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  • S. 116 of the Madras Estates Land Act
  • S. 112 of the Madras Estates Land Act,
  • Art. 12(b) of the Limitation Act,
  • S. 149 of the Estates Land Act.
  • Madras Estates Land Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • S. 116 of the Madras Estates Land Act
  • S. 112 of the Madras Estates Land Act,
  • Art. 12(b) of the Limitation Act,
  • S. 149 of the Estates Land Act.
  • Madras Estates Land Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by The Chief Justice)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns kudivaram (hereditary entitlement) interests in lanka lands measuring 217.32 acres that were jointly held by the second defendant and defendants 3 to 8 under the Madras Estates Land Act. The defendants had agreed that the second defendant would manage even-numbered faslis and defendants 3 to 8 odd-numbered faslis. In fasli 1344 (1 July 1934–30 June 1935) the first plaintiff was tenant and defaulted on rent of Rs. 993-12-0. On 2 June 1936 the second defendant initiated proceedings under S.112 of the Act (which he then had the right to do).

On 30 June 1937 (last day of fasli 1346) the first plaintiff served a written notice of relinquishment under S.149 of the Act; the second defendant received that notice on 2 July 1937. Earlier, within thirty days of receiving the S.112 notice, the first plaintiff had instituted a suit under Sub‑s. (2) of S.112 contesting the sale; that suit was dismissed on 19 April 1937. Third and fourth defendants had also contested their inclusion in the S.112 proceedings and were subsequently exonerated from the sale proceedings, which continued only against the first plaintiff.

The Deputy Collector ordered a sale under S.116 on 3 June 1937. The first plaintiff later asserted relinquishment and the Deputy Collector treated the petition as time-barred (order dated 18 August 1937). The third defendant applied (O.21 R.58 and S.151 CPC) to stop the sale alleging merger under S.8(1); the Deputy Collector dismissed that application on 5 October 1937 and a sale was fixed. The Collector dismissed revision on 16 December 1937. On 14 December 1937 the third defendant put Ramineedi Ranga Rao (father of the second plaintiff) into possession while defendants 3–8 were in management; the second defendant only learned of that possession on 22 February 1938.

A sale was held on 18 January 1938 and the second defendant purchased the kudivaram interest. Ranga Rao applied on 22 February 1938 to set aside the sale for irregularity; that petition was dismissed on 30 June 1938. On 31 October 1938 the Collector put the second defendant in possession and the second defendant granted tenancy to the first defendant.

The present suit was filed on 6 April 1942 by the plaintiffs (the second plaintiff is the son and successor of Ranga Rao). They sought declaration of their entitlement to the kudivaram right, possession and mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit as to the first plaintiff but decreed in favour of the second plaintiff, declaring him entitled to the kudivaram right and possession. The judge's stated reasons were (1) invalidity of the sale because of the first plaintiff's relinquishment and merger and (2) material irregularities in the sale's conduct. The first and second defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale of the kudivaram interest was invalid by reason of the first plaintiff's relinquishment under S.149 of the Madras Estates Land Act and consequent merger under S.8(1).
  2. Whether the suit for recovery of possession brought by the (second) plaintiff is barred by limitation, specifically whether Article 12(b) of the Limitation Act applies to bar the suit to set aside or to challenge a revenue sale.
  3. Whether, alternatively, the sale was vitiated by material irregularities in its conduct (note: the High Court determined it was unnecessary to decide this point because it found invalidity on the ground of relinquishment/merger).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (First and Second Defendants)

  • It was argued that the suit is governed by Article 12(b) of the Limitation Act and therefore barred: Article 12(b) prescribes that a suit to set aside a sale in pursuance of a decree or order of a Collector or other revenue officer must be brought within one year from the date when the sale is confirmed or would otherwise have become final.
  • Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, appearing for the appellants, relied on the judgment in Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari as authority for the application of Art.12(b) to such suits.
  • The defendants (appellants) also pleaded limitation in the Subordinate Court, which the Subordinate Judge had rejected; they renewed the appeal on that ground.

Other Parties' Pleadings and Contentions

  • The third and fourth defendants had contended in earlier proceedings that they had been unjustly included in the S.112 notice and that rent due could be recovered from the holding and the defaulting ryot rather than by sale of the kudivaram interest; as a result they were exonerated from the sale proceedings.
  • The first plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit in the O.21/R.58/S.151 application saying he had surrendered his tenancy and was unnecessarily made a party.

