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  • Bengal Municipal Act, 1884,
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  • Bengal Municipal Act, 1884,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit by the Plaintiff, Shyam Chand Basak, for a declaration that the Municipal election held at Dacca on 31 July 1918 was invalid and for a perpetual injunction restraining the successful candidates from acting as Municipal Commissioners.

The relevant facts as stated in the opinion are: the election was for three-year Commissioners for Ward No. 3; the Chairman and Commissioners determined the hours for polling under rule 17 of the Election Rules made under secs. 15 and 69 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884; the announced hours were 7:30–11:30 A.M and 3:30–6:30 P.M, but the presiding officer arrived late and the actual hours during which voting occurred were different (approx. 8:30–12:40 P.M and 3:00–6:30 P.M). Gates were shut at 6:30 P.M and those already inside were allowed to vote, and voting continued late into the night for voters who had entered before closing.

The counting and result declared two defendants (Bhagabat Prasanna Saha and Nabendra Nath Basak) elected; the Plaintiff was unsuccessful. The Plaintiff instituted suit on 7 September 1918 alleging irregularities. After trial on seventeen issues the trial Court found the election illegal and void and granted decree and a perpetual injunction against the elected candidates. The two elected candidates appealed. The District Judge allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff appealed to the Court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the departure from the hours for recording votes (as fixed under rule 17) vitiated the election.
  2. Whether rule 17 of the Election Rules is mandatory (such that its breach invalidates the election) or directory (such that the election stands unless the result was affected).
  3. On whom rests the burden of proof to show that an irregularity did not affect the result of the election — the party seeking to impeach the election or the party defending its validity.
  4. Whether the Plaintiff was estopped from challenging the election by reason of his alleged knowledge of and acquiescence in the irregularity at the time.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff) — Shyam Chand Basak

  • Brought suit for declaration that the municipal election was invalid and for a permanent injunction restraining the returned candidates from acting as Municipal Commissioners.
  • Challenged the legality of the election on multiple grounds, including that the poll hours as fixed by the Chairman under rule 17 were not adhered to (actual hours differed and polling occurred beyond the prescribed times).

