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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Acts
  • Sections 11 or 13 of the Evidence Act.
  • Sections 35 or 36, of the Evidence Act.
  • SECTION 9 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order XXIII, Rule 1 (2) of the Code,
  • Order XXIII, Rule 1 (2),
  • Order XXIII, Rule 1,
  • O XXIII, Rule 1 (3).
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 11 or 13 of the Evidence Act.
  • Sections 35 or 36, of the Evidence Act.
  • SECTION 9 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order XXIII, Rule 1 (2) of the Code,
  • Order XXIII, Rule 1 (2),
  • Order XXIII, Rule 1,
  • O XXIII, Rule 1 (3).
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge of Sylhet affirming a decree for possession passed by the learned Munsif, Second Court, Sylhet, in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. The plaintiffs are described in three groups: the first group claim title to the land (rooted in a purchase from one Rajani Kanta and also by adverse possession), the second and third groups claim as tenants and sub-tenants of the first group. The Additional Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the title they set up but had acquired title by adverse possession.

Procedurally, the defendants previously instituted a suit in 1927 under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and succeeded. The plaintiffs then instituted suit No. 1467 of 1928 seeking similar reliefs; that suit was withdrawn by order Ex. H dated November 14, 1929, which permitted withdrawal "with liberty to bring a fresh one unless barred as prayed for" and imposed costs to be paid within one month as a condition precedent to instituting a fresh suit. The plaintiffs did not pay those costs before instituting the present suit (instituted January 23, 1930) nor within the one-month period. The defendants raised an objection to maintainability in their written statement; an issue was framed and both lower courts decided that issue in favour of the plaintiffs (though on different grounds). The plaintiffs paid the costs into Court on January 5, 1931 (about a year after institution and eight days before the Munsif’s judgment). A payment order was passed on March 10, 1931; the defendants filed an appeal to the learned District Judge on March 11, 1931.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit was maintainable notwithstanding non-compliance with the condition in Ex. H requiring payment of the costs (within the prescribed time) as a condition precedent to bringing a fresh suit.
  2. Whether a chitta prepared by a zemindar in the year 1294 (a private document) was admissible evidence to support the plaintiffs' case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Non-compliance with the terms of the withdrawal order Ex. H (specifically that costs were to be paid within one month) meant that the present suit could not be entertained (i.e., it was barred or the Court lacked jurisdiction to try it).
  • The finding supporting the plaintiffs' possession was based partly on inadmissible evidence — specifically, a chitta prepared by the zemindar in the year 1294 — and that such a document should not have been admitted.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments in favour of the respondents beyond the factual and evidentiary materials discussed by the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ekcowrie Singh v. Heeralal Seal (11 WRPC ... : 12 MIA 136 ...) It is dangerous to admit in evidence a chitta prepared by a private person as against a third person without further account, introduction or verification. The Court acknowledged this caution but distinguished the present case because the chitta had been produced in a prior suit (1901), was found genuine and was corroborated by documentary and oral evidence; the Court therefore overruled the objection based on this precedent.
