The respondent in both these appeals, is one Subbayya, the adopted son of Ramachandrudu. He was dissatisfied with his father's misconduct and spendthrift ways andconsequently, wanted to file a suit for partition of the family property. Ashe had not sufficient funds to finance this litigation, he entered into relations with the appellant Seshayya, who is a private vakil. On the 1st of November, 1916, Subbayya executed a sale deed in favour of Seshayya for Es. 1,000, under which he sold one half of his share in the family properties. Admittedly the consideration was fixed at a low figure, on the ground that Subbayya's father was wasting the family property and alienating the same and that consequently the properties that would be recovered for Subbayya's share might be considerably less than what he really ought to have. It is found that Seshayya paid a sum of Rs. 600 towards the consideration for the sale deed, and a suit was filed by Subbayya and Seshayya jointly in 1918. A decree was obtained under which Subbayya was to get as his half share of the property all the properties which had not been alienated by his father, leaving the validity of the alienations undetermined. Before the decree was passed, Subbayya agreed to certain items being decreed in favour of Seshayya and the remainder was to fall to his share. Subsequently, Subbayya appears to have thought that he had been defrauded and he filed a suit O. S. No. 641 of 1919, to set aside the sale deed in favour of Seshayya. That suit was withdrawn, with leave to bring a fresh suit, on condition of Subbayya paying the costs of the suit. Subbayya then filed his present suit, O. S. No. 195 of 1921, in which no again seeks to set aside the sale deed. Seshayya has also filed a suit, O. S. No. 505 of 1921, in which he seeks to recover the property decreed to him, in the prior litigation, alleging that he obtained delivery through Court of the property decreed to him, but that subsequently the plaintiff has obstructed his enjoyment. Subbayya's suit has been decreed and at the same time Seshayya has been given a charge upon the properties for Rs. 600 with interest, Seshayya's suit for possession has been dismissed. Hence these two appeals.
The first point for consideration is whether Subbayya's suit is not barred by reason of O. 23, Civil Procedure Code; for it is admitted that he did not pay the costs of his first suit, until after the close of the trial in the present suit; and it is contended that he is precluded from filing a fresh suit until he has complied with the condition imposed. In Fischer v. Nagappa Mudaly, it was held that, when an order had been made giving permission to bring a fresh suit, on condtion of paying the costs before a specified date, a subsequent suit was barred, if the costs had not been paid, by that date. That case differs from the present, in that the date was specified for payment of costs, whereas the order in the case under consideration does not specify any date. Without expressing any opinion, as to the correctness of the decision in Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla, that case was distinguished. In that case, it was held that subsequent payment of costs was sufficient to warrant the reception and trial of a fresh suit, which had been allowed to be brought, on condition of those costs being paid. In that case, the costs were paid before the suit was tried. This has been followed in a later case, reported in Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad. where the question is discussed somewhat fully and the reasoning adopted for the conclusion is as follows: It is said that, inasmuch as permission to withdraw and bring a fresh suit is made conditional on a certain payment, the original suit cannot be deemed to be withdrawn, until those costs have been paid and it must, therefore, be deemed to be a pending suit, which becomes disposed of, as soon as payment is made. This case was followed in Kuldip Singh… v. Kuldip Choudhuri…. and also in Deb Kumar Roy v. Debnath Barna; but I can find no authority in this Court, for holding this view which, with all respect, appears to me to be incorrect. These cases all assume that the permission granted by the Court is not only permission to bring a fresh suit, but also permission to withdraw the first suit and that consequently until the condition is fulfilled, the first suit is pending. This seems to me to overlook the provisions of O. 23 R. 1 (1), which gives a plaintiff power to withdraw his suit at any time, without the permission of the Court. Consequently, I think that we must read the latter part of Cl. 2 (b), as referring not to permission to withdraw a suit, as well as permission to institute a fresh suit, but merely as allowing the Court to give permission to institute a fresh suit, in place of the one, which has been withdrawn. In as much as the withdrawal of the suit does not require the permission of the Court, it must be taken, that the first suit is withdrawn, when the order is passed and that the permission granted refers only to the filing of the subsequent suit on certain conditions. If the first suit it still pending, as held in the above cases, it would be open to the plaintiff to obtain permission under O. 23 and instead of complying with the conditions of that per. mission, to go to the Court and demand that the trial in his first suit should be proceeded with and this could be done, however long the interval might be. For these reasons I am unable to accept the view that the first suit is still pending; for it has been withdrawn and that withdrawal, in my opinion, takes effect from the date of the Court's order. If the Calcutta view were to be applied in the present case, it would appear, as observed in those judgments, that the trial of a second suit is barred under Sect. 10, Civil Procedure Code, until the first suit is disposed of, by performance of the condition imposed by the order granting leave. In the present case, therefore, the whole of the trial of the suit, which took place before the costs were paid, would be bad under Sect. 10, Civil Procedure Code, for want of jurisdiction and the whole suit would have to be tried again. There is another case, reported in Sajjad Hossain v. Ram Lal Shahu, where it was held that payment might be made after the institution of the suit but that the suit would not be deemed to be validly instituted, until the date of such payment. In the view that I take, I would follow Fischer v. Nagappa Mudaly and hold that it extends, as was held in Hari Nath Dass v. Sued Hossain Ali and Subal Chandra v. Mosaraf Ali to cases where no time is fixed for fulfilling the condition.