Respondents / Defendants

  • Denied the material allegations in separate written statements, defending the validity of the election.
  • The District Judge took the view (reflected in the lower Appellate Court) that the Plaintiff had not satisfied the Court that the election result was affected by the irregularity and effectively placed the burden on the Plaintiff to prove impact on the result.
  • It was suggested in the Court below (as a defence or contention) that the Plaintiff may have been estopped from challenging the election because of his knowledge of and acquiescence in the irregularity at the time of polling.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Islington case General principle that an election should not be void for transgressions by officials without corrupt motive if the election was in substance conducted under the law and the result was not affected. Cited as a lucid statement of the applicable principle governing when irregularities invalidate elections.
Warwick cases Authorities cited in support of the general approach to election irregularities. Referred to as part of the Islington case authorities supporting caution in upsetting elections.
Roxburgh case Authority referenced in the context of election tribunals. Referred to in support of the general principle in Islington.
Woodward v. Sarsons Illustration of the scope of sec. 13 of the Ballot Act 1872 and the common-law doctrine that elections should not be voided for non-corrupt transgressions if result unaffected. Used to explain that statutory provision (sec.13) codifies a principle that would exist at common law; court relied on its reasoning in shaping the applicable test.
East Clare case Example where election was not set aside because respondent's large majority showed irregularity could not have affected result. Cited as supporting authority for upholding elections where irregularities could not affect outcome.
Gribbin v. Kirker Authority where an election was set aside because polling continued after doors were closed and it was impossible to determine how many voted after time. Cited as an instance where inability to determine effect of irregularity led to invalidation of the election.
Drogheda case Example where late opening of polling did not invalidate election because irregularity had no effect where nearly whole constituency voted. Used to illustrate that an irregularity may fail if it clearly did not affect the result.
East Kerry case Cited for the proposition that minor delays/(not quite ready) in opening booths do not necessarily invalidate an election. Illustrative authority for unsubstantial departures from prescribed times.
Norcester case Authority where brief suspension of polling did not invalidate election. Used as supporting example of unsubstantial interruptions.
Wilson v. Ingham Instance where election was invalidated because the margin between candidates was very small and irregularity could have affected result. Cited to show that where numbers affected could change the result, election should be set aside.
Limerick case Earlier decision referenced in discussion of burden of proof; relationship to other authorities not fully clear. Noted in the opinion as part of the body of cases on election irregularities.
Harwich case Earlier decision referenced in relation to burden of proof; its precise stance not clarified in the opinion. Mentioned among older authorities; court observed uncertainty about their exact rule relationship.
Woodward v. Sarsons (referred again) Interpretation of sec.13 Ballot Act 1872 and common-law rule preventing voiding elections for non-corrupt errors if result unaffected. Adopted as persuasive authority for placing the onus on those upholding the election to show result unaffected.
Hackney case Judicial authority dealing with election irregularities and the circumstances in which an election should be upset. Referred to in the discussion of common-law authorities supporting the Court’s view.
Dudley case One of the cases compared in Woodward v. Sarsons on the common-law approach to election irregularities. Part of the chain of authorities relied upon for the general doctrine.
Salford case Authority referenced by the Court of Common Pleas as part of the common-law lineage. Included among precedents demonstrating the common-law rule.
Bolton case Another judicial decision referenced in the lineage of common-law authorities concerning elections. Referred to in the Court of Common Pleas' comparative discussion adopted by the present Court.
Norfolk case Older parliamentary/common-law authority cited in tracing the rule's history. Part of historical authorities cited in Woodward v. Sarsons and relied upon by the present Court for background.
Morpeth case Older authority in the line of election cases. Referenced as part of the historical jurisprudence supporting the rule.
Pontefract case Historic authority cited in the comparative discussion of election law. Included among the older cases relied on for the common-law principle.
Coventry case Historic authority in the group of parliamentary election cases. Referred to as part of the tradition of authorities on election irregularities.
New Ross case Historic authority in support of the Court's statement about common-law principles. Part of the chain of authorities cited in Woodward v. Sarsons.
People v. Cook U.S. authority cited for the directory/mandatory distinction regarding opening and closing of polls. Used to illustrate that time provisions may be directory where the election's object is achieved despite timing departure.
Patton v. Watkins U.S. case supporting the directory treatment of certain election time provisions. Referred to in the comparative survey of U.S. decisions.
Cleland v. Porter U.S. authority showing that if votes cast during irregular hours could not change the result, the election need not be set aside. Cited in support of the proposition that unsubstantial departures do not invalidate elections when result unaffected.
Lane v. Fern U.S. case on when timing departures are unsubstantial and do not affect the result. Used as an example of upholding elections where irregular votes would not change the outcome.
Tebbe v. Smith U.S. decision where significant timing deviations led to invalidation of the election. Cited for the opposite proposition — that substantial departures from prescribed times can invalidate an election.
Goree v. Cahill U.S. authority holding election invalid where polling hours substantially deviated from statutory requirements. Referred to as an example where the deviation was substantial enough to void the election.
Ramanjulu v. Parthasarathi Case noting that English common-law rules may be referred to where consistent with justice, equity and good conscience. Cited to justify relying on English authorities for guidance in the present matter.
East Glare (as referred to in the opinion) Mentioned regarding the question of estoppel but noted the question was not decided there. Referred to as an instance where estoppel was raised but not resolved.
Seaford case Authority indicating that the estoppel of a petitioner could operate to bar constituency rights and is problematic. Cited to show that estoppel might unjustly deprive the constituency of the right to challenge.
Athlone case Authority cited for the proposition that where election was set aside for no misconduct by either party, each party may bear their own costs. Relied upon to justify the Court's order that each party pay their own costs.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the concrete irregularity: the hours actually during which votes were recorded departed from the hours determined under rule 17. It noted that the presiding officer arrived late, the morning session commenced later and ran later, and the afternoon session commenced earlier than announced, and that voting continued late into the night for those already inside.

