1. The petitioner has obtained the present rule for consideration of convictions recorded against him under Ss. 409 and 477A of the I.P.C in two separate cases, the appeals from which were dismissed by a single judgment. In one case he was sentenced to eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 under S. 409 and to eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment under S. 477A, the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently. In the other cases he was sentenced under S. 409 to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 and under S. 477A to two years' rigorous imprisonment, the sentences of imprisonment again to run concurrently. The first case related to realisation of municipal tax from Satyendra Nath Banarji. The charge under S. 409 was as follows:
“That yon between 19th October 1931 and 1st April 1932, at Patna City, being a public servant in the employment of the Patna City Municipality and in such capacity entrusted with Municipal property i.e, collection of taxes, to wit, by Municipal Receipt No. 38960, dated 20th October 1931 for Rs. 139-7-0, Ex. 6, No. 55091, dated 6th January 1932 for Ea. 60, Ex. 3 and No. 81273, dated 31st March 1932 for Rs. 60, Ex. 2, committed criminal breach of trust with respect to the said property, and thereby committed an offence under S. 409, I.P.C, and within my cognizance.”
2. The charges under S. 477A relates; to the respective fraudulent false entries in the daily collection registers. The second trial was concerned with three similar realizations between 29th September 1928, and 28th March 1929, from Zamiruddin, and the charges were on the same lines except that in the charge under S. 409 the words
“to wit, by Municipal Receipt No. 10607, dated 20th September 1928 for Rs. 65-3-0, and Receipt No. 38201, dated 20th February 1923, for Rupees 32-9-6 and Receipt No. 46282, dated 28th March 1929, for Rs. 32-9-6”
3. Are within brackets.
4. The only question which arises is whether the petitioner has been tried according to law. It is urged on the authority of Kasi Viswanathan v. Emperor (1) and other decisions, which follow it, that a trial on what is substantially three charges of offences under S. 409 and three charges offence under S. 477A is not justified by the Code and is wholly invalid. In reply Mr. Akbari relied upon the decisions in Gajadhar Lal v. Emperor (2) and Michael John v. Emperor (3) as adequately meeting this contention on behalf of the petitioner. Now what was decided in the first of charged under S. 408 of the I.P.C with criminal breach of trust committed in one year in respect of a lump sum of money, the court is competent, by virtue of provisions of Sections 234 and 235 of the CR PC these cases was that where a person is cedure, to try with this charge three charges for an offence under S. 477A of the Indian Penal Code if committed within the period of one year and forming part of the same transaction as the offence under S. 408. In Michael John v. King-Emperor* the decision in Gajadhar Lal v. Emperor was approved while the decision in Raman Bechary Das v. Emperor (4) based upon Kasi Viswanathan v. Emperor was not followed.
5. These two cases are binding upon us and, with respect, we hold that they were rightly decide-ed. The learned Advocate for the petitioner does not contend that they were not, but he would distinguish them on the ground that whereas in each of them the charge under S. 409 was in respect of a lump sum (or to use the expression in Section 222(2) of the CPC a gross sum), it is otherwise within the charges under S. 409 set out above which, he contends, cannot be said to be in respect of a gross sum. The learned Government Advocate who appeared later, on behalf of the crown, contended in the first place the charge under S. 409 is in respect of a gross sum, being the aggregate realization under the three receipts enumerated which is also mentioned as “the said property”.
6. It is a reasonable inference from the charge itself that in each case the Magistrate intended that trial should be on the line held to be valid in the case of Michael John v. King-Emperor* It does not of course, affect the validity of a charge of criminal breach of trust in respect of a gross sum that the items of defalcation are also enumerated: Emperor v. Datto Hanmant (5) and Rahim Baksha v. Emperor (6). In our judgment, the charge has been correctly framed in accordance with the provisions of Section 222(2) of the CPC and is a charge of criminal breach of trust by a servant of a gross sum consisting of the three items of “collection of taxes” from one person (in one case from Satyendra Nath Banerjee and in the other cases from Zamiruddin) within a stated period of less than one year, templated as a single item of “municipal property” entrusted to the accused. The same view has been taken by Mears, C.J and King, J., in Emperor v. Prem Narain (7). In that case one charge was framed in which four sums of money said to have been embezzled were specified and three dates were also specified as being the dates of the alleged embezzlements, two of the four items being alleged to have embezzled on one of the dates. The time included between the first and the last of the three dates was less-than one year. It was held that there was in fact only one charge framed and as that charge, altogether it did not set out the total of the money embezzled, did specify all the items and the dates upon which the sums were alleged to have been embezzled and as the time included between the first and the last of such dates was less than two months (and so less than one year), the charge was correctly drawn up in accordance with the provisions of S. 222(2) and must be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of S. 234, so that it followed that there was no misjoinder of charges since the accused was on his trial for only one offence. The charge under S. 409 against the petitioner thus being in each case a single charge as to a gross sum the decisions in Gajadhar Lal v. Emperor and Michael John v. Emperor apply and the plea of misjoinder of charges fails.
7. The learned Government Advocate further contends that assuming that the charge under S. 409, as framed, must be taken to constitute three charges of as many offences nevertheless the trial is valid under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of August 1902 mentioned by Carnduff, J. in Emperor v. Jiban Krishan (8) it appears that in the trial
“on six counts with three separate embezzlements under S. 408, Penal Code, and with three corresponding falsifications under S. 477-A”
8. There was a conviction in the Calcutta High Court on each count. The decision on which the Advocate for the petitioner relies proceeds on the view that S. 234 and S. 235 are mutually exclusive, to use the expression of Tudball, J. in Sheo Saran Lal v. Emperor (9). Now S. 233 provides that for every distinct offence of which any person, is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately, except in the cases mentioned in Ss. 234, 235, 236 and 239. There is no apparent reason for holding that these four exceptional cases are mutually exclusive. Certainly there is no more reason for holding that Ss. 234 and 235 are mutually exclusive that one or other of these provisions and either S. 236 or S. 239 are mutually exclusive or that S. 236 and S. 239 are so. In our view it is far more consonant with reason and the probable wishes of the legislature that in a proper case the trial of three offences under S. 409 along with the falsification of accounts with which the subject-matter of each charge is linked, should be contemplated than that it should be barred. It can be predicated that in the present case there was no prejudice to the accused and indeed it is not easily dismisseble how prejudice can arise in such a case. S. 234 permits three offences of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last to be tried at one trial. A valid trial on, charges as to three offences being thus constituted, S. 235 comes in to provide that all offences committed by the same person in the series of acts so connected together as to form the same transitions with any one of those three offences, can be tried with that offence. In principle multiplicity of trials is to be avoided. Again in order to establish one or more of the charges triable at one trial under S. 234 it is frequently essential or expedient to produce all the evidence necessary and sufficient to establish the other offences referred to in S. 235(1). There being ordirily no likelihood that the accused would in the circumstances, be embarrassed in his defence, it is hard to believe that this evidence is only to have effect as to one of these offences committed in the same transaction: One would expect the legislature at least to permit a joint trial of all the offences in the series forming the same transaction in spite of the fact that one of the offences of the series is by another provision triable along with two other offences of the same kind. We consider that it has done so and we can see no reason why Ss. 234 and 235 are not to be regarded as cumulative in their effect an a proper case.
9. In our view, even if the first submission of the learned Government Advocate had failed the trials at which the petitioner was convicted were validity constituted, there being no misjoinder of charges.
10. We accordingly discharge the rule.
K.S
11. Rue discharged.