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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an arbitration dispute where Mr. V.S. Deshpande, retired Chief Justice of Delhi, issued an interim award on 15.12.1990. The respondent challenged the award on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to consider his counter-claims and erroneously treated disputed points as admissions. The petitioner relied on the precedent set in K.V. George vs. Secretary, AIR 1990 SC 53, to support the validity of the interim award. The court was called upon to examine the legality of the interim award in light of these contentions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an arbitrator must consider counter-claims before passing an interim award where claims and counter-claims exist.
  2. What is the legal meaning of the term "consider" in the context of an interim award involving claims and counter-claims.
  3. Whether the failure to finally decide counter-claims at the interim stage renders the award illegal.
  4. Whether the court can question the arbitrator’s appraisal of evidence in the arbitration proceedings.
  5. Whether the interim award can be set aside on grounds other than procedural misconduct or invalidity under the Arbitration Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The interim award was passed without considering the respondent’s counter-claims.
  • The arbitrator wrongly treated disputed points as admissions, thus prejudicing the respondent.
  • The arbitrator failed to appreciate the evidence properly, leading to erroneous conclusions.

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • Reliance on K.V. George case, which mandates consideration of claims and counter-claims before making an award.
  • The arbitrator did consider counter-claims in the interim award by addressing admitted amounts and security provisions.
  • Appraisal of evidence is the exclusive domain of the arbitrator and is not subject to court review unless there is misconduct or invalidity under the Arbitration Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.V. George vs. Secretary, AIR 1990 SC 53 Arbitrator’s duty to consider both claims and counter-claims before making an award. Used to establish that ignoring counter-claims renders an award illegal; distinguished on facts as counter-claims were considered.
Barium Chemicals vs. A.J. Rana, AIR 1972 SC 591 Meaning of the word "consider" as attentive examination, reflection, and taking note of. Adopted to interpret the scope of "consider" in the context of interim awards.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. C. Rajasekhar Rao, (1987) 4 SCC 93 Court’s limited role in reviewing arbitrator’s appraisal of evidence. Applied to affirm that erroneous decisions by arbitrators do not constitute grounds for setting aside awards.
M.C.D. vs. Jagannath, 1987 (4) SCC 497 (AIR 1987 SC 2316) Same principle as Hindustan Steel regarding court’s non-interference in arbitrator’s evidence assessment. Supported the court’s refusal to re-appraise evidence in this case.
Alppi Parshad & Sons vs. U.O.I., AIR 1960 SC 588 Grounds for setting aside arbitration awards include misconduct or invalidity under the Arbitration Act. Referenced to delineate limits of judicial intervention in arbitration awards.
Food Corp. vs. Joginderpal, AIR 1989 SC 1263 Arbitrator’s error in law or fact is not misconduct warranting setting aside the award. Confirmed that erroneous decisions do not amount to misconduct.
Trading Co. vs. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1989 SC 890 Same principle as Food Corp. regarding arbitrator’s errors not amounting to misconduct. Supported the court’s stance on non-interference.
Goa, Daman & Diu Housing Board vs. Ramakant, AIR 1991 SC 2089 Arbitrator’s findings must be supported by cogent reasons. Applied to conclude that the arbitrator’s detailed reasoning upheld the interim award’s validity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the legal requirement that an arbitrator must "consider" both claims and counter-claims before making an award. It clarified that "consider" does not mean a final decision but an attentive examination, reflection, and taking note of the claims and counter-claims. This interpretation was supported by authoritative dictionary definitions and prior Supreme Court rulings, notably Barium Chemicals.

Applying this understanding, the court analyzed the interim award and found that the arbitrator had indeed considered the counter-claims, particularly those admitted by the parties, as reflected in the award’s operative part and detailed references to admitted amounts and security arrangements. This distinguished the case from the precedent in K.V. George, where counter-claims were entirely ignored.

The court further held that it is not within its scope to reassess the evidence or question the arbitrator’s conclusions on admissions or submissions of bills, as the arbitrator is the sole judge of evidence quality and quantity. Judicial intervention is limited to instances of misconduct, invalidity under the Arbitration Act, or procedural irregularities, none of which were found here.

Lastly, the court noted that the arbitrator had provided cogent reasons for the interim award, satisfying the requirement laid down in Goa, Daman & Diu Housing Board vs. Ramakant. The arbitrator also took precautions to protect the interests of the counter-claimant, reinforcing the award’s fairness and legality.

Holding and Implications

The court upheld the interim award and made it the rule of the court, passing decree accordingly.

This decision directly affects the parties by validating the interim award despite challenges regarding consideration of counter-claims and evidence appraisal. The court reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial review in arbitration matters, emphasizing that interim awards can be made after attentive consideration, not necessarily final adjudication, of claims and counter-claims. No new precedent was established; the ruling applied existing principles to the facts at hand.

    P.K. Ramaiah & Co. v. National Thermal Power Corporation

    Jaspal Singh

    (1) [ED, facts : In arbitration between parties, Mr. V.S. Deshpande retired C.J., Delhi gave an interim award on 15.1290. Respdt. challenged it on the ground that it was given without considering his counter claims and also the arbitrator wrongly thought disputed points to be admissions. Petitioner relied upon K.V. George vs. Secy. AIR. 1990. SC. 53]. After detailing above. Judgment is : (7b) In K.V. George case observations are :

    "ITis not disputed that the Arbitrator did not at all consider the counter-claims the arbitrator did not at all consider the counter claims of the respondent in making the award. It is the duty of the Arbitrator while considering the claims of the appellant to consider also the counter-claims made on behalf of the respondents and to make the award after considering both the claims and counter claims. This has not been done......"
    .