The opinion contains the parties' core contentions relevant to the issues but does not set out exhaustive argumentation or all procedural pleas in detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari Held that a suit to set aside a revenue sale after one year (after expiry of 30 days from date of sale) is barred under Art.12(b) of the Limitation Act. Relied upon by appellants; the Court acknowledged it as binding authority that it would follow if Art.12(b) applied to the case, but ultimately did not apply Art.12(b) on other grounds.
Kootoorlingam Pillai v. Sennappa Reddiar Ramesam, J. indicated that a sale held according to Ss.111–131 is not a sale "in pursuance of an order of the Collector" and thus does not fall within Art.12(b). The Court noted Ramesam, J.'s unwillingness to accept Kamalammal; the opinion records that Ramesam did not attempt to distinguish Kamalammal but intimated non-acceptance of it.
Subbayya v. Kristayya Devadoss, J. took the view that a sale under Ss.111–131 does not fall within Art.12(b) because it is not in pursuance of a Collector's order. Referred to as one of the authorities expressing the view that Art.12(b) does not apply to such revenue sales; the Court discussed the conflict among authorities.
Satyanarayana v. Rayalamma Abdur Rahman, J. expressed the view that a sale under Ss.111–131 does not fall within Art.12(b). The Court notes previous statements as part of the conflict of authority; it also observes an erroneous characterization of Ramesam, J.'s approach in earlier remarks.
Kader Husain v. Husain Sahib (Full Bench) Held that Article 12(a) was not applicable where dispossession was the cause of action and the plaintiff was not a party to, or bound by, the sale (i.e., true owner not bound by sale to which he was not a party). The Court relied on this decision (and companion authorities) to conclude Art.12(b) could not be applied to bar the present suit; used as a primary authority for limitation analysis.
Jwala Sahai v. Masiat Khan (Allahabad High Court) Where immovable property was sold as belonging to a person to whom it did not belong and the true owner had no notice, the true owner could treat the sale as a nullity and sue for recovery of possession within twelve years. Adopted by the Court as supporting authority that a dispossessed true owner not party to the sale may sue outside the one-year period of Art.12(b); it supports the Court's limitation conclusion.
Kedarnath Goenka v. Ram Narain Lal (Privy Council) Express approval of the principle in Jwala Sahai (that the true owner may treat an erroneous sale as nullity and bring suit within the ordinary period for dispossession). The Court cited this approval to reinforce the proposition that the present suit, being one for dispossession of a person not party to the sale, was not barred by Art.12(b).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main analytical strands: (A) validity of the sale in light of the relinquishment and merger provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act; and (B) the question of limitation under the Limitation Act.

A. Relinquishment, Merger and Validity of the Sale

  • The Court observed that S.149 of the Madras Estates Land Act gives every ryot an absolute right to relinquish his holding (subject to compliance with formalities) effective from the end of a revenue year. S.187(1)(f) expressly states that the right of relinquishment cannot be taken away by contract between landholder and ryot.
  • Admitting that the first plaintiff's notice dated 30 June 1937 complied with S.149, the Court held the first plaintiff acted within his statutory rights; therefore the kudivaram right of the first plaintiff had vested in the landholders (the second defendant and defendants 3–8), i.e., there had been a merger within the meaning of S.8(1).
  • Because the kudivaram right had vested in the landholders by relinquishment, the second defendant had no right to apply for the sale of that right under the procedure employed; the second defendant's remedy for recovery of rent due for fasli 1344 was by suit under S.77, not by sale of the kudivaram interest.
  • The Court concluded that the sale was invalid for that reason: there could be no charge in favour of the landholders (or any of them) as the kudivaram right had vested in them by relinquishment. Consequently, the sale could not affect the rights of the second plaintiff, who was never made a party to the sale proceedings.
  • The Court expressly stated that, given this finding, it was unnecessary to decide whether there were material irregularities in the conduct of the sale (a ground on which the Subordinate Judge had also relied).

