Owens (1869) 2 El. & El., 89 English principle that a candidate is precluded from acting as Chairman at an election and is incapable of acting as a Returning Officer; if he so acts and is elected, his election is voidable on petition ad hoc. The Court relied on this English authority to interpret Rule 4 as including acts of presiding, counting, opening the ballot box and acting as Returning Officer; it supported the conclusion that Rule 4 was broken.
The Queen v. White (1867) 2 Q. B., 557 Same English principle as above regarding incapacity of a candidate to act as presiding officer/Returning Officer. Used alongside Queen v. Owens to support the interpretation of Rule 4 and to show Rule 4 was designed to carry out the principle that no man should be judge in his own cause.
Rogers on Elections, 18th Edition (page 115) (authoritative text cited) Collection of English authorities on election law supporting the principle that a candidate cannot act as returning officer/chairman. The Court referred to this authority to reinforce the established English law principle which informed interpretation of Rule 4.
Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman, Dacca Municipality (1920) I. L. R., 47 Calc., 524 Relied on by counter-petitioner to suggest that under Calcutta rules (if following Rule 13 of the English Ballot Act 1872) an election not conducted in accordance with the Act may be declared invalid (broader principle than Madras rules). The Court distinguished this authority, noting that Madras rules expressly require that a breach must have materially affected the result to invalidate an election; thus the Calcutta rule was not directly applicable.
Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Goundar Decision that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to election inquiries of this kind (High Court revision jurisdiction). The Court cited this recent Bench decision to confirm that it has power under Section 115 to revise subordinate Courts' decisions in election matters.
Amritrav Krishna Deshpande v. Balkrishna Ganesh Amrapurkar (1887) I. L. R. 11 Bom. 488 Cited as authority in the general discussion that "material irregularity" is not a mere mistake of fact or law (part of a list of cases supporting the proposition). Included among authorities establishing that what constitutes a material irregularity must be decided on facts and is not simply a wrong decision of fact or law.
Kuppuswami Aiyangar v. Narayana Aiyangar (1916) 3 L. R., 36 Part of the list of authorities indicating limits of Section 115; supports that "material irregularity" is case-specific and not mere mistake. Used to show precedential context for the Court's view on material irregularity under Section 115.
Jhotu Lal Ghose v. Ganouri Sahu (1918) 3 Pat. L. J., 376 One of the cases cited for the principle that material irregularity is not merely a mistake of fact or law. Included in the Court's survey of authorities on when revision under Section 115 is appropriate.
Merwanji Muncherji Cama v. Secretary of State for India (1915) 29 M. L. J., 299 (P.C.) Also cited among authorities on the limits of Section 115 and material irregularity. Part of the Court's reference list illustrating the principle that what is a material irregularity is a fact-specific inquiry.
Atchayya v. Seetharamachandra Rao (1916) I. L. R., 39 Mad., 195 (F.R.) Cited for the exception that a mistake which occasions a wrong assumption or refusal of jurisdiction may allow revision. The Court cited this case to show that where a mistake affects jurisdiction, revision under Section 115 may be appropriate.
Hindley v. Joynarain Marwari (1919) I. L. R., 46 Calc., 962 Cited in the context of authorities dealing with material irregularity and limits of revision. Included among cases that help delineate when Section 115 applies.
Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (1886) I. L. R., 11 Calc., 6 (P.C.) Cited as authority that Section 115 cannot be called in aid where a Court has jurisdiction and has merely exercised it wrongly (i.e., no irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction). Used to demonstrate that a mere wrong decision on fact or law does not by itself justify revision under Section 115.
Shew Prosad Bungshidhur v. Ram Chunder Haribux (1914) I. L. R., 41 Calc. 323 Also cited for the proposition that wrong exercise of jurisdiction (but within jurisdiction) does not invoke Section 115. Cited to support the distinction between a wrong decision and an irregular exercise or failure to exercise jurisdiction.
Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (1917) I. L. R., 40 Mad., 793 (P.C.) Cited for the proposition that when jurisdiction has been illegally or irregularly exercised, Section 115 will apply. The Court used this authority to support its conclusion that failure to decide a necessary point (thereby exercising jurisdiction irregularly) attracts revision under Section 115.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in structured steps corresponding to the three main points argued.

