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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The property in dispute originally belonged to Ram Charittar. The plaintiffs, who on the admitted pedigree are the uncles of Ram Charittar, claimed that Ram Charittar died in a state of jointness with them and sought a declaration of title or a decree for possession. Defendant 3 (Mt. Kaulpati) was impleaded by the plaintiffs; defendants 1 and 2 alleged themselves to be the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar and claimed possession, obtaining an order from the mutation department. The trial Court found that defendants 1 and 2 were not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar, that the plaintiffs were joint with Ram Charittar, and decreed possession for the plaintiffs against all defendants (including Mt. Kaulpati). Defendants 1 and 2 appealed; Mt. Kaulpati was not a party to that appeal. The lower Appellate Court agreed as to parentage but gave an unsatisfactory finding on jointness. On earlier review the higher Court remitted an issue on jointness (and indicated a finding on the identity of Mt. Kaulpati was desirable). After remand, the lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiffs were not joint with Ram Charittar and that the identity of Mt. Kaulpati had been proved. The present opinion addresses the appeal after those findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession against defendants 1 and 2 given the findings on parentage and the admitted pedigree.
  2. Whether defendants 1 and 2 may invoke a jus tertii — namely the right of Mt. Kaulpati (the widow) — to resist the plaintiffs' claim.
  3. Whether a mere declaratory decree that plaintiffs are reversioners of Ram Charittar should be granted while the widow (Mt. Kaulpati) is alive.
  4. Whether the lower Appellate Court's direction that the losing appellants pay a deficiency in court-fee (after dismissing their appeal) was proper.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments (Respondents)

  • The plaintiffs are the uncles of Ram Charittar and, on the admitted pedigree, claim rights as joint family members; they sought either a declaration of title or a decree for possession.
  • In the alternative, if Ram Charittar were held to have died separated from the plaintiffs, they sought a declaration that defendants 1 and 2 are not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar.

Defendants 1 and 2's Arguments (Appellants)

  • They alleged they were the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar and that the plaintiffs were not joint with Ram Charittar.
  • They contended they were in possession and that the plaintiffs' suit should be dismissed because, in the presence of Mt. Kaulpati (the widow), the plaintiffs are not entitled to possession or to a mere declaration while the widow is alive.
  • They argued they could set up a jus tertii — asserting the rights of Mt. Kaulpati — to resist the plaintiffs' claim.

Mt. Kaulpati's Position (Defendant 3 as per record)

  • At trial Mt. Kaulpati gave evidence admitting that the plaintiffs and Ram Charittar were joint and that when Ram Charittar died the plaintiffs entered into possession of his property.
  • She did not file an appeal against the trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
35 Cal 777 Illustrates the discretion to refuse a declaration that defendants have no right of succession where the plaintiffs' right is merely contingent and may never ripen into an actual right. The Court relied on the principle to refuse a mere declaratory decree for contingent reversionary rights while the widow is alive; the Court distinguished that the plaintiffs were seeking a decree for possession rather than solely a declaration.
AIR 1925 Mad 1021 The principle that "possession is good against all but the true owner" cannot avail defendants when the true owner is impleaded as a party and admits the plaintiff's title to the property. The Court applied this principle to hold that defendants cannot rely on mere possession or on jus tertii when Mt. Kaulpati, who could be the "true owner" in issue, had admitted the plaintiffs' title in her evidence before the trial Court.
AIR 1937 Mad 544 The view that, before a defendant can set up the right of a third person in defence, the defendant must prove that the third person has a subsisting right (i.e., the right has not been finally determined against that third person). The Court invoked this precedent to hold that defendants could not set up Mt. Kaulpati's right by way of jus tertii where there had been a decree in favour of the plaintiffs against Mt. Kaulpati and she had not appealed; thus her right was not subsisting for the defendants to rely upon.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from the procedural and factual findings made at trial and on remand. The admitted pedigree, and earlier findings that defendants 1 and 2 were not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar, established that defendants 1 and 2 were rank trespassers and lacked independent title.

On remand the lower Appellate Court made two definitive findings: that the plaintiffs were not joint with Ram Charittar (contrary to the trial Court's finding) and that the identity of Mt. Kaulpati had been proved. Defendants argued that, because Mt. Kaulpati (the widow) might be entitled to possession after Ram Charittar's death, the plaintiffs could not obtain possession or even a mere declaratory relief while the widow lived; further, defendants contended they could set up a jus tertii based on the widow's rights.

The Court rejected the defendants' reliance on jus tertii for two principal reasons drawn from the record and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Mt. Kaulpati herself had given evidence in the trial Court admitting that the plaintiffs and Ram Charittar were joint and that the plaintiffs entered into possession after his death. The Court applied the principle from AIR 1925 Mad 1021 that possession (or a defendant's claim based on possession) cannot prevail when the supposed true owner is impleaded and admits the plaintiff's title.
  2. There had been a prior adjudication — a decree of the trial Court — in favour of the plaintiffs against Mt. Kaulpati, and Mt. Kaulpati did not appeal against that decree. Because of that adjudication, Mt. Kaulpati had no subsisting right that the defendants could validly set up in defence. The Court relied on the view expressed in AIR 1937 Mad 544 that a defendant claiming a third party's right must first establish that the third party's right still subsists (i.e., has not been finally determined against them).

