O.P Garg, J.:— The thumb-nail sketch of the case is that the petitioner No. 1. Jagannath Sahai Varma is the owner-landlord of premises No. 1450/989 Mutthiganj, Allahabad. Upper portion of the said house was originally under the tenancy of one Gautam Deo Singh at the monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. An application for release—P.A Case No. 52 of 1986 under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was filed by the landlord. The said release petition was allowed on the basis of a compromise by the Prescribed Authority on 2.8.1986 pursuant to which, the landlord took vacant possession of the released upper portion of the house. Admittedly, Dilip Kumar Srivastava, who happens to be the real brother of the wife of the landlord occupied the released accommodation along with his family comprised of his wife and a child during the period 2.6.89 to 19.6.96, i.e, for a period more than 7-1/2 years. Thereafter the landlord inducted Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu—petitioner No. 2 as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 2050/- in pursuance of a tenancy agreement dated 10.1.1998 initially for a period of eleven months.

2. The respondent No. 2—Ashutosh Pandey and respondent No. 3—Vikas Kumar moved separate application for allotment of the upper portion of the said house as according to them, it was in unauthorized occupation of Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu. On the applications for allotment, a report of the Rent Control Inspector was called for. The report dated 7.4.1998 filed by the Rent Control Inspector indicated that Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal is an illegal occupant of the upper portion of the accommodation released in favour of the landlord. Affidavits were exchanged between the applicants for allotment, on the one hand, and the landlord as well as alleged illegal occupant, on the other. After considering the material brought on record and appraising the submissions made on behalf of the parties, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer came to the conclusion that a ‘deemed vacancy’ of the upper portion of the building in question in occupation of Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu—petitioner No. 2 has occurred and accordingly by the impugned order dated 23.3.2001, Annexure 10 to the petition, the vacancy has been declared and notified. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners have come before this court challenge the order of vacancy by means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

3. A supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners. Sri Rajesh Tandon who appeared on behalf of the contesting respondent Nos. 3 and 4 urged that the present petition be decided finally on merits on the basis of the material brought on record.

4. Heard S/Sri R.B Singhal and K.M Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri S.N Misra for the contesting respondent Nos. 3 and 4.

5. The thrust of the submission on behalf of the petitioners is that since Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu petitioner No. 2 has been inducted as a tenant in pursuance of an agreement at a monthly rent of Rs. 2050, the tenanted accommodation would no longer be governed by the provisions of the Act in view of the exemption clause contained in Section 2(1)(g) of the Act which reads as follows:

“2. (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to the following, namely:

(a)******

(b)******

(c)******

(d)******

(e)******

(f)******

(g) Any building, whose monthly rent exceeds two thousand rupees” (inserted by U.P Act No. 5 of 1995 with effect from 29.9.1994).

6. The next submission on behalf of the petitioners is that since the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner No. 2, the entire exercise of declaration of vacancy has been otiose and subsequent proceedings for allotment or release would be fruitless. This submission has been repelled with all vehemence by Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel for the contesting respondents.

7. Like some of the other Rent Acts existing in other States, our Act has also provided a safeguard against the abuse of order of release by unscrupulous landlords. Section 19 of the Act specifies the acts and omissions on the part of the landlord which would amount to abuse of an order of release. It also prescribes the procedure to be followed in a proceeding for investigating the allegations made by any person through an application moved before the District Magistrate or the District Judge, as the case may be. Section 24 also aims at to deal with the landlords who abuse the release order. Once it is proved that an order of release has been abused by the landlord in any of the manners specified in Section 19 and 24, the said order may be revoked and the building or part thereof may be treated as vacant available for allotment. The main object of this provision is to prevent fraudulent withdrawal of vacant buildings from the pool of buildings available to the District Magistrate for allotment to the needy persons. Once the fraud of the landlord is exposed before the District Magistrate, the landlord would not be permitted to reap the benefit of the order of release passed earlier in his favour and same may be revoked or in respect of the released accommodation a ‘deemed vacancy’ may be treated to have arisen under the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. In addition to it, the landlord may be prosecuted under Section 31 of the Act.