The Court framed the legal issue by reference to established authorities (chiefly the Islington case and Woodward v. Sarsons) which articulate the guiding principle: an election should not be declared void for transgressions of the election law committed without corrupt motive if (1) the election was in substance conducted under the election law and (2) the result was not and could not have been affected by the transgressions. Conversely, where irregularities are such that it is open to reasonable doubt whether they may have affected the result, the tribunal must declare the election void.

After surveying English and U.S. decisions, and observing that many authorities treat time provisions for opening and closing polls as directory rather than mandatory (subject to the qualification that departures must be unsubstantial and not capable of affecting the result), the Court applied these principles to rule 17 of the Election Rules.

The Court concluded that rule 17 is not mandatory in the sense that every breach automatically voids the election. Instead, the proper approach is to ask whether the result was in fact affected by the breach. Critical to this assessment is the allocation of burden: the Court held that those who assert the validity of an election notwithstanding an established irregularity (i.e., the Defendants) bear the burden of proving that the result was not and could not have been affected by the breach. The Court expressly rejected the District Judge’s contrary placement of the burden on the Plaintiff.

Applying the correct burden to the facts, the Court found that it was impossible to affirm that the result had not been affected. A substantial proportion of the electorate (601 of 1,287 registered voters — nearly one-half) did not vote, and a relatively small portion of those could have changed the outcome in favour of the Plaintiff. Because the irregularity was established and the defendants had not discharged the burden of proving the result unaffected, the Court concluded the election must be set aside.

On the matter of estoppel, the Court addressed the suggestion that the Plaintiff had been estopped by knowledge and acquiescence. It rejected this argument, stating that a protest by the Plaintiff could have been of no avail and that estoppel cannot be pleaded where statutory requirements are disobeyed by officers entrusted with public duties; further, to allow estoppel would effectively bar the constituency from raising whether the result was affected.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The decree of the District Judge is reversed; the suit is decreed; the municipal election is declared contrary to law and set aside; the second and third Defendants are restrained by a perpetual injunction from sitting on the Municipal Board and exercising the functions of Municipal Commissioner by virtue of the election so cancelled.

Consequences and implications:

  • The immediate direct effect: the election is annulled and the returned candidates are permanently restrained from acting by virtue of that election.
  • The Court placed the evidentiary burden on those supporting the validity of an election after an established irregularity to prove that the result was not and could not have been affected by the irregularity; the District Judge’s contrary allocation of the burden was rejected.
  • The Court recommended that a fresh election would be in the best interests of the Municipality and the candidates, expressing hope that future elections would better conform to the rules.
  • On costs: each party will pay his own costs in all Courts (the Court invoked Athlone as authority for the discretion to make each party bear its own costs where the election was upset for misconduct not attributable to either party).

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the matters explicitly stated in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text have been added.

    Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman Of Dacca Municipality

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    This is an appeal by the Plaintiff in a suit for declaration of the invalidity of a Municipal election and for a permanent injunction to restrain the successful candidates from acting as Municipal Commissioners.

    The Plaintiff Shyam Chand Basak, the second Defendant Bhagabat Prasanna Saha and the third Defendant Nabendra Nath Basak were candidates for election as Commissioners for a period of three years for Ward No. 3 at the Dacca Municipal Election held on the 31st July 1918. The first Defendant is the Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners of Dacca. The election was held on the day prescribed and Mr. Dwijendra Nath Sen of the Provincial Executive Service acted as Presiding Officer. The total number of registered voters was 1,287, each of whom had two votes. 686 persons recorded 1,372 votes. The result of the election was announced as follows:—

    Bhagabat Prasanna Saha … 627 votes. Nabendra Nath Basak … 509 votes. Shyam Chand Basak … 236 votes.

    The two Defendants were thereupon eleclared duly elected as Municipal Commissioners for the Ward. On the 7th September 1918, the Plaintiff who had been unsuccessful at the election instituted the present suit and attacked the legality of the election on a number of grounds. The Defendants filed separate written statements, denying all the material allegations. Seventeen issues were thereupon raised, and the Court, after a protracted trial, came to the conclusion that the election had been held in contravention of the rules and was consequently illegal and void. The suit was decreed and a perpetual injunction granted against the candidate Defendants restraining them from sitting on the Municipal Board and exercising the functions of a Municipal Commissioner. The two Defendants lodged separate appeals against the decree. The District Judge has allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit. In the view we take of the matter, it is necessary for us to deal with only one of the objections urged against the legality of the election.

