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Case Number

Appeal from Original Decree No. 66 of 1925

Attorney(S)

Mr. Sambhu N. Banerji (Counsel), Babus Bhupendra Nath Das and Shyama Das Bhattacharjee for the Appellant.
Mr. C.C Biswas (Advocate) and Babu Prafulla Chandra Chakravarti for the Respondents.
Babu Krishna Lal Banerji for Respondents Nos. 2, 4 and 8.

Judges

Greaves
Mukerji, JJ.

Acts

III(b) to sec. 234 of the Succession Act,
sec. 250 of the Succession Act

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Smart Summary

Bench Opinion Summary — Mukerji, J. (with Greaves, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order refusing to revoke a grant of letters of administration. The deceased, Mrs. Benjamin, a native Christian, left surviving her three sisters, three nieces (children of a predeceased sister), and two nephews and three nieces (children of a predeceased brother). On 3 January 1924, Betty Mahbert (one of the daughters of the predeceased sister) obtained letters of administration from the District Judge and is the principal respondent. On 23 July 1924, Ranmaya Gaorangini (also called Koili and Rasidunnissa), a sister of the deceased and the appellant here, applied for revocation of that grant; her application was refused by the District Judge and she has appealed from that refusal.

The appellant's original revocation petition (23 July 1924) raised multiple grounds; only several were pressed on appeal and are dealt with in this opinion. The appeal was heard after the District Judge had disposed of the revocation application, and the appellate court now reviews the legal sufficiency of the grounds and the District Judge's conduct in refusing an adjournment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the grant of letters of administration should be revoked because two minor sons of the deceased's brother (Dhan Bahadur and Harka Bahadur) were not represented by a formally appointed guardian ad litem and therefore were not properly cited.
Whether the grant should be revoked on the basis that the administrator (Betty Mahbert) fraudulently undervalued the deceased's assets (omission of Rs. 541 standing to credit in the Forest Department and failure to show valuation of a jote).
Whether omission to issue citations to three daughters of the deceased's brother (Mankala, Ivamalmaya and Sibey) rendered the grant void and required revocation.
Whether the District Judge erred in refusing to adjourn the revocation hearing when the appellant was absent and had filed a petition citing personal misfortune and illness.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The minors Dhan Bahadur and Harka Bahadur were not properly represented because no guardian ad litem had been formally appointed; notice to their mother Hiramaya was insufficient.
The administrator (Betty Mahbert) fraudulently undervalued estate assets by omitting a sum of Rs. 541 and not listing valuation of a jote.
Three daughters of Rajman (Mankala, Ivamalmaya and Sibey) were not cited before the grant was made; this omission requires revocation of the grant under the Succession Act.
The District Judge should have granted an adjournment of the revocation hearing because the appellant was absent, having alleged recent bereavement and illness.

Respondent's Arguments

The District Judge properly refused the adjournment; the appellant's petition seeking adjournment was unsupported by affidavit and, according to other proceedings, its assertions were untrue (the respondent says the appellant's son had died earlier and she was not ill), an argument not controverted before the court.
The mother Hiramaya appeared in the proceedings and acted as mother and "next friend" of the infants; she effectively represented the minors' interests.
Section 250 of the Succession Act gives the Judge discretion to issue citations; only omission of compulsory citations (e.g., those referred to in sec.193 or sec.199) would constitute just cause for revocation under sec.234; discretionary omissions do not automatically require revocation. Reliance was placed on Digambar Keshav Srotri v. Narayan Vithal Ashtekar.
The undervaluation allegation was traversed in an objection filed on 16 September 1924, and there is nothing on record substantiating the appellant's claim of under-valuation.
The daughters who were alleged to have been omitted were made parties to the revocation proceedings and to the present appeal and have not appeared, suggesting they do not complain; accordingly the omission should not automatically invalidate the grant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Walian v. Banke Behari Pershad Singh	Support for the proposition that infants may be effectively represented by a mother/next friend who appears in proceedings, even absent a formal guardian ad litem appointment.	The court relied on this precedent to hold that the two minor sons were effectively represented by their mother Hiramaya, who appeared, participated and stated the shares for her sons; thus lack of a formal guardian ad litem did not warrant revocation on that ground.
Akhileswari Dasi v. Hari Charan Mirdha	Cited by the appellant for the broad proposition that omission to cite necessary parties may invalidate a grant (case concerned with wills and representation of minors).	The court acknowledged the case but distinguished it as a will case; it did not accept that the proposition mandates revocation in intestacy cases and therefore did not treat it as controlling here.
Digambar Keshav Srotri v. Narayan Vithal Ashtekar	Relied on by respondents for the view that a distinction exists between compulsory and discretionary citations (case under the Probate and Administration Act, referring to sec.16 and sec.69), and that only omission of compulsory citations would amount to just cause for revocation.	The court noted the decision but expressed doubt that it established the narrow rule urged by respondents; the court read the judgment as not inconsistent with the view that both classes of citations may fall within the illustration but that remedy depends on circumstances.
Walters Rebells v. Maria Rebells	The precise contention (limiting revocation to omission of compulsory citations) was earlier urged and rejected in this Court (see Banerjee, J.'s judgment).	The court agreed with Banerjee, J.'s reasoning in that case and treated it as persuasive authority against the narrow view advanced by respondents.
Dwijendra v. Golok; Rebells v. Rebells; Shoroshibala v. Anandamoyee; Nabagopal v. Srigopal	These cases (grouped) concern wills and omission to take steps for proper representation of minors; they were relied on to show that omission to cite in wills proceedings has been treated as prejudicial.	The court observed these are will cases and distinguished them from intestacy cases; it held that their reasoning does not compel revocation in an intestacy context where omissions affect preferential administration rights rather than substantive succession rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the grounds in sequence and applied statutory interpretation, precedent and factual review as follows:

Adjournment: The revocation hearing occurred on 5 January 1925. The appellant was absent and had filed a petition (without affidavit) alleging recent bereavement and illness. The judge refused to adjourn. Mukerji, J. found it reasonable to refuse adjournment on an unsupported petition and noted the respondent's assertion (not contradicted) that the petition's statements were untrue. Consequently, the court held this ground lacked substance.
Representation of minors (first ground): The record shows notices were sent to Hiramaya Gurangini, described as mother and next friend of the infants who were abroad. Although only a postcard notice was sent, Hiramaya appeared, participated, and filed a petition stating the shares for her sons. There was no material demonstrating any prejudice to the minors. Relying on Walian v. Banke Behari Pershad Singh, the court concluded that, despite no formal order appointing a guardian ad litem, the infants were effectively represented; accordingly, this ground failed.
Alleged undervaluation (second ground): The alleged undervaluation was traversed by an objection filed on 16 September 1924. The court found nothing on the record to substantiate the appellant's assertion of fraud or omission as to the Rs. 541 or the jote valuation; this ground therefore failed.
Omission to cite the three daughters (third ground): The brevity of the District Judge's order made this point difficult, but the court considered several legal contentions. The respondent argued that sec.250 gives discretion about citations and that only omission of a compulsory citation (e.g., those in secs.193 or 199) would merit revocation under sec.234. The respondent relied on Digambar Keshav Srotri. Mukerji, J. expressed doubt that that decision intended to limit revocation to compulsory citations only, and noted that Walters Rebells v. Maria Rebells had rejected the narrow contention. The court held the grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited (bringing the case within III(b) to sec.234 of the Succession Act). However, the court examined whether that omission necessarily required revocation. Drawing a distinction between will cases and intestacy, Mukerji, J. explained that wills frequently affect substantive succession rights and therefore omission to cite can be prejudicial to heirs; in intestacy, omission usually affects preferential rights to administer rather than substantive succession rights, and such omission will not necessarily call for revocation unless there is mal-administration or resulting prejudice. Given that the daughters had not complained and there was no showing of prejudice or mal-administration, the court concluded the omission did not warrant revocation in the circumstances of this case. Nevertheless, the court cautioned that citations ought generally to issue to known interested parties.
Conclusion and costs: On the cumulative analysis, each ground for revocation failed on the facts and law as presented; accordingly the appeal was dismissed with costs in the terms set out below.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct holding and immediate effects:

The appeal from the order refusing revocation of the letters of administration is dismissed.
Costs are awarded as follows: costs against Respondent No. 1, with the hearing-fee assessed at 3 gold mohurs; the other respondents who appeared and supported the appellant are to bear their own costs.
Greaves, J. agreed with Mukerji, J.'s opinion; the notation "P.C" appears in the record.

Broader implications and judicial guidance (as stated in the opinion):

The court reaffirmed that omission to cite necessary parties may fall within III(b) to sec.234 of the Succession Act, but such omission does not automatically mandate revocation in all circumstances; the context—particularly whether the matter concerns a will (affecting substantive succession rights) or intestacy (typically affecting preferential administration rights)—is material to the remedy.
The opinion emphasizes that citations should ordinarily issue to known interested parties; failure to do so renders proceedings defective, though revocation is not invariably required absent prejudice or complaint from omitted parties.
The decision is fact-specific: no new broad precedent was stated beyond the court's reasoning and its distinction between wills and intestacy contexts as to the consequences of omissions to cite parties.