8. It is an indubitable fact that the whole house No. 1450/989 Mutthiganj, Allahabad is governed by the provisions of the Act. It was for this reason that the petitioner No. 1—landlord moved an application for release of the upper portion of the building in occupation of the tenant—Gautam Deo Singh under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and after the order of release was passed in 1986, he came in occupation of the said accommodation. Admittedly, the landlord-petitioner No. 1, after release of the accommodation, had permitted his brother-in-law to occupy the released accommodation. It was, however, urged that the brother-in-law of the petitioner No. 1 was merely a licensee of the accommodation and not a tenant, and therefore, it cannot be said that the landlord has, in any manner, abused the process of the court in getting the accommodation released. The theory that Dilip Kumar Srivastava, brother-in-law of the landlord occupied the released accommodation merely as licensee is nothing but an after-thought. Dilip Kumar Srivastava remained in occupation of the released accommodation for a long period of more than 7-1/2 years i.e, from 16.3.1989 to 19.6.1996 with his family. There is material on record to indicate that he was paying Rs. 125/ per month as rent to the petitioner No. 1. Even otherwise, it sounds ridiculous that the petitioner-landlord would permit his brother-in-law to occupy the released upper portion of the building without any consideration for a long period of more than seven years. Moreover, at best, even if it is taken that the landlord had put his brother-in-law in the released accommodation as a licensee, he could not have done so without complying with the rigours of Section 2-A of the Act. It is permissible for a person occupying a building as owner or tenant or in any other capacity to permit any other person to occupy for purely temporary residential accommodation for a period not exceeding three months without any order of allotment under Section 16 of the Act. There is a proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 2-A of the Act which reads as follows:

“Provided that intimation of the grant of such licence shall be given jointly by the licensor and the licensee to the District Magistrate within one month from the case of occupation of the building or part by the licensee.

It is further provided that the District Magistrate may by order extend the maximum period of such temporary occupation upto six months in the aggregate including original period of occupation.”

The above provisions make it amply clear that a person can be let into possession of a residential building as a licensee for a maximum period of six months and that too with information to or permission of the District Magistrate.

9. In the instant case, admittedly, no license was granted in favour of Dilip Kumar Srivastava after following the procedure prescribed for the same and, therefore, now to assert that the brother-in-law was allowed to occupy the released accommodation as a licensee is of no avail to the landlord. The possession of the brother-in-law of the landlord was not of temporary nature. As said above, he stayed in the released accommodation along with his family for a period of more than 7-1/2 years. It would also not be out of place to mention here that the brother-in-law is not covered by the definition of the term ‘family’ as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act. Therefore, the unchallenged position which emerges out of the above discussion is that the landlord had allowed the released accommodation to be occupied by a person who is not a member of his family and, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, the landlord shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the released upper portion of the building.

10. Sri Rajesh Tandon learned counsel for the contesting respondents urged that as a matter of fact and in law, a ‘deemed vacancy’ had arisen right in the month of June, 1989 when the petitioner No. 1—landlord allowed his brother-in-law Dilip Kumar Srivastava to illegally occupy the released accommodation and that the subsequent events which have taken place need not be considered. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decisions of this court in Rajendra Prasad v. IXth Additional District Judge, Kanpur . 1980 A.C.J 194.; Mahender Singh v. Xth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar . 1988 A.W.C 530.; Smt. Shashi Govil v. District Judge, Meerut . 1989 15 ALR 17.; Trust Asha Mai Dharmashala v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Dehradun4 and Syed Mazahar Mustafa Jafri v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer Allahabad . 1992 19 ALR 3 Sum., capped by the two recent decisions of this court in Hriday Narain Misra v. Rajnath Shukla . 2001 42 ALR 545. and Smt. Lilawanti v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer/VIth Additional City Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar . 2001 43 ALR 673.—Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8394 of 2001 decided on 26.4.2001 These decisions relate to the question as to at what point of time, a ‘deemed vacancy’ would arise with regard to a residential accommodation in view of the provisions of Section 12(3) of the Act, i.e, from the date of acquisition of a residential accommodation in a vacant state by a tenant or his family members within the same municipality limits or on the date on which the application for allotment or release was made. The gist of all the above decisions is that the relevant point for applying Section 12(3) of the Act for the purposes of treating the ‘deemed vacancy’ is the date on which the tenant acquires another building in a vacant state and not on the date on which the application for allotment or release was made.