In support of the view held by the Calcutta High Court, reference has been made to other cases, in which similar conditions were held not to be mandatory Ramayyangar v. Krishnayyangar with reference to the provisions of Sect. 539, Civil Procedure Code, Ammukutty v. Manavikraman with reference to the permission necessary to bring a suit against a receivers and Mohammad Azmat Ali Khan v. Lalli Begum, with reference to the certificate requisite for bringing a suit, under the Pensions Act. I do not attach much importance to these cases; for in all of them, the Court prima facie has jurisdiction to try such suits, and beyond imposing a condition precedent, none of the provisions referred to takes away the jurisdiction of the Courts; whereas under O. 23, R. 2 (3), a Court is definitely precluded from entertaining a second suit, when no permission has been granted. Unless, therefore, permission has been given, a Court is specifically forbidden to entertain a second suit.
In this view, Subbayya's suit is barred, under O. 23 and must be dismissed. Second Appeal No. 203 must therefore be allowed and the suit dismissed with costs throughout, to be paid by 1st respondent.
As regards Second Appeal No. 204, the Subordinate Judge has found that the sale deed in favour of Seshayya is “vitiated by undue influence and fraud and cannot be enforced” and, consequently has dismissed the suit, “which is based upon it.” I may observe here that the suit is not based upon the sale deed, but upon the decree obtained in pursuance of that sale dead, namely, the decree in C. S. No. 12 of 1918. In giving his finding, the Subordinate Judge does not definitely specify the facts, which he finds to be sufficient, to prove undue influence and fraud. In the plaint, the plaintiff stated that the sale deed was brought about, owing to several misrepresentations, specified in paragraph 4; but there is no finding by the Subordinate Judge that these misrepresentations were made, and apparently the statements set out in the plaint are substantially correct. The cases relied upon, by the Subordinate Judge, for holding that the sale deed is invalid, are merely cases in which the transactions were set aside as being hard, unconscionable and opposed to public policy, Chunni Kuar…(Plaintiff); v. Rup Singh…(Defendant).*. It has been held that in this country champerty is not necessarily opposed to public policy; and in considering whether champertous agreements should be set aside, it has to be considered whether such an agreement is extortionate and unconscionable, or one made for the purpose of gambling in litigation, or of injuring or oppressing others, by encouraging unrighteous suits, in which case it would be contrary to public policy and unenforceable. These facts do not seem to have been considered by the Subordinate Judge. He has not found what the facts were, which made the bargain unconscionable, or otherwise opposed to public policy, He finds that property worth Rs. 2,000 was sold for Rs. 1,000 and that Rs. 600 cash was actually paid as consideration. The properties, which have passed under the sale deed are no doubt worth Rs. 2,000; but it was by no means certain that the plaintiff's suit would be successful, or at any rate, successful to such a large extent. Half of the family property had been alienated and if those alienations had been found to be valid, Subbayya's share would have come to Rs. 1,000 or less, the consideration agreed to be paid, to which must be added additional compensation for Seshayya's trouble and knowledge of litigation. Here again, I must note that the Subordinate Judge has not discussed the question, whether the decree in pursuance of the sale deed was obtained by fraud. There is no such allegation in the plaint, but the Subordinate Judge seems to hold in paragraph 7 of his judgment that the undue influence exercised in the suit was that of the plaintiff's vakil, who is not a party to this litigation, and not the influence of Seshayya; and he has also omitted to notice that Subbayya did not pray to have the decree set aside, although an amendment was asked for, but refused by the District Munsif. There are other points to be considered also, in this appeal, which have not been dealt with, by the Subordinate Judge, one of these being, whether Seshayya's remedy was by suit or by execution proceedings. It was on this latter ground, that the District Munsif dismissed his suit, without giving him an opportunity of treating the suit, as an execution petition. It would also be necessary to consider what effect the dismissal of Subbayya's suit will have upon Seshayya's suit; for in execution proceedings a claim by Seshayya to these properties was allowed: vide Ex. VI, and it has to be considered whether that was not a final adjudication of the rights of the parties. Appeal No. 99 of 1922 will accordingly be remanded for fresh disposal, in the light of the above remarks. Costs in this Court will abide the result.
Court fee in Second Appeal No. 204 of 1923 will be refunded.
W.S.SS. A. No. 203 of 1923 allowed: S. A. No. 204 of 1923 remanded.