Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 32 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 302, of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 161, Cr.P.C
  • Section 162, Cr.P.C
  • Section 302, I.P.C
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 32 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 302, of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 161, Cr.P.C
  • Section 162, Cr.P.C
  • Section 302, I.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.M. Patnaik, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a woman detained in jail, challenged her conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life. The prosecution's case, as narrated in the trial court, was that on the night of 7-10-1989 the deceased, Ganduri (the second wife of Bandhanu), was sleeping in her house when the appellant poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire with the help of a burning dibiri, resulting in burns over approximately 75% of the body. A report was lodged and the injured was examined at the Hatibari Public Health Centre where a dying declaration (Ext. 12) was recorded; she was then referred to Rourkela General Hospital, treated as an indoor patient, developed complications and died about 35 days after the incident.

The appellant denied the charge. The present opinion arises from the appellant's criminal appeal against the conviction and sentence; the appeal was ultimately allowed and the appellant acquitted of the charge under Section 302, IPC, and ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dying declaration (Ext. 12) recorded by the doctor alone could sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302, IPC, given alleged infirmities in its recording.
  2. Whether the absence of the deceased's signature or thumb impression on the dying declaration required that the declaration be discarded, in light of cited decisions.
  3. Whether medical evidence and other testimonial material provided satisfactory proof that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death (i.e., whether causation and homicidal nature were established).
  4. Whether earlier statements made to the police (recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C.) which were in the case diary but not proved by the prosecution, affected the reliability of the prosecution case and the dying declaration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. A.C. Mohanty)

  • There was no satisfactory evidence against the appellant and it was erroneous to convict solely on the basis of the dying declaration (Ext. 12).
  • The dying declaration suffered from various infirmities, including the absence of the deceased's signature or thumb impression; relying on authorities (State of U.P v. Shishupal Singh and Maniram v. State of Madhya Pradesh), such unsigned dying declarations should be discarded.
  • The manner in which Ext. 12 was recorded was criticized; the doctor could have obtained attestation by the investigating officer, medical staff or relatives despite the inability to take L.T.I. or R.T.I.

Respondent / State's Position (Mr. G.K. Mohanty)

  • The learned Additional Standing Counsel supported the conviction and judgment of the trial court. No further specific arguments of the State are detailed in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of U.P v. Shishupal Singh, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 60 : AIR 1994 SC 129 (1994 Cri LJ 617) Cited by appellant for the proposition that in the absence of any signature or thumb impression of the deceased on a dying declaration, the declaration must be discarded. The Court examined this authority and distinguished it on facts: in that decision there was no explanation for absence of L.T.I.; in the present case the doctor offered an explanation (extensive burns) for not taking L.T.I./R.T.I., and the Court found nothing to discard that explanation as false or incorrect.
Maniram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 539 : AIR 1994 SC 840 (1994 Cri LJ 946) Cited by appellant to support the contention that a dying declaration without signature/thumb impression may be discarded. The Court noted that in Maniram an explanation was offered that it was not thought necessary to take the signature. The Court treated that distinction as relevant and accepted the doctor's explicit explanation in the present case for not taking L.T.I./R.T.I.
Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1970) 2 SCC 113 : AIR 1970 SC 1566 (1970 Cri LJ 1415) Cited in context of admissibility: the opinion references the legal context that statements recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. and their admissibility under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and exceptions under Section 162, Cr.P.C. The Court relied on this authority to observe that a prior statement in the case diary (recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C.) could have been proved by the prosecution and was admissible; failure to prove that earlier statement raised doubt on the correct nature of the dying declaration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the evidence in a step-by-step manner and identified multiple reasons for doubt about sustaining a murder conviction solely on Ext. 12:

  1. Medical evidence: P.W.13 (post-mortem doctor) stated in cross-examination that no definite opinion could be given that the injuries, as observed, would cause death in a normal person. P.W.14 (doctor who treated the deceased at Rourkela General Hospital) stated that if infection had not set in, there was a good chance of recovery. The court held that, on these medical opinions, it was difficult to conclude that the injuries were by themselves sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; no doctor gave a positive opinion that the injuries were likely to cause death.
  2. Witness testimony and inconsistencies: P.W.6, who first reached the spot, testified that after extinguishing the fire the deceased went towards her house and he left and slept; he did not support the existence of any dying declaration implicating the appellant and had resiled from an earlier police statement. P.W.1 claimed the deceased said the appellant set her on fire, but other persons allegedly present (e.g., P.W.3) did not corroborate. The court found the solitary account of P.W.1 difficult to accept without corroboration.
  3. Dying declaration (Ext. 12): The declaration was recorded by P.W.15 at the Hatibari Public Health Centre on 8-10-1989 at 2:30 p.m. The doctor recorded the deceased's statement in Oriya (deceased spoke Sadri) and explained that he could not take L.T.I. or R.T.I. because of extensive burns on the palms and fingers. The doctor's explanation for absence of signature/thumb impression was accepted by the court as not false or incorrect.
  4. Procedural/informational infirmities: The court noted a material procedural gap — an earlier statement of the deceased recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. was present in the case diary but was not proved by the prosecution at trial, even though it could be admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and exceptions reflected in Section 162, Cr.P.C. The prosecution's failure to prove that earlier written statement cast grave doubt on the correct nature of the dying declaration; the earlier statement also differed in a material detail (police statement mentioned a matchstick, whereas Ext. 12 mentioned a burning dibiri).
  5. Attestation and corroboration: Although the doctor explained inability to take limb impressions, the court observed that the doctor could still have had the statement attested by the investigating officer (who accompanied the injured), other medical staff, or relatives. The absence of any attestation was treated as a real infirmity.
  6. Overall assessment of reliability: The court held that a dying declaration may serve as the sole basis for conviction only if it is true, correct and not made under doubtful circumstances. Given the infirmities in Ext. 12 (procedural failings, inconsistencies with other statements, lack of attestation, inconclusive medical opinion, and lack of corroboration), Ext. 12 was not sufficiently clinching to sustain a conviction on its own.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE JAIL CRIMINAL APPEAL SUCCEEDS; THE APPELLANT IS ACQUITTED OF THE CHARGE UNDER SECTION 302, I.P.C. AND IS TO BE SET AT LIBERTY FORTHWITH.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence of the decision is that the appellant's conviction and life sentence under Section 302, IPC were set aside and the appellant was ordered to be released immediately.
  • The court did not treat the matter as establishing any new legal principle; rather, it applied established principles on dying declarations, corroboration and admissibility, and found on the facts that the prosecution had not discharged its burden. The opinion identifies procedural and evidentiary failings specific to this case (non-proving of prior statement, inconsistencies, absence of attestation, inconclusive medical evidence) that led to acquittal.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the material and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add any information beyond that text.

    Niru Nanhar Beck v. State Of Orissa .

    D.M Patnaik, J.:— The appellant, a lady from jail, assails her conviction under Section 302, of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of imprisonment for life.

    2. Prosecution case is, on 7-10-1989 sometime in the midnight. Ganduri (herein after referred as ‘the deceased) the second wife of Bandhanu was sleeping in the house. The appellant put kerosene on her body and set fire with the helpof one bibiri as a result of which 75% of the body was burnt. On a report having been lodged. The case was registered and she was examined by the Doctor at the Hatibari Fublic Health Centre where her dying declaration was recorded and subsequently. The injuries being serious in nature, she was referred to the Rourkala Generai Hospital where she was treated as an indoor patient but ultimately died about 35 days thereafter on developing titanous. The appallent denied her indictment.

    3. Mr. A.C Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that, in the absence of any satisfactory evidence against the appellant it was an error on the part of the learned Additional Sessions Judge in recording the conviction only on the basis of the dying declaration recorded by the Doctor which itself suffered from various infirmities.

    4. Mr. G.K Mohanty, learned Additional Standing Counsel on the other hand, supported the judgment of conviction.

    5. P.W 13 is the Doctor who conducted the post mortem examination over the dead body of Gandhuri, the deceased. In cross-examination he stated that no definite opinion could be given as to whether death could be caused in case of these injuries on the body of a normal person. Needless to say, the lady died on 12-11-1989, that is, 35 days after the occurrence.

    6. P.W 14 is the Doctor admitted the deceased in the Rourkela General Hospital on 8-10-1989 after she was referred from the Matibari Public Health Centre. In the cross-examination, the Doctor stated that, had the infection not set in, there was good chance of the patient's recovering.

    7. With these opinions of the two Doctors, it is difficult to hold that the injuries, if at all caused by the appellants, could be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is also no opinion of any of the Doctors as to whether the injuries were, in fact, likely to cause death. In the absence of any positive opinion, we entartain a doubt as to the homicidal nature of death of the deceased.

    8. P.W 6 is the witness who reached the spot first on the night of occurrence. He stated that his mother was ailing and so he was aware. He heard the shouting of Gandhuri for help. He rushed to her house and found her on fire which he extinguished. He found bum injuries all over her body. Thereafter Gandhuri went towards her house and he left for his house and slept. In the morning he informed the Grams Rakhi. He did not speak of any declaration given by Gandhuri implicating the appellant. He resiled from his earlier statement before the police that on his asking Gandhuri gave out that the appellant set fire on her body.

    9. Thus there is no substantive evidence so far as this witness is concerned with regard to any dying declarations.

    10. P.W 1 is the informant who stated that, in the morning on 8-10-1989 being informed by P.W 6 he went to the house of Gandhuri and found her lying on the Verandha with burn injuries on her person. On inquiry she informed that the appellant set fire in the previous night.

    11. This witness admitted that before his arrival several others including P.W 3 were present there, but P.W 3 is si lent about any such declaration by the deceased. Therefore, it is difficult for us to believe the sole evidence of P.W 1 in the absence of any corroboration from the witnesses, who admittedly according to P.W 1 were already present before he arrived at the spot.