  1. On whether Rule 4 was broken: The Court treated the lower Court's finding that Rule 4 was broken as a finding of fact that would not ordinarily be disturbed on revision. The petitioner argued the lower Court misread Rule 4 (claiming "take part in a ballot" meant only voting). The Court rejected that narrow reading, holding that Rule 4 clearly intended to prevent a candidate from acting in any capacity that would make him judge in his own cause (including presiding, opening the ballot box, counting votes and acting as Returning Officer). The Court relied on English authorities (The Queen v. Owens; The Queen v. White) and Rogers on Elections to conclude Rule 4 was breached.
  2. On whether a breach required a finding of material effect before invalidating the election: The Court noted the Madras statutory rules (published in the Fort St. George Gazette, 30 November 1920) provide that non-compliance with the Act or rules can invalidate an election only if the result has been materially affected by such non-compliance. The Court found the lower Court nowhere addressed whether the breach had materially affected the result. The Court contrasted the Madras rule with broader Calcutta practice (as in Shyam Chand Basak) and emphasised that under the Madras Rules it is a question of fact for the trial Judge whether a breach materially affected the result.
  3. On whether the High Court could interfere under Section 115: The Court accepted the precedent that Section 115 applies to election inquiries and that the High Court may revise subordinate Courts on grounds of "material irregularity." Citing authorities, the Court elaborated the governing principle: when a subordinate Court has jurisdiction and merely decides a point wrongly, Section 115 is not available; but when the Court, having jurisdiction, fails or refuses to take up a point essential to its jurisdiction, that constitutes an irregular exercise of jurisdiction and may justify revision. Applying this to the present facts, because the lower Court omitted to decide whether the breach materially affected the election (the one question giving it jurisdiction to set aside the election), the omission was a material irregularity.
  4. Remedy and directions: The Court concluded that the Subordinate Judge exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity (having no legal basis to set aside the election without deciding the material-effect question). Therefore, under Section 115(c) the Court set aside the lower Court's order and directed the lower Court to re-hear and decide afresh the petition according to law. The Subordinate Judge is to consider, if annulment is decided, whether amendments by Madras Act I of 1922 to Madras Act V of 1920 require a fresh election. The Court did not decide the fresh-election question itself.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The High Court set aside the lower Court's order under Section 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and directed that the Subordinate Judge re-hear and decide the election petition afresh according to law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The lower Court's decision annulling the election is vacated and the election petition must be reheard by the Subordinate Judge, who must determine whether the breach of Rule 4 materially affected the election result before any annulment is made.
  • The Subordinate Judge, on rehearing, must also consider whether amendments introduced by Madras Act I of 1922 into Madras Act V of 1920 make a fresh election necessary if annulment is ordered (the High Court did not decide that point and directed consideration of it on rehearing).
  • Costs in the petition and up-to-date in the lower Court will abide the result of the rehearing.
  • No broader new precedent was announced beyond application of established principles: the Court applied existing authorities on Rule 4, the material-effect requirement under Madras rules, and the scope of Section 115 (revision for material irregularity) to the facts of this case.

    Ahamad Thambi Maracayar v. Basava Maracayar

    1. Three main points have been argued on this petition, (1) whether the statutory rules for the election of the Chairman were broken, (2) whether having found that they were broken the lower Court was not bound to find further that that breach had materially affected the result of the election, before it could set aside the election, (3) whether if the Court has neglected so to find, this Court can, and, if it can, will, interfere in revision, and in what manner it should so interfere.

    2. As to point (1) whether the election rules have been broken, the lower Court's finding appears to me to be a, finding of fact, which in revision, this Court will not ordinarily disturb. It is pleaded for petitioner that the lower Court's finding is vitiated by a fundamental misreading of the rules which are statutory rules, i.e., that it is based on an error of law. Rule 4 lays down that:

    no candidate whose name has been proposed and seconded shall take part in a ballot.