Sudukhina v. Raj Mohan (3 BLRAC 381) Observations (by Hobhouse, J.) relevant to the admissibility/corroboration of chittas and similar documents. The Court said its view on admissibility was justified by Hobhouse, J.'s observations in this case and relied on that support in admitting the chitta here.
Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury v. Deb Nath Barna (64 Ind. Cas. 738 : AIR 1920 Cal. 897) Authority holding that where a withdrawal order contains a condition as to payment of costs (including where a time limit is fixed), failure to comply prevents institution of a fresh suit; treated as binding in similar circumstances. The Court regarded this decision as directly on point ("on all fours") and binding; accordingly the Court applied it and dismissed the appeal, notwithstanding the judge's personal inclination that the suit might not be maintainable.
Hari Nath Dass v. Syed Hossain Ali (2 CLJ 480 : 10 CWN 8) Held that if costs were not paid within the time limit in such an order of withdrawal, the withdrawal must be taken as without permission to bring a new suit and the new suit would be barred under Order XXIII, Rule 1(3). The Court cited this case for the proposition that non-payment within the prescribed time can bar the fresh suit; used to illustrate the line of authorities treating the condition as jurisdictional.
Abdul v. Ebrahim (31 C 965) and Shidramappa v. Malappa (55 B 206 : 133 Ind. Cas. 256 : 33 Bom. LR 278 : AIR 1931 Bom. 257) Represent the the view that institution of a new suit without fulfilling the conditions is an irregular institution only (not jurisdictional). The Court referred to these authorities as exemplifying the contrary position (that non-compliance produces irregularity only) but indicated disagreement with that view in its analysis of the authorities it preferred.
Rachpal Singh v. Sheo Ratan ; Robert Fischer v. Nagappa ; Seshayya v. Subhayya (47 MLJ 646 : 82 Ind. Cas. 499 : AIR 1924 Mad. 877 ...) Cases cited in the discussion of conflicting views on whether non-payment of costs in conditional withdrawal orders renders a subsequent suit barred or merely irregular. The Court cited these cases as part of the body of authorities expressing the "irregular only" viewpoint and addressed them in contrasting the reasoning of different High Courts.
Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad (19 CLJ 529 : 23 Ind. Cas. 210 : AIR 1914 Cal. 207) Principle (formulated by Sir Lawrence Jenkins) about construction of withdrawal-with-leave orders: where no time limit is fixed, the leave and the withdrawal order should be construed as a single order; the Court can attach conditions to leave to sue again and those conditions are to be treated as accepted or rejected by the plaintiff at the time. The Court explained that the decision in Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury proceeds upon this principle; the Court relied on the Jenkins formulation to justify treating conditional withdrawal orders (with time limits or conditions) as potentially barring a later suit if conditions are not met.
Syed Qazi Muhammad v. Lachman Singh (5 Pat. 306 : 96 Ind. Cas. 942 : AIR 1926 Pat. 409) Supportive citation regarding construction of withdrawal-with-leave orders and the attachment of conditions to leave to sue again. Referred to by the Court in explaining the Jenkins approach and how conditional leave to sue again should be interpreted.
Mohant Biharidasji v. Parshotamdas (32 B 345 : 10 Bom. LR 293) Authority (cited via Jenkins, C.J.) that a plaintiff can withdraw his suit at any moment and does not require permission to withdraw; but leave to sue again is a distinct matter upon which conditions can be attached. Cited in support of the reasoning that withdrawal and leave to sue again are distinct concepts and that conditions attached to leave are effective if accepted by the plaintiff.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed two principal matters: the admissibility of the chitta of 1294 and the maintainability of the present suit in light of the conditional withdrawal order Ex. H.