This summary is restricted to the matters and reasoning expressly recorded in the provided opinion and does not add facts, claims, or interpretations beyond the text of that opinion.

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Ranmaya Gaorangini Alias Rasidunnissa Petitioner, v. Betty Mahbert And Ors. Opposite Party,

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

Mukerji, J.:— This appeal has been preferred from an order refusing to revoke a grant of letters of administration.

One Mrs. Benjamin, a native Christian, died leaving three sisters, three nieces by a predeceased sister, and two nephews and three nieces by a predeceased brother. Betty Mahbert who is one of the daughters of the predeceased sister obtained letters of administration from the District Judge on the 3rd January 1924 and she is the principal Respondent in this appeal. Ranmaya Gaorangini alias Koili alias Rasidunnissa who is a sister of the said Mrs. Benjamin, on the 23rd July 1924, applied for revocation of the grant and her application being refused has preferred this appeal.

The application for revocation filed on the 23rd July 1924 was based upon various grounds of which two only have been pressed in this appeal. The first of these grounds is to the effect that there were two minor sons of Rajman, the deceased brother of Mrs. Benjamin, named Dhan Bahadur and Harka Bahadur—living under the guardianship of their mother, Hiramaya, but no guardian ad litem had been appointed in respect of the said minors and the citation on Hiramaya that was issued by the Court was not sufficient as she was not a properly constituted guardian competent to represent the said minors. The second ground asserts that Betty Mahbert in her affidavit of assets had fraudulently undervalued them by omitting to mention a sum of Rs. 541 which stood to the credit of the deceased in the Forest Department and by not showing the valuation of a certain jote which belonged to the deceased. To these a third ground has been added, drawn from a petition filed on the 16th September 1924 by the Appellant when the revocation proceedings were pending in the Court below by which she amended or supplemented her original petition for revocation. This ground is to the effect that there were three daughters of Rajman named Mankala, Ivamalmaya and Sibey, and that the grant had been made without issuing any citation on them. A fourth ground has also been urged complaining of the propriety of the order passed by the District Judge by which he rejected the Appellant's application for adjournment on the day that the case was heard and disposed of.

I shall deal with this ground first. The application for revocation came on for hearing on the 5th January 1925. The Appellant was absent on that day and on her behalf was filed a petition unsupported by any affidavit in which it was stated that a son of hers had died a few days before and she herself was ill. I am unable to say that the Judge was wrong in refusing to adjourn the case on a petition of this sort. Moreover it is said here on behalf of the Respondent Betty Mahbert that she had proved in some proceedings that were before this Court in connection with the case that the statements in the aforesaid petition were not true, the Appellant's son having in fact died long before and that she herself was not ill as was alleged. This argument of the Respondent has not been controverted in reply. This ground therefore has no substance.

As regards the first ground what appears upon the record is this. In a petition filed on behalf of Betty Mahbert on the 1st September 1924 it was stated that the infants Dhan Bahadur and Harka Bahadur were away in Burma and their mother and next friend Hiramaya Gurangini was living at Gayabari. The notices addressed to Hiramaya Gurangini as mother and next friend of the said infants were sent to her. It is complained that only a post card notice was sent, but it matters little that it was so, for, in fact, she appeared in the proceedings and as such guardian. She appears to have taken part in the proceedings and put in a petition stating the shares which her sons would, according to her, be entitled to. She does not appear to have done anything injurious to the interest of her sons and nothing has been shown to us which may suggest that their interest was not properly looked after. It must under the circumstances be held, despite the absence of a formal order appointing her guardian ad litem on behalf of the infants, that the infants were effectively represented by her in the proceedings. [Walian v. Banke Behari Pershad Singh ]. This ground accordingly must fail.

As regards the second ground it is sufficient to state that it was completely traversed in the objection that was filed on behalf of Betty Mahbert on the 16th September 1924 and there is nothing on the record to substantiate the Appellant's assertion as to under-valuation.