In the background of above law, there can be no manner of doubt that ‘deemed vacancy’ arose in the month of June 1989 when the petitioner No. 1-landlord abused the order of release made in his favour by inducting a non-family member in the released accommodation on rental basis. The view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the impugned order on the point cannot be faulted.

11. The upper portion of the building which was released in favour of the landlord had again, as a matter of fact, fallen vacant in the month of June 1996 when his brother-in-law Dilip Kumar Srivastava shifted therefrom. The landlord-petitioner No. 1 who was under an obligation to intimate the vacancy to the District Magistrate did not do so and instead, admittedly inducted Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu—petitioner No. 2 as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 2050. The stand taken on behalf of the landlord is that since the agreed rent payable by Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu is more than Rs. 2000 per month, the accommodation let out to him stands exempted from the operation of the Act and consequently, no further action under the Act for declaration of vacancy or allotment can be taken. Sri R.B Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioners maintained that restrictions put in Section 11, 13, 16 and other provisions are all applicable only where the building falls within the purview of the Act and when once it is shown that in view of the provisions of Section 2(1)(g) of the Act, the accommodation is outside the purview of the Act, the right of the landlord to let out the accommodation to a person of his choise cannot be defeated and it would be unwise to read the above restrictions merely because they were applicable at one point of time to the tenanted accommodation. To fortify his contention that a building already not exempted earlier, can get exemption if brought within any one of the clauses of exemption contained in Section 2(1) of the Act, Sri Singhal placed emphatic reliance on the decision of the apex court in Satya Narain Pandey v. State of U.P . 1998 A.R.C 193.. Sri Singhal painstakingly argued that it is permissible to a landlord to enhance the rent and if the rent of the accommodation as agreed between the parties is more than Rs. 2000/- the tenanted accommodation which earlier was governed by the provisions of the Act, would qualify for exemption automatically if the monthly rent payable is more than Rs. 2000/- as contemplated in clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act. Reliance was placed on certain observations made by this court in Nand Ram Sharma v. Ist Additional District Judge, Jhansi . 1993 21 ALR 287., in which the effect of the agreement for enhancement of rent was tested with reference to the provisions of Section 4 to 9, 9-A and 10 of the Act as well as the provisions of Section 5 of the old Act of 1947. For the sake of clarity, observations made in paragraph 10 of the report may be reproduced below:

“10. It may be noticed that Section 4 of the Act corresponds to a part of Section 5 of the old Act (U.P Act No. III of 1947). A perusal of Section 4(2) of the Act makes it apparent that it clearly contemplates that the rent payable for any building shall be such as may be agreed upon between landlord and the tenant. It is in the absence of any agreement that the question of fixation of rent arises. Subject to certain limitations, the provisions contained in Sections 5, 6 and 7 contemplate the right of the landlord to get the rent enhanced unilaterally even in the absence of any agreement. Sections 8 and 9 relate to the determination regarding standard rent upward etc. and the method for calculating the standard rent. The provisions contained in Section 9-A of the Act relate to upward revision of rent in certain specific cases and Section 10 contains a provision for appeal against the orders passed under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act. Section 5(i) of the U.P Act No. III of 1947 stipulates that except as provided therein the rent payable for any accommodation to which the Act applies was to be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of the aforesaid Section 5 of the U.P Act No. III of 1947 envisage certain special contingencies. The new Rent Act viz., U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 has by and large retained the underlying policy relating to the enhancement of the rent, which was adopted in the old Act, viz., U.P Act No. III of 1947. However, certain additions, alterations and changes in the nature of special contingencies have been made under the new Act but they do not affect the right to get the rent in respect of the accommodation enhanced by a mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenant. While the U.P Act No. III of 1947 was in force, a similar question as is raised in the present case had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Daulat Ram Sawhney v. Trilok Nath . AIR 1962 Allahabad 147.. After examining the provisions contained in U.P Act No. III of 1947, the Full Bench came to the conclusion that there was no prohibition against an agreement for fixation of rent between any landlord and his tenant under the U.P Act. No. III of 1947 or the Rules framed thereunder. The Full Bench observed that it was quite immaterial whether the rent was agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant prior to the allotment order. It was further observed that if the agreement was prior to the allotment Order, it would be still binding on both the landlord and the tenant and the rent would be payable in accordance therewith, if the contemplated tenancy later comes into existence ultimately by allotment order issued in accordance with the provisions of the Act.”

There can be no quarrel with the observations made above and the law on the point is well settled that the rent in respect of an accommodation governed by the Act can be enhanced by mutual agreement and such enhancement is not prohibited by any provision under the Act. Nevertheless, the decision in Nand Ram Sharma's case (supra) cannot be taken to be an authority on the point that a landlord can circumvent the provisions of the Act with regard to the regulation of letting. The various observations made in the said case postulate that the order of allotment in respect of the premises about which the agreement for enhancement has been made was required to be passed.

12. So far as the decision in Satya Narain Pandey's case (supra) is concerned, it pertained to the interpretation of exemption clause with reference to the provisions contained in clause (d) sub-section (1) of Section 2, which provides that the provisions of the Act will not be applicable to—

“(a) any building used or intended to be used for any other industrial purpose (that is to say, for the purpose of manufacture, preservation or processing of any goods) or as a cinema or theatre, where the plant and apparatus installed for such purpose in the building is leased out along with the building:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply in relation to any shop or other building situated within the precincts of the cinema or theatre, the tenancy in respect of which has been created separately from the tenancy in respect of the cinema or theatre; or ….”

13. Interpreting the provisions of Section 2(1), the apex court leaned in favour of an automatic exclusion of certain classes of buildings from the purview of the Act for the reasons stated in paragraph 15 of the Report. The decision in Satya Narain Pandey's case (supra) was rendered in the year 1988 with reference to the provisions of clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act. Clause (g) which is relevant for our purposes, as said above was inserted by U.P Act No. V of 1995 made effective from 29.9.1994