    Secs. 15 and 69 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, authorise the Local Government to frame rules for Municipal elections. The rules in force at the time of the disputed election contained the following provisions relating to the manner of holding elections:—

    “17. The poll shall be held at such time and place as the Commissioners in meeting or the Chairman may determine, and the place at which and the hours between which votes will be recorded shall be notified, by beat of drum and by publication of notices, at the same time as the list of candidates is published under r. 14.

    17A. After the second hour mentioned in the notice referred to in the last preceding rule, no elector shall be admitted within the building or enclosure within which the election proceedings are being held, but the votes of all duly registered voters who are already within the building or enclosure shall be recorded.”

    In accordance with r. 17, the Chairman determined the hours between which votes would be recorded, as follows:—

    7-30 A.M … 11-30 A.M 3-30 P.M … 6-30 P.M

    It has been found that the presiding officer did not arrive at the place of election till 7-45 A.M, and that the hours between which votes were recorded were as follows:—

    8-30 A.M … 12-40 P.M 3 P.M … 6-30 P.M

    The gates were shut at 6-30 P.M, but all voters who had entered the premises before 6-30 P.M were allowed to record their votes under r. 17A, this in fact went on till late at night. There is no controversy now that the hours between which the votes were actually recorded were not exactly identical with the hours as determined under r. 17; the recording commenced later, went on later, during the first half of the day, and commenced earlier during the second half of the day. The question thus arises, whether the validity of the election has been affected by this circumstance. The Courts below have arrived at divergent conclusions upon the matter. The primary Court held that the election was vitiated, as the rule had been substantially infringed. The lower Appellate Court has held that the election cannot be successfully impeached on the ground mentioned, as the Plaintiff had not satisfied the Court that the election has been affected by the infringement of the rule. We are of opinion that neither of these views can be supported.

    The principle applicable to questions of the invalidity of elections by reason of the infringement of election rules were lucidly stated by Kennedy and Darling, JJ., in the Islington case (1).

    “An election ought not to be held void by reason of transgressions of the law, committed without any corrupt motive by the returning officer or his subordinates in the conduct of the election, where the Court is satisfied that the election was, notwithstanding, these transgressions, an election really and in substance conducted under the existing election law, and that the result of the election, that is, the success of the one candidate over the other, was not and could not have been affected by these transgressions. If, on the other hand, the transgressions of the law by the officials being admitted, the Court sees that the effect of the transgressions was such that the election was not really conducted under the existing election laws, or it is open to reasonable doubt whether these transgressions may not have affected the result, and it is uncertain whether the candidate who has been returned has really been elected by the majority of persons voting in accordance with the laws in force relating to election, the Court is then bound to declare the election void. It appears to us that this is the view which has generally been recognised and acted upon by the tribunals which have dealt with election matters. We may refer, in regard to cases heard by Parliamentary Committees, to the Warwick cases (2) and the Roxburgh case (3) and, in regard to the more important authority of Courts of law and the election Judges, to the considered judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Woodward v. Sarsons (4) which cites a number of authorities and contains an express approval of the answer of Mr. Baron Martin before a committee of the House of Commons. We may also refer to the much more recent judgment of O'Brien and Johnson, JJ., in the East Clare case (5). And it is to be borne in-mind by the tribunal which has to consider the validity of elections that it ought to act with great caution. ‘I adhere,’ said Mr. Baron Martin in the Warrington case (6) to what Mr. Justice Willes said at Lichfield (7) that a Judge, to upset an election, ought to be satisfied beyond all doubt that the election was void and that the return of a member is a serious matter and not lightly to be set aside,’”