    3. It is admitted that petitioner, whose name had been duly proposed and seconded, himself presided at the meeting and conducted the ballot, opened the ballot box, counted the votes and acted as Returning Officer. I am in full agreement with the lower Court that this is "taking part in a ballot," and that that phrase is not restricted, as petitioner argues, to the mere act of voting. The rule has clearly been framed to carry out the salutary principle that no man shall be a' Judge in his own cause, and that it should not be in the power of one vitally interested in the result to decide on such questions intimately affecting the result, e.g., the validity of a particular vote, as the officer presiding at the ballot has to decide. The English Law on this subject is quite plain, see The Queen v. Owens (1869) 2 El. & El., 89., The Queen v. White (1867) 2 Q. B., 557. and other cases cited on page 115 of Volume III of Rogers on Elections, 18th Edition, viz., that a candidate is precluded from acting as Chairman at an. election and is incapable of acting as a Returning Officer, and that if he so acts and is elected, his election is voidable on petition ad hoc. Rule 4,1 have no doubt, was designed to carry out the principle of English Law.

    4. I have no doubt then that in this case Rule 4 was broken, and that the lower Court did not misinterpret the rules or the law relating to elections when it held so. It has been urged before me that this Rule 4 seems to be in direct contravention of Section 28 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, Act V of 1920, which, implies that at every meeting of the Council at which the Chairman is present, he shall preside. The difficulty is not met in my opinion by counter-petitioner's suggestion of interpreting "absence" as including "incapacity." These two words are in fact used in Section 18 separately and as not implying each other, and if the incapacity of the Chairman to preside had been contemplated in Section 28, similar language to that used in Section 18 could have been employed. Section 30 (4) has been obviously misread by the lower Court and has no application to the present point. The difficulty however is resolved by holding that the word "Chairman" in Section 28,includes "Chairman-Delegate" in cases where there is no Vice-Chairman, and in fact it is clear that one must hold so, otherwise the "Chairman-Delegate" could not preside at meetings at all, a reductio ad, absurdum. The proper procedure then in cases like the present is that the Chairman, being incapacitated from fulfilling his duty of presiding at the election meeting, should under Section 18 appoint a Chairman-Delegate, who, under Section 28, would preside at the meeting. Whether the salutary principle that a man should not be a Judge in his own cause is preserved by a procedure which allows him to appoint his own Judge in his cause may well be doubted, but that is, so far as I can see, the result of the present procedure as laid down in the Act and the statutory rules.

    5. Be that as it may, the difficulty does not alter the fact that petitioner committed a breach of the election rules in presiding at the meeting and taking part in the ballot for the election at which he was a candidate. It does not, however, at all follow that the lower Court's order setting aside the election was correct. Here I come to the second point argued before me. Under the statutory rules for the decision of election disputes published in the Fort St. George Gazette, dated 30th November 1920, page 607, non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or rules made thereunder can invalidate an election only if the result of the election has been materially affected thereby.

    6. To that question the lower Court has, in my opinion, nowhere given its attention. Counter-petitioner argues that since the lower Court holds that the rule broken was a mandatory provision, it must be deemed to hare held that the result of the election was materially affected, and relies on the ruling in Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman, Dacca Municipality (1920) I. L. R., 47 Calc., 524. "What the Election Rules in Calcutta are, has not been stated- before me. If they follow Rule 13 of the English Ballot Act of 1872 as quoted at page 532 of that ruling, they are wider in principle than the rules in Madras, for under Rule 13 an election conducted "not in accordance with the principles laid down in the body of the Act may be declared invalid." Under the Madras Rules no breach of the rules, whether mandatory or directory, shall invalidate an election unless the result of the election has been materially affected by such breach. It is not an axiom then in this Presidency that the breach of a mandatory rule will so affect an election. It is a question of fact to be decided and found by the Judge who hears the election petition.

    7. It was the more necessary for the lower Court to have decided this question in this case, as it was never oven alleged much less attempted to be proved by counter-petitioner, that the result of the election would have been different had the rules not been broken, and there is no suggestion that, while the ballot was going on, the petitioner had to give and did give a decision on any point which could have affected the result of the ballot; and the majority of votes in his favour was overwhelming. Counter-petitioner argues that the onus of showing that the breach did not affect the election lay on petitioner who had violated the rule. Granting so, it is still clear that the lower Court never put that issue before petitioner or called on him to prove it. While obviously it was unnecessary for petitioner to go out of his way to set out any rebuttal to a, case never stated by counter-petitioner in his objection petition to the lower Court.