    (2) WHAT do we find from the observations extracted above ? It is that where there are claims and counter-claims, court (?) must make the award only after considering the claims and the counter-claims and that if the court (?) makes award without considering at all the counter-claims, such an award would be wholly illegal. It is significant to note that the Supreme Court has no where laid down that where there are claims and counter-claims no interim award can

    (3) WHAT do we mean, in the context of the case, by the word "consider" ? Obviously, the word "consider" cannot mean "to finally decide," because, if the arbitrator is required to finally decide and adjudicate upon both the claims as well as the counter-claims then the award passed after such adjudication would not be an interim award. Thus, once it is accepted that there can be an interim award even where there are both claims and counter claims, then it has to be taken that at the stage of such an interim award both the claims and counter-claims are not finally decided and determined in their totality and that some claims or counter (?) are left out to be decided or adjudicated upon at a later stage. After all, the very expression "interim award" implies an award which decides a part of the claim or counter-claim or an issue of liability. Thus, if the word "consider" cannot, in the context of the case, be taken to mean "to finally decide". What does it then signify ?

    (4) ACCORDING to Shorter Oxford Dictionary the meaning of the word "consider" is "to view attentively, to survey, examine, inspect (arch), to look attentively, to think over, meditate on, give need to, to take note of, to think deliberately, to think oneself, to reflect".

    (5) ACCORDING to Words and Phrases- Permanent Edn. Vol. 8-A, to "consider" means to think with care, to fix a mind upon with a view to careful examination, to ponder ; study ; meditate upon, think or reflect with care.

    (6) BLACK'S Law Dictionary defines "consider" to mean. To fix the mind on, with a view to carefully examine to inspect. To deliberate about and ponder over. To entertain or give heed to.

    (7) AS per Webster's New International Dictionary "consider" means to view attentively, to fix the mind on ; to think on with care ; to ponder ; to study ; to meditate on ; also, to bear in mind ; to estimate ; calculate.

    (8) IN Barium Chemicals vs. A.J. Rana, AIR 1972 S.C. 591, the Supreme Court referred to, with approval, the meaning assigned to the word "consider" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and in Words and Phrases-Permanent Edn. Vol. 8-A and as reproduced by me above

    (9) KEEPING in view the ambit and scope of the word "consider" can it be said that both the claims and the counter-claims were considered by the learned arbitrator before the passing of the interim award ? The answer, to my mind, must be in the affirmative. Let me, in support refer to the interim award. The latter part of the second paragraph is significant and reads as under :

    "THEdecisions of the claims and counter claims which are contested will take some time. In the meanwhile, this interim award is given only in respect of those amounts of claims and counter-claims which are admitted by the parties."

    The interim award then proceeds to deal with clause 7.1 of the Contract and then, after referring to the first counter-claim with regard to refund of some advances, holds that since this first counter-claim is admitted, the claimant is to pay the amount and so also interest from August 1,1991. At page 6 again reference is made to one of the counter-claims amounting to Rs. 213404.15 and the same has been allowed on the basis of the admission made by the claimant. One finds reference to the counter-claims again at page 8. At page 9 also the counter-claims are taken note of and so also their effect on the payment of admitted amounts. In this respect reference may also be made to page 11 where the question as to whether the amounts admitted as payable should be withheld or not till the decision of the disputed counter-claims is considered. It cannot thus be said that the learned arbitrator has not considered at all the counter-claims. It is this which distinguishes this case from the case before the Supreme Court and, as the counter-claims cannot be said to have not been considered at all, the interim award cannot be dubbed as illegal.

    (10) IT was argued by Mr. Dutta that the learned arbitrator had not appreciated the evidence on the record in the right perspective and as such has arrived at wrong conclusions. However, appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is never a matter which the court questions and considers. The arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity of the evidence and it will not be for the court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator. [See Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. C. Rajasekhar Rao (1987) 4 SCC 93; M.C.D. vs. Jagannalh 1987(4) SCC. 497 (AIR 1987 SC 2316) ; Mis. Alppi Parshad & Sons vs. U.O.I. AIR 1960 SC 588]. The Court is entitled to set aside the award if the arbitrator has misconducted himself in the proceedings or when the award has been made after the issue of an order by the court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid u/S. 35 or where an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid under section 30. It is not misconduct on the part of an arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision. [See Halsebury's Laws of England Vol., 2, 4th Edn.; Russell on Arbitration, page 422, 20th Edn. Food Corp. vs. Joginderpal AIR 1989. SC. 1263 ; Mis. Sudar 1992. Rajdhani Law Reporter 379, 380 san Trading Co. vs. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1989 SC 890].

    (11) THE legal position being as noticed above, I do not think it is open to me, in the context of this case at least, to go into the correctness or otherwise of the finding of the learned arbitrator on the admissions relied upon by him or to probe into the question as to whether those admissions were conditional or unconditional. Similarly, it would not be within my domain to consider as to whether the finding with regard to the submission of the Final Bill is in the light on the evidence on the record, justified or not. I feel similarly on the challenge to the finding on the question of recoveries claimed.

    (12) IN any case, the perusal of the interim award would go to show that the learned arbitrator has gone into the questions raised analytically and critically and has, to borrow the expression from the Supreme Court, come "to his finding after giving cogent reasons" (See Goa, Daman & Diu Housing Board vs. Ramakant AIR 1991 SC 2089=1991 Raj LR (N) 110. This being the position, the second limb of the challenge to the interim award also fails.

    (13) THE learned arbitrator has taken sufficient precautions to safeguard the interest of the counter claimant. This would be borne out from his discussion under sub-head 'Security' and from the "Operative Part of The Interim Award" with regard to the furnishing of security. Finding no merit in the objections raised, the Interim Award is made the rule of the court and decree is passed in terms thereof.

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    Comments

    P.K. Ramaiah & Co. v. National Thermal Power Corporation
    (May 15, 1992)