B. Limitation — Applicability of Article 12(b) of the Limitation Act

  • The appellants contended that Article 12(b) barred the suit; they relied on Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari which held that a suit to set aside a revenue sale is barred as per Art.12(b) if not brought within the specified period.
  • The Court reviewed the conflicting authorities: some High Court judgments (Devadoss, Ramesam and Abdur Rahman, JJ.) had indicated that sales under Ss.111–131 do not fall within Art.12(b) because such sales are not in "pursuance of an order of the Collector" (Collector's role being to direct the sale rather than conduct it). The Court observed differences in reasoning among those decisions and noted that one of them (Ramesam, J.) had signalled non-acceptance of Kamalammal.
  • Rather than resolving that conflict directly, the Court held that Article 12(b) could not be applied in the present case for the reasons given in the cited authorities Kader Husain v. Husain Sahib, Jwala Sahai v. Masiat Khan and Kedarnath Goenka v. Ram Narain Lal:
    • These authorities support the proposition that when the true owner (or a person entitled) is dispossessed and was not a party to or bound by the sale, the dispossessed person may treat the sale as a nullity and sue for recovery of possession under the ordinary limitation for dispossession (e.g., within twelve years), rather than being confined by Art.12(b)'s one-year period for setting aside a sale.
  • The Court also noted a statutory development: S.116 of the Madras Estates Land Act was amended in 1934 to direct the Collector expressly to order the sale, which altered the landscape of earlier judicial opinions. The Court stated that, had it considered Art.12(b) applicable, it would nonetheless have followed Kamalammal if necessary as binding, but given the authorities and the facts, Art.12(b) was not applicable here.
  • Importantly, the Court characterized the present suit as one for recovery of possession (on the ground of wrongful dispossession) and not a suit merely to set aside the sale; the second plaintiff was dispossessed on 31 October 1938 and the suit was filed within four years of that dispossession, so it lay within the permissible limitation period for recovery of possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The High Court affirms the Subordinate Judge's decree in favour of the second plaintiff (the second respondent) declaring him entitled to the kudivaram right and to possession. Costs are awarded in favour of the second plaintiff.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The sale conducted on 18 January 1938 is held to be invalid as against the second plaintiff by reason of the first plaintiff's valid relinquishment under S.149 and the resulting merger under S.8(1); therefore the second plaintiff's dispossession is wrongful.
  • The plaintiffs' suit for recovery of possession was timely (filed within four years of dispossession) and succeeds in respect of the second plaintiff.
  • The Subordinate Judge's finding of possible irregularity in the sale was not necessary to the decision and thus the Court did not adjudicate upon that ground.
  • The plaintiffs' cross-objections were not pressed and are dismissed with costs in favour of the appellants.

The opinion does not purport to establish a broad new precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authority and statutes; its decision rests on statutory interpretation of S.149 and S.8(1) of the Madras Estates Land Act and the application of established principles concerning limitation in cases where the plaintiff was not a party to the sale.

    Vajapayajula Venkateswarlu And Another v. Pegadimilli Viraswami And Others.

    (Delivered by The Chief Justice.)

    The facts in this case are complicated, but they are not in dispute. The contest is with regard to their effect in law.

    At all times material to the suit out of which this appeal arises the second defendant and defendants 3 to 8 jointly held as landholders within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act certain lanka lands measuring 217.32 acres. It was agreed between these defendants that the second defendant should have the right of managing the lands in faslis ending with an even number and that defendants 3 to 8 should have the same right in faslis ending in an odd number. In fasli 1344 (1st July 1934 to 30th June 1935) the first plaintiff was the tenant of the lands and it being an even fasli the second defendant was lawfully in charge of them. The first plaintiff failed to pay the rent due for that year and on the 2nd June 1936 the second defendant started proceedings under S. 112 of the Madras Estates Land Act, which he had then the right to do. The amount due by the first plaintiff in respect of rent was Rs. 993-12-0. On the 30th June 1937, that is the last day of fasli 1346 the first plaintiff gave notice under S. 149 to all the co-landholders of his resolve to relinquish his tenancy. The notice served upon the second defendant was admittedly received by him on the 2nd July 1937. Within thirty days of the receipt of the notice served upon him under S. 112, the first plaintiff instituted a suit under Sub-S. 2 contesting the right of the second defendant to proceed with the sale. This suit was dismissed on the 19th April 1937.

