Woodroffe, J.:— In this case the Judge in the Court below refused to amend the pleadings upon an application made to him; and the first question that has been argued before us is whether, that being an interlocutory order, it comes within the terms of sec. 115 of the Code. The determination of this question depends upon another, viz., whether the word “case,” which is used in that section, is wide enough to include an interlocutory order.
The view which has been taken by other High Courts is in the negative. There is, however, one decision of this Court, namely, Dhapi v. Ram Pershad(1), in which the opinion was expressed that the section did cover the case of interlocutory orders. That decision, however, was a decision of one alone of the learned Judges who took part in it. The other Judge (Mr. Justice Tottenham) reserved his opinion on the point, but assented to the order upon other grounds which are stated in his judgment.
So far as I am aware, it has not been the general practice to interfere under this section in the case of interlocutory orders. In one of the recent cases, namely, the case of Gobinda Mohan v. Kunja Behary(2), where the point was raised, the Court stated that, under the circumstances, it was not necessary to consider whether the case of Dhapi v. Ram Pershad was rightly decided, or to investigate the precise extent of the revisional powers of this Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Speaking for myself, I should have thought that interlocutory orders did not come within the scope of this section. It is unnecessary, however, to decide this point for reasons with which I shall proceed to deal. It has, however, been contended, upon the authority of the decision of Mookerjee and Vincent, JJ., Gobinda Mohan v. Kunja Behary, that this Court has power, at any rate, to interfere under sec. 15 of the Charter; and there are other cases in which that decision appears to have been followed and which are recorded in Amjad Ali v. Ali Hussain Johar(3) and Kshirode Chunder Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad Mitra(4). In Manilal Guztati v. Harendra Lal Rai Chowdhry(5), the rule was discharged, the case having been disposed of on the merits. This Court has generally been disinclined to limit the powers which it possesses under the Charter Act. I do not propose to lay down any rule in this regard. But whether or not the revisional section of the Code applies and whether or not this Court has the power to act under the Charter, there is one common principle, which, in my opinion, governs its interference in both cases, and that is this, that this Court will not have recourse, ordinarily at least, to its revisional or superintending powers where there is another and an adequate remedy which is open to the applicant. The Court usually exercises these special powers in order to do justice, because without recourse to such powers a remedy would not be open to the applicant.
Now, in the present case it appears to me to be quite plain that there is another and a proper and adequate remedy open to the applicant. The learned District Judge in this case has refused to amend the pleadings. If he has wrongly refused to do so, the applicant will have a right to appeal; and if the order which has been passed is erroneous, we must assume that justice will be done and that the erroneous order will be corrected upon appeal. This, therefore, is not such a case as is referred to in Gobinda Mohan v. Kunja Behary, where the learned Judges speak of the power of the Court to interfere under the Charter where the circumstances are such that they are likely to cause irreparable injury.
On this ground, therefore, I would discharge this rule with costs, assessing the hearing-fee at three gold mohurs.
Carnduff, J.— I agree; but as I was one of the Judges who decided the case of Amjad Ali v. Ali Hussain Johar, I desire to add a few words. That was a case in which an erroneous order, directing a partition, was set aside by Mr. Justice Mookerjee and myself in the exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 15 of the Charter Act. If that order had been allowed to stand, there would have followed protracted and costly proceedings, which in the end, would, as we felt convinced, most certainly have been set aside. The case was, therefore, an extreme one; and I would also point out that apparently it was not then disputed before us that the Court bad jurisdiction under sec. 15 of the Charter to set aside the order. The general question, therefore, was not then considered. I agree that in this case, assuming that we could, we ought not to interfere under either sec. 15 of the Charter or under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for there is another and adequate remedy secured for the Petitioner in the right of appeal which he will have should the judgment eventually given in the Court below be against him.
Rule discharged.