The Court also observed the well-known discretionary principle (illustrated by 35 Cal 777) that a mere declaration of contingent reversionary rights while a widow is alive is not appropriate; however, the plaintiffs' primary claim was for possession rather than a mere declaration. Because defendants had no independent right and could not legitimately invoke Mt. Kaulpati's right under the present record, the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed against defendants 1 and 2.

Separately, regarding court-fee procedure: the lower Appellate Court had directed the losing appellants (defendants) to pay an alleged deficiency in court-fee after dismissing their appeal, although earlier the Court had admitted the appeal as properly stamped. On review, the present Court found it was not proper for the lower Appellate Court to pass the order requiring payment of any deficiency in that manner; the High Court concluded the court-fee paid by the defendants in the lower Appellate Court was sufficient and set aside the lower Appellate Court's direction for payment of additional court-fee.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED and dismissed with costs.

Other direct orders and immediate consequences:

  • The dismissal of the appeal affirms that the plaintiffs, on the admitted pedigree and given the record, are entitled to succeed against defendants 1 and 2.
  • The Court held that defendants 1 and 2 cannot set up the jus tertii of Mt. Kaulpati because (a) Mt. Kaulpati admitted the plaintiffs' title in evidence and (b) a competent Court had already given the plaintiffs a decree for possession against Mt. Kaulpati which she did not appeal; consequently the defendants cannot rely on her right.
  • The lower Appellate Court's order directing the defendants (losing appellants) to pay a deficiency of court-fee is set aside; the High Court found the court-fee paid was sufficient.
  • Leave to file an appeal by way of Letters Patent is allowed.

The opinion does not set out any novel legal principle or wider precedent beyond the application of cited authorities to the facts; its effect is confined to the parties and the matters adjudicated in this record.

    Mt. Guda Kueri v. Adnath Pande

    1. Reference may be made to my order dated 14th September 1937 by which I remitted one issue to the lower Appellate Court, because a definite finding, was necessary and originally the lower Appellate Court had not recorded such a definite finding. There was yet another matter on which the lower Appellate Court in the first instance had not said anything and I made it clear that it would be necessary for the Court to decide that matter as well. After remand, definite findings have been reached by the lower Appellate Court, and on those findings the rival contentions of the parties are that the appeal ought to be decided in their favour.

    2. Although the facts are stated in the judgments of the Courts below and in my previous order also, yet it might be necessary to recapitulate them shortly and state the findings of fact which are now binding, A pedigree is given in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court after remand and that pedigree is admitted. The property in dispute belonged to Ram Charittar who appears on the left hand side of the pedigree. The plaintiffs, according to the pedigree, are the uncles of Ram Charittar and their case was that Ram Charittar died in a state of jointess with them, that they were therefore entitled to the property even in the presence of Mt. Kaulpati, the widow of Ram Charittar, but defendant 1 alleging herself to be the daughter of Ram Charittar and defendant 2 alleging himself to be the daughter's son of Ram Charittar interfered with the possession of the plaintiffs and that interference went to this-extent, that they obtained an order in their favour from the mutation department and therefore the plaintiffs sought either a declaration that they were in possession or a decree for possession. The plaintiffs impleaded Mt. Kaulpati as defendant 3 and alleged that she was not entitled to possession, because Ram Charittar was joint with the plaintiffs, but when the plaintiffs sought a decree for possession they did not in any way in the prayer for relief exempt Mt. Kaulpati from the operation of the decree sought. There was of course a prayer in the alternative that in the event Ram Charittar be held to have died in a state of separation from the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs should be given a declaration that defendants 1 and 2 are not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar.

    3. Defendants 1 and 2 pleaded that they were the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar, that the plaintiffs were not joint with Ram Charittar, that they were in possession of the property left by Ram Charittar and that the real Mt. Kaulpati was traceless and a pretender had been set up by the plaintiffs. The trial Court same to a definite finding that defendants 1 and 2 were not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar, that the plaintiffs were joint with Ram Charittar and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession. The decree that was framed by the trial Court was a decree against all the defendants giving the plaintiffs possession. All the defendants were made liable to pay the costs of the plaintiffs. There can be no manner of doubt that the decree as given by the trial Court was against all the defendants including defendant 3, Mt. Kaulpati. There was an appeal by defendants 1 and 2 against the decree of the trial Court. The plaintiffs alone were impleaded as respondents to the appeal. Mt. Kaulpati was not a party to the appeal at all. The lower Appellate Court also agreed with the trial Court that the defendants were not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar. It recorded, if at all, a very unsatisfactory finding on the question of the jointness of the plaintiffs with Ram Charittar, and in the result it dismissed the defendants' appeal.

    4. When the matter came before me on the first occasion, I accepted the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the defendants were not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar. I recorded my disapproval of the perfunctory finding of the lower Appellate Court on the question of jointness and I therefore remitted an issue on that point. There was no clear decision by either of the Courts below as to whether the lady, who appeared in the mutation department as Mt. Kaulpati, was the widow of Ram Charittar or not, and I indicated the advisability of a finding on that point as well. The lower Appellate Court after remand has found definitely that the plaintiffs were not joint with Ram Charittar and that the identity of Mt. Kaulpati had been proved by the evidence on the record.