The third ground now remains to be considered. So far as this ground is concerned it is the brevity of the learned Judge's order which has caused some difficulty. He has disposed of it in these words:—“Heard pleader. The only reason which can be considered ‘just cause’ is the failure to issue citations to the alleged sisters of the two minors. That objection was taken in the case and it is not open to the same parties to raise the objection. If those persons have any grievance, it is for them to appear and ask the Court for revocation.” The Respondent seeks to support the order by contending that the Appellant had taken this objection in the proceedings for the grant, but notwithstanding that no issue had been raised therein relating to this objection and that she cannot be heard in support of this objection again as a ground for revocation of the grant. I am not prepared to attach much importance to this argument of the Respondent. The Appellant no doubt had brought this matter to the notice of the Court, but if inspite of that the daughters were not cited and letters were granted, there is no rule of res judicata nor any similar rule that I know of that would preclude the Appellant from putting forward this omission as a ground for revoking the grant. The Respondent next urges that the fact that no issue was raised on the point and there is no discussion of it in the order granting the letters suggests that this objection was not seriously pressed. There again I must differ, for I do not find any materials on which it may be definitely said that the objection was taken otherwise than bona fide. The Respondent further urges that the said daughters were made parties to the revocation proceedings and to the present appeal and they have not appeared till now and that this fact suggests that they are not interested in questioning the validity of the grant. That undoubtedly is so, but still the question has to be considered as to whether omission to cite necessary parties necessarily invalidates a grant and calls for its revocation. That the daughters of Rajman were necessary parties to whom citation ought to have issued is a position which cannot be disputed and indeed had not been disputed. For the broad proposition that such an omission of itself invalidates a grant reliance has been placed on behalf of the Appellant on the decision in the case of Akhileswari Dasi v. Hari Charan Mirdha . On behalf of the Respondents it has been urged that sec. 250 of the Succession Act gives a discretion to the Judge in the matter of issuing citation, and the only case where such omission amounts to a just cause for revocation under sec. 234 of the Act is a case of an omission to issue a citation such as is mentioned in sec. 193 or sec. 199 of the Act and is compulsory, and in support of this contention reliance has been placed upon the case of Digambar Keshav Srotri v. Narayan Vithal Ashtekar (3). This last-mentioned case, which related to a Will and was under the Probate and Administration Act, it is true, lays down a distinction between compulsory citations and discretionary citations on reference to sec. 16 and sec. 69 of that Act; but I doubt very much whether the learned Judges intended to lay it down that it is only compulsory citations which would come within III(b) to sec. 50 of the Act as has been contended for before us. The judgment in that case to my mind is not inconsistent with the view that they held that both classes of citations come within the illustration, but that the question whether the grant should be revoked or not would depend upon the circumstances, that is to say, in the case of compulsory citations nothing else need be considered, while in the case of discretionary citations other considerations have to be taken into account. This precise contention which the Respondent has now put forward was urged in this Court in the case of Walters Rebells v. Maria Rebells and was not accepted as well-founded (see the judgment of Banerjee, J., in that case) and I agree with what was said by the learned Judge in his judgment in that case.

In my opinion it must be held, in the words of III(b) to sec. 234 of the Succession Act, that the grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited. The question then arises whether if the case comes within the III(b) the grant must necessarily be revoked or annulled. The Appellant's contention is that it must be. The case of Akhileswari Dasi v. Hari Charan Mirdha and the cases of Dwijendra v. Golok , Rebells v. Rebells and Shoroshibala v. Anandamoyee and the case of Nabagopal v. Srigopal upon which it proceeds are all cases of wills, and omission to take steps for the proper representation of minors concerned therein. There is in my opinion a broad distinction between cases of Wills and cases of intestacy in the matter of citations, for in the former cases the proof of a will in a majority of cases, if not in all, acts prejudicially to the legitimate rights of those who would inherit or be entitled to the properties in the absence of a will, and omission to cite them is likely to affect such rights of theirs in their absence, while in the latter cases such omission only affects their preferential right to administer or prevents them from objecting to the personnel of the administrator or to like matters and it is not until there is any mal-ad-ministration that they are really affected. These considerations lead to different results in different cases. In the present case in view of the fact that the daughter? themselves have not yet complained of the proceedings having taken place in their absence, the omission to cite them does not, in my opinion, call for revocation of the grant. I wish to guard against suggesting in any way that the proceedings were not defective or that the District Judge exercised a sound judicial discretion in making the grant without isssuing citations on the daughters. It has been repeatedly enjoined by this Court that citations should always issue to parties who are known to the Court to be interested or to claim any interest in the estate of the deceased. This ground, however, as a ground of revocation fails in the circumstances of the case.

The appeal accordingly must be and is dismissed with costs as against the Respondent No. 1, hearing-fee being assessed at 3 gold mohurs. The other Respondents who have appeared and supported the Appellant must bear their own costs.

Greaves, J.:— I agree.

P.C

Ranmaya Gaorangini Alias Rasidunnissa Petitioner, v. Betty Mahbert And Ors. Opposite Party,

Bench Opinion Summary — Mukerji, J. (with Greaves, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ranmaya Gaorangini Alias Rasidunnissa Petitioner, v. Betty Mahbert And Ors. Opposite Party,

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