    The third and fourth defendants had received notice under S. 112 of the second defendant's intention to sell and they also filed a suit under Sub-S. 2. They maintained that they had been unjustly included in the notice and that the rent due to the second defendant could be recovered by proceeding against the holding and the defaulting ryot. As the result of their protest they were exonerated from the proceedings which were continued merely against the first plaintiff as the ryot concerned. On the 3rd June 1937 the Deputy Collector passed an order for sale under S. 116. On the 10th August 1937 the first plaintiff filed a memorandum saying that he had relinquished his interest in the holding under S. 149 and therefore he was no longer interested in the proceedings. On the 18th August 1937 the Deputy Collector passed this order: “The petition for relinquishment is time barred under S. 149 of the Estates Land Act. File with S.A No. 2 of 1346.”

    S.A No. 2 of 1346 was the application filed by the second defendant under S. 114 after the first plaintiff's suit under S. 112(2) had been dismissed. The order is difficult to understand as there was no question of limitation. Learned Counsel have not been able to throw any light upon the matter.

    On the 20th August 1937 the third defendant, on behalf of himself and defendants 4 to 8, filed an application purporting to be made under O. 21, R. 58 and S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure asking that the sale be stopped and all proceedings dropped. The basis of this application was that as the result of the first plaintiff's relinquishment of his tenancy there had been a merger within the meaning of S. 8(1). Pending the hearing of the application the sale was stayed. In these proceedings the first plaintiff filed a counter affidavit saying that he had unnecessarily been made a party because he had surrendered his tenancy. By an order dated 5th October 1937 the Deputy Collector dismissed the third defendant's application and cancelled the stay order. By an order dated the 29th October 1937 he ordered the selling officer to sell the holding before the 24th December 1937. On the 1st November 1937 the selling officer fixed the sale for the 23rd December 1937.

    On the 13th November, 1937 the third defendant filed an application asking the Collector to revise the Deputy Collector's order of the 5th October, 1937. The Collector dismissed this application on the 16th December, 1937 and discharged an interim stay order which he had passed. On the 27th December 1937 the Collector's order was communicated to the selling officer, who thereupon fixed the sale for the 18th January 1938. On the 15th January 1938 the first plaintiff asked the Deputy Collector to stay the sale on the ground that the proceedings were invalid because there was no pattadar. This was dismissed by an order passed the next day.

    On the 14th December 1937, that is two days before the Collector dismissed his revision petition, the third defendant let Ramineedi Ranga Rao, the father of the second plaintiff, into possession. This was during fasli 1347 when defendants 3 to 8 were in management of the property. The fact that Ranga Rao had been let into possession was not known to the second defendant until the 22nd February, 1938.

    The sale was held on the 18th January 1938 and the second defendant purchased the kudivaram interest in the property. On the 22nd February, 1938 Ranga Rao applied to the Deputy Collector for an order setting aside the sale on the ground of irregularities in its conduct, but the petition was dismissed by an order passed on the 30th June, 1938. On the 31st October, 1938 the Collector put the second defendant in possession whereupon the second defendant granted a tenancy of the lands to the first defendant.

    The present suit was not filed until the 6th April 1942. In the meantime Ranga Rao had died and his interest had devolved upon his son, the second plaintiff. The two plaintiffs asked for a decree declaring that they were entitled to the kudivaram right in the lands, for possession and for mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit as regards the first plaintiff, but granted the second plaintiff a decree declaring him to be entitled to the kudivaram right and to possession of the property. His reasons for doing so were (1) the sale of the holding was invalid by reason of the relinquishment of the tenancy by the first plaintiff and (2) there had been material irregularities in the conduct of the sale. The Subordinate Judge rejected a plea advanced by the first and second defendants that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. The first and second defendants have appealed.

    By virtue of S. 149 every ryot has the right of relinquishing his holding or any part of it with effect from the end of a revenue year. The relinquishment must be by a notice in writing signed by him. His right to relinquish is absolute, subject to his compliance with the formalities required by the section and the right of the landholder to institute a suit before the Collector for indemnity against loss of rent for the revenue year next following the date of the relinquishment, unless the tenant had given notice of his intention to relinquish, before the 1st April. S. 187(1)(f) expressly states that the right of relinquishment cannot be taken away by a contract between the landholder and the ryot. Therefore the first plaintiff undoubtedly acted within his rights when on the 30th June 1937, the last day of the revenue year, he gave notice of relinquishment to the proprietors of the land. Admittedly the notice complied with all the requirements of S. 149. That being the position, the second defendant had no right to apply for the sale of the holding. The kudivaram right of the first plaintiff had vested in the second defendant and defendants 3 to 8. In other words, there was a merger within the meaning of S. 8. By reason of the relinquishment the second defendant could, of course, not be deprived of his right to recover the rent for fasli 1344, but his remedy was by way of suit under S. 77, and not otherwise. As the kudivaram right had vested in the landholders, there could be no other charge in favour of them or any of them. In these circumstances the sale was invalid and therefore could not affect the rights of the second plaintiff who at no stage was made a party to the proceedings instituted by the second defendant for the sale of the kudivaram right.