    The Court, after this general exposition of the law, expressed its approval of the decision in Gribbin v. Kirker (8), where Monaham, C.J, set aside an election at which polling was allowed to go on for an hour after the doors were closed by people inside the room and there were no means of finding out how many voted after the time. The Court then proceeded to consider whether the Respondent had discharged the burden of proving that the result of the election, that is, the success of the one candidate over the other, was not and could not be affected. It was found that ballot papers had been given out after 8 P.M, in contravention of the rule that the doors at each polling station were to be shut at 8 P.M, and only voters who had ballot papers delivered to them before that hour should be allowed to mark them and deposit them in the ballot box. But it was also proved that only 14 ballot papers were given out after 8 P.M; if all of these were assumed to have been given for the Respondent and were excluded, he would still have a majority of five. It was consequently ruled that the election could not be impeached on the ground alleged, as the Respondent had proved that the result of the election had not been affected by the irregularity. Rogers in his work on Elections (1918), Volume 2, pp. 109, 257, states on the authority of this case, that the onus rests on the Respondent to prove that the result of the election, that is, the success of the one candidate over the other, was not and could not be affected by the infringement of the rule. This view receives support from other decisions. Thus in the Drogheda case (9), where the validity of the election was questioned on the ground that the polling stations were not opened till 8-45 A.M, instead of 8 A.M, the objection failed, because the irregularity was shown to have had no effect on the election at which nearly the whole constituency voted. Again, in the East Clare case where two of the presiding officers closed the poll while they adjourned for lunch, the election was not avoided, as the Respondent had such a large majority that it could not have been affected by the irregularity. To the same effect are the decisions in the East Kerry case (10) where the booths were not quite ready at 8 A.M, and the Norcester case (11) where the polling was suspended by the presiding officer for a few minutes owing to his having the room cleared in consequence of a rush of voters. On the other hand, in Wilson v. Ingham (12) the Court invalidated the election, as there were only three votes difference between the last two candidates declared elected and the Petitioner. It is not quite clear that the earlier decisions in the Limerick case (13) and the Harwich case (14) lay down a different rule on the question of burden of proof.

    We have seen that Kennedy and Darling, JJ., in the Islington case refer to the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Woodward v. Sarsons . In that case, a question was raised as to the effect of sec. 13 of the Ballot Act, 1872:

    “13. No election shall be declared invalid by reason of a non-compliance with the rules contained in the first schedule to this Act, or any mistake in the use of the forms in the second schedule to this Act, if it appears to the tribunal having cognizance of the question that the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the body of this Act, and that such non-compliance or mistake did not affect the result of the election.”

    Lord Coleridge, C.J, held that the section was inserted ex abundanti cautela and that the same rule would have applied by virtue of the common law even if the section had not existed. It was pointed out that at common law, an election ought not to be held void by reason of transgressions of the law, committed without any corrupt motive, by the returning officer or his subordinates in the conduct of an election, where the Court is satisfied that the election was in substance conducted under the existing law and that the result was not and could not have been affected by those transgressions. This, according to the Lord Chief Justice, is the result of comparing the judgments of Grove, J., at Hackney case (15) and Dudley case (16) with the judgment of Martin B. at Salford case (17) and of Mellor, J., at Bolton case (18), all of which judgments are in accordance with but express more accurately the grounds of the decisions in Parliament in the older cases of Norfolk case (19), Morpeth case (20), Pontefract case (21), Coventry case (22), New Ross case (23) and Drogheda case (24). The substance of the matter, consequently, is that the infringement of the rule does not necessarily invalidate the election as it would have done if the rule had been deemed mandatory in character. The party who maintain the validity of the election, notwithstanding the infringement of the rule, may satisfy the Court that the result of the election has not been affected by the error or irregularity. The Court has to be satisfied upon this point. The election would be avoided, even if the tribunal should be satisfied that, in the words of Lord Coleridge, there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority of the electors may have been prevented from electing the candidate they preferred.

    The principles deducible from the cases mentioned above have been adopted in leading decisions in the United States. They recognise the distinction between mandatory and directory provisions. A provision as to the time of opening and closing the polls is considered directory on the general principle that a statutory provision is to be regarded as directory, if the directions given to accomplish a particular end may be violated and yet the given end be in fact accomplished and the merits of the case unaffected. People v. Cook (25). Patton v. Watkins (26), Cleland v. Porter (27) and Lane v. Fern (28). On this principle it has been ruled that where the law fixes the opening and closing of the polls at sunrise and sunset, the election should not be invalidated, merely because the polls were closed a few minutes before or were kept open a few minutes after sundown, not thereby affecting the result in any manner. But this rule is applied only to what are called unsubstantial departures from the law. Where polls were opened from 1 P.M until 6 P.M, instead of from one hour after sunrise to sunset, as required by law, the election was held invalid, Tebbe v. Smith (29) and Goree v. Cahill (30). But an election will not be declared invalid, where it is apparent that the votes cast while the polls were not properly opened are not sufficient to change the result of the election, Lane v. Fern and Cleland v. Porter .