On admissibility of the chitta:

  • The chitta was prepared by predecessors of the plaintiffs of the first group and recorded the lands in the possession of their tenants (predecessors of the second group and one Keramat for the third group).
  • The plaintiffs corroborated the chitta with collection papers showing rent realisation over a series of years and examined witnesses to prove the realization and the possession of the persons recorded in the chitta.
  • The Court concluded that under Sections 11 or 13 of the Evidence Act the chitta could be admissible in the circumstances of corroboration; it noted that Sections 35 or 36 (which govern public documents) did not apply because the chitta was not prepared by a public servant in discharge of duty.
  • Although Ekcowrie Singh v. Heeralal Seal warns against admitting privately prepared chittas without further verification, the current chitta had been produced in an earlier suit (1901), found genuine, and was corroborated by substantial documentary and oral evidence. The Court also relied on Hobhouse, J.’s observations in Sudukhina v. Raj Mohan to support admissibility. Consequently, the Court overruled the appellant's objection to the chitta's admissibility.

On maintainability under the conditional withdrawal order (Ex. H):

  • The Court observed divergent views among the High Courts of India and inconsistent prior decisions of this Court on whether non-compliance with a conditional withdrawal order (requiring payment of costs) renders a subsequent suit barred (jurisdictional defect) or merely irregular.
  • The Court noted that in Ex. H a time limit (one month) was specified as a condition precedent to bringing a fresh suit and that the plaintiffs did not pay the costs within that time before instituting the fresh suit.
  • The Court reviewed authorities: some (e.g., Hari Nath Dass) hold non-payment within the time limit makes the withdrawal without permission and bars the new suit under Order XXIII, Rule 1(3); several High Courts (Allahabad, Madras, Bombay) treat the condition as jurisdictional so that subsequent payment cannot confer jurisdiction; other authorities treat the defect as irregular only.
  • The Court stated it was bound by the decision of Mukherjee, A.C.J. and Fletcher, J. in Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury v. Deb Nath Barna (AIR 1920 Cal. 897), which applies the principle formulated by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad: where leave to sue again is granted with conditions the order must be read as a single order and the plaintiff, having accepted the order (and its terms), cannot later disregard non-performance of the conditions.
  • The Court explained the Jenkins rationale: a plaintiff may withdraw at will, but when he seeks leave to sue again the court's permission is a distinct element and the court may attach conditions; if the plaintiff accepts the conditional leave, failure to perform those conditions does not wipe the order from the record.
  • Although the presiding judge expressed personal inclination that the suit might not be maintainable, because Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury was binding, the Court applied that authority and dismissed the appeal. The Court also noted that its comments were made with an awareness that cases in which no time limit is fixed may possibly be distinguishable, but that was not the posture of the present case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeal. The precise order in the opinion is that "The appeal is accordingly dismissed without costs but leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree for possession affirmed below stands; the appeal is dismissed and no costs are awarded against the successful party at this stage, but the appellants are granted leave to appeal under the Letters Patent (i.e., permission to seek further review by the higher court).
  • On precedent and broader law: The Court treated itself as bound by prior authority (Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury v. Deb Nath Barna) and applied that rule to the factual situation (a withdrawal order containing a time-limited condition precedent to instituting a fresh suit). The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle; rather, it applies existing precedents and notes divergence in authority while following the binding decision. The Court also clarified its reasoning on admissibility of a privately prepared chitta where there is significant corroboration, relying on established evidentiary principles and existing case law.

    Abdul Khaleque v. Susil Chandra Chaudhury And Ors.

    1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate of Sylhet affirming the decree for possession passed by the learned Munsif, Second Court, Sylhet, in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. The plaintiffs fall into 3 groups, the second and third groups claiming as tenants and sub-tenants, respectively of the plaintiffs of the first group.

    2. The root of the title of the plaintiffs of the first group, according to them, is a purchase by their predecessors from one Rajani Kanta of the lands in suit which they say are specific lands of taluq Ram bullav Nij Hissya. They also claim title by adverse possession. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the title set up by them, but they have acquired title by adverse possession.

    3. It appears from the record that the defendants instituted a suit in the year 1927 against the plaintiffs for possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and succeeded therein. The plaintiffs thereupon instituted a suit being No. 1467 of 1928 asking for the same reliefs as in this suit, based on the same cause of action. That suit was not proceeded with but was permitted to be withdrawn. The order for withdrawal dated November 14, 1929, is Ex. H. It is in these terms. The plaintiff be permitted to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh one unless barred as prayed for. Defendant will get costs which must be paid within one month as a condition precedent to the fresh suit. This order is quoted at p. 12 of the paper book but there is a slight mistake as to punctuation. These costs were not paid before the institution of the suit out of which the appeal arises nor within one month of the date of Ex. H. The present suit was instituted on January 23, 1930, and in the written statement which was filed shortly after an objection was taken as to its maintainability on the ground that the costs had not been paid in terms of Ex. H. An issue was framed on the said objection, but both the lower Courts have decided that issue in favour of the plaintiffs but on different grounds. It is only at the time of the hearing before the Munsif, about a year after the institution of the suit, that the plaintiff paid in Court the costs of the suit of 1928. The date of payment into Court is January 5, 1931. The Munsif pronounced his judgment eight days later. On March 10, 1931, a payment order was passed in favour of the defendants and I take it that the defendants received the amount thereafter. They filed the appeal to the learned District Judge on March 11, 1931.