In the case of clause (g), the possibility of automatic exclusion of a building from the operation of the Act is clearly ruled out. In a case where the building was governed by the provisions of the Act and the exclusion of it from the operation of the Act is pleaded on the ground that by an agreement, the amount of rent has been fixed more than Rs. 2000/-, naturally the question would arise as to how the question regarding applicability of the Act is to be determined. It can certainly not be ipsi dixit of the landlord. If a landlord acts on his own and let out the property or otherwise deals with it, he takes the risk and if he is found at fault, will not only render him punishable but will also be unable to resist order of allotment of the property by the District Magistrate in due course. Since the District Magistrate has been empowered to deal with the buildings to which the Act applies, it is for the District Magistrate to satisfy himself before he proceeds to deal with any premises that it is, in fact, a building to which provisions of the Act are applicable. In paragraph 16 of the Report in Satya Narain Pandey's case (supra) the apex court laid down that it is open to the landlord to intimate the vacancy and to make a claim before the District Magistrate that the Act has ceased to be applicable to his building but he is not obliged to do this. Where the landlord fails to do so, the District Magistrate may consider the issue if the vacancy in respect of the building is brought to his notice. The District Magistrate has powers to inspect the property and then to decide whether the Act continues to apply or not. It is for the District Magistrate to consider the circumstances and to satisfy himself about the applicability of the Act or otherwise. The controversy which boils down in the present case is this : whether an accommodation which is governed by the provisions of the Act and has been released in favour of the landlord can subsequently be let out by him without any reference to the authorities concerned by directly inducting a person on a rent which is more than Rs. 2000 per month and then to defend the application for allotment by claiming that the exemption under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act applies and, therefore, the District Magistrate has lost jurisdiction to declare the vacancy and to allot the same. This question has to be dealt with in its true perspective with reference to the purpose and object of the Act. A reading of the preamble of the Act would make it clear that the enactment came into existence to provide in the interest of the general public, for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas, and for matters connected therewith. “Regulation of letting” comes first. The basic object of the Act was to attempt to provide a reasonable solution to the acute problem of finding accommodation for those who have a dire need. “Regulation of rent” is intended to safeguard the interest of the tenants of urban buildings from unscrupulous and avaricious landlords. Due to acute shortage of residential and non-residential buildings in urban areas, greedy landlords try to exploit tenants by making arbitrary increase in the rent and demanding exorbitant premium from the prospective tenants as consideration for admitting them into the building. Rights of the landlords with regard to the payment of rent—standard, agreed or otherwise—stands protected under the provision of Sections 4 to 9, 9-A and 10 of the Act as discussed in Nand Ram Sharma's case (supra). Right of the landlord to enhance the rent under an agreement does not, in any manner, annul or override the provisions made in Chapter III of the Act with regard to the regulation of letting. Section 11 of the Act prohibits letting without an order of allotment. It puts prohibition on letting saying that no person shall be let any building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under Section 16 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act imposes a restriction on occupation of a building without an order of allotment or release. These provisions same to be interpreted by a Full Bench of this court in Nutan Kumar v. Additional District Judge Banda . 1993 22 ALR 437 SC. with a view to quell the earlior conflicting decisions on the point. Placing reliance upon the Full Bench decision in Nutan Kumar's case (supra), it was held in Lal Chand v. District Judge Faizabad . 1994 23 ALR 306 L.B. that an agreement of lease between the landlord and tenant for letting and occupation of a building in contravention of the provisions of the Act is void. Section 11 of the Act imposes a prohibition or restriction against letting out an accommodation without an allotment order while Section 13 of the Act provides and places restriction on occupation of the building without allotment order. A combined reading of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act makes it clear that they impose prohibition on letting out without order of allotment and occupation without any such order. A Division Bench of this court was quite emphatic in Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. Allahabad v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad . 1982 1 A.R.C 585., when it observed that a possession of a person who has come in possession without an order of allotment in contravention of the provisions of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act is unauthorized and cannot be recognised in the eye of law and if it cannot be recognised in the eye of law, there would be a vacancy. It was further clarified that it would entitle the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to pass an order under Section 16 of the Act. This decision has been affirmed by the Full Bench in Nootan Kumar's case (supra). An agreement offending a statute or a public policy forbidden by law is ordinarily void and invalid from nativity. The main object of the legislature in imposing certain restrictions on private letting i.e, to put all such buildings which are vacant or about to fall vacant at the disposal of the District Magistrate for being allotted to the needy persons in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III. Having prohibited private letting of any building, the legislature has imposed a ban on the occupation of such building either on behalf of the tenant or the landlord vacating the same otherwise than in pursuance of an order of allotment or release under Section 16. Any person so purporting to occupy a vacant building shall be deemed to be an unauthorized occupant of the building or the part thereof, as the case may be, apart from being liable for punishment under Section 31 of the Act. Such a ban on occupation of a vacant building without an order of allotment or release was imperative in order to completely check private letting thereof by the outgoing tenant or the landlord.