    5. In this state of findings learned counsel for the defendants has argued that the plaintiffs' suit ought to be dismissed inasmuch as in the presence of Mt. Kaulpati the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree for possession or to a decree for a mere declaration that they are the reversioners of Ram Charittar and would be entitled to possession after the death of Mt. Kaulpati or even to a negative declaration that defendants 1 and 2 are not the daughter and daughter's son of Ram Charittar. I have no doubt, and it is not necessary to cite any authorities that a decree for a mere declaration that the plaintiffs are the reversioners of a male Hindu while the widow of that person is alive should not be granted, and I may also refuse, as was done in 35 Cal 777,1 in my discretion to give a declaration that the defendants have no right of succession, because the plaintiffs have no existing right, but a mere contingent right which may never ripen into an actual right, but what is contended by learned counsel for the plaintiffs is that he is not seeking for a mere declaration but for a decree for possession. The reply of the defendants is that they are entitled to set up a jus tertii, namely the jus of Mt. Kaulpati who, on the finding after remand, is entitled to possession of the property. It is said that Ram Charittar died as a separated Hindu and after his death Mt. Kaulpati is entitled to possession of the property and the defendants can say that they are entitled to resist the claim of the plaintiffs against everybody except Mt. Kaulpati. I have no doubt that this contention has been suggested to learned counsel for the defendants, because of a loose passage in my judgment at the time of remand. I said therein:

    If Ram Charittar was separate from the plaintiffs, then, after the death of Ram Charittar, Mt. Kaulpati would come into the possession of the property as a Hindu widow and the defendants might well set up a jus tertii.

    6. In the circumstances of the present case, I am satisfied that the defendants are not entitled to set up the right of Mt. Kaulpati. The defendants have no right in them-selves, and in order to set up the right of Mt. Kaulpati they must prove that Mt. Kaulpati has an existing right and that her right has not been determined by any Court of law finally. In the trial Court Mt. Kaulpati entered into the witness-box and stated that the plaintiffs and Ram Charittar were joint and that when Ram Charittar died the plaintiffs entered into possession of Ram Charittar's property. As Ramesam J. observed in AIR 1925 Mad 10212 at page 1022:

    The principle that the possession is good against all but the true owner cannot avail the defendants when the true owner is impleaded as a party and admits the plaintiff's title to the property.

    7. This is not all. There was a decision of a competent Court giving the plaintiffs a decree for possession against Mt. Kaulpati and thus negativing any title in Mt. Kaulpati. Mt. Kaulpati did not file any appeal against the decree of the trial Court and Mt. Kaulpati was not impleaded even as a respondent by the defendants before the lower Appellate Court. There has thus been an adjudication by a competent Court between the plaintiffs and Mt. Kaulpati, and before the defendants can be allowed to set up a jus tertii they must prove that the person whose right they set up in defence has a subsisting right. This was the view taken in AIR 1937 Mad 544.3

    8. The position therefore is that on the admitted pedigree, the plaintiffs are the uncles of Ram Charittar, defendants 1 and 2 are rank trespassers, and the plaintiffs have obtained a decree for possession against Mt. Kaulpati who in the finding of the lower Appellate Court after remand—a finding given in the absence of Mt. Kaulpati—might otherwise have been entitled to possession, and the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed against defendants 1 and 2 and the latter are not entitled to set up the right of anybody else, because nobody else has under the present circumstances any better right than the plaintiffs.

    9. In this view of the matter this appeal is liable to be dismissed, and I dismiss it with costs.

    10. There is just one other matter which requires an order. As I said before, the appeal in the lower Appellate Court was by the defendants. The appeal was filed on a memorandum of appeal said to be insufficiently stamped. This was not discovered by the lower Appellate Court till the learned Judge proceeded to write his judgment, and after having dismissed the appeal of the defendants he directed them to pay Rs. 101-4-0 as deficiency in court-fee within a fortnight from the date of his judgment and if they failed to do so it was to be realized from them in due course. I have looked at the report of the munsarim in the lower Appellate Court and I find that, although he was of the opinion that ad valorem court-fee ought to be paid, the learned Judge decided that the court-fee paid was sufficient, and it was thus that the appeal was heard and disposed of by the lower Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the parties have not been able to show any other order of the lower Appellate Court vacating its former order, dated 22nd November 1933 admitting the appeal as properly stamped. In any event, it was not proper for the lower Appellate Court to pass the order which it did, directing the defendants who had lost their appeal to pay any deficiency and to direct that the same should be realized from them in due course at the time of writing its final judgment. In this case I am of the opinion that the court-fee paid by the defendants in the lower Appellate Court was sufficient and the order of the lower Appellate Court directing the defendants to pay any court-fees is set aside. Leave to file an appeal by way of Letters Patent is allowed.

    B.D/R.K

    11. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mt. Guda Kueri v. Adnath Pande
    (Jul 26, 1938)