    In view of this finding it is not necessary for us to consider whether the Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the sale was also vitiated by irregularity in its conduct. It is, however, necessary to deal with the question of limitation. The argument for the appellants here is that the suit is governed by Art. 12(b) of the Limitation Act, which provides inter alia, that a suit to set aside a sale in pursuance of a decree or order of a Collector or other officer of revenue shall be brought within one year from the date when the sale is confirmed or would otherwise have become final and conclusive had no suit been brought. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar on behalf of the appellants has relied on the judgment in Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari (1). It was there held by Phillips and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., that a suit to set aside a revenue sale after one year after the expiration of thirty days from the date of sale was barred under Art. 12(b) of the Limitation Act. In Subbayya v. Kristayya(2) Devadoss, J., in Kootoorlingam Pillai v. Sennappa Reddiar(3) Ramesam J., and in Satyanarayana v. Rayalamma(4) Abdur Rahman, J., said in effect that a sale held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Ss. 111 to 131 does not fall within Art. 12(b) because it is not held in pursuance of an order of the Collector, whose function was merely to direct the selling officer to conduct the sale. Devadoss, J. did not consider Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari but Ramesam, J. did. Abdur Rahman, J. considered that Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari had been distinguished by Ramesam, J. in Kootoorlingam Pillai v. Sennappa Reddiar . This statement is erroneous. Ramesam, J. made no attempt to distinguish Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari from the case before him. Although it was quite unnecessary for him to do so for the purpose of deciding the case before him Ramesam, J., intimated that he was not prepared to accept the judgment in Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari .

    We are not called upon to discuss the conflict because we are of the opinion that Art. 12(b) cannot be applied in this case for the reasons given in Kader Husain v. Husain Sahib (5), Jwala Sahai v. Masiat Khan(6) and Kedernath Goenka v. Ram Narain Lal (7). If we had been of the opinion that the suit fell within Art. 12(b), we should have followed Kamalammal v. N. Chockalinga Asari as being binding on us even if S. 116 of the Madras Estates Land Act had remained unamended. The section was amended in 1934 and the amendment has negatived the opinion expressed by Devadoss, Ramesam and Abdur Rahman, JJ. because S. 116 now expressly directs the Collector to order the sale.

    In Kader Husain v. Husain Sahib a Full Bench of this Court held that Art. 12(a) was not applicable to a case in which dispossession was the cause of action and in which the plaintiff was not a party to, or bound by, the sale. The same view was expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Jwala Sahai v. Masiat Khan . In that case immoveable property was sold as the property of person to whom it did not belong and the person to whom it did belong had no notice of the sale. It was held that the true owner was competent to treat the sale as a nullity and to bring his suit for recovery of possession at any time within twelve years from the date when he lost possession. This decision received express approval from the Privy Council in Kedarnath Goenka v. Ram Narain Lal .

    The present suit was not one for setting aside the sale. The suit was for the recovery of possession of property from the first defendant on the ground that the second plaintiff had been wrongly dispossessed. As we have already pointed out, he was let into possession by defendants 3 to 8 when they were in lawful management of the property. He was dispossessed on the 31st October 1938 when the second defendant was given possession by the Revenue authorities by reason of his purchase at the sale held on the 18th January 1938. The sale was illegal and therefore the second plaintiff was wrongly dispossessed. As the suit was filed within four years of the dispossession it was well within time.

    The appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of the second plaintiff (the second respondent).

    The plaintiffs have each filed a memorandum of cross-objections. These are not pressed and are dismissed with costs in favour of the appellants.

    N.R.R

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    Comments

    Vajapayajula Venkateswarlu And Another v. Pegadimilli Viraswami And Others.
    (Jan 17, 1946)