    4. Two points have been urged before me by the learned Advocate for the appellant. The first is that the terms of the order Ex. H not having been complied with this suit cannot be entertained and the second is that the finding relating to the possession of the plaintiffs has been based partly on inadmissible evidence, namely on a chitta prepared by the zemindar in the year 1294. I do not consider the second point to be of any substance, but the first requires serious consideration.

    5. The chitta of 1294 was prepared by the predecessors of the plaintiffs of the first group and recorded the lands in suit in the possession of their tenants, that is of the predecessors of the plaintiffs of the second group and of one Keramat, the landlord of plaintiffs, of the third group. In corroboration of the chitta the plaintiffs of the first group proved collection papers for a series of years to show realisation of rent from the persons recorded as tenants in the chitta and examined witnesses to prove such realization and the possession of the said person as their tenants. I do not see why the chitta under these circumstances would not be admissible in evidence either under Sections 11 or 13 of the Evidence Act. No doubt the chitta being one not prepared by a public servant in the discharge of his duty or under the authority of the government cannot come in under Sections 35 or 36, of the Evidence Act. In Ekcowrie Singh v! Heeralal Seal 11 WRPC 2 : 12 MIA 136 : 2 BLR 4 : 2 Suther 171 : 2 Sar. 399 (PC), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee ruled that it would be dangerous to admit in evidence a chitta prepared by a private person as against a third person without further "account, introduction or verification." In the case before me the chitta in question was produced in a suit of 1901, has been found to be genuine and corroborated by a mass of documentary and oral evidence. The view I take is justified by the observations made by Hobhouse, J. in Sudukhina v. Raj Mohan 3 BLRAC 381. I accordingly overrule this contention of the appellant.