    12. Now the only point for consideration is the dying declaration (Ext. 12) recorded by the Doctor, P.W 15.

    13. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant, was critical about the manner in which the dying declaration was recorded It was submitted that as has been laid down in by the apex Court in the case of State Of U.P v. Shishupal Singh., 1992 Supp (3) SCC 60 : AIR 1994 SC 129 : (1994 Cri LJ 617) and Maniram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 539 : AIR 1994 SC 840 : (1994 Cri LJ 946) in the absence of any signature or thumb impression of the deceased giving such statement on the dying declaration, the same has to be discarded.

    14. P.W 15 was the Medical Officer at Hatibari Public Health Centre who received the injured on 8-10-1989 and recorded the dying declaration (Ext. 12) at 2.30 p.m on that day. He stated in his evidence that the deceased gave her statement in Sadri language and he noted her statement in vervatim in Oriya script. He further stated that because of the extensive bums on her paln and fingers he could not take her L.T.I or the R.T.I on the statement. She gave put the statement which was to the effect that, while the deceased was sleeping in the night in her house, she felt something like water being poured on her body and when she got up, there was smelling of kerosene and found the appellant standing nearby who set fire on her hair first with a burning Dibiri and that her entire body was burnt and she shouted for help.

    15. On going through Ext. 12 we found the above statement to have been recorded by the Doctor, P.W 15. The submission of Mr. Mohanty that in the absence of signature of L.R.I of the deceased on Ext. 12, the dying declaration should be discarded does not find favour with us since in one of the decisions in the case of State of U.P (supra) there was no explantion whatsoever as to the absence of the L.T.I of the deceased and, in the other, in the case of Maniram (supra) the explanation was offered that it was not thought necessary to take the signature of the deceased on the dying declaration. In the present case the Doctor has categorically given an explanation that because of the extensive burn injuries he could not take L.T.I or R.T.I of the deceased. There is nothing to discard such explanation as either false or incorrect. However, we agree with the contention of Mr. Mohanty that conviction should not have been based only on the basis of Ext. 12, reason being as follows:—

    The I.O (P.W 12) stated in his examination in chief that when he visited the spot, Gandhuri was lying on the verandah of the house with severe burn injuries all over her body. The case diary shows that he recorded her statement. That statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C obviously gives out the cause of her death. Surprisingly, prosecution did not prove that statement althought there was no bar for proving such statement being admissible under Section 32, of the Evidence Act. Prohibition of admissibility of such a statement is excepted as provided under Section 162, Cr.P.C (also see the decision reported in (1970) 2 SCC 113 : AIR 1970 SC 1566 : (1970 Cri LJ 1415) Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab).

    16. It is not known as to why the prosecution did not prove this statement although it is in the record. This might be either because of ignorance of the provision which were are slow to accept or it may be to avoid the inconsistent case of the prosecution being spoken to by the deceased that the appellant set fire to her body by a matchstick whereas, Ext. 12 indicates that the appellant set fire with the help of a burning Dibiri. In any view of the matter, nonproving of the earlier written dying declaration prior to the dying declaration under Ext. 12 casts a grave doubt as to the correct nature of the dying declaration.

    17. The I.O stated that he accompanied the injured to the hospital and gave a requisition to the Doctor to record the dying declaration. The Doctor explains that because of the extensive burn injuries on the body including the two hands, he could not take either the L.T.I or the R.T.I of the deceased. But there was nothing which prevented the Doctor to get this statement attested either by the I.O who was present, or by any of the medical staff or in the worst case by the relations of the deceased. This is admittedly an infirmity in the dying declaration as correctly submitted by Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant.

    18. Law on the question of dying declaration is well settled that a dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration if the same is true and correct version of a dying man and is not stated to have been made under any doubtful circumstances. It is like any other prosecution evidence and subject to scrutiny. Corrobration is not sought for because it is a weak piece of evidence, but corroboration is sought for because it suffers from certain infirmity.

    19. As discussed above, we find certain infirmity in the dying declaration under Ext. 12. Therefore, corroboration is necessary in such case. But there is surprisingly no corroborative evidence in support of Ext. 12. Firstly, none has stated that the deceased and the appellant were sleeping in the night together. The statement of the deceased before the police was that a matchstick was used whereas, Ext. 12 shows that a Dibiri was used. Secondly P.W 6 stated that after he extinguished the fire, the deceased walked to her house. It is not known as to how, when almost 75% of the body was affected, the lady was able to walk. Thirdly Doctors as already discussed above did not opine whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. P.W 13, the Doctor admitted in his cross-examination that the injuries could have been also possible in case of salf immolation. Fourthly, the deceased had given such a statement in presence of many other witnesses but, none of them supported the prosecution case. The deceased survived for 35 days but during this period she did not give any further statement confirming Ext. 12.

    20. In such doubtful circumstances, particularly in view of the evidence of the husband of the deceased (P.W 1) that both the wives were not pulling on wall, it would not be proper to sustain the conviction only on the basis of Ext. 12 which evidence we do not find to be clinching. In the result, the jail criminal appeal succeeds and the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302, I.P.C he be set at liberty forthwith.

    21. Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Niru Nanhar Beck v. State Of Orissa .
    (Jan 31, 1995)