    8. The lower Court has thus neglected to put to itself and to the parties the question it had to decide before under the rules it had any legal power to set aside the election. I therefore come to the third point argued, viz., whether this Court can, and if it can, will, interfere in revision. That in a matter of this kind this Court has power to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been lately decided by a Bench of this Court, in Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Goundar . I need not recapitulate the ratio decidendi of the decisions of their Lordships Krishnan and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., on this point, with which I respectfully agree. They hold that, when dealing with an election inquiry of this kind, the Judge is sitting as a Court subordinate to this Court and therefore Section 115 applies.

    9. Is the present case one then in which this Court should interfere on revision? The phrase in Section 115 which can be called in aid by petitioner is if such subordinate Court appears to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity."

    10. A good deal of discussion has centred round this point and many cases have been cited to me for the purpose of showing in what sort or class of cases. High Courts in India and in England have acted in revision. J need not deal with these cases in detail since they all lead to the same conclusion that what is a "material irregularity" is a matter in itself undefinable and must be decided on the facts in each case. So far as it may be negatively defined, it is not a mere mistake of fact or law; see [Amritrav Krishna Deshpande V. Balkrishna Ganesh Amrapurkar (1887) I. L. R. 11 Bom. 488., Kuppuswami Aiyangar v. Narayana Aiyangar (1916) 3 L. R., 36. Jhotu Lal Ghose v. Ganouri Sahu (1918) 3 Pat, L. J., 376., Merwanji Muncherji Cama v. Secretary of State for India (1915) 29 M. L. J., 299 (P.C.).], unless that mistake has occasioned a wrong assumption or refusal of jurisdiction [Atchayya v. Seetharamachandra Rao (1916) I. L. R., 39 Mad., 195 (F.R.)], Hindley v. Joynarain Marwari (1919) I. L. R., 46 Calc., 962.] since a Court which has jurisdiction to decide a case on a point of fact or law has jurisdiction to give a wrong as well as a right decision on either point. Thus where there is jurisdiction and that jurisdiction has been exercised merely wrongly so as to eventuate in a wrong decision on fact or law, Section 115 cannot be called in aid; see Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (1886) I. L. R., 11 Calc., 6 (P.C.). and Shew Prosad Bungshidhur v. Ram Chunder Haribux (1914) I. L. R., 41 Calc. 323. But when there is jurisdiction and that jurisdiction has not been exercised or has been illegally or irregularly exercised, Section 115 will apply; see Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (1917) I. L. R., 40 Mad., 793 (P.C.).

    11. I take the general principle to be this, that when a Court has taken up a point of fact or law for decision and has decided that point wrongly, it has acted with full jurisdiction and regularly and legally, and no revision lies unless that decision itself affects the Court's own jurisdiction; but that when, having jurisdiction, the Court has failed or refused to take up the point for decision, it has exercised its jurisdiction irregularly, and the more the failure or refusal affects the exercise of its jurisdiction, the greater the irregularity will be.

    12. Applying that principle to the present case, and recalling my conclusions that the lower Court has omitted to decide whether the result of the election was materially affected by the breach of the rules, i.e., to decide the one point in this case which gave it jurisdiction to set aside the election, I cannot come to any other conclusion than that the Subordinate Judge exercised his jurisdiction with material irregularity. Clearly he exercised it irregularly, since he had no legal basis on which to set aside the election and overlooked the one factor which alone gave him jurisdiction to set it aside; and clearly the irregularity was material, because it may well be that if he had decided that question, his decision might have been in petitioner's favour, and then he would not have set aside the election.

    13. I, therefore, under Section 115 (c) set aside the lower Court's order and direct it to re-hear and decide afresh the petition before it according to law. In doing so, the Subordinate Judge will consider, if he decides that the election should be annulled, whether having regard to the amendments introduced by Madras Act I of 1922 into Madras Act V of 1920, a fresh election is necessary. It is a point I have not heard at length in this Court.

    14. Costs in this petition and up-to-date in the lower Court will abide the result.

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    Comments

    Ahamad Thambi Maracayar v. Basava Maracayar
    (Oct 10, 1922)