    6. Regarding the first point, the High Courts of India have taken divergent views and the views taken by this Court on different occasions are hardly consistent with each other. I am bound by the decision of Mukherjee, A. C.J. and Fletcher, J. in the case of Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury v. Deb Nath Barna Bipra 64 Ind. Cas. 738 64 Ind. Cas. 738 : AIR 1920 Cal. 897. which is on all fours with the case before me and on that ruling I am bound to dismiss this appeal, but my own inclination is that this suit would not be maintainable. In making my observations I have in view that limited class of cases where a time limit is placed for the payment of the costs in the conditional order made under Order XXIII, Rule 1 (2) of the Code, for those cases in which no time limit is fixed may possibly stand on a different footing. In the case of Hari Nath Dass v. Syed Hossain Ali 2 CLJ 480 : 10 CWN 8, it was held without assigning practically any reason that if the costs were not paid within the time limit prescribed in such an order of withdrawal, the withdrawal must be taken as without permission to bring a new suit on the same cause of action and new suit would be barred under O XXIII, Rule 1 (3). The cases decided by the High Courts of Allahabad, Madras and Bombay take the view that where the payment of costs is made a condition precedent whether a time limit for the payment is prescribed or not, the costs must be paid before the new suit is instituted, and the Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the new suit in such a case. The matter being treated as one of jurisdiction, payment at a subsequent stage would not confer jurisdiction on the Court and it would follow that no question of waiver by acceptance of the costs by the defendant paid after the institution of the new suit or out of time can arise. I do not consider the institution of the new suit without fulfilling the conditions to be an irregular institution only as was the view expressed in Abdul v. Ebrahim 31 C 965 (See Shidramappa v. Malappa 55 B 206 : 133 Ind. Cas. 256 : 33 Bom. LR 278 : AIR 1931 Bom. 257 : Ind. Rut (1931) Bom. 368, Rachpal Singh v. Sheo Ratan , Robert Fischer v. Nagappa 33 M 258 : 6 Ind. Cas. 288 : 7 MLT 225 and Seshayya v. Subhayya 47 MLJ 646 : 82 Ind. Cas. 499 : AIR 1924 Mad. 877 : 20 LW 642 : 35 MLT 62 : (1924) MWN 887. The judgment of Mukherjee, A.C.J., Fletcher J. in Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury's case, 64 Ind. Cas. 738 64 Ind. Cas. 738 : AIR 1920 Cal. 897 proceeds upon the principle formulated by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in the case of Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad 19 CLJ 529 : 23 Ind. Cas. 210 : AIR 1914 Cal. 207. In the last mentioned case no time limit was fixed for the payment of costs, but the principle formulated by Sir Lawrence Jenkins would cover such a case. The learned Chief Justice holds that where there is no express order for dismissal of the suit on non-performance of the condition attached to the order made under Order XXIII, Rule 1 (2), there is no final order determining the suit. He says in effect that the order for withdrawal with leave must be taken as one order, it is not an order for withdrawal with a separate order granting leave to institute a new suit conditional on the payment of costs, either before the new suit is instituted or before the fixed date, as the case may be, (See Mullick, J. in Syed Qazi Muhammad v. Lachman Singh 5 Pat. 306 : 96 Ind. Cas. 942 : AIR 1926 Pat. 409 : 7 PLT 491. I consider that the reasons advanced by Philips, J. in Seshayy's case 47 MLJ 646 : 82 Ind. Cas. 499 : AIR 1924 Mad. 877 : 20 LW 642 : 35 MLT 62 : (1924) MWN 887, against this view is cogent. A plaintiff can withdraw from the suit at any moment he likes. He does not require the permission or an order of the Court to do so (See Jenkins, C.J., in Mohant Biharidasji v. Parshotamdas 32 B 345 : 10 Bom. L.R 293. It is only when he applies for leave to institute a new suit on the same cause of action that an order of the Court granting such leave is necessary. The Court can attach any condition, and the condition must be taken to be attached to the leave to sue that is prayed for. An order of the character I have in this suit, which does not specifically state that on default of payment of costs within the time fixed, the suit will stand dismissed, must be construed in terms of Order XXIII, Rule 1, para. 2. When an application for withdrawal with leave to sue again is made and the Court attaches a condition the plaintiff is at liberty to say then and there that he does not accept the condition. In that case the Court has to proceed with the suit dismissing the plaintiffs application for withdrawal with leave to sue again. But if after such an order the plaintiff takes no further steps for the prosecution of his suit, he must be taken to have accepted the conditional order. He cannot be heard to say afterwards that an order which he accepted but the terms of which he has not or could not comply with later on must be taken to be wiped off from the record. The intention of the Court to put a time limit for the payment of costs is to settle the position of the parties within a reasonable time and not to keep the defendant in suspense of a further attack on him, which, according to the view taken in the later cases of this Court which I have noticed above, may be launched many years later, may be till the last date of limitation for the suit. In this view of the matter my opinion is that the view taken by the Allahabad, Bombay and Madras High Court are sound. At one time I thought of sending the case to the Division Bench so that the matter may, if that Court thought fit, be referred to a Full Bench, but as a great deal of time had already been taken up before me, I have thought it best to consider Deb Kumar Roy Chaudhury's case 64 Ind. Cas. 73864 Ind. Cas. 738 : AIR 1920 Cal. 897, to be a binding authority on me and to dismiss the appeal giving the defendant appellants leave to appeal under the Letters Patent. The appeal is accordingly dismissed without costs but leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.

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    Abdul Khaleque v. Susil Chandra Chaudhury And Ors.
    (Nov 23, 1934)