    We do not refer to the decisions in England or in the United States as in any way binding upon us. But, as was pointed by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Ramanjulu v. Parthasarathi (31) though the common law of England relating to Parliamentary Elections cannot control our decisions, “wherever the rules of that law are in conformity with justice, equity and good conscience, they may be referred to for the mental satisfaction of the Judge in India who finds that his decision, based on justice, equity and good conscience, happens to be also in accordance with those Parliamentary Common Law Rules.”

    On the grounds explained above, we have arrived at the conclusion that r. 17 of the Election Rules is not mandatory, as the Trial Court held; and an election is not necessarily void because that rule has been infringed. The Court will uphold the election, if it is satisfied that the result has not been affected by the infringement which actually took place. The burden rests upon the Defendants to establish this, as they maintain the validity of the election notwithstanding the infraction of the rule. We do not agree with the District Judge that the burden lay upon the Plaintiff to establish that the result has not been affected by the transgression of the rule. If that view were maintained, the consequence would in effect be to encourage a violation of the rule. It is, we think, important to emphasise the aspect that rules are made to be obeyed and that violation of the rules may imperil the election, throwing a heavy burden upon those who, notwithstanding the breach of the rules, wish to support the election and to satisfy the Court that the purpose of the election has been in fact achieved.

    When we test the present case from this point of view, it becomes clear that the decree of the District Judge cannot be supported. On the facts stated, it is impossible to affirm that the result has not been in fact affected by the irregularity. Nearly one-half of the constituency did not vote, namely, 601 voters out of 1,287. If less than a quarter of these voters had voted for the Plaintiff alone, he would have been successful. The truth is that the suit has been tried on a wrong basis; as soon as the irregularity was established, the burden should have been thrown upon the Defendants to establish that the result of the election had not in fact been affected; if this had been done, they might have found it extremely difficult, successfully, to discharge the onus. In these circumstances, we have anxiously considered what direction should now be given. We are of opinion that we should not remit the case to the Court of first instance and direct a fresh trial; but a fresh election would be in the best interest of the Municipality and of the candidates. We can only express the hope that at such election some endeavour will be made to conform to the rules and the directions issued thereunder.

    We find from the proceedings in the Court below that the suggestion was made that the Plaintiff may have been estopped by reason of his knowledge of and acquiescence in the irregularity at the time. We are of opinion that there is no foundation for this contention. A protest by the Plaintiff could have been of no avail. Besides, an estoppel cannot be pleaded where statutory requirements are disobeyed with full knowledge by the officers entrusted with the discharge of public duties. The question was raised in the East Glare case but was not decided. The Seaford case (32) on the other hand shows that the estoppel of the Petitioner would in effect estop the constituency from raising the question, whether the result of the election had been affected by the irregularity, and their rights should not be taken away by his acts.

    The result is that this appeal is allowed and the decree of the District Judge reversed. The suit is decreed: the election is declared contrary to law and is set aside; the second and third Defendants are restrained by a perpetual injunction from sitting on the Municipal Board and exercising the functions of a Municipal Commissioner by virtue of the election hereby cancelled. Each party will pay his own costs in all the Courts. No doubt, the ordinary rule is that the costs are borne by the unsuccessful party, but where the suit has been caused by the conduct of the returning officer, each party may, in the discretion of the Court, be ordered to pay his own costs; Monaham, C.J, observed in the Athlone case (33) that as the election was set aside for what was no misconduct on the part of either party, each party must abide his own costs, although it was a misfortune. [Hackney case ].

    S.C.M
    Appeal allowed.

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    Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman Of Dacca Municipality
    (Aug 28, 1919)