14. An analysis of the legal position makes it clear that the legislature has attempted to use all possible safety valves so that unscrupulous landlords cannot defeat the purpose of the Act by resorting to private letting or by circumventing the exemption clauses.

15. Now it is the time to consider the stark facts of the present case. The landlord-petitioner No. 1 has obtained an order of release in the year 1986 on the basis of a compromise in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) or the Act. He admittedly parted with the possession of the released accommodation in favour of Dilip Kumar Srivastava, real brother of his wife. He not being a member of the family of the landlord, continued to occupy the same for a long period of 7-1/2 years. The act of the landlord in inducting Dilip Kumar Srivastava as a tenant in the released accommodation was nothing but a blatant violation of the release order. Obviously, a ‘deemed vacancy’ has arisen under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act right in the month of June, 1989 when Dilip Kumar Srivastava was inducted abusing the release order. After the vacation of the accommodation by Dilip Kumar Srivastava, the avaricious and unscrupulous instincts impelled the landlord-petitioner No. 1 to induct Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu obviously without the intimation of vacancy or an order of allotment at a monthly rent of Rs. 2050 which was designedly put in the agreement with a view to reach over the exemption clause contained in Section 2(1)(g) of the Act. In the Municipal records, the annual rental value of the tenanted accommodation is not more than Rs. 1200. Even Dilip Kumar Srivastava, who was in occupation of the accommodation prior to Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu was paying 125/- per month. The only perceptible reason which prompted the landlord and the occupant to enter into the agreement fixing the rent at Rs. 2050 per month appears to be that they not only wanted to throttle the provisions of the Act but intended to render the allotment applications infructuous. This observation is fortified by the fact that the agreement fixing the rent at Rs. 2050/- came into being after an application for allotment had been moved.

16. There is yet another aspect of the matter. At the precise moment when the agreement was entered into between the petitioners, the provisions of the Act were undoubtedly applicable. A private agreement for letting was forbidden by law in view of the prohibition against letting and occupation contained in Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. The agreement, therefore, was void ab-initio and it could not be saved from the sweep of the aforesaid provisions by merely putting the monthly rent at Rs. 2050/- with an oblique motive.

17. One cannot loose sight of the fact that a quixotic situation is to arise if the same double storied building is treated differently in the matter of applicability of the Act. Undoubtedly, the ground floor portion of the building is under the sweep of the Act while according to the landlord, the upper portion of said building would stand excluded from the operation of the Act on account of its rental value being more than rupees two thousand per month. If the contention of the landlord is accepted, in that event, though the Act would be applicable to the ground floor accommodation, the first floor accommodation would stand exempted from its operation. This situation cannot be brought about on account of the machinations and the deliberate designs on the part of the landlord.

18. Both on factual and legal matrix, there can be no doubt about the fact that the vacancy of the upper portion of the building came into being for two reasons firstly that the petitioner No. 1 misused the release order by inducting a person who was not his family member and secondly, after the accommodation had been vacated by his brother-in-law, he had let out the same in favour of the petitioner No. 2—Sanjeev Kumar Agarwal alias Neelu without any intimation of vacancy or order of allotment. If a vacancy had occurred and has been declared by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in accordance with law, the logical consequence culminating in the allotment of the accommodation is bound to follow. The order of declaration of vacancy made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot be defeated or frustrated on account of motivated agreement which is void ab-initio indicating the rate of rent as Rs. 2050 per month. As said above, it has been done by the petitioner No. 1—the landlord in an unscrupulous manner. Undoubtedly, the attempt of the landlord is nothing but a fraud on the statute. The agreement set up by the landlord for the reasons discussed above has to be ignored and a categorical finding is recorded that the provisions of the Act apply to the accommodation in question in respect of which the impugned order of vacancy has been passed.

19. In the result, the writ petition turns out to be devoid of any merit or substance and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

Petition Dismissed.